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2ABSTRACT
Discussion here is generally inclusive of perspective relating 
to the processes of national political integration in 1949-1954. 
Firstly, "political integration" is defined in terms of the creation 
of a new state super-structure, hence there is a review of the 
problems of integration in terms of the relation between levels of 
administration and between systems of organization such as the 
economic and financial departments of state administration. One must 
also consider the nature of the relation between general systems of 
army, Party and state. "Political integration" is secondly viewed in 
larger terms of the relation of the mass line to government. The 
pattern of national political integration is discussed generally in 
terms of the transposition of Yenan strategies of leadership and 
organization to the plane of national political development in the 
early 1950's. The pre-1949 "pattern" had been characterized by the 
inter-relation of armed struggle with various political and economic 
programmes, and it is important to note that the CCP came to power in 
1949, already knowing how to govern.
The various perspectives outlined above are very general, and 
the lines of this inquiry are more closely defined for purposes of 
research. Discussion is structured in terms of a focus on a particular 
level of administration, namely, the Greater Administrative Region.
The pattern of centralization, affected by this level, in fact reveals 
the transposition of earlier experience to the plane of national 
political development. The role of this level of government is 
discussed in terms of several specific problem areas; for example, 
there is lengthy discussion of specific problems, relating to the 
creation of a national economy, but there is also discussion of the
application of mass line techniques to government in terms of the 
role of supraprovincial government in the development of the mass 
campaigns of 1950-52.
Many of the policies and strategies discussed are still very 
much relev’ant to present-day problems of organization, and it is 
hoped that a discussion of the pattern of national political 
integration in the early 1950fs will further an understanding of 
organization in China today.
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9INTRODUCTION
In a great historic moment, Mao Tse-tung on October 1st 
1949, stood on the rostrum in Tien-An Men Square, and speaking 
into the microphone formally announced the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China. A few flag was raised over a ’'new” 
China, and no doubt Mao reflected on more than two decades ■ of 
bitter struggle and hard fighting. But fundamental questions as 
to national political integration had yet to be resolved, and a 
military victory over the KMT, while obviously a prerequisite to 
the process of national political integration, was only a beginning.
As of October 1949, there was a vast "newly liberated" country­
side in Southwest, Northwest, Central-South and East China, which 
had yet to be won politically. Throughout large parts of the 
country, there was no basic-level Party organization, and new state 
administrative structures had yet to be established. In many 
regions there was serious social disorder. Endemic banditry 
persisted. The problems of warlordism did not disappear overnight 
with the simple announcement of a people’s regime. The new central 
government structure was weak and provincial administration was in 
a shambles. In some cases provincial units had yet to be reinteg­
rated.
Furthermore, the new central government had yet to create a 
national economy. A national budgetary framework had not been 
established and the centre had yet to impose fiscal discipline at 
the local levels. "Old liberated areas" were subsidizing "newly 
liberated areas". Various currencies had yet to be unified. The 
new people's government was struggling in the midst of an economic 
and fiscal crisis of alarming proportions. Inflation was rampant; 
the budget was unbalanced; and a mammoth personnel establishment of 
over nine million had to be supplied.
It was only in September 1948 that the CCP leadership began 
to articulate a national perspective on the process of political 
integration, as the PLA swiftly moved from interior to exterior
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lines of military conflict. Under the new conditions of 
positional warfare, there was a reassessment of strategic 
priorities. The CCP had always made the necessary theoretical 
genuflection towards working class leadership. The importance of 
national economic reconstruction had been stressed by both the CCP 
and the KMT. These aspects had always assumed a certain ideological 
significance, but previously CCP strategy had dictated a short­
term perspective on urban China. Previously, the strategic emphasis 
was on the consolidation of the hinterland so as to starve enemy- 
held cities of food, raw materials, etc., but there was in 1948 a 
growing emphasis on the government of cities and in particular'the 
careful husbanding of precious industry. And the Party had also to 
consider the future establishment of "orderly administration" in the 
base areas south of the Yangtze.. ^
At the March 5th 1949, meeting of the Seventh Central Committee 
of the CCP, the shift in the centre of gravity of Party work was 
confirmed. It was then decided to occupy cities first and then 
penetrate the countryside. Mao could not have been more explicit 
in his stress on the importance of production in the cities, and in 
the following comment he asserted that such production was crucial 
to the maintenance of the CCP's power:
"If we know nothing about production and do not master 
it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop production 
as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so 
that the livelihood of the workers, first of all, and 
that of the people in general is improved, we shall be 
unable to maintain our political power, we shall be 
unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail."^
1. In September 1948, Mao talked of the training of 30,000 to 40,000
cadres for posting in territories liberated in the fourth year of
the war. Mao Tse-tung, "On the September Meeting —  Circular of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", October 10th 
1948 , SW, Vol.IV, p.274. In February 1949, Mao noted that 53,000 
cadres had been trained. "Turn the A m y  into a Working Force",
February 8th 1949, SW, Vol.IV, p.338.
2. Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Seesion of the Seventh
Central Committee of the Communist Party of China", March 5th 1949,
SW, Vol.IV, p.365.
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In 1949, there was an obvious problem. The CCP did not have 
adequate leadership facilities south of the Yangtze. In a telegram 
to the Second and Third Field Armies, Mao emphasized the army as 
a "working force" and established the following policy in order 
to deal with the initial problems of occupation in the "newly 
liberated areas":
"The occupation of eight or nine provinces and scores 
of big cities will require a high number of working cadres, 
and to solve this problem the army must rely chiefly on 
itself. The army is a school. Our field armies of 2,100,000 
are equivalent to several thousand universities and 
secondary schools."3
Given the well-established tendency throughout the history of 
CCP organization to maximize the close inter-relation of the 
general systems of Party, army and state, this reliance on the army 
cannot be simply viewed in terms of martial law. This point is in 
fact fundamental to the characterization of Greater Administrative 
Region government under the Military and Administrative Committees. 
Despite the word, "military", these committees were part of the 
state structure, and the relevant organic regulations of 1949 
charged these committees with three specific tasks, namely, the 
completion of military operations (and it might be noted here that 
mopping-up operations and the localization of PLA divisions was 
related to the first stage of agrarian reform, which among other 
things involved the establishment of social order and the 
elimination of banditry), the completion of social revoltition, in 
particular agrarian reform and the creation of peopleTs democratic 
state power.
The CCP was not without experience of government, and the 
pattern of political integration had in fact already been 
established in the soviets of the late Kiangsi period, and was 
further developed in the border regions of North China in the Yenan
3„ Mao Tse-tung, "Turn the Army into a Working Force", SW, Vol.IV, 
p.338.
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period. Generally the history of the pattern was characterized 
by the inter-relation of a struggle with social revolution, the 
building of people*s democratic state power, economic recon­
struction, etc. In 1939 and again in 1945, Mao rejected Sun Yat- 
sen's three stag© of political development from military rule 
through tutelage to democracy. His discussion of war in the 
countryside thus reflected a very broad definition of "political 
integration". War, as an extension of politics, was in Mao*s 
mind inter-related with considerations of social revolution, 
democracy and economic reconstruction for the well-being of the 
masses. Hence democracy could be pursued while fighting. 
Similarly, democracy could be inter-related with agrarian reform 
under the second united front. Mao pronounced on this point in 
a speech to cadres, attending a conference in the Shansi-Suiyuan 
Liberated Area:
"At one time we thought of setting up people*s 
representative conferences in rural districts only 
after the land reform had been completed in the main.
Now that your own experience and that of other 
Liberated Areas have proved that it is possible and 
necessary to set up these people*s representative 
conferences and their elected government councils at 
the district and village levels in the midst of the 
Struggle for the land reform, that is the way you should 
continue to do it."4
What is of particular interest in the context of this study is 
the philosophy of administration, which was articulated in the 
course of the establishing this pattern of inter-relations and 
its relevance to the structure and functioning of regional and 
national institutions in the early 1950's.
In answering the question as to how this pattern of inter­
relations was achieved, one cannot affort to neglect the 
traditional concerns of political science as a study of government
4. Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at a Conference of Cadres in the Shansi- 
Suiyuan Liberated Area” , April 1st 1948, SW, Vol. IV, p.230.
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institutions. "National political integration" is therefore 
discussed in the first instance in sharply circumscribed terms 
relating to institution-building and the art of communications 
in government. One begins with questions such as how is 
information gathered? How is a centralized uniformity in policy 
implementation to be achieved? How will the "centre" understand 
the localities, and the localities the "centre"? The successful 
erection after 1949 of a truly nationwide government structure, 
strong enough to contain the centrifugal tendencies which had 
played havoc within the Chinese political system, since the 
collapse of the Ching imperium, was a feat perhaps even more 
impressive than the stunning PLA victories of 1948-49.
The following discussion is initially structured in relation 
to a definition of "political integration" as institution-building 
and the art of communication; however, it is readily appreciated 
that the art of communications in government relates to methods of 
leadership and inter-reaction of cadres with the masses. One must, 
therefore, take into consideration the larger connotations of 
"political integration" and thus sally forth into areas, perhaps 
more familiar to the student of "modern" revolution. "Political 
integration" also connotes mass mobilization and the assimilation of 
ideological belief. Indeed, the CCPrs own definition of "political 
integration" primarily relates to these aspects. The legitimacy of 
the new regime was not to be based on war-weariness, or the passive 
acquiescence explicit in ideas such as anything is better than the 
KMT. Genuine ideological commitment on the part of the overwhelming 
majority of people in the various parts of the country was deemed 
necessary to the integrity of the revolution, and the creation of 
a new nation-state was seen to involve mass mobilization as well 
as the breaking down of a complex of traditional social values.
In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Chinese 
intellectual continuum was broken by a Promethean impulse. In 
the context of competing nation-states, a teleological concept of 
linear progress took root in the Middle Kingdom. While on a 
philosophical plane, Mao may have on occasion talked of contra­
dictions j,forever, thus implying an open-ended time scale (which
14
is perhaps more consistent with a Taoist scheme of the universe
than the Judaic-Christian concept of time, implicit in Marxism-
Leninism), there was, nonetheless, manifest at the popular level
a preoccupation with industrialized utopia.
In this dynamic intellectual climate, it was Li Ta-chao’s
nationalism which prevailed over the "Asiatic mode of production".
Feudalism was discovered in China. The emphasis on youth, the
belief in revolution and the tendency towards voluntarism weighed
against any historical determinism which might have denied China’s
position in the mainstream of world history. The seeds of
liberalism did not germinate. In such times of international
aggression and the disintegration of the Chinese policy, Hu Shih’s
pragmatism was anachronistic, and Yen Fu discussed "individualism",
not in terms of the state*s guarantee of civil freedom, but in
terms of the collective unleashing of individual energies for the
5
purpose of creating a new China. The thane o f ’Wealth and power" 
had tremendous significance in terms of the nature of the inter­
relation of Chinese polity and society. Mao later saw in China’s 
vast population and in China’s "blankness" the way to utopia. It 
was a question of mobilizing China’s masses.
Early in his career Mao experienced the strength of social 
linkages in the countryside of southern China. He then wondered 
how the Party was going to break down the peasant impulse towards 
localism and particularism. The following observation is 
illustrative of his dilemma:
"In the party organizations in the villages, it often 
happens that a branch meeting virtually becomes a clan 
meeting, since branches consist of members bearing the same 
family name and living close together. In these circum­
stances it is very hard indeed to build a "militant 
Bolshevik Party". Such members do not quite understand when 
they are told that the Communist draw no sharp line or 
demarcation between one nation and another or between one 
province and another, or that a sharp line should not be 
drawn between different counties and even between districts 
and townships.
5. See Benjamin Schwartz, In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and 
the West, passim.
6. Mao Tse-tung, "Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains", November 25th 
1928, SW, Vol.l, p.93.
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In 1928, Mao was confident that "White oppression" would break 
down this "localism", and he went on to develop the mass line0
It is obvious that "political integration" does involve 
mass mobilization, but the discussion of the mass line herein 
relates closely to our initial perspective on "political 
integration" as a process, involving institution-building and 
government communications. One cannot empirically demonstrate 
the level or intensity of ideological conviction of the masses in 
post-liberation China; however, one can to a certain extent 
determine the ability of the cadre within the specific spatial and 
temporal context of mass campaigns such as agrarian reform and 
the san-fan, or three-antis rectification to assimilate policy 
emphases and master the techniques of the mass line. And one can 
thus discuss the way in which the exercise of the mass- line 
strengthened organization in the early 1950’s.
The various concerns, briefly outlined, above are of course 
large subject areas and must be rigorously qualified for purposes 
of meaningful discussion and research. Thus "political integration" 
is here discussed with reference to the activity of one level of 
administration in particular. The bulk of the material discussed 
herein, originates with reports, directives, speeches and newspaper 
editorials relating to the administrative activities of Greater 
Administration Region governments of 1949-54. The documentation of
7
the Party and state organization at the GAR is under-researched.
In fact with the major exception of land reform little research has 
been carried out in relation to the history of national political 
integration in the early 1950*s. It is somewhat surprising as the
7. Dorothy Solinger has reviewed some of the documentation relating 
to the SWGAR. In this interesting study of political integration 
in Southwest China, Dorothy Solinger presents for discussion three 
types of strategy, for political integration, namely, "direct", "indirect"
and "mixed". These different strategies, which basically derive 
from existing theories of comparative politics, are related in 
particular to the role of regional government in the futherance 
of trade, the suppression of counter-revolutionaries and the 
political integration of national minorities. Dorothy J. Solinger 
Regional Government and Political Integration in Southwest China. 
1949-1954, passim.
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documentation of the early 1950*s is particularly rich in 
perspective as to the elaboration of policy emphases and the 
problems of policy implementation, ■which have generally 
characterized the Chinese political system since 1949. The 
policies for decentralization and local self-reliance for 1951, 
for example, compare closely with policies outlined in the Great 
Leap Forward.
Discussion in this dissertation, however, is related primarily 
to the administrative activities of the Greater Administrative 
Region governments. In terms of the CCP's basic programme for 
political integration, such as agrarian reform, the establishment 
of a democratic framework of representation under the second united 
front and national economic reconstruction, the different regions 
in China moved forward at different rates. The regional differences 
in the inter-relation of the various programmes for political 
integration necessitated the creation of supraprovincial governments 
in the several Greater Administrative Regions.
These structures were expressly designed to cut down distances 
between Peking and the provinces, and to provide for leadership 
byased on a dialectical relation of factors of flexibility and 
discipline. Flexibility was needed in order to adopt general policy 
principles to concrete local conditions, and implied the close co­
ordination of general systems, namely, the Party, the army and state, 
as well as the close horizontal relation of systems with similar 
functions; for example, the close inter-relation of different 
departments involved in the sale of native products and the 
interflow of urban-rural trade. But under conditions of 
"dispersionism" in which leadership facilities were scattered, it 
was necessary to insure discipline, and a vertical chain of command. 
There will be opportunity to discuss at length how these competing 
emphases were related in the structure and functioning of GAR 
governments. One might, however, note briefly that in 1949-50, the 
GAR governments played an important role in the unification of 
economic and financial work and were instrumental in establishing 
budgetary discipline at local levels. Whereas in the crucial year,
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1951, this level facilitated a decentralization of administrative 
responsibilities. This decentralization reflected a philosophy 
of region-centre relations, which had earlier been articulated 
in the border regions of North China. One might also note that 
the operational headquarters for agrarian reform and the various 
mass campaigns of 1951-52 were established at the GAR level.
It is necessary to stress the continuity of CCP principles 
of organization and reassess the significance accorded to the 
"Soviet model" with its emphases on a rigidly vertical command 
structure and a discrete division of labour between different 
systems. An historical review of the development of organization 
in the early 1950's reveals this continuity, and one cannot 
therefore describe a straight progress towards the "Soviet model". 
One might, alternatively, inquire as to the transposition of 
earlier CCP organization experience in the process of political 
integration at lower levels of administration to the plane of 
national administration in the early 1950*s. What was learned at 
lower levels was creatively applied at higher levels.
Thus in Chapter Two, the development of supraprovincial 
organization is placed in large historical relief. The 1949 
demarcation of the Greater Administrative Regions derived from 
the specific development of the Civil War; however, if one is 
to understand the structure and functioning of GAR administration, 
one must push back further into history, tracing the CCP's early 
attempts to solve problems of political disintegration. Of 
particular relevance are the underlying principles of the CCP*s 
philosophy of administration. Thus the principle of "unfied Party 
leadership" is reviewed in terms of the relation between Party, 
army and state systems and the CCP's concept of a division of 
labour. One might also consider the border region attempts to 
administer economic organization, and here the policy,
"centralized leadership and decentralized management", which later 
became the basis for the programme of decentralization in 1951 
under Chou En-lai's slogan, "centralized leadership and divided 
responsibilities", assumes special significance.
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Chapter Three has been divided into three sections in order 
to deal with three important aspects of GAR administration.
Firstly, there is an attempt to review the rationality which 
sustained the novel demarcation of China into several Greater 
Administrative Regions. This demarcation was particularly 
relevant to later development of economic organization on the 
basis of the principle of self-reliance during the Great Leap 
Forward. Secondly, the constitutional significance of the GAR 
level is described in terms of the relation between organization 
in the early 1950*s and the various emphases of the Yenan 
philosophy of administration. And thirdly, the GAR governments 
are discussed in terms of elite conflict and the naturec of 
"regionalism'1. It is argued throughout this dissertation that 
the GARs generally performed invaluable service in furthering the 
process of national political integration. More specifically, 
it is argued that the "federalization" of the central executive 
in the early 1950fs was an established pattern of personnel 
circulation and that one cannot rigidly distinguish a central elite 
from a GAR "regional elite". The Kao Kang Affair is thus discussed 
in terms of its significance as an instance of "regionalism" at 
the GAR level.
In the fourth chapter, discussion focuses more narrowly on 
selected problems in order to determine how closely administrative 
theory related to administrative practice, thus three important 
problem areas, namely, the unification of economic and financial 
work, the restoration and development of urban-rural trade inter­
flow and the early attempt to plan economic construction, are 
discussed in terms of the role played by the GARs in the process of 
national political integration, defined in terms of institution- 
building and the art of government communications.
In the fifth chapter, there is an attempt to come to terms 
with the wider implications of "political integration". The effect 
of mass mobilization and its relation to political integration is 
discussed in terms of the C C P ’s ability to assert leadership and 
to raise the policy level and political consciousness of its cadres 
in the activation of the mass^ line.
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"National political integration” is, of course, an on-going 
concern, and not, therefore, to be confined to the limited time- 
scale of the early 1950*s. Mao, on March 5th 1949, noted that 
country-wide victory was only one step "in a long march of ten 
thousand li” . By late 1954, the CCP may not have marched another 
ten thousand li, but the CCP did march forward in terms of some of 
the problems discussed at the beginning of this introduction. The 
social and political conditions, which characterized warlordism, 
were basically overcome, and the new leadership built firm 
foundations for national government. The problems of regionalism 
and localism did not disappear, but they became less significant 
in terms of the life of the political system. The unification of 
national economic and financial work effectively militated against 
the re-emergence of regional forces capable of endangering the 
life of the new nation-state. During the course of mass 
mobilization in this period, greater control was asserted over 
various sectors of society, and the Party began to consolidate 
basic-level organization, while relatively effective "rectification" 
militated against "counter-revolution" and organizational decadence.
On March 5th 1949, Mao had mused that after several decades 
the people*s democratic revolution would appear as "a brief
g
prologue to a long drama". The "prologue" may have been brief 
(and in 1949 nobody knew just how brief), but the pattern, policies 
and techniques of national political integration were, nonetheless, 
set forth with great effect.
8. Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the 
Seventh Central Committee....", March 5th 1949, SW, Vol.IV, 
p.374. Mao in his report stressed the importance of private 
industry and noted that "for a fairly long period after the 
victory of the revolution" it would be necessary "to make use 
of the positive qualities of urban and rural private capitalism 
as far as possible", (p.367).
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II
FROM BORDER REGION TO NATION-STATE 
i) The Politics of Disintegration
In this chapter, we can pursue a comparison of KMT and CCP 
performance in relation to the forces of political disintegration 
at work within the Chinese political system. Essential to this 
comparison is an appreciation of the inter-relation of "armed 
struggle" and factors of "political integration" such as mass 
mobilization in social revolution, the building of a representative 
framework within united front and attempts to further economic 
reconstruction. In the second section, discussion specifically 
relates to a philosophy of administration and communications, which 
emerged in the context of the CCP’s attempt to cope with the 
conditions of dispersion and disintegration, which characterized 
the North China border regions in the early 1940 s. It is perhaps 
paradoxical that such a philosophy, which was specifically 
articulated to meet such conditions, should have later provided the 
basis for an approach to national political integration. In the 
third section, discussion moves forward to treat the development of 
supra-provincial organization as it relates to the pattern of 
political integration during the Civil War.
At any given time in the life of a political system factors 
of disintegration and integration compete simultaneously, hence the 
historians dating of the precise moment in history when the 
imperial system under the Ching began to disintegrate is 
problematical. Undoubtedly, those historians, preoccupied with 
the dynastic cycle, would prefer to begin with the White Lotus 
Rebellion, while those interested in China*s "response to the West" 
would move the date forward to the First Opium War, or possibly 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. It is thus with a certain degree 
of arbitrariness that this review of the forces of disintegration 
begins with the death of Yuan Shih-kai.
Obviously the progressive militarization of Chinese society 
began long before Yuan Shih-kai met Li Hung-chang. The Hsiang and
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Anhwei Armies of gentry leaders, such as Tseng Kuo-fan and Li 
Hung-chang, were conglomerates of intra-provincial t'uan-lien.,
The Peiyang Army of Yuan Shih-kai with its academy-trained 
officer corps was to have been China*s defence against the 
incursions of the ’’West". But over the course of the 1911 
Revolution Yuan managed to steal the political initiative 
from the revolutionary forces in the south, and he also managed 
to purge from the Peiyang Army those young officers with 
revolutionary affiliations and impressive records of training at 
Japanese military academies. Thus the men who took over the 
central government in the twilight of the Ching were more likely 
to have been t*ung-nien (classmates) from Yuan's military
academies. Yuan is a symbolic figure for the historian, and he 
seems to represent a certain point in the developing militarization 
of Chinese polity and society.
In 1911 the Manchu imperium collapsed. The historical
sequence was rather neat in comparison with what came after. In
1911, province after province challenged the centre with declarations 
of independence. A similar sequence took place in the context of the 
anti-Yuan movement of 1915-16, only the parts did not neatly fall back 
into place to form a whole.
After Yuan's death in 1916, the pattern of disintegration (and 
here "disintegrationM is used in the limited sense of institutional 
breakdown, as opposed to social disintegration, or ideological 
despair) became more heady and more complex. From 1916 through 1949, 
the claims of a variety of self-proclaimed (and in some instances 
internationally recognized) "national" governments, notwithstanding, 
there were only regional governments in China. During the 1920's r 
various aspiring warlords competed for the capital and the financial 
benefits, which accrued from international recognition. The wording 
of successive constitutions successfully defied reality, as the 
warlords continued to play "musical chairs".
Despite the high-sounding rhetoric, the universal condemnation 
of warlordism and ideological commitment to national self-assertion, 
the Northern Expedition did not arrest the process of disintegration.
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There was a polarization of the ’’right” witliin the KMT in reaction 
to mass involvement in the Northern Expedition, and after the 
Shanghai massacre, the united front suffered a painfully protracted 
disintegration.
The later capture of Peiping was symbolic; it did not mean 
the creation of a new national state structure. The plan for 
national unification was jeopardized from the outset by an ill- 
advised policy of co-optation. Warlord troops were co-opted, but 
not assimilated into the National Revolutionary Army so that the 
command structure based on personal loyalty of troops to particular 
commanders remained unchanged. The Northern Expedition did not 
alter the underlying nature of warlord politics. Delay in the 
dismantling of the branch political councils of the KMT reflected 
the perpetuation of regional power blocs. In mid-January 1929, the 
victorious leaders of the Northern Expedition sat in conference and 
agreed to a plan for demobilization. In the context of the times, 
demobilization of troops spelled political suicide for the politician- 
generals, involved, and it is not surprising that the plan eventually 
precipitated war between the constituent warlord elements of the 
National Revolutionary Army.
Chiang Kai-shek emerged victorious in the sense that he had 
managed to defeat the Kwangsi Clique, Feng Yu-hsiang and Yen Hsi-shan, 
but he did not destroy the warlord system. James Sheridan in his 
recent study of ’’disintegration” in Republican China notes that what 
emerged from Chiang Kai-shekfs bloody victory was only "mutual 
tolerance” . Chiang could assume the posture of primus inter pares,
but he still did not have the resources to destroy each and every one
of the warlords, and a protracted conflict would undoubtedly have
led to the expansion of the CCP’s soviets. Mao saw in the multi­
polar nature of warlord conflict and in the ’’white regime’s”
1. James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration, p.!860
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tendency to "split" the basis for the survival of red political 
power in China. Chiang undoubtedly appreciated the logic, 
explicit in Mao*s perspective. Whether Chiang is to be considered 
as another warlord or as a "residual" warlord, and here we might 
note Jerome Ch*en*s argument that Chiang*s espousal of the three
3
principles of Sun Yat-sen saved him for the "residual" category, 
it is, nonetheless, the case that under Chiang the buying of 
hostile generals was common practice, and the command structure 
of the K M T ’s forces was highly personalized. The KMT, itself, 
remained a loose confederation of factions, the identification 
with the "nationalist" cause, being more nominal in some cases 
than in others.
Over the Nanking Decade, the authority of the "Nationalist"
Government was hamstrung by a lack of fiscal centralization.
Fiscal centralization was crucial if the KMT was to undermine the
basis of warlordism by reducing the warlords* capacity to supply
and payroll their independent units. The KMT standardized provincial
currency systems by 1935, but the standardization proved ineffective
4
at the local level. Agricultural taxes were conceded to the 
provinces. At times the provinces refused to turn over central
5
government revenues to the "central" government . Similarly, 
initiative in agrarian reform seems to have been lost to the 
provinces. The "Nationalist" government was not even able to 
control the appointment of hsien magistrates.^ There was a proliferation 
of conflicting administrative jurisdictions, which originated with the 
constant balancing of factions within the KMT. The warlord style of 
politics persisted within the KMT, as client relationships determined 
the functioning and structure of organization.
2. Mao Tse-tung makes the following statement in "Why is it that Red 
Political Power Can Exist in China?": "If we only realize that splits
and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall 
have no doubts about the emergence, survival and daily growth of Red 
political power". October 5th 1928, SW, Vol.l, p.65.
3. Jerome Ch*en, "Defining Warlords and Their Factions", Bulletin of the
School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol.31, No.3, 1968, pp.585-586.
4. James Sheridan, op.cit.. p.221.
5. James Sheridan, ibid.. p.204.
6. See Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China 1927-37, 
for a discussion of the problems in KMT government in the Nanking Decade.
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Chiang Kai-shek was perhaps strongest in relation to local
authority* which had to contend with CCP infiltration. Provincial
authorities, who were unable to stem the Communist ’'tide’* on their
own, had perforce to turn for funds and soldiers to the KMT and
the inevitable result was greater KMT control in the province under 
7
attack. James Sheridan has reviewed a pattern whereby KMT troops 
would be assigned to infiltrated provinces and when they were „ 
ordered to return, part of the KMT*s units would remain in the 
province while part of the old provincial units would be moved
g
with the KMTfs regular units.
An indication of the KMT1 s difficulties in asserting control 
over provincial administration is explicit in the KMT*g reorganization 
of supra-hsien administration. In 1932, the KMT attempted to 
establish the Administrative Inspectorate District (Special District
9
in Communist usage). Chiang Kai-shek used this level to circumvent
hostile provincial governments and to reduce administrative distance
between his military headquarters in Nanchang and the hsien in
10
nominal KMT provinces. Chiang hoped to maximize the revenue flow 
to the "centre" and minimize the powers of provincial governments.
The need to create some form of supra-hsien government was obvious, 
as military lines criss-crossed provincial demarcations, and related 
more closely to the disposition of natural barriers and
communications. The Japanese and the CCP used this same level of
. 1 1
administration.
In the 1940?s while the CCP was unifying and strengthening its 
organization through the application of principles such as democratic 
centralism and unified Party leadership and through "rectification", 
which not only checked the spread of liberalism under united front in 
the border regions, but also acted to reduce leadership conflict, the 
KMT continued to succumb to organizational decadence and internecine
7. Tien Hung-mao, Government and Politics- etc., op.cit.. p.113 and 
pp.149-150.
8. James Sheridan, op.cit., p.187
9o For discussion of this level of administration refer to Joseph Whitney, 
Chinat Area Administration and Nation-Building, p.84, and also Tien 
Hung-mao, p.107.
10. Contrary to Tien, Chien Tuan-sheng argues that the KMT did in fact 
achieve an impressive degree of centralization. See Chien*s article, 
"Wartime Local Government in China", Pacific Affairs. Vol.XVI, No.4, 
pp.441—460.
11. See Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power, pp.42-43.
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leadership conflict. The above depiction of the KMT as a 
confederation of competing factions applies almost equally well 
to the 1940*s as to the 1930*s. This perspective contributes to 
an explanation of the rapidity of the CCP’s victories in 1948 and 
1949 and accounts for the successful application of M a o fs "Peiping" 
and "Suiyuan" patterns, which capitalized on factional disaffection 
within the KMT and resulted in massive troops defections to the 
Communist side. This co-optation was more rigorous and explicit 
than that of the KMT in the Northern Expedition, as it involved 
the reorganization of units, the creation of Party structure and 
ideological indoctrination within the new units. Furthermore, 
the CCP was able to create economic organization which could sustain 
the impact of the demobilization of large populations of soldiers.
Donald Gillin has studied the massive defection of tsa-parh
troops in 1948 through 1950, and he has argued that the policy of
military modernization, sponsored by General C h fen Ch'eng, KMT chief
of staff in 1947, proved to be counter-productive, and that given the
realities of power within KMT-held areas, C h fen miscalculated and
over-centralizec^ with the result that disaffected tsa-parh went over 
12
to the enemy. The CCP*s magnanimous co-optation policy made 
"going over the hill" all that much easier.
The crucial question, which concerns us here, is how did the 
CCP in the 1930*s and 1940*s react to the proliferation of centres of 
political and military authority, which characterized Warlord China. 
After the repudiation of Li Li-san line, there was little to be said 
for the "nationwide high tide". The CCP, thereupon, became committed 
to the building of soviets in the countryside. Already in 1928-29, 
Mao was developing the idea of a Party army, and we can see the 
beginnings of his two unities, the unity of the army and people and 
the unity of officers and men, both of which offered an alternative
12. Donald Gillin, "Problems of Centralization in Republican China: The 
Case of Ch*en Ch*eng and the KMT", Journal of Asian Studies. XXIX, 
No.4, August 1970, pp.835-50.
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13
to KMT and warlord practice. Mao repudiated people who followed
14
the line of "hiring men and buying horses". The "pure military 
viewpoint" was based on a misconception of the nature of war in 
the countryside. Above all it lacked political emphasis. Problems 
of supply, intelligence, logistics and recruits were as much 
political as military, for the relation of army and people was 
explicit therein. At that time Mao had already developed the 
relation between local Red Guards and local troops on the one hand, 
and the main forces of the Red Army on the other.
In the late 1930*s in the context of the Sino-Japanese War,
Mao further developed his ideas on strategy and further defined the 
inter-relation of military and political perspectives. In May 1938,
Mao gazed into his crystal ball to predict the course of the War of 
Resistance. Much of the analysis, offered in "On Protracted Warfare", 
is based on Mao’s perception that Japan did not have a sufficiency of 
resources to penetrate and hold the vast rural hinterland; he 
concluded:
"First, the enemy, employing his small forces against 
a vast country, can only occupy seme big cities and main 
lines of communication and part of the plains. Thus there 
are extensive areas in the territory under his occupation 
which he has had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide 
a vast arena for guerilla warfare."15
Mao discussed at length the inter-relation of guerilla, mobile and
positional warfare, predicting that in the third stage of China’s
protracted war with Japan, the CCP would modify its strategy of
"protracted defensive warfare on interior lines", and would gradually
shift the focus from strategically interior to exterior lines. It
was in this third stage that the Party would place increasing emphasis,
first on mobile as opposed to guerilla warfare, and then later on
positional warfare. In fact, the CCP had to wait until 1948 before
13. Mao Tse-tung, "On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in theParty", 
December 1929, SW, Vol.I, pp.105-115.
14*. Ibid., p.114.
15. Mao Tse-tung, "On Protracted War", SW, Vol.II, p.158.
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shifting militarily from interior to exterior lines of warfare, 
and politically and economically the Party then altered the 
"centre of gravity" of Party work so as to facilitate a new 
emphasis on the winning and consolidation of urban China.
While Mao may have failed as a fortune-teller, the brilliance 
of his analysis is not to be underestimated, and of particular 
interest is his anticipation of the future pattern of national 
political integration. Mao indicated that there would be country­
wide high tide even in the third stage of the war, and that the 
pattern,would, nonetheless, be regional:
"Because of the unevenness in China’s political and 
economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of 
the third stage will not present a uniform and even 
picture throughout the country in the initial phase, but 
will be regional in character, rising here and 
subsiding there.
In fact during the first two years of the Civil War the
prosecution of the CCP’s military effort depended to a large
extent on the imagination arid initiative of local commanders, and
the military historian, William Whitson, informs us that there is
little evidence of significant shifting of Communist resources from
17
one theatre of operations to another. Politically in 1948-49, the 
different areas of the country proceeded at different rates toward 
the creation of people’s democratic state power. The process of 
supra-provincial integration of large regional economies only started 
in late 1948.
What were the policies which characterized the CCP’s relation to 
political disintegration? In November 1931, the First All-Chinese 
Congress of Soviets at Juichin proclaimed the establishment of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic. This republic was in fact an archipelago 
of soviets, which dotted a vast ocean of countryside in central China. 
The primary characteristic of the soviets was economic and geographic
16. Mao Tge-tung, "On Protracted War", op.cit.Q p e143a
17. William Whitson, The Chinese High Command, p.84.
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isolation. The Paj?ty*s fortunes in any one soviet very much
depended on the "white regim's" tendency "to split", and the
natural barriers, which made counter-insurgency operations
difficult. Organization, however, steadily improved, and in
1933 a People’s Commission for National Economy was created.
In August 1933, Mao criticized "right deviationis-tif’ for
their view that economic constructions wa& impossible in the midst
18
of revolutionary war. He noted that many local governments paid
little attention to such problems and that the economic departments
of these governments were poorly organized. On this occasion he
criticized bureaucratic leadership and hailed the relation of the
mass line to production. In the summer of 1934 a programme of
economic construction was launched. At the Second All-Chinese
Congress of Soviets in January 1934, a resolution on soviet economy
was passed. The statement therein was fairly comprehensive and
contains rudimentary notions of economic organization which were
later developed in the Yenan period. In Kiangsi the Party experimented
with mixed economy, relating state, co-operative and private enterprises.
"Encirclement and suppression" encouraged tentative impulses towards
autarchy. There were attempts to restore handicrafts and attempts to
develop inner soviet markets. Significantly, M ao emphasized that the
basis of CCP financial policy was to increase revenue by developing
the economy, hence the slogan of the Yenan period, "frcm economics
to finance" Ctsung ching-chi tao ts1ai-cheng) relates back to the
19
later Kiangsi period. The emphasis on the well-being of the masses 
was drawn out in comparison with warlord practice and was central to 
the perspective on the nature of war as involving a political and 
economic relation between the Red Army and the people of a base area.
This early wrestling with the problems of state organization was
18. Mao Tse-tung, "Pay Attention to Economic Work", August 20th 1933, 
SW, Vol.I, p.129.
19o Mao Tse-tung, "Our Economic Policy", January 23rd 1934, SW,
Vol.I, p.144.
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disrupted by the fourth and fifth encirclements, and the CCP had 
to abandon its soviet-building to begin the Long March in October 
1934. Ostensibly the Red Army went north to fight the Japanese, 
but it also went north to save itself.
The initial period of united front in the late 1930*s allowed 
the CCP some breathing space in which to consolidate its 
organization of border region governments. However, in the ensuing 
crisis, the CCP developed a strategy to deal with disintegration.
Communist historiography describes the War of Resistance in
20
terms of three stages of development. The first stage, which 
lasted from 1937 to the spring of 1941, was one of expansion. After 
the initial Sino-Japanese hostilities of 1937, the Eighth Route Army 
moved south into the Wutai mountains, the Taihang area and other 
parts of the northwest to establish the anti-Japanese base areas of 
Chin-Ch*a-Chi, Southeast Shansi, and Northwest Shansio Guerilla 
warfare was successfully waged in Central Shantung, and eventually 
resulted in the creation of a base there. Also between 1938 and 
1940, the Fourth Route Army established the anti-Japanese base areas 
of South Kiangsu, Central Kiangsu, North Kiangsu, North Huai and 
Kijigsu-Hopei-Anhwei.
The second stage of the war was characterized by a life and 
death struggle. Again the CCP faced the problems of encirclement, 
but this time the presence of Japanese forces rendered the situation 
even more complicated and desperate. The various regions were criss­
crossed by shifting lines of military and political authority, and 
it is probably for this reason that Mao originally dubbed the War of 
Resistance the ”war of the jig-saw pattern" (fu-ya chiao-ts*o ti 
chan-cheng). In the second stage, the CCP faced both the KMT blockade 
and the "Three-Alls". The sudden loss of KMT financial aid and 
spiralling inflation precipitated an economic crisis, which lasted 
from June 1941 to May 1942. The crisis was further aggravated by
20. K* ang-.iih chan-cheng shih-ch* i chieh-fang ch*^ kai-lc'uang,
(Conditions in the liberated areas during the War of Resistance), 
Peking, Jen-min c h Tu-pan she, 1953, pp.1-4.
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serious natural disasters. The Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region budget 
was in disarray as receipts failed to meet expenditure. It was a 
make-or-break situation, which taxed the limits of the CCP's 
organizational capabilities, and it was in this context of struggle 
that the CCP developed the "Yenan Way". The border regions 
suffered severe contraction and severe economic problems, but the 
crisis was gradually overcome as a state of autarchy was achieved 
in the following three years.
The third stage of development was characterized by renewed 
expansion and was coincidental with Mao’s great rectification and 
production campaigns of winter 1942, to spring 1943. As of spring 
1944, the CCP had some fifteen liberated border region areas in 
North China, Central China, (this region later became part of the 
Bast China Liberated Region, as opposed to Central Plains Liberated
Region) and the rear liberated areas of South China.
Critical to the integrity of the CCP-held areas in North China
was the Chin-Sui Border Region, which acted as a buffer, protecting
the front lines of the Shen-Kan-ning Border Region and insured
communications between Yenan and the Chin-Ch’a-Chi and Chin-Chi-Lu-
Yu Border Regions. The border regions tGOk shape with respect to
21
natural geography and the lines of communication.
In the early 1940’s there was little potential for the pattern
of political integration moving beyond the limits of the various 
regions. Beyond the boundary of any given region, there was only 
the Party. The pattern of administrative demarcation varied from 
region to region, but the administrative district (hsing- cheng ch’u ) 
tended to be the highest administrative level. However, administrative 
activity was more focused at the sub-region level, hence "sub-region
ft
management" (fen-ch’u kuan-li) characterized state activity in this
21. For example, the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region was divided into two 
military zones, Chin-Ch’i-Yu and Chi-Lu-Yu. The dividing line 
which cut the region into two eoughly equal halves was the Peiping- 
Hankow Railway. The parameters of region were determined by 
three railway lines. Ibid.. Map Four*
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period. It was early in September 1948 that the CCPCC decided 
to promote regional organization at a higher level and called 
for the "centralization of sub-region leadership".
It is perhaps paradoxical, but, nonetheless, important, 
that the policies and strategies articulated in the early 1940*s 
at a time when the process of political integration was confined 
to a relatively low level of organization, later became the basis 
for the pattern of national political integration in the early 
1950*s. After all these strategies and policies, which together 
constituted the "Yenan Way", were articulated in a period when 
each border region constituted an economy unto itself. Local 
production drives and the vigorous emphasis on self-sufficiency 
reinforced the pattern of independent economic development. The 
financial position of Communist armies in the various border 
regions was maintained without reference to financial administration 
in Yenan. The economic independence of the various border region 
governments was explicit in the proliferation of border region 
currencies. There were at least twenty different currencies 
circulating in the early stages of the Civil War, and the CCP did 
not initiate the process of bringing together the various currencies 
until 1948.
In the Yenan period, the CCP deliberately confined the process 
of political integration to a low level of organization; for 
example, in the course of the 1940-42 war of communications, the 
operative words were "the enemy repairs by day, we destroy by night". 
One might argue, therefore, that the tendency towards autarchy 
implies "disintegration" and was hardly appropriate to the later 
process of political integration on the national level, but in fact 
this "disintegration" was an "integration" which was consistent with
22. TadaoMiyashita, The Currency and Financial System of Mainland China, 
Tadao Miyashita reviews the CCP*s financial and economic policies 
in the Kiangsi and Yenan periods and notes that the various base 
areas constituted individual, isolated economies; for example, 
refer to pp.16 and 52.
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the prevailing economic and political conditions of the times. 
Furthermore, the strategies and policies of this period were 
refined and applied in the context of post-1949 China.
Hie policies and strategies of the Yenan Period are well- 
known and have been recently summarized in Peter Schran’s study 
of the guerilla economy in the Shen-Kan-Ning Border Region. Neo­
merchant ilist policies, favouring the development of import- 
substituting manufactures and the curtailing of the outward shipment 
of necessities were judiciously combined with policies, designed to 
increase border region production through the application of the 
mass line in the economy. There were emphases on internal migration, 
the participation of women, students, soldiers and cadres in 
production. The campaign, waged under the slogan "crack troops 
and simple administration" (ching-ping, chien-cheng). was consistent 
with these emphases. Under this slogan, there were attempts to 
simplify procedure, reduce costs, improve quality and quantity of
production and reduce the number of personnel working in administrative
23
organs, transferring excess personnel to production or schooling.
Peter Schran has aptly described the Yenan strategies in 
terms of a "dualistic pattern":
"The Chinese communists were quite successful in 
organizing the population of the Shen-Kan-Ning border 
region for the purposes of administration, defense, 
economic development, and education on a dualistic 
pattern which made allowances for differences in 
interests, talents and circumstances. They supplemented 
a small state administrative apparatus with mass 
organizations.... They added to a small garrison of 
regular troops a much more numerous militia-like self- 
defense corps. They complemented a small number of state- 
operated industrial enterprises with much larger numbers 
of cooperative ventures in import-substituting and export- 
promoting activities.... And they promoted expert as 
well as mass education in a somewhat complicated form, 
which often combined work witj^study —  not only by 
necessity but also by choice.
23. See Peter Schran, Guerrilla Economy, p.85. Mao commented on the 
importance of this policy in the light of the contraction of border 
region areas and material difficulties uhich characterized the second 
stage of the war. He noted: "...we cannot maintain the same enormous
was apparatus as before". Mao Tse-tung, "A Most Important Policy", 
September 7th 1942, SW, Vol.Ill, p.100.
24. Peter Schran, pp.94-95.
33
During the Sino-Japanese War the KMT and the CCP faced the 
same set of abnormally exaggerated determinants of localism and 
regionalism, but the CCP was more creative in applying itself to 
the problems of political disintegration. There was 
decentralization in terms of CCP government functions and military 
operations, but the situation was saved by an exercise of 
democratic centralism within the Party. The CCP did not at that 
stage attempt to create a central government structure as had been 
the case in Kiangsi. In the decentralized context of the Yenan 
Period, the CCP maximized "unified Party leadership". In terms 
of border region economic organization, the principle "centralized 
leadership and decentralized management" was exploited in order to 
maximize local initiative within the border region0 The CCP 
developed a philosophy of administration to cope with the 
multiplication of independent centres of warlord, KMT and Japanese 
authority and the consequent factors of border region economic and 
geographic isolation.
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ii) Administrative Philosophy and the implementation of Policy 
in the Yenan Period
CCP administration was based on a philosophy which inter­
related factors of flexibility and discipline. This approach was 
consistent with experience gained in the organization of a military 
structure under the highly decentralized conditions of guerilla 
warfare. The same perspective was applied in other areas of 
organization.
In May 1938, Mao explained that proper co-ordination between
regular warfare and guerilla warfare necessitated M a unified
strategic command by the national general staff and the war-zone
commanders”. However, he qualified this statement with an
observation on the importance of flexibility in guerilla warfare:
"If any attempt is made to apply the methods of command in regular
warfare to guerilla warfare, its great flexibility will inevitably
1
be restricted and its vitality sapped.” Then Mao enunciated the 
principle of command in guerilla warfare to be "centralized strategic 
command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles” Cchan- 
lueh ti chi-chung chih-hui ho chan-yi chan-cheng ti fen-san chih-hui) 
It would seem worthwhile to quote Mao*s formulation at length:
"In general matters, that is matters of strategy, the 
lower levels should report to the higher and follow their 
instructions so as to ensure concerted action.
Centralization, however, stops at this point, and it would 
likewise be harmful to go beyond it and interfere with the 
lower levels in matters of detail like the specific 
dispositions for a campaign or battle. For such details 
must be settled in the light of specific conditions, which 
change from time to time and from place to place and are 
quite beyond the knowledge of the distant higher levels of 
command. This is what is meant by the principle of 
decentralized command in campaigns and battles. The same 
principle generally applies in regular operations, especially 
when communications are inadequate. In a word, it means 
guerilla warfare waged independently and with the initiative 
in our hands within the framework of a unified strategy."2
I. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against Japan”,
SW, Vol.II, p.109.
2* Ibid..p.115, or in Chinese text, Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi. Vol.II, p.404.
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Essentially the same principle was applied to party construction.
In a CCP publication of 1938, for example, the relation between
3
party-building and democratic centralism was emphatic. Cadres 
were advised against indulging in the deviation of over-centralizing. 
They were not "to centralize every last penny and gun" (i-fen 
ch*ien i-chih chJiang tou chi-chung le). On the other hand, it was 
noted that fast changing conditions of the military situation 
warranted a certain degree of centralization and a corresponding 
restriction of democracy in terms of Party action. Unrestrained 
democracy was inimical to discipline. Local Party committees were 
as the limbs of the body to the brain and had to be co-ordinated 
by the Central Committee.
On September 1st 1942, the Politbureau of the CCP Central 
Committee passed a resolution calling for unification of leadership 
in the anti-Japanese war bases. The crisis of 1941-42, precipitated 
by the KMT blockade and the "Three-Alls", was to be expedited in 
organization terms byabalancing of centralism and democracy, or 
more basically, a balancing of discipline and flexibility, thus 
the September 1st resolution reads:
"The ruthless Japanese mopping-up campaign, the 
strengthening of the blockade and strong points, the 
difficulty of relations between higher and lower 
echelons, and the increase of local guerilla warfare 
in the War of Resistance call for a greater elasticity 
in relations of subordination between higher and lower 
echelons, an increase and strengthening in each district 
(military districts and sub-districts) of an active 
spirit of independence as well as an active and general 
unification of leadership and a greater degree of 
co-ordination among all organizations in every district, 
so that none will provide the enemy with an advantageous 
loophole.''^
It is important to note that the subtleties of CCP thinking in 
regard to the definitions of "centralization" (i.e. t fung-i ling-tao)
tT
and "unification" (i.e. ling-tao ti i-yuan-hua). The distinction is 
spelled out in this September 1st resolution as follows:
30 Tang ti chien-she (Party construction), p.23. Originally printed 
in 1938, and reprinted in Taiwan, 1951.
4. "Central Committee Resolution of the Unification of Leadership in 
the Anti-Japanese War Bases", in Boyd Compton, etd., Mao's China, 
p.162. Full Chinese text in Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung chi. 
(Tokyo), Vol.8, pp.155-163.
36
"On the one hand, unification of Party leadership 
[tang ti ling-tao ti i-yuan-hua] is to be expressed 
in the mutual relations between Party, governmental 
and mass organizations of the same level; on the other 
hand, it is to be expressed in the relations between 
upper and lower levels.
This emphasis was consistent with the shift towards a "dual" 
system of administration. The earlier trend towards separation 
of Party and state was checked, as the new situation of 
decentralization and border region contraction necessitated 
greater co-ordination between systems. The problems of 
dispersionism were dealt with on the basis of a dual pattern of 
centralization. It was a fundamentally Maoist approach, which 
capitalized on flexibility and decentralization in order to further 
centralization and discipline. There was greater emphasis on the 
horizontal relations of systems, but centralization would, none­
theless, be achieved in terms of unified Party leadership. In the 
very midst of great:, political disintegration, Mao articulated a 
philosophy of administration which became the basis for the pattern 
of political integration. While the primacy of the Party was 
explicit in this discussion of unified Party leadership, it 
must be pointed out that this primacy was qualified; it was not a 
repudiation of a division of labour. The Party was not to supplant 
other systems, but was to co-ordinate their activities, raise 
standards of ideological consciousness and provide leadership in 
terms of the determination of general policies and principles.
Party cadres, who attempted to impose Party management on 
government systems were admonished. However, the integrity of the 
different systems was not always sustained in practice. In keeping 
the CCP*s tendency to enforce a very close relation between 
organizational structure and objective conditions, point eight of
5. Boyd Compton, ed., Mao's China» pp.171-172.
6. Refer to Franz Schumann for a discussion'of "dual" and 
"vertical" rule in Ideology and Organization in Communist China* 
2nd edition, pp.188-194.
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the September 1st resolution indicated that due to the special 
nature of the guerilla areas, the "unification of leadership"
Tt
(ling-tao ti i-yuan-hua) was not to be limited to "mutual 
relations" (hsiang-hu kuan-hsi) of systems. If necessary organs 
of Party committees, the government and mass organizations could 
be amalgamated with military and political organs. Similarly,
Mao later justified large-scale military involvement in production
7
even at the expense of the principle of the division of labour.
The point that should be reiterated here is that "unification
tt
of leadership" (ling-tao ti i-yuan-hua) does not conform with 
common Weberian conceptions of centralization based on a rigid 
distinction of government functions and a straight up-and-down 
system of subordination. "Unification" derives from CCP theories 
regarding the mass line and implies the horizontal as well as the 
vertical. "Unification" is also consistent with the CCP*s 
theoretical preference for collective leadership.
A Politbureau resolution of June 1st 1943, regarding methods 
of leadership drew attention to the "method of division of labour
It tt
and centralized unification" (fen-kung erh yu t *ung-i ti i-yuan-
g
hua ti fang-fa). "Centralization" is described in terms of a 
higher level cadre contacting subordinates in lower level departments 
and offices. There is a formal division of labour, but in fact every­
one bears a responsibility. In some sense then there is both an 
official and moral responsibility, and everyone on down the line 
must understand policy.
7. In 1945, Mao wrote: "In our circumstances, production by the army
for its own support, though backward or retrogressive in form, is 
progressive in substance and of great historical significance. 
Formally speaking, we are violating the principle of division of 
labour. However, in our circumstances —  poverty and disunity of 
the country...., and the protracted dispersed guerilla w a r — 'What 
we are doing is progressive". "On Production by A m y  for its own 
Support SW, Vol.Ill, p.276. One notes that Mao no longer
felt the need to rationalize such "violations" after 1949 when 
such circumstances assumed less significance.
8. Boyd Compton, op.cit.. p.182.
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One cannot simply relate the opposites, "dual" and "vertical"
with centralization and decentralization. The formulation of
"unification" suggests centralization within a dual pattern.
Action inhibiting the unified co-ordination of systems at any one
level could be viewed in the CCP context as a manifestation of
dispersionism (fen-san chu-i). The CCP did not entertain a fixed
notion as to what degree of centralization was the correct degree
of centralization as changes in objective conditions necessitated
organizational change*}.
What did the above theory mean in practice? Here we might
focus on the economic and financial problems of the Shen-Kan-Ning
Border Region and M a o ’s lengthy discussions in his essay of
9
December 1942, "Economic and Financial Problems".
In the second section of his treatise, Mao discussed the 
development of agriculture. One notes his awareness of the uneven 
development of agriculture, in particular the differences between 
counties such as Yenan, where there was a lot of land and paucity
It
of people, and the defence areas (ching-pei ch’u ) where there was 
little excess land and a great many people. Mao advised the 
cadres to "act according to local conditions and season".^ Mao 
stressed that where land was plentiful and labour scarce the 
technique to adopt was deep ploughing as opposed to opening up new 
acreage, a technique which was more appropriate to counties such as 
Yenan. The theme, "adopt different methods according to different
?f
regions," (:i ko-chung pu-t'ung ti-ch’u erh t s 1ai - ch'u pu-t'ung 
11
fang-fa) indicates a sensitivity to regional economic differences.
Mao formulated his ideas not only in relation to natural 
economic distinctions. During the hard years of the KMT blockade 
and the "Three-Alls" he hoped to resolve the economic difficulties
9. The first section of this treatise appears in Mao Tse-tung, SW, Vol.Ill, 
under the title, "Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti-Japanese 
War", pp.11-116. I have had the benefit of Andrew Watson’s translation 
of sections two to five. Excerpts from sections six to ten are my own 
translations. As for the Chinese text, the following references are 
made to the 1949 Hong Kong edition of Ching-chi wen-t’i yu t s ’ai-cheng 
wen-t’1 (Economic and financial problems), henceforth cited as CCWT.
10c Watson’s translation, p.9, or CCWT, p.15.
11. Watson’s translation, p.10, or CCWT, p.16.
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of the border regions by unleashing local creativity and enthusiasm.
In conjunction with the movement for greater production there 
appeared a government policy of easing the tax burden on the masses 
in order to stimulate local production enthusiasm; for example, a 
COP Politbureau directive of October 1st 1943, urged economic and 
financial workers to put ninety per cent of effort in increasing 
agricultural production and ten per cent into agrarian tax 
collection. A singular emphasis on finance was eschewed particularly 
as it was identified with warlordism and counter to the unity of 
the people and army.
Mao was similarly concerned with local creativity and activism 
in industry and handicrafts. The CCP adopted a policy of self- 
sufficiency in industry in conjunction with a policy in trade to 
restrict the importation of unnecessary goods and the exportation 
of necessary goods from the border regions. State enterprise was 
developed under the direct management of (a) the army, (b) government 
departments, and (c) educational institutes of official organs.
During the earlier Kiangsi period the CCP soviet governments had 
benefited from comparatively favourable economic conditions, and it 
was not then necessary to involve the army in state enterprise. In 
1938 the army did become involved in agricultural production. At 
the time it was argued that the army represented the ideal working 
force as its ranks included healthy men of the right age and excluded 
the old and very young. Furthermore, it was argued that soldiers 
did not have to bear the rent and tax fesponsibilities of the peasants. 
The army subsequently became involved in trade and industry. According 
to Mao*s assessment of 1942 of the three sectors of state enterprise, 
the army was the most significant. Mao later resurrected these 
arguments on December 5th 1919, in a directive of the People*s 
Revolutionary Military Council, which called on the army to engage in 
production and assist the government in the national fiscal crisis 
of late 1949.
12. CCWT, pp.98-99.
40
In February 1940, the CCP Central Committee issued a 
directive which spelled out the formula, "centralized leadership
13
and decentralized management" (chi-chung 1ing-tao-fen-san ching-ying). 
In 1941 the CCP moved from a policy of half self-sufficiency to 
complete self-sufficiency, and industrial development was comparatively 
rapid in 1941-42. Mao, however, complained that many cadres only 
learned "decentralized management" and did not appreciate "centralized 
leadership", and although the formula had already been announced in 
1940, it was necessary in a senior level cadre conference in 1942 to 
go over the matter carefully once more.
Mao elaborated in his treatise of 1942 as to "decentralized 
management":
"Why is it that together with self-sufficiency in 
industry we want this sort of decentralized management?
Primarily we want it because labour power is dispersed 
in the various Party, government and army departments, 
and if we were to centralize then we might destroy the 
element of activism [chi-chi chu-f]: for example, if
we encourage Brigade 359 to open up the Ta-kuang Textile 
Factory and yet do not order its amalgamation with 
government textile factories this is because the greater 
number of workers in the Ta-kuang Factory were selected 
from among the officers and men of Brigade 359. They 
would very actively labour to meet the clothing needs of 
the entire brigade, and if we were to centralize it 
would on the contrary damage this quality of activism.
There are other important reasons for decentralizing, 
namely, the dispersion of natural resources and the 
difficulties of transportation."14
Mao did warn that decentralization could reach a point of
diminishing returns and that there was to be uniformity of the
same type of enterprise in the same area. He then spoke of greater
centralization following an initial pattern of decentralization,
citing the examples of centralization of the Tuan-chieh and Chiao-
t ’ung Textile Factories under government department. A rough
distinction was made between large and small enterprises, and in
the case of large enterprise, there was to be a greater degree of
13. CCWT, p.105.
14. CCWT, p.102.
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15
centralization. Mao discussed the relation between enterprise 
belonging to different systems and concluded:
11 In cases where we should centralize agriculture, 
industry and commerce, no one organization is to 
exclusively centralize the enterprise concerned on a 
region-wide basis. But a unified plan is to be worked 
out by the appropriate agency Cat present the Border 
Region Finance and Economic Committee and the General 
Affairs Office) in accordance with the needs of the 
whole and its parts and the possible conditions of 
management. The various systems of Party, government 
and army can be entrusted with separate management, 
and we will then have a unified plan and separate 
management. This amounts to a condition whereby we 
have "centralized leadership and separate management"
(chi-chung ling-tao, fen-pieh ching-yingj.16
Explicit in Mao’s idea of unified plan was emphasis on inter­
system co-ordination, and his statement to the effect that no 
one organization was exclusively to centralize a particular 
industrial, agricultural or commercial sector stands as a 
repudiation of a rigidly vertical scheme of state administration.
Although in 1943, Mao was inclined to place a greater emphasis 
on unified planning and centralization than he had done in the past 
two years, he, nonetheless, continued to expound on the correctness 
of "centralized leadership and decentralized management". In a 
speech at a conference for labour heroes on January 10th 1945, Mao 
informed his audience: "Since we are in the countryside, where man­
power and material resources are scattered, we have adopted the
policy of 'unified leadership and decentralized management1 for
17
production and supply". In April of the same year, Mao chose to 
emphasize that the centre should not take on more responsibility 
than it can handle, and then noted: "The principle of ’unified
leadership and decentralized management’ has proved to be correct 
one for organizing all economic activities in our Liberated Areas in
15o CCWT, p.103.
16. CCWT, p.104.
17. Mao Tse-tung, "We Must Learn to do Economic Work", SW, Vol.Ill, p.191, 
Here "chi-chung ling-tao” is used for "centralized leadership", 
whereas in CCWT, "t ’ung-i ling-tao" is used.
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18
the present circumstances". The important question is at what 
point in the process of integration would circumstances warrant a 
change in this formula in favour of greater vertical centralization. 
Despite the basic change in Party policy of 1948 and the 
accelerated process of integration in North and Northeast China at 
that time, this policy persisted and became explicit in the 
constitutional arrangements of 1949, and the policy was extensively 
applied in 1951.
18. Mao Tse-tung, "On Production by the Army for its own Support....", 
SW, Vol.II, p.275.
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iii) Fran Border Region to Liberated Region
tt
The smaller border regions (pien-ch*u) of the late 1930fs 
and early 1940Ts were integrated into larger regional entities
ti
called "liberated regions" (chieh-fang c h Tu ). Greater 
Administrative Region demarcations evolved out of the Civil War, 
but in terms of their structure and functioning the GAR governments 
very much related to the Yenan experience, and in terms of the 
overall process of "political integration" they reflected a basic 
perspective on the inter-relation of armed struggle on the one hand, 
and (a) united front and the building of people*s democratic state 
power, and (b) the prosecution of social reform, and (c) economic 
construction on the other. There will be further opportunity to 
define the constitutional role, the structure and functions of the 
GARs in the next chapter, but it is noted here that the GAR structures 
were explicitly "dual", and these structures demonstrated a clear 
expression of a horizontal emphasis on the inter-relation of 
different systems under the principles of "unified Party leadership" 
and "centralized leadership and divided responsibilities".
It is with the above interests in mind that we can discuss the 
basic continuity of this inter-relation of armed struggle and (a),
(b) and Cc) outlined above. There is an immediate and explicit 
difference between KMT and CCP perspective on the nature of war, 
which is essential to an understanding of the process of political 
integration in China. For the KMT, war was war, but for Map and the 
CCP war was also "political integration". In the CCP context, armed 
struggle involved a complexity of military, political and economic 
factors.
On September 16th 1939, Mao stressed in an interview that Sun 
Yat-sen’s three stages of military rule, political tutelage and 
constitutional government were no longer appropriate to China's 
political development.'*' He argued that the people of China had proved
1. Mao Tse-tung, "Interview with Three Correspondant....", September 16th 
1939, SW, Vol.II, p.270.
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themselves in war and were ready for democratic government. He, 
therefore, refused to consider proposals that the Shen-Kan-Ning 
Border Region be abolished to facilitate unification of the various 
united front governments. Mao was closely identified with the 
introduction of the three-thirds system, and the New Fourth Army 
Incident of January 1941 did not affect the C f P ’s implementation 
of that system in the February elections of the Shen-Kan-Ning 
Border Region. The second united front was bigger than the 
combination of KMT and CCP, and the three-thirds system came into
wider use after the incident.
In April 1945, Mao claimed that all the policies of the anti-
Japanese united front had been put into practice in the nineteen
liberated regions of the CCP and that regional governments had
been democratically established. Once again Mao dismissed the
question of abolition for the sake of national unification and
emphasized that the border regions constituted areas of political 
2
enlightenment. During the uneasy peace which followed upon the 
Japanese surrender the CCP actively applied in its political struggle 
with the KMT the principle of united front and new democracy, and 
it was on this basis that the CCP countered KMT arguments for 
further unification and claimed that the KMT’s Consultative 
Conference of 1946 was bogus.
Of course ther was tremendous inter-regional unevenness in 
the establishment of people’s democratic state power, and the 
regional variations very much related to the pattern of military 
conquest. The pattern was the most advanced in North and Northeast 
China. In 1946, the CCP energetically campaigned for democracy in 
the Northeast, and in mid-July it was claimed that the people of all
3
nine provinces of the Northeast had elected provincial chairmen. In 
August 186 delegates from various localities in the Northeast met to
2. Mao argued that "national revolution" was entwined with the struggle 
for democratic reform and people’s livelihood, and he repudiated 
"the so-called theory of two stages" (i.e. a stage of "national 
revolution" and then a stage of "revolution for democracy and people’s 
livelihood"). See "On Coalition Government” , April 24th 1945, SW,
Vol.Ill, p.249.
3. JMJP (Wuan edition), July 12th 1946.
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discuss the strengthening of the relations between the provinces 
4
of the Northeast.
The KMT^ by way of contrast, failed to achieve effective 
organization at the supra-provincial level even in exclusively 
military terms. KMT military organization was elaborate and 
jurisdictions overlapped. This complexity was a reflection of 
political instability within the KMT. Clear lines of authority 
were difficult to establish in the context of competing factions. 
The CCP had experienced intra-elite conflict in the contexts of 
the Chang Kuo-t*ao dispute and the repudiation of Wang Ming, but 
Party leadership was comparatively stable as Mao established his 
position.
Prior to 1946, several regional commands with supra-
provincial jurisdiction existed under the KMTfs Military Affairs
Commission (Chun-shih wei-yuan hui). Althou^i this commission was
abolished in the reorganization of KMT military structure in 1946,
the several regional commands survived the reorganization and were
" 5
redesignated presidential headquarters (chu-hsi hsing-vuan).
There were several headquarters responsible for South China, North­
west, Southwest, Northeast, North and Central China. Initially the 
several commissioners of the regional presidential headquarters 
were concurrently the highest civilian authorities in their 
respective regions, but these headquarters later became exclusively 
military agencies, and the chairmen of provincial governments 
assumed responsibility for all civilian matters in their 
respective provinces.
One very much suspects that the presidential headquarters were 
established by Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of controlling the 
various war zone (chan-ch*u) commanders such as Yen Hsi-shan, 
commander of the Second War Zone and commander of the Twelfth War
4. JMJP (Wuan edition), August 20th 1946.
5. Hua Shang-pao, I-chiu-ssu-pa nlen shou-ts*e (Handbook for 1948) 
section one, p.16.
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War Zone, Fu Tso-yi. Under C h Ten C h feng*s reorganization of 
March 1947, the war zones were abolished and replaced by Offices 
of Pacification (sui-ching lcung-shu). Redesignations and 
transfers reflected shifts of power constellations within the KMT, 
and the KMT remained more or less a weakly integrated confederation 
of factions, which were controlled to various degrees by the 
generalissimo. Chiang insured his position by practising "divide 
and rule" and hence furthered the process of organizational decadence.
In the first year of fighting from July 1946 to June 1947, the
CCP adopted the strategy of fighting on interior lines and lost
substantial tracts of territory as a result of a vigorous KMT 
offensive. Yenan itself, was occupied by KMT forces in March 1947. 
But after this initial contraction of CCP-held territory, the CCP’s 
military forces began to switch to the offensive in the period July 
to September 1947. At the December 25~28th 1947, meeting of the 
CCPCC, it was decided: "Strive to wipe out the enemy through
mobile warfare. At the same time, pay attention to the tactics of 
positional attack and capture enemy fortified points and cities".6 
The meeting also determined that the time was not yet ripe to
establish a central government. The CCP was not yet ready to make
bold outward attacks from interior lines. Although there was a new 
willingness to attack cities, the capture of cities was still viewed 
in short-term perspectives of the overnight exploitation of urban 
resources.
The CCP reconsidered its strategy in the spring of 1947 in the 
light of stunning military victories in the North and Northeast, and 
in the light of the disorders and excesses which occured at the time 
of the taking of Anshan and Szuping in Kirin province. These 
victories opened up the possibility of creating large stabilized 
rear areas in the Northeast and North China, and cities could at 
that point be held on a more or less permanent basis. The
6. Mao Tse-tung, "The Present Situation and Our Tasks", SW, Vol. IV,
p.161.
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preservation of urban assets was necessary to the rehabilitation
of industry and the prosecution of positional warfare. It was no
longer expedient to sacrifice urban production and the Party moved
to defuse class struggle in the cities.
Reacting to the excesses in the talcing of Anshan and Szuping,
the NEB outlined the procedures and institutions necessary to the
takeover of cities in an important directive. The directive was
severely critical of cadres who despite the transition to positional
7
warfare persisted in ar “village viewpoint*1.
To insure public order and to prevent any further occurrence 
of indiscriminate confiscation and destruction of urban assets, 
provisions were made for the creation of a Military Control Commission
ti ii
(chun-shih kuan-li wei-vuan hui) at the time of the takeover of any
particular city. All local government and party personnel were to
be responsible to the Military Control Commission (MCC). Before
dealing with matters of substance, the MCC had first to report to
and seek the approval of higher leadership organs, namely, the
Northeast Administrative Committee and the Northeast Bureau of the
8
CCP Central Committee. The period of MCC control was to be 
determined by the next level of military command in accordance with 
the over-all military situation and conditions within the particular 
city itself. The powers of the MCC were to be transferred to the 
people’s democratic municipal government once order had been 
restored, and one of the units.occupying the city was thereupon 
designated as a municipal garrison under the leadership of the civil 
authorities„
7. There had been troop disorders and the cannibalizing of valuable 
industrial equipment; for example, soldiers used electrical
generator“parts as chamber pots, etc. The directive of the North­
east Bureau was Carried in the JMJP (Shihchiachuang edition),
June 21st 1948. This document, along with other relevant material 
concerning CCP urban policy, is in Chung-kuo ien-min chieh-fang 
chun ju-ch’eng cheng-ts’e (Policy with regard to the PLA entering 
the cities), Hsin-hua shu-tien, c.1949; 1969 reprint.
8. Chung-kuo .ien-min chieh-fang chun .iu-ch’eng cheng-ts’e . p.39.
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The military aspect of the takeover machinery should not be
overstressed. By resorting to this kind of institutional solution
the Party was not abandoning newly-liberated cities to uninhibited
martial law. The MCC was to act in the fashion of a receiver in
a bankruptcy case; for example, in Peiping the MCC was assisted by
a Joint Administrative Office, consisting of KMT officials and CCP
representatives, in compiling inventories of the assets of the former
government and bureaucratic capital. Upon completion of the
inventory, the assets were then entrusted to the local people*s 
9
government. One must also bear m  mind that the personnel on the 
Commission were not exclusively military personnel. Many cadres 
held positions in more than one system. The Commission also 
included officials of local government and party organizations.^
The MCC was bound in its actions by the Party’s urban policies in
11
regard to rear services and the protection of industry and commerce. 
The military had no independent power of confiscation. Only those 
military personnel necessary to the maintenance of public order 
could remain within city boundaries.
The overlapping membership of the MCC and municipal government 
facilitated a smooth transition from the former to the latter.
Often municipal government was established within a matter of days 
after the creation of the MCC. The Peiping MCC started to function 
on February 1st 1949, under the command of General Yeh Chien-ying, 
who was under the orders of the Peiping-Tientsin Headquarters. On 
February 4th the new municipal government under Mayor Yeh Chien-ying 
started to function, and thus precipitated the gradual process 
whereby the powers and responsibilities of the MCC were passed to 
the municipal government.
9. See William Brugger, " ’Democratfeation* and *Enterprisation* in 
Chinese Industrial Enterprise —  A Socio-political Perspective",
PhD thesis, London University, November 1971, pp.26-27.
10. Arthur Steiner has also reviewed the process of urban takeover in 
"Chinese Communist Urban Policy", American Political Science Review* 
Vol.XLIV, No.l, March 1950, pp.47-63, especially pp.56-58.
11. JMJP (Shihchiachuang edition), June 21st 1948.
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In September 1948, the CCP*s Seventh Central Committee
12
convened in Hsipaipo village, Hopei. The CCPCC noted that 
whereas in the past the conditions of war, such as the criss­
cross pattern of enemy lines and the isolation of the base areas, 
necessitated a high premium on the Minitiative" and "enthusiasm" 
of leading organs of the Party in different areas, it was now 
necessary to check tendencies towards localism and guerilla-ism.
The level of political integration was to be raised to a higher
* . '\l\C
level of organization, and there was to be "centralization of sub- 
region leadership".
r' ‘ '
The development of land reform also called for a greater level 
of organization. Mao thus called for a greater emphasis on 
collective leadership and the strengthening of the Party Committee
system as well as-closer relations between the various levels of
‘ ' - • 13
Party organization,.
The development of North China supra-provincial organization
reflected' the rapid creation of higher level organization to sustain
the new positional war. In fact the September meeting of the CCPCC
seemed to accredit the. new North China government with the status
of a de facto central government, hence the following decision:
"In order to facilitate support to the front, we 
have decided to entrust this government. with th.e task of 
unifying the. work of leading and administering the 
economy, finance, trade, banking, communications and war 
industries in three regions, northern China, eastern 
China ..(with a population of 34 million) and the Northwest 
(with a population of 7 million) and we are prepared in 
the near future to extend the unification of this work to ^  
two additional: regions, the Northeast and the Central Plains."
12. The meeting had the iargest attendance since the Japanese 
surrender. In the early years of the Civil War, members of 
the CCPCC were scattered and communications difficult, 
hence it was not then possible to hold such a large meeting.
Mao Tse-tung, "On the September Meeting...", SW, Vol.IV, p.270, 
editor*s note.
13. See Mao’Tse-tung, "On Strengthening the Party Committee System", 
September 20th 1948, SW, Vol. , p.267, and "The work of Land 
Reform and of Party Consolidation in 1948", May 25th 1948, SW, 
Vol.IV, p.258.
14. Mao Tse-tung, "On the. September Meeting...", p.272.
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1948 was a watershed year in terms of the pattern pf national 
political integration. As the PLA moved to exterior lines, the'
CCP began to study problems with a nationwide perspective. The 
switch to positional warfare necessitated an extension and 
development of military organization, and on November 1st 1948, the 
Revolutionary Military Commission of the CCPCC classified all troops 
into fi£ld, regional,'and guerilla forces and created five large 
field armies, the Northwest Field Army, Central Plains Field Army, 
the East China Field Army, .the Northeast Field Army and the North 
China Field Army to carry out positional warfare in the several large 
regions of. China. On November 2nd Mukden was liberated. On
• 15
November 14th Mao predicted the war would be over by November 1949, 
thus revising an earlier prediction of September 7th 1948, thdt 
the war would last five years, counting from July 1946.
In 1948 the Party began to shift its "centre of gravity" 
towards the cities. In11948, the PLA moved to exterior lines. And 
in 1948 the level of political integration was elevated to the supra- 
provincial level with the creation of the North China People's 
Government. Consolidation in the rear.areas of North and Northeast 
China was.’crucial to the war effort. In these stabilized areas, 
agricultural and industrial production could be developed so as to 
reinforce the advance into KMT-held areas. It was also in these 
areas that, the Party hoped to train cadres to export to "newly 
liberated areas" in the south.
Throughout 1949, the CCP reaped the short-term benefits which 
accrued from the application of the Peiping and Suiyan patterns in 
central, south, southwest .and northwest China. Mao, perhaps more 
than anyone, appreciated the nature of KMT organization as a con­
federation: of shifting factions, and these two patterns were applied
15. Mao Tse-tung, ^Th'e Momentous Change in China's Military Situation", 
SW, Vol.VI,. p.288.; •
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with the obvious intention of encouraging the development of 
centrifugal tensions within the KMT. The negotiations of April 
1949, were undoubtedly pursued with this objective in mind. Mao 
described the situation perfectly:
..,"We are preparing to have negotiations with the 
reactionary Nanking government. Its moving forces for 
negotiating with us are the warlords of Kwangsi clique, 
tjiose factions of the Kuomintang favouring peace and 
the Shanghai bourgeoisie. Their aims are to obtain 
a share in the Coalition government, retain as many 
troops as possible, preserve the interests of the 
bourgeoisie in Shanghai and the south and do their best 
to moderate " the revolution. ...Those trying to 
wreck the. negotiations are Chiang Kai-shek and his 
sworn followers. ...Our,policy is not to refuse 
negotiations, but to demand that the other side accept 
the eight terms in their entirety and to allow no 
bargaining. .In return, would refrain from fighting 
the Kwangsi clique and the other Kuomintang factions 
which favour peace, postpone the reorganization of their 
troops for about a year, allow some individuals in the 
Nanking government to take phrt in the Political 
Consultative Conference and the coalition government 
and agree to protect certain interests of the bourgeosie 
in Shanghai and in the south."16
One notes that the magnanimous gestures, explicit in the PLA's
eight-point programme were consistent with the Peiping-Suiyuan
approach; for example point five reads:
"Except for the incorrigible war criminals and 
counter-revolutionaries who have committed the most 
heinous crimes, the People’s Liberation Army and the 
People1s Government will not hold captive, arrest or 
subject to indignity any officials, whether high or 
low, in the Kuomintang1s central, provincial, municipal 
and county, governments, deputies to the ’National 
Assembly', members of the Legislative and Control Yuans, 
members of the political consultative councils, police 
officers and' district, township, village and pao-chia 
officials, so long as they do not offer armed resistance 
dr plot sabotage. All these persons are enjoined, pending 
the takeover, to say at their posts...."17
16. Mao Tse-^tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh 
Central Committee of- the Communist Party of China", March 5th 1949, 
SW, Vol.IV, p.371.
17. Mao Tse-tung, "Proclamation of the Chinese People's Liberation Army", 
Arpil 25th 1949, SW, Vol.IV, p.398.
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In May through December, several provinces fell peacefully to 
the PLAj for example, on August 4th, the KMT governor of Hunan 
province, Chren Cheng, renounced his allegiance to the KMT and 
handed.his .province over to the CCP. In September the KMT Garrison 
Commander-'in-Chief of Sinkiang and the provincial governor 
renounced their allegiance to the KMT government and handed their 
province:over to the CCP. On December 9th, the KMT authorities 
in Yunnan and Sikapg renounced their allegiance to the KMT, and 
these two provinpes were peacefully liberated.
The swiftness pf the PLA*s'advance had a significant impact 
on the. national pattern of political integration. -While the CCP's 
forces .had fought on interior lines there had been opportunity to 
further t h e ,inter-relation of armed struggle on the one hand, 
social reform and 1jhe establishment of people's democratic state 
power on the other, but the speed with which the PLA advanced in 
1948 and 1949 militated against the successful inter-relation of 
military, political and economic factors, and the inter-relation 
broke d(pwn south of the Yangtze. This breakdown reinforced the 
tendency to strengthen horizontal co-ordination as well as vertical 
command, and flexibility, as well as discipline, was emphasized in 
the attempt to deal with the tremendous regional variations in the 
process of political integration. Ihese emphases to a large extent 
determined the structure and functioning of the GAR governments. 
Before moving on to a brief consideration of the formative 
development of each of the several GARS, it would seem appropriate 
to describe further the above inter-relation, particularly in 
terms of; the development of agrarian reform in Northeast and North 
China., In terms of the CCP's definition of "political integration", 
agrarian reform was crucial, and it can be noted here that the 
successful completion of agrarian reform was one of the three 
criteria for the establishment of people's governments at the GAR 
level.
Between 1946 and 1948, agrarian reform policy seriously 
fluctuated from a radical-position in relation to the rich peasants, 
to a more intermediate position, articulated in the Outline Land Law
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of September 1947, to the position of February 1948, which 
dictated that blows would be struck exclusively at landlords 
while rich peasants would be manoeuvred into neutrality. Most 
of the early CCP bases in Northeast and North China experienced 
the provisions of the Outline Land Law in the period of late 1947 
to mid-1948. Those areas, which later experienced^ agrarian reform 
enjoyed the soft class line, explicit in the arrangements of 
February 1948.
The CCP’s scheme of political integration was inclusive of
three broad categories of ’’liberated area", namely, "old", "semi-
' IS
old", and "newly liberated area". "Old liberated areas” were 
those areas established prior to the Japanese surrender,, In these 
areas, it was not considered necessary to redistribute land for a 
second time in accordance with the provisions of the Outline Land 
Law of September 1947. The bulk of the rural population in the 
"old liberated areas" were middle peasants, the majority of whom 
were classified as "new middle peasants". The "semi-old liberated 
areas" were liberated during the period September 1945, to August 
1947. Localities in this second category had some experience of 
land reform, especially in terms of "settling of accounts" (ching- 
suan); however, in these areas there was to be a thorough 
distribution of land in accordance with the September 1947 law. In 
this second.category of liberated area, the poor peasants constituted 
the majority. The third category, namely the "newly liberated areas", 
included territory liberated after August 1947, and it is in these 
areas that landlords and rich peasants remained influential while 
the masses had yet to be mobilized.
Within the larger categories of "old liberated" and "semi-old 
liberates” , the Party further elaborated on three sub-categories of
area in the February 22nd 1948, "Directive on the Work of Land Reform
' ; 19
and Party Consolidation in the Old and Semi-Old Areas” .
1
----   ;---- ■--  r-- - ----  1----  7...................
18. Mao Tse-tung, "Different Tactics for Carrying Out the Land Law in 
Different Areas”, SW* Vol.IV, pp.193-195. .
19. Available in I-chiu-ssu-chTi nien i-lai Chung-kuo kuhg-chfan tang 
chung-yao wen-hsien chi (A collection of important documents of the 
CCP from 1937 on), pp.62-68, The three categories are outlined on 
pp.62-64,
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Those localities which had been placed in the first category 
were areas in which the May 4th 1946, directive had already been 
carried out. These areas had experienced the campaign for rent 
and interest reduction, the "settling of accounts" and land 
distribution^ This-, category was characterized in terms of class 
analysis by a large, class, of middle peasants, which constituted 
from fifty to'eighty per cent of the local population. More than 
half of this percentage was classified as "new middle peasant".. 
Similarly,, these areas had more "newf than "old rich peasants".
In the second category, however, the pattern of land refoim 
was relatively more’ uneven. In parts of these areas, the "settling 
of accounts" and land reform had already been carried out, but else­
where due to bureaucratism, conmandism and wartime conditions, land 
distribution had not been equitable, and remnants of the feudal 
system,still persisted. In those parts where land distribution had 
not been ^borough, there was an unsatisfactory numerical relations 
between."old rich peasants" and landlords on the one hand and "new 
rich peasants" on the>,other, and the bulk of the rural population 
(fifty to eighty per cent) was still made up of poor peasants and 
hired labourers. The middle peasants represented twenty to forty 
per cept:of the population, the greater part of which was "old 
middle.peasant". ...
Jn the ,third SQtegory, although some parts had undergone the 
"settling of accounts" and land reform, yet worfe was very poor, with 
the result, that the feudal system had not been broken, and landlords 
and riph .peasants retained ownership of a great deal of landed wealth.
In other parts of these areas, land reform was at a complete standstill.
These different sets of conditions necessitated three different 
sets of factics; fpr example, in each of the three categories of 
locality there was a different relation between poor peasant corps 
and peasant associations. Under^the more advanced conditions of 
class metamorphosis, extant in the first category, it was not 
necessary to encourage poor peasant corps to take up leadership in 
the locality. Land distribution had already been carried out, and 
the middle peasants constituted the majority; In this instance, if
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the Party focused too exclusively on poor peasants, it risked
separation from the majority, and for this reason a broader
base in the membership of peasant associations was sought.^
The poor peasant corps were thought to serve a more useful purpose
in localities of the second category, as poor peasants and hired
labourers constituted the majority of the populations in these
areas. In this category, poor peasant corps would continue to be
organized; however, once the majority class had actually gained
leadership, the peasants* associations were to be placed on a 
' .11 ■: '
broader class basis which would include."hew rich peasants", but
exclude "old rich peasants" and landlords. It is in the localities
of the third category that the Party was to expend its greatest
efforts at stimulating the leadership of the poor peasant corps.
As for the "newly liberated areas", it was decided to implement 
the Land Law in two. stages. During the first stage, the rich 
peasants were to be neutralized, and the landlords isolated and 
attacked. In the second stage the Party would concentrate on 
distributing the land, rented by .the rich peasants. The pace of 
land reform in these areas had to be closely correlated with local 
circiimstarises, in particular the level of political consciousness of 
the local masses. By forcing the pace the CCP would have violated 
the conciliatory spirit of United front and antagonized the rural 
populations in those areas with little experience of CCP policies.
The Parfy had experienced serious deviations In North China 
land reform. / In 1946-47, middle peasants had been antagonized 
and industrial and commercial enterprise destroyed. In conjunction 
with the new emphasis on China*s cities and the development of urban 
production to support the new positional war, Mao and Jen Pi-shih 
adopted a soft line on class struggle in the countryside.
20. Note Mao*s comments in "Essential Points in Land Reform", SW, 
Vol.IV, p„20l.
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A Party directive of May 25th 1948, established three
conditions which had to be.met prior to the initiation of land
reform in a particular area, namely, the elimination of enemy
armed forces, the presence of a sufficient number of experienced
Party cadres, and a demand on the part of the majority of farm
21
labourers, poor and middle peasants for land reform. The
directive specifically excluded from the implementation of land 
reform areas in North, Northeast and Northwest China, which bordered 
on enemy territory, and also the area enclosed by the Yangtze,
Huai, Yellow and Han Rivers, which was under the jurisdiction of
' ■ 22 
the Central Plains Bureau of the Central Committee.
Hie Party was especially sensitive to its lack of a political
base in the "newly liberated areas". It was feared that a lightning
campaign of land reform imposed on a politically unprepared populace,
would jeopardize production in a time of- economic and fiscal crisis
and disrupt the gradual process of political integration. Hence, in
August 1948, the Central Plains Bureau of the CCP Central Committee
made an about-face and ordered the cessation of land distribution
and a return to rent and interest reduction. An editorial of August
4th 1948, explained the Party's position in the following terms:
"We in the Central Plains Liberated Region must 
as in the case of all newly liberated areas throughout 
the country carry out land reform without exception.
This is absolutely basic policy of our Party and Army.
We have no intention to deceive anyone on this point, 
but it must be appreciated that in order to carry out 
land reform there has to be an appropriate context as 
well as. adequate political preparation."22
21. Mao Tse-timg, "The Work of Land Reform and of Party 
Consolidation", SW, Vol.'IV, pp.254-55.
22« Ibid.. p.255. „
230 See Lun hsin-chieh~fang ch*u thu-ti cheng-tsfe , (On land 
policy in the newly liberated areas), Hsin-hua shurtien, 
1949, p.12. •
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It should be stressed that the threefold classification of 
"old”, "serai-old'1, "newly liberated areas", was not exclusive to 
land reform, but also pertained to other types of work such as the 
building.of people16 democratic state power (which was integrated 
to a degree with the process of land reform), the propagation of 
new culture, etc. This classification was central to.the strategy 
for social revolution in the countryside. The application of the 
mass line was first attempted at key-points, which acted as 
reference points for the further development;of new contiguous 
points. Fundamental ,to the Party’s strategic thinking was the 
inter-relation of "advanced", "intermediate" and "backward" areas. 
Intermediate and backward areas would relate to advanced areas.
The momentum in advanced areas would propel intermediate and back­
ward areas forward.. Cadres, who experienced the mass' line in "old" 
and "semi-old liberated areas" could be exported to the "newly 
liberated areas".
The map on p.58 is particularly useful as it gives a rough 
idea of the extent of CCP liberated area in the summer of the 
second year of the Civil War, prior to the PLA’s lightning advance
south of the Yangtze and prior to.the breakdown of the inter-
' 24
relation between armed struggle and social revolution.
24. This map is extracted from PLA General Headquarters, Chung-kuo
jen-rain chleh-fang chan-cheng san-nien chan-hsu. (Battle results 
of three -years of-PLA warfare), July 1949. Unfortunately, the map 
does not distinguishvthe full extent of "semi-old liberated area". 
The double red criss-cross pattern indicates area, which the CCP 
cl aimed'1 (it would seem rather generously) to have held at the time 
when "Bandit" Chiang.initiated large-scale Civil War in 1946. The 
single-line angular red pattern indicates areas liberated in the 
first year of the war, July 1946-July 1947. The solid red is area 
liberated in the second year, while the dispersed red dottings are 
areas of guerilla- activity. The small areas of blue-lining are 
areasv-. pc-fcahen by the. ’f W T  : ‘ " . ’ ’’ • :
th e
I Map of Liberated Areas 
of June 1948.
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The later demarcation of the GARs was such that as much "old" 
and "semi-old liberated area” as geographically possible was 
included in East China, Central-South and Northwest China; for 
example, Shantung, which might well have been placed within the 
geographical context of the North China Plain, was situation 
within East China so that "oid liberated.area” could exert 
influence on ”newly liberated area” . Similarly, the ”newly 
liberated areas” in 'South Kiangsu and South Anhwei were to relate 
to ”old liberated area” in North Kiangsu and North Anhwei.
The pattern of military conquest, the success of the Peiping- 
Suiyan approach and the Party's switch to a go-easy approach to 
agrarian reform and to a conciliatory approach towards the national 
bourgeoisie dramatically affected the course of national political 
integration, as the inter-relation of armed struggle with social 
revolution, the creation of people's democratic state power and 
economic reconstruction was different in different parts of the 
country. This inter-relation was different in "old” , "semi-old” 
and "newly liberated areas” , and there was a very broad general 
difference between north and south. Mao discussed these differences 
in March 1949: /
"Conditions in the south are different from those in 
the north, and the Party's tasks must also be different.
The squth is still under Kuomintang rule. There, the 
tasks of the Party and the People's Liberation Army are to 
wipe'out the Kuomintang's reactionary armed forces in 
city and countryside, set up Party organizations, set up 
organs of political power, arouse the masses, establish 
trade unions, peasant associations.... In the countryside, 
our first tasks- are to wage struggles step by step, to 
clean out the bandits, and to oppose the local tyrants... 
in order to complete preparations for the reduction of rent 
and interest. ...At the same time, care must be taken 
to maintain the present level of agricultural production 
as far as possible, and to prevent it from declining. In 
the north, except for the few new Liberated Areas, conditions 
are.completely different. Here the Kuomintang has been over­
thrown, the people's rule has been established and the land 
problem has been fundamentally solved. Here the central task 
of the Party is to mobilize.all forces to restore and develop ^5 
production; this should be the centre of gravity in all work.”
25. Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh 
Central Committee.of the Communist Party of China", March 5th 1949, 
SW, Vol. IV, pp.365-366. ;
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The operational headquarters for agrarian reform, as well 
as the other campaigns of the early 1950*s in the "newly liberated 
areas", were set up at GAR level, hence the GAR governments were 
primarily responsible for bringing the various•areas within their 
jurisdiction to a common point of political integration. We might 
now turn to review briefly the formative development of each GAR.
The demaraction of the GAR administrations are set forth in the 
map on p.6 1 ,26
North China Liberated Region 1
The North .China Liberated Region is particularly important 
as the North China People*s Government acted at one point as a 
de facto central government. One might also note in this connection, 
that in October 1949, the NCPG made a significant contribution to 
the staffing and organization of the new Central Peopie*s Government.
On May 20th 1948, the two regional bureaux of Chin-ch*a-Chi 
•r * 
and Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Regions were merged to form the North
China Bureau of the CCPCC. The two corresponding military districts
had earlier been merged to create the North China Military District,
and one might also note that units of the three armies, which were
brought together to form the North China Field Army, unlike the
units assigned to the other field armies, were placed under the
direct command of the PLA General Headquarters.
On June 15th, the Jen-min jih-pao announced the creation of 
the North China Liberated Region. The paper stressed that it was 
not possible to unify the whole of the country, but that the pattern 
in North China would soon be repeated in the Northeast, Northwest,
27
Central Plains and East China. North China was to be regarded as
26. There is' a map in English available in People*s China. October 1950, 
Vol.2, No.7, pp.17-18. See Chinese map in Chung-hua ien-min kung-ho 
kuo fen-sheng ti-t*u« (Maps of the provincial divisions of the 
People*s Republic of China), Shanghai, 1951, Map.No.20. * For the 
convenience of the reader, the population figures of the various GARs 
are here set forth; East China, 140,928,712; Northeast China, 
41,570,678;< •North China, 67,068,386; Northwest China, 23,472,480; 
Central-South China, 136,775,290; Southwest China, 70,634,691. These 
figures were compiled by the Ministries of the Interior, Agriculture, 
Finance and Trade and Office of Statistics of the GAC Committee of 
Economic and Financial Affairs, and are available in Hsin-wen pao.
Hong Kong, in SCMP, No.466, December 5th 1952, p.18.
27. JMJP (shihchiachuang edition), June 15th 1948.
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a firm base while the PLA was militarily engaged in other regions.
In this region, the CCP was in a position to begin the tasks of 
restoration and reconstruction. The Jen-min jih-pao appealed for 
the restoration of agricultural production, the completion of land 
reform, "crack troops and simple administration", the reform of 
management methods in industry, the revival of handicrafts, the 
repair of irrigation, the planned distribution of raw materials, 
the strengthening of united front organizations, the establishment 
of people's governments, etc.
On June 26th in Shihchiachuang, a joint session of the Chin-
tt
Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region Consultative Conference and the Resident 
Committee of the Chin-Ch*a-Chi Border Region Consultative 
Conference, passed a resolution calling for elections to the North 
China Provisional People's Congress (hua-pei lin-shih jen-min tai- 
piao ta-hui).
During the first session of the North China Provisional 
People's Congress, which lasted from August 7th to 19th, government 
leaders of the various North China border regions reported on the 
work of border region governments over the last two years. The
II
Chairman of the Chin-Chi-Lu-Yu Border Region government, Yang Hsiu- 
feng, was happy to report that the feudal system had been wiped out 
in "old" and "semi-old liberated" districts of seme 21,500,000 
people/ Similarly, the Chairman of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region
government reported that ninety per cent of his border region had
28
already undergone land distribution. The Congress elected the 
North China People's Government Council (NCPGC) on September 4th.
The delegates then approved draft regulations for temporary 
agrarian taxation in North Chin^ as well as regulations for the 
creation of city, hsien and village people's democratic state power.
Tung P.i-wu, in his new capacity as Chairman of the NCPGC, 
delivered the opening address at the Congress. He noted that although 
the present Congress was "regional" and "provisional" in nature, it
28, US.Consulate-General, Peking, Translation of North Shensi Radio 
Broadcasts, September 1948, p.2.
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was basically different from past conventions held in liberated 
29
areas. The Congress was said to represent the establishing of 
new democratic state power in North China, and in general outline 
was similar to East European democracies. The composition of 
the Congress reflected the structure of the united front, and it 
was held up as a model in the context of the preparation for a 
new Political.Consultative Conference to replace the 'bogus” one 
of 1946.'
News of the North China Provisional People's Congress was
received warmly by the various democratic parties in Hong Kong.
The coalition character of the NCPG was stressed in the Hong Kong
press; for example, one paper described the new government as
"the foundation for the future federal democratic coalition
government."30 '
Nieh Jung-chen, one of the keynote speakers at the Congress,
pointed out that with the exception of the Shen-Kan-Ning Border
Region, North China was the oldest liberated region and constituted
31
a base where the Party had enjoyed a long period of work. Like 
his colleagues, Nieh stressed the high degree of political 
consciousness of the North China population and the successful 
implementation of land reform in the region.
Northeast Liberated Region 
Except for North China, the' greatest concentration of 
"old liberated area" was situated in the northeast, and the level 
of political integration there could be roughly compared to that 
of North China. ’
During the August 1946 meeting of delegates from the various 
localities -in the Northeast, the Joint Office of the Administrative
29. JMJP (Shihchiachuang edition), September 11th 1948, p.l.
30. U,S„ Consulate-General, Hong Kong, Review of the H ong Kong Chinese 
Press. No.152, "Light Comes from the North", September 2nd 1948.
31. JMJP (Shihchiachuang edition), September 11th 1948, p.l.
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32.
33.
34.
35.
Affairs of the Provinces and Municipalities of the Northeast
(hsing-cheng lieh-ho pan-shih ch’u ) was established. The 186
delegates discussed the unified planning of promotion of local 
32
government.
According to CCP periodization, the CCP-KMT conflict in the
Northeast passed through three stages leading up the capture of
33
Mukden and regionwide liberation. During the first stage, lasting 
from September 1945 to December 1946, the KMT forces spread over a 
wide area, while the CCP moved back to interior lines in the hinter­
land. During the second stage, January 1947 to April 1947, the KMT 
adopted a strategy of holding the nprth while attacking the south, 
but eventually switched to a defensive posture altogether. From 
May 1947 to August 1948, the CCP took the offensive, cutting up 
KMT lines and isolating KMT military forces. In a period of fifty 
days the CCP recovered forty-two cities, hence the necessity for
the "shift in the centre of gravity of Party work”.
i
On June 9th 1948, the Standing Committee of the Northeast
.... l.
Administrative Committee detailed the composition of delegates to
34
the forthcoming. Northeast People’s Representative Congress. At
r • • • .•
the second plenary session of the Northeast Administrative Committee
• - i
on July 21st 1948, it was noted that land r eform was almost
completed, and the call went out to conduct elections at the
” 35
municipal, hsien, and c h ru levels.
As in North China, a campaign was waged in Party and government
agencies against anarchism and indiscipline. The process of
political integration of the Northeast Liberated Region was greatly
enhanced by the convening in the last weeks of August 1949, of the
Northeast People’s representative Congress. On August 29th, Lin Feng,
JMJP (Wuan edition), August 20th 1946, p.l.
JMJP (Shihchiachuang edition), August 26th 1948, p<,2. 
North Shensi Radio', June 12th 1949.
JMJP (Shihchiachuang edition), September 16th 1948, p„2.
. -ci -
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as the Chairman of the Northeast Administrative Committee (tung- 
pei hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui)> reported to the Congress on the work 
of the government during the past three years. Lin Feng warmly 
praised the enthusiasm of the people in the Northeast in furthering 
the war effort. 1,600,000 workers and peasants of the Northeast had 
joined the PLA. Lin briefly reviewed the development of the land 
reform campaign, which had started in July 1946. The Land law, 
promulgated by the CCP Central Committee in October 1947, had been 
adapted to local conditions in the Northeast, and the process had 
unfolded along a north-south axis. Land reform in most areas of 
Northern Manchuria had been completed in the spring of 1948; 
however, it was not until the spring of 1949 that the process was 
basically completed in the new areas of Southern Manchuria.
In terms of the economic development of the Northeast, the
liberation of Mukden in November 1948, proved to be a turning point.
At that time, according to the analysis of Li Fu-ch'un, Vice-
chairman of the Northeast People's Government, the Party turned its
attention away from the problems of the liberation struggle and
37
concentrated on the restoration of production. Li echoed the 
sentiments of the leaders of the CCPCC and stressed the northeast's 
significance in terms of the future of national industrialization.
The relation of the northeast to the national pattern of 
political integration was somewhat paradoxical. The process of 
economic reconstruction was already well under way in the Northeast 
during the summer of 1949, and the Party decided to insulate the 
Northeast economy from the regional economies south of the Great 
Wall, where financial and economic conditions were more directly 
affected by the war. By protecting Northeastern industry from
36. For the text of Lin Feng's remarks see JMJP, Peking edition,
August 29th 1949, p.2.
37o Li Fu-ch'un, "Kuan-yu i-chiu-wu~ling nien tung-pei t s 'ai-ching-chi 
chi-hua ti pao-kao11. (Report on the economic and financial plan 
for the Northeast in 1950) in CFKTPK, 1950, p.408o
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inflation south of the wall, the Party would seem to have involved 
itself in an apparent contradiction, for such protection came at 
the cost of inhibiting the programme for the nationwide unification 
of regional currencies. The introduction of the jen-min pi into 
the Northeast was delayed, but by protecting industry in the North­
east the Party was assuring itself a viable base with which to 
launch a national programme of industrialization once the Civil War
came to an end. In effect, the Party cultivated the industry of
38
a particular region in the national interest.
The 1949 trade agreement between the Northeast People’s 
Government and the Soviet Union must also be placed in the context 
of this strategic emphasis. Since it had ben decided to focus on 
the development of industry in the northeast, the necessity of an 
agreement with the Russians, which included the importation of 
machinery and materials necessaty to industry, would seem self- 
explanatory. Since there was no recognized central government in 
China at the time of the treaty negotiations, and since the highest 
level of government at that time was at the GAR level, it is not 
surprising that the NEPG was involved in the treaty. Even after 
the creation of the central government, MACs were assigned functions 
in foreign affairs.
Central Plains Liberation Region (CSGAR)
Teng Tzu-hui, in his report to' the inaugural session of the 
Central Plains Military and Administrative Committee, reviewed the 
government work of the Central Plains Provisional People’s
M
Government (chung-yuan lin-shih .jen-min cheng-fu) and the history
38. Li Fu-ch’un and others presented this argument to the fourth 
session of the CPGC, and it was subsequently developed in the 
columns of the JMJP. See Li Fu-ch’un, op.cit., p.409, and! 
JMJP, March 31st 1951. The JMJP editorials relating to 
currency unification are reproduced in HHYP, July 1950, Vol.2, 
No.3, pp.613-615.
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of the liberation of the central plains. Overall it took two 
years and four months to liberate the whole of the region, but the 
greater part was liberated in the last six months after the Third 
and Fourth Field Armies crossed the Yangtze in April 1949.
After the liberation of the Kaifeng-Chengchow area in October 
1948, the Party made the "shift in the centre of gravity".
Previously the CCP had concentrated on the countryside areas, 
surrounding the cities, and these areas had been brought under the 
jurisdiction of seven administrative districts. In this formative 
period, the policies of the CCPCC Central Plains Bureau were adapted 
to the different military conditions of each administrative district, 
and each administrative district office exercised a substantial 
degree of autonomy within the policy parameters set by the CCPCC.
But with the great change in objective conditions in the fall of 1948, 
there was need for provincial and supra-provincial organization to 
support the war effort. The switch to positional war necessitated 
greater economic integration in terms of the restoration of urban- 
rural trade interflow, the checking of inflation and the revival of 
industrial and agricultural production.
The thrust towards large regional organization was explicit in 
the December 1948 call for the convening of the All-Circles People’s 
Representative Conference of the Central Plains. In March 1949, the 
Conference convened and elected a provisional people’s government.
In the subsequent months, the Fourth Field Army moved further south 
and the Central Plains Region became the larger Central China Region
If
(Hua-chung c h ’u ). At the second session of the government council 
various administrative districts were abolished so as to pave the way 
for the organization of the Honan and Hupeh provincial governments.
i-
In September 1949, the PLA made another breakthrough, penev- 
trating the province of Kiangsi and most of the province of Hunan.
The provincial government and Kiangsi and Hunan and the municipal 
government of Wuhan were organized while the army prepared for an
39. Teng Tzu-hui, "Chung-yllan lin-shih jen-min cheng-fu chin-i nien 
lai ti shih-cheng kung-tso", (Administrative activities of the 
Central Plains Provisional People’s Government over the past year), 
in HHYP, Vol.l, No.5, 1950, p.1126.
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attack on South China. Canton was liberated thirteen days after 
the creation of the Central People’s Government. The Central 
China Region was expanded to include Liangkwang, hence the 
new designation, the Central-South Greater Administration Region 
(chung-nan ta-hsing cheng-ch*u).
During the first plenary session of the Central-South MAC,
Vice-chairman Teng Tzu-hui, commented on the plans for the political
transition in the vast "newly liberated regions" of Central-South 
40
China.. He announced that government systems were to conform 
with old administrative demarcations, and that government organs 
were to be created from top to bottom, from the province down to
II
c^’u . In terms of the creation of military systems, Teng 
recommended that "localization" (ti-fang hua) be emphasized,and 
that each local guerilla force should act as the backbone of local 
military organization.
The cadres were told to concentrate first on the takeover of 
the cities. In the case of large and medium sized cities, the 
transition was supervised by either an MCC, or a Provisional Work 
Committee. Once the process of takeover in the cities had been 
completed, the cadres were then to move into the surrounding 
countryside. In the countryside during the transition tjhe CCP 
followed the ideologically distasteful, but pragmatically necessary 
policy of retaining the services of former pao-chia officials. The 
Party acted to avoid chaos and indicated that it was a good opportunity 
for these officials to atone for their sins, and the promise was 
held out that upon rendering meritorious service such officials 
would be retained as cadres, even after the establishment of the 
people’s democratic state power.
Teng in his analysis provided an interesting note on cadre
41
composition in Central-South China. 10,000 cadges had been 
transferred from North China to Central-South China, and 8,000 more 
had been transferred from Northeast China. The CSMAC authorities
40. Teng Tzu-hui, Administrative activities etc., op.cit..
section two, pp.1126-1127.
41o Ibid.o section two, poll27.
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also drew on the membership, of underground Party organization, 
which was concentrated particularly in the provinces of Kwangsi, 
Hunan and Kwangtung. Altogether the cadres, who originated with 
the underground Party apparatus, numbered 5,000. Hie Party also 
actively recruited local intellectual and working class activists.
Teng talked at length concerning the gap between city and 
countryside. He was especially concerned about the disruption of 
the flow of trade between the countryside and city due to a 
complexity.of factors such as the wartime destruction of 
communications, spiralling inflation and the lack of currency 
unification. Urban industry was starved of raw materials, and 
there were food shortages. Teng noted the basic change in policy 
from exploitation of cities to the careful husbanding of cities as
important economic assets. He did not care to comment too
specifically on the effects of the CCP's own impulses towards
autarchy, and instead he commented on the KMTTs disruption of the
relation between country and city:
"This phenomenon [i.e. the disruption of trade and 
the separation of city and countryside] is essentially 
the nefarious consequence of an antithesis between 
countryside and city, which the former KMT regime has 
bequeathed us. Although the cities have been liberated, 
a large part of the countryside remains yet in the grip 
of feudal forces, and this is the reason why this 
phenomenon has developed,. However, in the past we were 
placed in the.context of wartime divisions and used the 
countryside to surround the cities. In the past we were 
accustdmed to the enemy blockade. We controlled 
imports and experts, and we collected taxes locally. As 
for the old set of techniques of the various semi- 
autonomous governments, although we have already under­
gone a change in terms of regional and countryside 
unification, yet there has been no immediate change in 
this same set of techniques, and these techniques have ^  
impeded closer relations between city and countryside."
42. Teng Tzu-hui, Administrative activities, etc., op.cit., 
section three, pp.1127-1128.
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Before officials in Central-South China could begin a 
programme of agrarian reform, they had to create conditions of 
political stability. Unlike North China and Northeast China,
■f.
Central-South China and similarly Northwest, Southwest and East 
China were characterized by widespread social disorder. In the 
reports of officials of the latter four regions, constant 
reference was made to the KMTfs "so-called guerilla warfare".
KMT guerillas, local despots and bandits were tied together as 
subversive elements. In- accordance with the official view of the 
CCP, the KMT, having lost at positional warfare then turned to 
subversion in the hope of denying the CCP full control over the 
countryside,, While it may be difficult to establish whether or 
not the KMT did have such a grand design, and actually managed to 
co-ordinate hostility in the countryside against the CCP, one can 
say that'Inhere was a serious threat to social order in the 
countryside, which manifested itself in sniping, looting and the 
disruption of harvesting and tax collection Hie retrogressive 
social phenomena, which characterized warlordism, did not, of 
course, immediately disappear with the declaration of a peoplefs 
republic.
Teng Tzu-hui outlined the three steps to be taken to
43
eliminate social disorder. The first step was primarily to 
involve military action, designed to reduce the numbers of enemy 
agents and bandits, and to throw their bands into confusion. The 
second stage was one of political action coupled with complementary 
military action. 'Hie leaders of the bandit gangs were to be 
arrested and the masses were to be activated. The third stage 
exclusively involved mass movements.
There were certain tasks,for which any one region would have 
greater responsibility than the other regions; for example, the 
East China military establishment was particularly responsible for 
the liberation of Taiwan. The CSMAC, on the other hand, was
43. Teng Tzu-hui, Administrative activities, etc., op.cit.. 
section four, pp.H28o
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responsible for the logistical support of the Second and Fourth 
Field Armies in the military campaigns in South and Southwest 
China°
Once the liberation of South and Southwest China had been
accomplished, the Central-South and South China military
establishments were still responsible for the liberation of Hainan
and the various small islands off the southern coast of China. It
is significant that within the Central-South Greater Administrative
Region, the fiscal burden was apportioned in accordance with the
timetable of political integration at local levels.
. General T'an Cheng in a report on the military tasks of t h e -
South China region for,1950, noted that the PLA had three general
responsibilities, namely the liberation of the South China islands,
the elimination of bandits and enemy agents, and finally production 
44and "education'’. In Liangkwang, parts of west and south Hunan
and west Hupeh, the array was to focus first on the liberation of
Hainan and elimination of banditry. In the "semi-old liberated
areas" of Honan and Hupeh, where the bandit question had been
resolved as well as in parts of Kiangsi and Hunan, where the bandit
question had been basically resolved, the military was to place
a priority on production in keeping with M aors December 5th 1949,
directive, which urged the ?LA to engage in production in order
to.help overcome the government's financial crisis. T ’an proposed
as an approach to bandit suppression, "a necessary and progressive
decentralization" of military units, and the South Chian authorities
had, in fact already begun to implement a policy of "localization of
45
independent divisions" (ti-fang hua ti ko tu~li shih).
44. T fan Cheng, ”Kuan~yu i-chiu-wu-ling nien chung-nan chun ch'ti 
wu-chuang pu-tui kung-tso jen-wu ti pao-kao", (Report on the 
work tasks of 1950: for military units of the Central-South 
Military District), in HHYP, May 1950, Vol.l, No.l, p.16.
45. Ibid., p d 6.
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East China Liberated Region
The East China Liberated Region was in a slightly better
position, ,as compared with the Central-South, to advance the process
of political integration, as there were larger tracts of "old
liberated area" in that region, and this region had earlier contact
with the North China border regions.
Shantung had acted as the hinge, connecting East and North
China* and had also acted as the logistical base for the PLA’s
penetration into the central-eastern part of China. After the
CCPTs victory in the Huai-hai campaign the various bases in North
Anhwei were brought under centralized leadership. Tseng Hsi-sheng
in a report on government work conditions in the North Anhwei
Administrative District paid tribute to the tremendous efforts of
the people of North Anhwei in assisting the PLA in the crossing of 
46
the Yangtze.
The logistical back-up of the crossing was a mammoth under­
taking. A branch of the East China Finance and Economic Affairs 
Office was set up at the front to co-ordinate the supply effort.
After the liberation of Shanghai* the functions of the branch office 
were transferred to the Shanghai Finance and Economic Takeover 
Committee. The problem-, involved in supplying the PLA in South Anhwei, 
South Kiangsu and Chekiang were particularly difficult as local state 
organs had yet to be established in these areas.
On December 2nd 1949, Jao Shu-shih reported to the fourth
session of the Central People's Government Council on political and
47
economic conditions in East China. Implicit, if not explicit in 
his remarks was a note of complaint concerning the heavy fiscal 
burden imposed on East China by the central authorities. East China
46. Tseng Hsi-sheng, "Kuan-yu Wan-pei hsing-cheng c h Tu kung-tso ching- 
k fuang ti pao-kao" (Report on work conditions in the North Anhwei 
Administrative District), in CFKTPK, 1950, p.685.
47. Jao Shu-shih, "Kuan-yu hua^-tung kung-tso ching-lAiang ti pao-kao". 
(Report on the work conditions in East China), CFKTPK, 1950,
pp.543-544.
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was being asked to assimilate 32 per cent of the burden of national
revenue collection. While Jao was prepared to admit that the task
was indeed glorious, he felt it was extremely onerous in the light
of conditions,prevailing in Bast China. He noted that East China
would have to absorb most of the financial shock associated with
the anticipated liberation of Taiwan and the Chusan Islands. Jao
asked the central authorities to consider the fact that East China
had to support 2,000,000 field array personnel, regional and local
personnel and former KMT personnel. He indicated that he was
worried over conditions in East China’s "newly liberated areas".
The various levels of state organization had yet to be set up in
some areas, the "feudal" landlords still controlled the villages,
and bandit gangs persisted in disrupting social order. East China
was suffering from severe famine in Shantung, North Kiangsu and
North Anhwei, and the KMT blockade and bombardment of Shanghai and
the east coast had resulted in the stoppage of foreign trade and
the disruption of communications lines.feeding Shanghai industry.
It was this latter point which made the liberation of Taiwan
48
imperative in Jao’s view. He linked hostile forces in the East 
China countryside with the continued presence of the KMT on Taiwan.
At the first plenary session of the ECMAC, in late January 1950, 
Jao and his colleagues discussed the preparations for the assault 
on Taiwan and reviewed the process of political integration in the 
region. Jao indicated that in the following three months all towns 
of 30,000 or more were to convene all-circle people’s representative 
conferences. All provinces (except Taiwan) and administrative 
districts were scheduled to convene all-circles people’s 
representative conferences during 1950, and as soon as conditions 
permitted, the East China All-Circles People’s Representative 
Conference was to be convened.
48. For an assessment of the military problems involved in the 
liberation of Taiwan refer to Su Yii, "Kuan-yu hua-tung chun-shih 
ching-k’uang ti pao-kao". (Report on the state of military affairs 
in East China), in Shanghai chieh-fang i-nien. pp.27-29.
49. Jao Shu-shih, "Kuan-yu hua-tung chun-cheng wei-yuan hui kung-tso 
jen-wu ti pao-kao", (Report on the tasks of the ECMAC) in CFKTPK, 
1950, p.550,
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Northwest and Southwest Liberated Regions
The northwest and southwest were the last regions to be 
liberated. The campaign to liberate the southwest did not really 
get under way until after the founding of the People's Republic.
As of October 1st 1949, there was still a one thousand mile enemy 
front, but whereas it had taken two years and four months to 
liberate all of the Central-South, the PLA liberated the Southwest 
in less than 57 days. Both regions shared a common problem in 
terms of the density of national minority populations. But the 
northwest had a "leading factor", namely the old Shen-Kan-Ning 
Border Region, whereas the Southwest did not.
P«ng Teh-huai made a report to the fifth session of the CPGC
on January 7th 1950, which outlined conditions in the Northwest.
Peng noted that the Sinkiang and Ninghsia provincial governments
had already been formed and that cadres were at that moment
organizing provincial governments in Shensi, Kansu and Chinghai.
Obviously he could not make the same kind of claims as Jao Shu-shih,
Chairman of the ECMAC, or Kao Kang, Chairman of the NEPGC, in terms
of the significance of industrial development in his region, but he
did stress the abundance of natural resources in the northeast. The
central authorities nonetheless chose to assign an agricultural role
50
to the northwest for "a definite period".
The northwest was characterized by vast stretches of land 
and a thin population. Although the region sprawled over almost 
one third of China’s land mass, less than five per cent of China’s 
population resided there. Physical distance and communications 
constituted a problem in so far as the economic integration of the 
Northwest with the rest of China’s economic system was concerned. 
Trade with Russia appeared not only as inviting, but necessary.
Peng favoured closer trading relations with the Russians and 
criticized the policies of the former KMT regime, which had 
resulted in disruptions of Sino-Russian trade.
tt
50o Peng Teh-huai, "Kuan-yu hsi-pel kung-tso ching-k'uang ti pao-kao" 
CFKTPK, 1950, pp.413-414.
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Peng elaborated on the plan for work in the northwest,
stressing that the key to work was to act "in accordance with
different local conditions” (an-chao pu-t*ung ching-^uang ti ti- 
51
c h fti). Whereas in the "old liberated areas" the NWMAC intended 
to develop production and facilitate economic recovery, in the 
"semi-old liberated areas", the focus was on mass mobilization 
and the completion of agrarian reform.
At the inaugural session of the NWMAC in January 1950, Peng
52
reviewed the schedule for land reform in the northwest. Part of 
west Shensi, different localities of Kansu and Ninghsia and a 
special region of Chinghai were earmarked for land reform in the 
period between the autumn harvest of 1950 to the spring planting 
of 1951. Peng hoped that land reform would be completed in all 
areas of Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi and in most of Chinghai by spring, 
1.952, but he impressed on his colleagues the point that a very 
selective and cautious approach was to be adopted in areas where 
minority nationalities resided, and that cadres were first to start 
in rural areas, in which there was a composite population of Han 
and minorities.
Peng indicated that people*s representative conferences at
ft
the ch*u and hsiang levels were to be entrusted with the 
responsibility for creating the legal apparatus necessary to the 
prosecution of land reform. It was anticipated that provincial 
all-circles people’s representative conferences would soon be 
convened in Kansu, Ninghsia, Chinghai, Sinkiang and Shensi. The 
All-Circles People’s Representative Conference of the NWGAR was 
to be convened in 1951.
With the rapid military collapse of the KMT elsewhere in 
China, it is not surprising that the PLA covered more territory 
in shorter time in the Southwest than anywhere else, and that the 
"Peiping" and "Suiyuan" patterns fell on particularly fertile ground
51. Peng Teh-huai, "Kuan-vu etc.." on-ci^o, .p.414. „
52. Peng Teh-huai, "Kuan-vu mu-chien hsi-pei ti-chjju ti kung-tso
jen-wu", HIIYP, Vol.l, No.5, pp. 1124-25.
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in the Southwest. The four Military and Administrative Committees
in the CSGAR, ECGAR, NWGAR and the SWGAR were experiencing
finamcial difficulties, but these difficulties Were particularly
severe in the Southwest, due to the costs of demobilization. The
Vice-chairman of the SWMAC, Teng Hsiao-ping reviewed the situation
in the SWGAR for the benefit of the members of the CPGC on April 
53
11th 1940, On November 1st 1949, units of the First, Second and 
Fourth Field Armies initiated the campaign to liberate the southwest. 
On the 29th, "Bandit'1 Chiang fled "ignominiously". On the 30th, 
units of the Second and Fourth Field Armies triumphantly entered 
Chungking. Major military operations were concluded on December 
27 th „ Within fifty-seven days, the PLA marched 3,000 li and 
inactivated 900,000 (400,000 of whom had surrendered and were 
taken prisoner, while another 400,000 had changed sides).
Teng summed up the implications of the "Peiping" and "Suiyuan"
patterns: "If we donft manage well the problems involved in the
feeding and clothing of some 2,000,000 men then there will be ■
54
chaos"* Like his colleagues in the other three MACs, Teng Hsiao- 
ping was worried about KMT threats to disrupt social order in the 
countryside. According to his intelligence reports, the KMT, after 
the CCP*s victory in the Huai-hai campaign, had already begun 
preparation for "so-called guerilla warfare", and some 5,000 agents 
had reportedly been trained in Szechwan to organize ,this type of 
warfare. Unless the CCP quickly established its ability to support 
the 900,000 military personnel and 400,000 civilian personnel, whom 
the CCP inherited from the KMT, there was the real danger of a 
resurgence of warlordism and banditry on a large scale. Initially, 
the SWMAC experienced grave financial difficulties, and Teng 
revealed that southwest tax receipts would not even account for 
20 per cent of regional government expenditure.
53. Teng Hsiao-ping, "Kuan-yu hsi-nan kuna-tso ching-k*uang ti pao-kao" 
CFKTPK, 1950, p.989.
54. Ibid., p.991.
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The Chairman of the SWMAC, Liu Po-ch’eng, anticipated that
demobilization in the SWGAR would be further complicated by the
influx of military personnel returning from other GARs. In
accordance with the CCP’s generous co-optation programme, KMT
officers were offered transport to their native districts.
Demobilization Work Committees were set up at various levels to
declassify KMT personnel and assist in their training for employment
in civilian life. Liu instructed that the PLA should first tdrn to
problems of banditry and demobilization before turning to carry
out M a o ’s directive of December 5th, calling for PLA involvement 
55
m  production.
One report indicated that there was a great deal of opposition
to the CCP’s tax collections in the countryside.5 ^ Apparently,
2,000 cadres had died in the attempt to collect the public grain
tax. Aside from problems of deliberate sabotage, sniping and the
burning of grain by enemy agents and hostile landlords, the rural
population at large was less than enthusiastic to pay a tax on a
harvest, which had already been taxed heavily by the KMT. These
serious problems of social disorder not unnaturally affected the
progress of the first stage of agrarian reform.
Liu Po-ch’eng stressed the inter-relation between the KMT’s
57
"so-called guerilla warfare" and rent and interest reduction.
Like his colleagues on other MACs, such as Jao Shu-shih and Peng 
Teh-huai, he stressed that there must be solid preparation prior 
to the second stage; otherwise, social chaos would favour the 
KMT’s strategy in the countryside.
55o Liu Po-ch’eng, "Hsi-nan ch’u ti kung-tso ien-wu" (Work tasks
of the southwest region), HHYP, Vol.2, No.5, pp.997-998.
56„ Liu Tai-feng, Vice-chairman, SWMAC Economic and Finance Committee, 
"Kuan-vu hsi-nan ts* ai-ching kung-tso ti pao-kao". (Report on the
Southwest economic and finance work), July 27th 1950, CFKTPK, p a992.
Also see William Skinner, "Aftermath of Communist Liberation in the 
Chengtu Plain", Pacific Affairs. March 1951, Vol. XXIV, No.l, p.64.
57. Liu Po-ch’eng, "Hsi-nan c h ’u ti kung-tso .ien-wu", (Work tasks of
the southwest region), HHYP, Vol.2, No.5, pp.996-999.
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Hie Southwest authorities faced a formidable task of regional
political integration at a time when government and Party systems
were suffering from a staggering shortage of experienced personnel.
The core of SWMAC personnel was made up of cadres from three source?,
namely, personnel exported from "old liberated areas", PLA and local
underground Party personnel. This core of 30,000 represented a
'sixth of the regional cadre work force. Fifty per cent of the work
force was composed of retained KMT personnel. The remainder consisted
58
of student, worker and peasant activists.
Supra-provincial organization emerged in the context of a 
process of political integration, which was based on an inter­
relation of armed struggle with processes of social revolution, 
economic construction and the establishment of people’s democratic 
state power. This inter-relation as of October 1st 1949, was most 
advanced in North China and Northwast China, where agrarian reform 
had been basically completed and where united-front style 
governments were created. The inter-relation was less advanced in 
Central-South and Past China, and was almost non-existent in the 
Southwest and Northwest GARs. The Central-South, East China, South­
west and Northwest China had yet to achieve agrarian reform, while 
the Northeast and to a certain extent North China, were already 
engaged in the process of economic reconstruction.
In the early 1950’s the GAR structures played an important role 
in the creation of new national state structure and that role was 
played out in the very specific context of a very familiar historical 
emphasis on the relation of centralized leadership to local creativity 
and initiative. The structure and functioning of the GAR governments 
reflected a philosophy of administration based on a dialectical unity 
of flexibility and discipline, which maximized the principle of "dual" 
leadership and the horizontal as well as vertical inter-relation of 
different systems of organization.
58. Liu Po-ch’eng, "Hsi-nan ch?u etc.," op.cit„, p.999.
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III
THE CREATION OF A NEW NATIONAL STATE STRUCTURE
In this chapter the question of the role of the Greater 
Administrative Regions in relation to the creation of a new national 
state structure is taken up and examined firstly in terms of the 
inter-relation of military, political and economic factors in the 
progressive elaboration of the new administrative demarcations of 
1949-54, secondly and most importantly in terms of the 
C.C.P’s philosophy of administration, as it relates to the inter­
relation of different levels of government in the course of policy 
formulation and implementation, and thirdly in terms of what is 
described as the '’federalization of the executive machinery", whereby 
parts of the centre were sent down to the GAR level to oversee the 
pattern of national political integration and reduce the "administrative 
distance" between centre and provinces.
i) The Rationality of Regional Administrative Demarcation
Chou Fang, the author of Wo-kuo kuo-chia chi-kou, (China’s 
state structure), once asked what is meant by "administrative
IV
demarcation" (hsing-cheng c h ’u-hua). The question is not only
of concern to the geographer, but is of vital importance to both
the political scientist and the economist. Through an understanding
of the reasons for Chinese Communist "administrative demarcation"
we can, on the one hand gain rich perspective as to the significance
of "regionalism" and on the other, as to the rationale of the
CCP’s approach to China’s economic development.
Chou Fang, in answering his own question not surprisingly
1
adopted a Marxist framework for discussion. Capitalist 
administrative demarcation, he argued, was profoundly affected by 
the ruling class attempt to "divide and rule" (fen erh chih-chih)
1. Chou Fang, WKKCCK, pp.78-79.
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and pre-1949 administrative demarcation reflected China’s
semi-feudal, semi-colonial position in the world of competing
imperialist powers. Chou asserted that post-1949 demarcation
was based on a recognition of and respect for the cultural life
of China’s nationalities and the prerequisites of the people’s
livelihood. The latter emphasis meant talcing into account local
economic conditions, population density and communications
facilities. The CCP advanced the general argument that the KMT
"reactionaries1* and their "imperialist" partners had failed to
2
view China’s natural resources from a total perspective. More 
specifically, it was argued that under KMT policy China’s natural 
resources were extracted piecemeal to the benefit of foreign 
capital.
GAR administrative demarcation to a large extent evolved 
specifically out of the military context of the "War of Resistance" 
and the "Third Revolutionary Civil War". One is keenly aware that 
an analysis of the CCP's wartime experience in relation to this 
demarcation is especially complicated by difficulties in 
isolating military from economic and political factors. The way, 
in which the CCP in 1949 perceived the national economy related 
directly to military strategy, as it evolved in the Sino-Japanese 
and Civil Wars. The way in which various problems of supply, 
consumption communications and transport were perceived relates 
back to the specifics of border region experience.
We might briefly note that the Yenan experience placed a high 
premium on "self-reliance", (tzu-li keng-sheng) the utilization of 
all positive economic factors and the optimizing of local 
resources and manpower. It would seem that these emphases 
determined the parameters of the CCP's thinking on national 
economic development when the Party began to transpose its border 
region experience to the national level in the early 1950*s.
2. For example see Kuo Jui-ch'u, Hui-fu shih-ch'i ti chung-kuo
ching-chi, (The Chinese economy in the period of restoration), 
1953, p.27.
81
We have already seen that "centralized leadership and 
decentralized management" originated with a military perspective 
on the relations of command to guerilla warfare. Indeed, the 
CCP’s whole approach to local economic development is consistent 
with perspectives, relating to military organization. The 
mutually sustaining relationship between local militia organization 
and regional military forces on the one hand, and regional and 
regular, or positional forces on the other, is broadly consistent 
with an economic strategy based on the assumption that local 
economic development will sustain rather than contradict national 
economic development.
One could perhaps add, parenthetically, that military
organization has often been a crucial element in the formation of
state structure in Chinese history. Hie sword was inevitably
the final arbitrator of imperial fortunes. The origins of the
pao-chia system of social control were military. The ideal of the
farmer-soldier, explicit in the system . of military colonization
(t'un-t'ien) is very ancient; for example, the famous Chinese
general, T s ’ao Ts'ao not only used military colonies to overcome
the logistical problems explicit in China's natural geography, but
also to restore agriculture in areas of central China devastated 
3
by war. Later, under the T ’ang dynasty, a divisional militia
system was developed throughout north China on the basis of the
principle of dispersion and self-supply. Once Kiangnan had been
developed as a key economic area, capable of supplying the needs
of the central government bureaucracy and the canal system was
improved, the logic of a self-sufficient defence establishment
4
became less compelling. One might note, however, that the Maoist 
emphasis on self-reliance, which was originally formulated to meet 
the dispersed political and economic conditions of border region 
conflict, became explicit in the very process of national economic 
integration which occurred in the 1950*s.
3. See Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p.37.
4. Ibid., p.65.
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The important question at hand, however, is to what extent 
the 1949 administrative demarcation reflected an economic and/or 
political rationality. Observers in 1949-50 in fact suggested 
that China*s demarcation into Greater Administrative Regions was 
not in the least rational in economic terms. The following 
analysis was offered by the US Consulate-General in Hong Kong:
"It has been suggested that one of the Communists* 
reasons for establishing larger regional groupings on a 
formal basis was a conscious desire to undermine the past 
geographical basis for existing political regionalism and 
thus to restrict the unilateral activities of the provinces.
To a certain extent, the regional units are now 
utilized by the central regime for policy formulation and 
regional planning. Attempts at logical analysis of the 
present regions of Communist China from a strictly 
geographical or economic standpoint, however, do not really 
clarify the rationale employed by the Communists in 
constituting the regional divisions in the first place. It 
may be pointed out, for instance, that few of the regions 
exhibit any major features of an integrated regional economy 
and that some are actually composed of widely differing 
economies, physiographic features, and cultures
The geographer, Norton Ginsberg, came to much the same
conclusion. In his view the division of China into northeast,
north, northwest,- southwest, central-south and east might well
have derived from a deliberate political design to insure that no
one region had sufficient economic potential to challenge the
centre politically. Ginsberg suggested the following axiom:
"The Administrative Areas seem almost to have been 
developed on the assumption that centralized political 
power can be wielded efficiently in inverse proportion 
to the degree of regional development and integration 
possible.1'6
5. CB, No.170, "Pattern of Control", April 8, 1950, p.3.
6. N.S.Ginsberg, "China*s Changing Political Geography", 
Geographic Review, January 1952, pp.102-117, especially p.104.
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In his view, the administrative demarcation of East China and
Central-South China defied China's natural economy, disrupting la­
titudinal economic organization in favour of a longitudinal 
grouping of provinces, which irrationally lumped together double­
cropping rice areas with winter wheat-millet-kaoliang areas.
There is, however, no reason to assume that in the perspective of 
the CCP agriculture or natural geography was the final determinant 
of supra-provincial demarcation.
The development of the Northeast economy does not substantiate 
a hypothesis which suggests the CCP leadership acted on the 
assumption that centralized political power could only be wielded 
efficiently in inverse proportion to the degree of rational 
economic development and integration possible. In fact, the 
leadership strengthened the economic integrity of the Northeast 
region in 1949 when the provinces therein were reduced from ten in 
number to six, and again in August 1954 when the provinces of 
Liaohsi and Liaotung were combined to create Liaoningo During the 
first years of the People*s republic at a time when the central 
government structure was still in an embryonic state, every effort 
was made to promote the integrity of the industrial sector in the 
northeast. In fact, the northeastern economy was then taken 
the base for national economic development.
This "divide and rule" hypothesis underestimates the drive for 
and commitment to economic restoration on the part of the Chinese 
Communist leadership, and overestimates the possibilities of 
"regionalism". One can seriously doubt that the apprehension of 
"regionalism" was so great that the leadership would have adopted 
an administrative structure which in all possibility would have 
seriously jeopardized economic restoration. Furthermore, this 
perspective does seem to suggest that the CCP was not confident of 
the ideological commitment, which had been generated amongst the 
cadres in the previous decades of struggle.
Ginsberg cited the disposition of Shantung province within 
the jurisdiction of the ECMAC as a good example of what he meant 
by the disruption of the "latitudinal organization of China's
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political economy". Writing in 1952, he could not have taken 
into consideration the fact that Shantung was once again placed 
in the overall regional context of East China in July 1957. 
Shantung*s economic relation to the North China Plain has failed 
to impress China's planners. Why? In 1949, as has already been 
argued, there was good reason to place Shantung under ECMAC 
jurisdiction.
Firstly, in terms of political integration, the CCP 
deliberately encouraged a pattern whereby the advanced would 
lead the backward. More specifically, the "old liberated regions" 
of Shantung were to exercise an influence on and act as a point of 
reference for the vast "newly liberated regions" of East China. 
Secondly, the leadership may have placed Shantung within ECMAC's 
jurisdiction in order to facilitate the logistical back-up of the 
projected invasion of Taiwan.
It is difficult to determine just how much deliberate planning 
went into the creation of the regional administrative demarcations 
of 1949. To a large extent these regions were the natural, organic 
outgrowths of specific military and political exigencies of the 
Civil War. In the autumn of 1949, there were immediate 
considerations which had to be taken into account, such as under­
standings with KMT generals, who had defected, the different timing 
of liberation in various parts of the country, the uneven 
development of Party and mass organization, the hitherto uneven 
progress in land reform, and the need to create united front 
organization in the vast "newly liberated regions". The 
alternatives of administrative demarcation were, thus, limited. 
There was little possibility of assuming a theoretical tabula rasa 
and redrawing the map of China so as to conform to absolute 
principles of economic rationality. In this respect, we might turn 
to the following admission of the author of Wo-kuo kuo-chia chi-kou 
(China's state structure):
7. N.S. Ginsberg, op.cit.» p.107.
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"Because the period of Chinese liberation was brief, 
we could not possibly have demarcated administrative regions 
exclusively on the basis of scientific principles as was the 
case in the Soviet Union. We had no alternative but to make 
certain adjustments. Over sevdral years the administrative 
regions underwent several changes and these changes were all 
determined by and consistent with the needs of w o r k . "8
The outlines of the GARs were already distinct prior to the
promulgation of the Organic Regulations of the People*s Government
Councils of the Greater Administrative Regions in December, 1949,
As of 1941, the CCP had control over fifteen revolutionary bases,
but in 1946, the CCP carried out an extensive reorganization cjt
state administration and the following six large regions were
created: Shansi-Chahar-Hopei; Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan;
Shansi-Suiyuan; East China (including former bases in Shantung,
Kiangsu, and Anhwei); North-east China; and the Central Plain
9
(Hopei-Honan).
The move to integrate border regions into larger liberated 
areas had already been anticipated in terms of Party organization® 
Article Twenty-six of the 1945 Party constitution had stipulated:
"To facilitate the direction of the work of the 
provincial and regional Party organizations, the Central 
Committee may, according to the needs of circumstances, 
establish central bureaux and sub-central bureaux, each 
of which shall have jurisdiction over several provinces 
or border regions. The said bureaux shall be appointed 
by the Central Committee and shall be held responsible 
to it. Any of the said bureaux may be abolished or 
merged with any orher(s) when its continued existence 
becomes unnecessary."10
This arrangement in terms of Parry organization was indicative of
the very flexible approach which the CCP took in relation to
problems of organization in the context of shifting military
lines, and herein lies the authority for the creation of the
CCPCC Bureaux, which were attached to the GAR administrations
of the early 1950*s.11
8 . Chou Fan& p.81.
9. Jacques Guillermaz, A History of the Chinese Communist Party. 
1921-1949. p.429.
10. See CB, No.8, September 4, 1950, p.10 for the English text of 
this document.
11. Descriptions of the jurisdictions of these bureaux is available 
in CB, No.48, January 2, 1951, pp.1-12.
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'Tie process of integrating the old border regions into larger 
liberated regions took place over the years 1947-50. It is 
important to note that the GARs took shape in the context of united 
front organization. In the "old liberated regions" the evolution of 
united front organization is obvious. In 1947, the Northeast
tr 2.2
Administrative Committee (Tung-pei hsing-cheng wei-vuan hui). was 
created. Government organization advanced a further step when on 
August 17th, 1949, the Northeast People's Government (NEPG) was 
formally inaugurated. The progress of reintegration and creation of 
people's democratic state power was even faster in North China. As 
a result of a provisional people's conference of August 7th, 1948, 
the North China People's Government (NCPG) came into being. Steps in 
the same direction were taken in Central-South China. The Central 
Plains Bureau of the CCPCC convened in December 1948 an all-circles 
people's representative conference, which led to the establishment of 
the Central Plain Provisional People's Government in March 1949.
In terms of the overall military struggle the PLA had won before 
there was time to allow for the transition from provisional admini­
strative committee to people's government council in the Southwest, 
Northwest, Central-South and East China. Although the four Military 
Administrative Committees, which were created in December 1949, were 
something less in formal constitutional stature than the North-east 
People's Government Council, they, nonetheless, reflected a basic 
united front character; for example, the Northwest GAR was created
when the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia and Shansi-Suiyuan Border Regions were
13
merged in February, 1949. The NWMAC was formally inaugurated at a 
regional congress of January 19th~27th, 1950, and was represented as 
the culmination of the great historical mission of the Shan-Kan-Ning 
Border Region Government. In composition, the NWMAC represented the 
various localities of the NWGAR, the various nationalities, democratic
12. This committee is not to be confused with a committee of the same name, 
created in the reorganization of state administration in November 1952. 
See JMST, 1949, Section 1, p.32.
13. See H. Arthur Steiner, "New Regional Governments in China", Far Eastern 
Survey. Vols.<18-19, May 1950, p.114.
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parties, the PLA, the revolutionary classes and patriotic democratic 
14
elements. The NWMAC was used to woo the minority nationalities.
Pai Hai-feng, for example, was elected to the NWMAC to represent the 
Mongols; Ma Hung-pin represented the Moslems, Hsi-Jao-Chia-Ts'o, the 
Tibetans, etc.
Jao Shu-shih, Chairman of the new ECMAC, repeatedly stressed the
united front aspect of the ECMAC in his remarks at the inaugural
congress which installed the ECMAC on January 17th, 1950. He observed
that the ECMAC not only represented the region's 130 million people,
but it more specifically represented the various provinces, the PLA,
the overseas Chinese, the various revolutionary classes and other
patriotic elements. The ECMAC, he stated, was a "democratic, united
government of a local character, which brought together the people of
15
East China in a great alliance".
To return to the basic questions to what extent did administrative 
demarcation represent a deliberate planning effort, and what was the 
rationality which sustained this planning effort? It would seem that 
the GARs to a certain extent were a natural outgrowth of the political 
and economic conditions of the mid and late forties; however, we must 
qualify this observation with the perspective, already suggested in 
Chapter Two, that the CCP leadership did attempt to include as much of 
"old liberated region" in the territories of the four MACs as was 
geographically possible, in order to provide the vast "newly liberated 
regions" with points of reference. The CCP's perspective in this regard 
will perhaps become more clear when we come to a discussion in later 
chapters as to the technique of "leaping from points to surface". What 
was the underlying rationality? It will be argued in the next 
section of this chapter and elsewhere that the GAR-level governments 
were conceived of as an administrative expedient to overcome the 
terribly uneven pattern of economic and political integration, which 
characterized China in 1949.
14. See "Tai-hsing hsi-pei jen-min cheng-fu chita-ch'uan; hsi-pgi chun- 
cheng wei-yuan hui ch'eng-li"  ^ (The powers add functions of the 
Acting North-west People's Government; the Establishment of the North- 
West Military and Administrative Committee....", JMJP, January 21, 1950, p.2
15. See "Hua-tung chun-cheng wei-yuan hui ti ch'eng-li". (The establishment 
of the ECMAC"} JMJP, February 3, 1950, p.l.
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The JMJP editorial of November 17th 1952, explained why the 
creation of the GARs had been necessary in the following terms:
"During the past three years, we have also carried out 
on a nationwide basis the difficult tasks of economic 
rehabilitation and reconstruction. In these tasks due to 
the imbalanced development of the local economy in different 
areas, due to the differences in the time of liberation and 
enforcement of democratic reforms in different areas, 
uniform measures could not be applied all over the country, 
and the Central People’s Government accordingly authorized 
the leadership organs of the administrative regions to attend 
to the task of the restoration and development of the 
economy in keeping with local conditions and in fixing 
priority and attaching greater importance to such issues 
as considered proper.
The question of the demarcation of the Greater Administrative 
Regions is only part of the much larger issue, namely what was the 
specific rationality underlying the CCP's approach to administrative 
demarcation. Chou Fang conceded that demarcation in 1949 had to take 
into account immediate, political and military circumstances and was 
not, therefore, consistent with scientific principles employed in the 
Soviet Union, but we also have noted that he did choose to emphasize 
that administrative demarcation, achieved under the new people's 
regime, was more scientific (in terms of the principles of Marxism- 
Leninism) than had earlier been the case under the KMT.
As the following points illustrate, there were difficulties in 
reconciling some of the 1949-54 administrative demarcation, which had 
been explicit in the conditions of war-time China, and which had been 
carried over into the new era of the People's Republic, with the new 
Marxist-»Leninist logic, which under ideal conditions was to determine 
administrative demarcation.
The problem of defining strategy for-national economic. . . . 
development in terms of. the perspectives of the war years..in north 
China was already evident in 1949. ..On August 1st, 1949, the North 
Chin a-People's Government adjusted the administrative demarcations 
within the new North China Liberated Region. Several Administrative
16. See translation of this editorial in SCMP., No.455, November 19, 
1952, pp.3-5D
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Districts (hsing-cheng ch*u) such as Hopei-Shantung-Honan, Taihang,
Taiyueh, Hopei-East, Hopei-Central, and Hopei-South were abolished
and the boundaries of the provinces of Hopei, Suiyuan, Shansi and 
17
Chahar demarcated. The NCPG claimed that the administrative 
demarcation was consistent with the region1s economic conditions, 
historical mass relations and natural conditions; however, the 
creation of the province of Pingyuan out of south-western Shantung, 
was a radical departure from the traditional provincial demarcation 
of north China. The area of Pingyuan covered hsien, located in 
the old border region of Shantung-Honan-Hopei, the demarcation of 
which had been quite rational in terms of the development of warfare 
in North China and in terms of the disposition of CCP communications. 
In the course of the reorganization of state structure and the 
adjustment of administrative demarcations in November 1952, Chou 
En-lai explained that the abolition of the new province of Pingyuan 
was necessary to conditions of work. Chou took the following 
position on Pingyuan:
"The old provincial system has certain historic and 
economic connotations. To readjust the territories in 
accordance with the old system will be of interest of work.
For instance, Pingyuan province was composed of the hsien 
in the Shantung-Honan-Hopei border region. After the 
inauguration of Pingyuan, no new economic centre was 
established. Hie part previously subordinated to'Shantung 
province still took Tsining (i.e. Chining) in Shantung 
province as economic centre9 and the part previously 
subordinated to Honan province still took Sinhsiang (i^e., 
Hsin-hsiang) as economic centre, and maintained close 
economic ties with Changchow and Kaifeng in Honan province.1'
17a See JMJP, August 1st 1949, p.l.
18* See SCMP, No.494, January 17-19 1953, p.38. Also refer to official
text of decision of the CPGC, dated November 15th 1952, which
details a list of hsien* most of which were returned to their
traditional provincial affiliations. Text available in Jen-min.mln- 
£ i m ^ e . n g rd ^  (Hie work of establishing the
people*s democratic state power), p.127. Chou En-lai*s observation 
would seem to Confirm William Skinner*s arguments concerning the 
importance of the natural marketing system in China. In particular 
Professor Skinner has argued that the CCP*s attempt to substitute 
commune marketing organization for natural marketing system failed.
As for the relation between marketing and administrative demarcation,' 
Professor Skinner drew the following conclusion: "Whereas administra­
tive units are discrete throughout the system, each lower-level unit 
belonging to only one unit at each ascending level, marketing systems 
are indiscrete at all levels except that of the standard market". See 
William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part 
III", Journal of Asian Studies* No.3, May 1965, P.373.
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The decisions of November 1952, noted that the demarcation of 
certain areas had taken place in' relation to developments in 
the Sino-Japanese and Civil Wars, hence the creation of Pingyuan 
province and North and South Kiangsu Administrative Districts.
Indeed, the level of administrative district, unlike the special 
district, seems to have been an ahistorical administrative creation, 
which was designed to act as a temporary expedient to overcome 
administrative problems in provinces, where provincial administra­
tion had been completely disrupted in the war years. Szechwan, it 
was claimed, had in 1949 to be divided into four administrative
districts ’'...due to its great expanse in order to facilitate
19
leadership immediately after liberation". In the summer of 1952,
North and South Anhwei were united, as were the four administrative
Districts of Szechwan. North and South Kiangsu were united at the
same time. In November 1952, Pingyuan and Chahar were abolished.
It is obvious that the CCP did not attempt to apply a new
rationality in terms of work conditions. Hsien. which were
considered either too large or too small, were adjusted. Of 334
hsien in North China, 23 were newly created. Most of the 23 had
been created by dividing traditional hsien in two, hence in Tangshan
Special District, Hopei, for example, the western part of Ch*ien-an
hsien was designated as C h ’ien-hsi hsien. and the southern part of
20
Peng-jun hsien was designated as Feng-nan hsien.
A good example of this tendency to think in terms of smaller- 
sized administrative units is provided in a 1951 directive of the 
CSMAC, which ordered a redrawing of hsiang and c h *u in the Central- 
South in order to facilitate the work of establishing the people’s 
democratic state power. Note the following instruction:
19. See SCMP, No.455, November 19th .1952, for translation of a JMJP 
editorial of November 17th 1952, covering the relation between 
capital construction and administrative readjustments. Reference 
here is on p.5 of SCMP, No.455.
20. See "Hua-pe.i tung~pe.i liang hsing-cheng c h ’u hua ehieh-shao" ,
(An introduction to the administrative demarcations of North China 
and Northeast China), HHYP, Vol.l, No.6, p.1355.
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"In order to further our work and efficiently 
mobilize the masses to take part directly in rural 
administration, the classification of administrative 
areas in the countryside should follow the principle of 
"small ch’u and small hsiang". If a hsiang is made tpo 
large, there would be need for a lower administrative 
organ. In such cases, administrative work may not be 
thorough and the various democratic systems may deviate 
into mere forms. If a ch’u is too large, there would be 
difficulty over subordinate hsiang."21
In his November 21 1952, report on the work of the CSMAC, Teng
Tgu-hui made the following point: "In the work of administrative
construction, the hsien is naturally the most important unit, but
22
the foundations are built on the hsiang". Indeed, the convening
of hsiang people’s congresses was an extension of the work of agrarian
reform in so far as it represented an institutional guarantee of the
new revolutionary order in the countryside. Teng stressed that proper
administrative demarcation was prerequisite to the convening of
people’s congresses, and he outlined a programme to increase the
Central-South*s 4,100 c h ’u to 5,300 c h ’u . The emphasis on small
ch’u and hsiang was in his words "to facilitate the centralization
of the views of the masses and the supervision of government by the 
23
masses",, Hie move to reduce the size of sub-hsien organization 
was, of course, more obvious in the vast "newly liberated regions", 
south of the Yangtze, where CCP control had been established rather
One is immediately struck by the flexibility and degree of 
experiment, which characterized sub-hsien and hsien demarcation. 
Readjustment in accordance with work conditions was undertaken for 
a great many reasons, hence the new hsien, I-ch’un,- was created in 
Heilungkiang to facilitate construction in the forestry industry. 
Similarly, Hung-che hsien was created in Kiangsu to facilitate
21* See CCJP, June 19th 1951,Marticle translated in SCMP, No*142, p.20.
The Principle, "small ch’u and small hsiang" * as it relates to agrarian 
reform, had been set forth by Mao in a Politbureau decision of February 
19th 1951o See Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung hsiian-chl. Vol.5, Peking,
1977, p.35.
22. Teng Tzu-hui, "Report on the work of the CSMAC", in CB, No .160,
February 20th 1952, p.30.
23. Teng Tzu-hui, ibid. * p.23. Franz Schumann in Ideology and Organization 
in Communist China* has suggested that administrative demarcation was 
carried out in order to insure against the infiltration and domination 
of the lowest levels of state administration by vested village interests.
24. See Franz Schumann, fn.62, pp.440-441.
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work in the fishing industry and to insure control over lake
areas, while Shih-mien hsien was created in Szechwan to strengthen
25
administrative control over mining in that area.
In summary one can note that GAR and provincial demarcation 
reflected a strategy, whereby "old liberated regions" were to lead 
"newly liberated regions", and as for administrative demarcation as 
a whole, we can accept with qualification the thrust of the following 
analysis, put forward by the Russian observer, L„M. Gudoshnilcov:
"With regard to the denomination of units of admini­
strative-territorial division, both permanent and temporary, 
if you exclude the question of the regions of national 
autonomy, no fundamental changes took place in comparison 
with the period before the formation of the people's 
republic....This, however, does not mean that after the 
formation of the People's Republic of China, the old 
administrative-territorial division remained as a whole.
Without considering here the question of the intermediate 
units of this division which do not exist at present 
(large administrative regions...), it should be said that 
much work was carried out by the people's government to 
regulate the administrative-territorial division with a 
view to adjusting it to the needs of development of 
industrial and agricultural production, the development of 
the cooperative movement in agriculture, reduction of the 
state apparatus, with a calculation of the relations between 
nationalities, of popular customs and of the size of the 
population. The work to regulate the administrative- 
territorial division acquired a special dimension with the 
beginning of the socialist industrialization and of 
socialist reforms."26
An assessment of the historical'significance and underlying 
rationality of the 1949-54 demarcation must include a consideration 
of the later creation of the "co-ordinated economic regions". Such 
an assessment brings into sharp focus the problems involved in the 
inter-relation of economic, political and military factors in the
25. Refer to "Chung-hua .ien-min kung-ho kuo hsing-cheng ch'u ch'eng ti 
hua-fen"a (The delineation of PRC administrative demarcations), Ti-li 
hsueh-pao. Vol.24, No.l, February 1958, pp.84-97, here p.88.
26. L.M. Gudoshnikov, "Development of the Organs of focal Government and 
Administration in the People's Republic of China", in JPRS OC-34 
2/CSO DC-2118, October 21 st 1958, pp.1-18, here pp.8-9.
93
elaboration of administrative demarcation and further demonstrates 
the centrality of the CCP's strategy, whereby not only in terms of 
political development, but also in terms of economic development, a 
threefold classification is made in order to facilitate a progressive 
inter-relation of units of administrative organization, described 
as ’’intermediate", "advanced" and "backward".
Again, one can gain immediate dividends by reviewing the 
disposition of Shantung province in relation to the national pattern 
of administrative demarcation. In 1957, Shantung was again placed 
within the Past China context, but this time to serve the creation 
of a complete industrial system in Past China. It is perhaps 
surprising that the several "co-ordinated economic regions” (ta_ ching- 
chi hsieh-tso ch *u) created in July 1957, namely Northeast China, 
North China, Northeast China, Past China, Central and South China 
were fairly consistent with the demarcation of the six Greater 
Administrative Regions, created in 1949. In terms of the 1949 
demarcation, the later administrative determination of a South China 
Co-ordinated Pconomic Region is not particularly anomalous, as in 
1949-54, South China had already a certain measure of administrative 
integrity of its- own. There was a sub-bureau of the CCPCC for South 
China, and there was also a South China branch of the CSMAC Economic 
and Financial Affairs Committee. Why was Shantung not returned to 
the ^orth China Plain in 1957?
Each economic zone was demarcated so as to include relatively 
adv.anced industrial areas; for example, Liaoning acted as the 
industrial core for the Northeast, while Hopei stood in the same 
relation to North China. Shantung*s inclusion in the East China 
Co-ordinated Region may have related to the need to bolster East 
China*s industrial strength, and to provide the provinces of East 
China with another industrial core, or poirt of reference with which 
to inter-relate. The provinces of East China with the major exception 
of Kiangsu are not particularly well endowed with natural resources,
ft
27. See Liu Tsai-hsing, "Lun hsieh-tso chfu wan~c h Teng kung-veh pen-hsi
ti chien-li wen~t * i" , (On problems of establishing complete industrial 
systems in the co-ordinated economic regions), Hsin chien-she. No.10, 
1958, cited in Franz Schumann's "China’s New Economic Policy1, in 
CQ, N o , 17, January/March 1964, p.73, fn.18.
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hence Shantung was related to.East China instead of North China, 
which already had a strong industrial core, particularly in Hopei. 
The concept of "key-point" was not only important in terms of the 
development of mass mobilization, but was central to the CCP's 
perception of national defence and economic development. A 
prominent Chinese Communist economist, Sun Ching-chih, discussed 
the new economic zoning in the following way:
"Not only does the determination of the seven joint 
regions provide great impetus toward realization of the 
general line, but it also contains a high degree of 
political foresight. Between the provinces within these 
joint regions, the advanced provinces lead the more back- 
ward aies with mutual support and drive to form a complete 
industrial system within each region as soon as possible. 
Particularly outstanding is the inclusion of Inner Mongolia 
in the North China region, Tibet in the Southwest region 
and Sinkiang into the Northwest region, to provide these 
three areas with economic development and support from the 
more densely populated provinces and rapidly change their 
picture of a backward economy."28
The last sentence in particular highlights the utopian visionary
quality of the Great Leap Forward.
Within each region, there was eventually to be created a
complete industrial system, defined in terms of the ability to
produce steel and the means of production and also in terms of
29
the availability of coal and the generation of electricity.
Since 1949, the Chinese leadership have been' concerned with the 
irrational disposition of China's natural resources in relation 
to the areas of production and consumption. In the theme of self- 
reliance, Mao had hoped ultimately to find the solution to this 
problem, whereby raw materials and manufactured goods had to be 
shipped across China's vast territories.
28. Sun in the prefaces of various of the several volumes, which his 
team of researchers prepared on the natural economy of China, was 
at pains to explain why his project had been based on a division 
of China into ten zones. He was careful to extol the "political 
foresight" of the Party in dividing China into seven zones. See 
Sun Ching-chih, Economic Geography of the East China Region*
(JPRS 11438; CSO 5384), December 1961, preface, p.iv.
29. Liu Tsai-hsing, op.cit., p.46.
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Again we might profit from the perspectives of military 
strategy,. Self-reliance was conceived as a solution to the KMT*s 
economic blockade of the North China border regions and the 
military offensive launched by the Japanese. Mao was only too 
well aware that the Japanese armies in China had lost due to over­
extended supply lines and the disposition of Japanese troops along 
the length and breadth of China’s major communications arteries.
In fact, we should not be surprised to discover in the perspective, 
which sustains the current slogan, "dig tunnels deep, store grain 
everywhere and never seek hegemony", the sum of the CCP’s experience 
in the North China border regions. Not only does this slogan 
illustrate a continuing perception of foreign affairs and national 
defence, which is predicated on an inward-looking military posture 
(China’s defence policy is based on fighting on Chinese soil), but 
this slogan also reveals an approach to economic development, 
based on self-reliance— self-reliance in terms of China and the 
world, but also in terms of the various levels of political and 
economic organization within China itself.
Thus, the theme of self-reliance encompasses both internal and 
external dimensions. Firstly, the Chinese people are to achieve 
self-reliance in relation to the rest of the world. Secondly, the 
various levels of political and economic organization within China are 
to achieve a certain degree of self-reliance in relation to the fiscal 
and material resources available to the central government. The first 
of these two dimensions was not particularly explicit in the early 
year of "leaning to one side". Chou Bn-lai, in his September 16th 
1956, report on the proposals for the second five year plan did, 
however, indicate that there were different opinions within the 
leadership as to the development of a completely self-reliant 
industrial System >. in China. Chou then charted a middle course 
between what he called "isolationist" and "parasitic" views. Chou 
En-lai toolc to task those who had argued that China could rely 
exclusively on her own efforts to build an independent industrial 
system, and in the following statement described a policy position, 
consistent with M a o ’s August exposition on t ’i and yung:
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"Another view, that we can close our doors and carry 
on construction on our own, is wrong too. Needless to say, 
the establishment of a comprehensive industrial system in our 
country requires assistance from the Soviet Union and the 
Peop l e d  Democracies for a long time to come. At the. same 
time, it is also necessary for us to develop and expand 
economic, technical and cultural exchange with other 
countries even when we have built up a socialist industrial 
state, it will still be inconceivable that we should close 
our doors and have nothing to ask from others."*^
Chou, as the following comment illustrates, was equally critical
of those who would too exclusively depend on international
assistance:
"...yet a populous country like ours, which has rich 
resources and great demands, still needs to build its own 
comprehensive industrial system. This is because, in 
accordance with our internal requirements, we must quickly 
alter the long-term backwardness of our national economy; 
and in accordance with international requirements, the 
establishment of a powerful industry in our country can 
promote a common economic upsurge in the socialist countries 
and add to the forces in defence of world peace."31
As for the second of the two dimensions, a programme of 
administrative decentralization had been clearly worked out in 
1951. Under the division of the labour, which was then established, 
Chou had hoped to conserve the strength of the centre in favour of 
key projects, sponsored by Russian credits, but had also hoped to 
capitalize on local initiative and self-reliance.
Of course both internal and external dimensions achieved their
clearest expression with the advent of the Great Reap Forward. In
his report to the second session of the Eighth Party Congress Liu
Shao-ch'i emphasized that all of Chinafs hsien. cities and market
32
towns were to have their own industry. In a well publicized 
visit to Tientsin in August 1958, Mao was especially concerned to 
ask the Governor of Hopei, Liu Tzu-hoU, when the administrative
30* Refer to Mao Tse-tung, "Talk to Music Workers", in Stuart R„ Schram, 
(ed*)? Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed : Talks and Letters 1956-1971. pp.84- 
90, especially pp.85-86, for Mao*s views on learning from foreign 
countries. Chou*s position is outlined in "Report on the Proposals 
for the Second Five Year Plan for Development of the National Economy", 
in Supplement to People*s China. No,21, November 1, 1956, p.10.
31. Chou En-lai, p.10.
32e Liu Tsai-hsing, op.cit., p.45.
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regions and special districts would acquire their own industrial 
base. In conversation with the Mayor of Tientsin, Mao instructed:
"Localities should build up independent industrial 
systems. First, co-ordination zones, and then provinces 
in which the situation permits should establish their o w n ^  
different and relatively independent industrial systems."
A great deal of the ensuing discussion relates to this theme 
of self-reliance, which is developed in terms of the substantive 
problems which arose in the attempt to co-ordinate the various 
levels of state administration. In Chapter Two, we have already 
noted that the efforts of the various border regions were loosely 
co-ordinated by the CCPCC, and it was in this context that inter­
system relations were worked out, hence the significance accorded 
"unified leadership of the local Party Committees". In the second 
section of this chapter, we will want to consider what this 
emphasis on self-reliance means in terms of leadership defined 
either as "ling-tao" or "chih-tao".
Essentially, military perspectives played a rather significant 
role in the emergence of a strategy for economic development in 
China. At times such considerations loomed too large in the minds 
of the Chinese leaders. In 1956, Mao conceded in his remarks on 
the second of his "Ten Great Relations", concerning alternative 
weights to be assigned to coastal and interior industrial sites, 
that the industrial base in China*s coastal provinces, in particular 
the area around Shanghai, had been too much neglected in the early 
1950*s due to an over-emphasis on the possibility of invasion. Mao 
specifically remarked:
"However, in recent years we have underestimated 
coastal industry and to some extent have not given great 
enough attention to its development. This must change.
In the past, fighting was going on in Korea and 
the international situation was tense; this could not 
but affect our attitude towards coastal i n d u s t r y " . 34
Mao, at the same time, demonstrated that his concern with the
evenness of industrial development in ChinaTs various regions was
linked with his view of national defence. Expanding on his second
33. See JMJP, August 16, 1958, pp.l & 2, and refer to SCMP, No.837, 
August 21, 1958, pp.2-3.
34. Official English version of "On the Ten Major* R elationships" is 
available in Peking Review, No.l, January 1977, p.12.
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relationship Mao observed:-
"Without doubt, the greater part of new industry 
should be located in the interior so that industry may 
gradually become evenly distributed; moreover, this 
will help our preparations against war."35
Mao, thus, provides a good example of how an immediate military
factor intervened to negate a long-established emphasis on the
development of all positive economic factors.
This failure to assign proper weights to coastal and interior
industries speaks volumes as to the concrete administrative problems
involved in applying the principle of self-reliance across the board.
Even while Chinafs leaders talked of the need to create independent
industrial systems in all parts of the country, they conceded the
extreme unevenness in the geographical distribution of natural
resources in China. In 1958, they focused at the level of the
"co-ordinated economic region", for at this high level of
organization, it was presumed there were sufficient resources to
guarantee the creation of independent industrial systems.
In 1959, the 1957-58 emphasis on self-reliance was qualified
with an emphasis on "taking the whole country as a single chess board"
which in real terms meant the introduction of a closely supervised
system of priorities. In 1959, it was claimed that the 1958
emphasis on self-reliance at all levels had led to "dispersionism".
A JMJP editorial of February 24th 1959, noted:
"...We should not view the practice of developing the 
enthusiasm of all quarters in the light of the practices of 
laissez-faire dispersionism and organizational egoism which 
are alien to the practices of centralized leadership and 
overall arrangements; nor, on the other hand, should we 
view the practice of taking the whole country as a co­
ordinated chess game merely as a practice of letting the 
central authorities take full charge of everything through 
the issuance of directives and orders."37
35. Peking Review, No.l, January 1977, p.12.
36. See K*o C h ’ing-shih, "Lun 'c h ’uan-kuo i-pan ch'i1" (On "the whole count 
is a single chess ..board) in Hung-ch'i , Vol.VI, 1959, pp.9-13.
37. See translation in SCMP, No.1970, March 11th 1959, p.2.
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The editorial claimed that it was impossible, given the uneven
distribution of natural resources, to distribute major projects
evenly among the various provinces, cities and regions.^
Ch'en Yun joined the debate, siding with those who argued
that evenness of regional economic development was not as important
as national economic construction. He specifically concluded:
"...the nature and speed of development of the 
industrial system, in the various sections of the country 
will not be uniform; modern industry is an extraordinarily 
complex form of economic co-operation."39
C h fen expanded on his point in such a way as to discredit the 
concept of the "co-ordinated economic region", when he argued:
"The production of a complex variety of things such 
as these, requiring a high degree of co-ordination and 
co-operation, is not possiblp in any one enterprise, or 
even in one province or co-operative area....To try at 
this time to plan the establishment in one province or 
autonomous region of a complete, fully equipped, and 
competently staffed independent industrial system is
not realistic."40
Obviously, Ch*en when he used the concept "the whole country as a single 
chess board", envisioned a national economy, which was integrated 
in terms of inter-dependent regions, hence he moved away from a 
vision of the economy, which had been predicated on the military 
perspectives of the Yenan period, which highlighted the co-ordination 
of self-reliant localities rather than inter-dependent localities.
38. SCMP, No.1970, p>4.
39. Ch*en Yun, "Some Immediate Problems Concerning Capital 
Construction Operations", Htmg-ch*i, No.5, March 17th 1959, 
pp.1-16, translated in JPRS: 708-D/CSO: 2794-D. Here po4.
40o Ch'en Yun, op.cit., p.4.
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What is extraordinary, however, is that the idea of supra- 
provincial demarcation survived the abolition of the GAR governments 
and the early pattern of national political integration. The close 
approximation between the demarcation of the GARs and the - demarcation 
of the later "co-ordinated economic regions" might suggest that 
these GARs of 1949-54 were more than simply temporary expedients, 
designed to facilitate the conditions of integration, which 
specifically characterized 1949 China. While it is obvious that 
neither of these two demarcations corresponded particularly well 
with the natural economy of China, one might argue that economic 
rationality as defined by the CCP reflects a preoccupation with 
the methodology of the "key-point" and the inter-relation of 
advanced, intermediate and backward units of organization. This 
meithodology seems to have transcended the formal line between what 
is economic and what is political.
In 1949, "old liberated regions" within the jurisdiction of the 
MACs provided reference points in terms of model experience and 
personnel for the "newly liberated regions". In economic terms in 
1958, the Chinese leadership viewed the core areas of industrial 
development such as Chinan in Shantung, as points of reference for 
more industrially backward areas. In terms of the "co-ordinated 
economic region", Mao seems to have taken his Yenan concept of China 
and the’world one step further, and elevated his theme of self- 
reliance to the plateau of supraprovincial organization. Herein lies 
one of the many paradoxes of M a o ^  thinking, which no doubt will 
continue to fascinate observers of modern China. In his writings,
Mao demonstrates a preoccupation with the duality of democracy and 
centralization (that he attached more weight to the latter half of 
this equation will become evident in the following discussion of the 
devolution of administrative responsibility within a unitary state 
structure), but in terms of his theme of self-reliance, Mao conceived 
within his framework of leadership, based on formulae such as 
"centralized leadership and decentralized management", a strategy 
of economic development which emphasizes the creation of independent 
industry at all levels of administrative organization. One is in
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the end left with a question mark as to whether a strategy 
inspired by military perspectives such as self-reliance, is 
appropriate to the natural economic conditions of China and 
to the stage which China has reached in terms of national 
political and economic integration.
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ii) Constitutional Structure and Administrative Theory:
The Devolution of Administrative Responsibility in 
a Unitary State
In formal constitutional terms, the People's Republic 
of China is a unitary state, and this observation has been 
rendered explicit in various constitutional arrangements from 
the Common Programme and the Organic Law of the Central People's 
Government of the People's Republic of China of 1949 to the 
present constitution of January 1975. More specifically, "state 
legislative power" is conceived in the Chinese constitutional 
context as indivisible.
The Third Article of Chapter One of the 1954 constitution 
notes that all power in the People's Republic of China belongs 
to the people, who exercise their power through the National
1
People's Congress and the various local people's congresses; 
however, Article Twenty-two of Chapter Two asserts that the 
National People's Congress is the only organ to exercise "state
M 2
legislative power" (kuo-chia li-fa ch'uan).
This last construction was not specifically adopted in the 
January 19th 1975, constitution, but Article Four of the "General 
Principles" affirms that the People's Republic of China is a "unitary
Chung-hua _ien-min lcung-ho lcuo hsien-fas Jen-min ch'u pan she, 
Peking, 1954, p.6.
2* Ibid., p.10.
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multi-national state". More to the point, it should be noted 
that under the wording of the 1975 constitution the National
m 4
People's Congress has the power to "enact laws" (chih-ting fa-lu), 
whereas the local people's congresses are charged with the 
"guaranteeing of the laws" (pao-cheng fa-lli) as well as the
5
"implementation of the laws" (fa-ling ti chih-hsing).
These various constitutional arrangements demonstrate a 
consistent perspective as to the distribution of constitutional 
powers. Mao Tse-tung was perhaps most explicit on the question of 
the distribution of constitutional powers in his remarks to Party 
cadres at the Nanning Conference of January 11th 1958. He then 
elaborated on the division of constitutional power in terms of the 
relation of Party and state:
"In recent years we coined a slogan against 
dispersionism: great powers concentrated [at the centrej
small powers dispersed5 the Party Committees make 
decisions and the various localities carry them out; the 
carrying out of decisions does involve the exercise of 
power, but this cannot depart from principle; the work of 
checking-up [chien-c h1a] is the responsibility of the Party 
Committees.
There are those in the judicial organs who would 
rather that the Party and state were separated* Can the 
state and Party be separated any more than a family can be 
divided in two? Hi is is no good. Initially, we do not 
divide power and only later do we make a division; other­
wise, if small powers were grasped [at any particular local 
levelj, how could we divide the Forty Articles? Twenty for 
the centre and twenty for [local levelj industrial and 
agricultural [organization]? This would not be satisfactory. 
We cannot have the centre conduct business under one 
constitution and some other administration conduct business 
under another constitution."6
tt |»
3. Text in Chung-hua jen-min kung~ho kuo ti-szu ch'u ch'uan-lcuo /ien-mm 
tai-piao ta-hui ti-i cz'u hui-i chien hui-pien (Collection of 
documents of the first session of the Fourth National People's 
Congress of the People's Republic of China), pp.31-42*
4. Article Seventeen, Chapter Two, ibid., p.38.
5. Article Twenty-three, Chapter Three-, ibid., p.40.
6. Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan sui, 1969, p.148.
I am particularly grateful to Professor Stuart Schr am for pointing 
out the importance of this passage.
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One can see in M a o ’s perception of the importance of the
indivisibility of constitutional power, the reason for his
7
repudiation in 1967 of the Shanghai People’s Commune.
Parenthetically, we might note the implications, which the above 
passage has in terms of the relation of Party to state, were 
rendered explicit in the 1975 constitution, in which it is stated: 
"The Communist Party of China is the core of the leadership of 
the whole Chinese people. The working class exercises leadership 
over the state through its vanguard, the Communist Party of 
China.
In the case of a ’’federal" state, a division of powers between 
central and regional governments is often rendered explicit in the 
state constitution, and this arrangement is normally qualified by 
some general clause, insuring the central government some.degree 
of "residual” power, consistent with the preservation of the nation­
state. The CCP, however, did not adopt such a formula to describe 
the "form of government" (cheng-t Tl) in China.
The Party’s thinking of ’’form of government” and administrative 
theory ultimately turns upon an understanding of the organization of 
command structure, explicit in the Leninist concept, democratic 
centralism. There seems to be little need to comment on the 
enormous appeal such a concept had for the Chinese mind, keenly 
sensitive to metaphorical imagery, depicting China as a carved melon 
and the Chinese people as a sheaf of loose sand, and at the same time 
very conscious of the negative centrifugal tendencies, characteristic 
of warlord and KMT political processes.
One must also take cognizance of the emphasis on democracy in 
the course of military struggle, in particular underlining the 
importance of united front in determining organizational emphases.
It is the intention here to review the dialectical inter-relation of 
these two competing emphases, democracy and centralism, firstly in 
terms of constitutional structure and secondly in terms of 
administrative theory.
ft
7. See "Talfcs at .Three Meetings with Comrades Chang C h ’un-ch’iao and Yao 
Wen-yuanfin Stuart R. Schram (ed.) Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p.278.
Mao was concerned as to what implications the Shanghai People’s Commune 
would have in terms of the international diplomatic recognition of China.
S. Article Two, Chapter One, op.cit., p.13.
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"Democratic centralism” was originally used in relation to 
Party organizationj however, the same concept was later applied 
to state organization. Mao discussed this concept in relation to 
the "form of government” in "On New Democracy” . He wanted to 
exploit the theme of democracy in order to establish a favourable 
comparison between the CCP and KMT and thus establish the legitimacy 
of the North China border region governments. Mao spoke on 
democratic centralism in the following terms:
"But if there is to be a proper representation for 
each revolutionary class according to its status in the 
state, a proper expression of the people’s will, a proper 
direction for revolutionary struggles and a proper 
manifestation of the spirit of New Democracy, then a 
system of really universal and equal suffrage, irrespective 
of sex, creed, property or education must be introduced.
Such is the system of democratic centralism. Only a 
government based on democratic centralism can fully
express the will of all the revolutionary people and fight
the enemies of revolution most effectively."^
The second article of the first chapter of the Organic Regulations
of Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China
announced: "The government of the People’s Republic of China is
a government of the people’s congress system, based on the principle
10
of democratic centralism” . The concept, however, survived New 
Democracy, and was restated in the second article of the first 
chapter of the 1954 constitution.
In administrative terms, "democratic centralism" sustained an 
emphasis on "centralized leadership”, yet it also pointed to the 
importance of the healthy exchange of ideas and criticism between 
systems and levels of state administration*
In terms of China’s historical development, "democratic 
centralism" was the CCP’s answer to the political fragmentation of 
the warlord years, but at the same time the concept seemed to afford
9. Mao Tse-tung "On New Democracy", SW, Vol.II, p°352.
10. See text in Jen-min min-cliu cheng-ch’uan chien-she lcung-tso. 
(The work of establishing the people’s democratic state power), 
Peking, 1953, p.94.
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a solution to the problems of " administrative distance" first in 
the North China border regions, and later in relation to China as 
a whole- The latter half of this formula worked against "regionalism" 
while the former half encouraged the exploitation of local creaticity 
and initiative in the national interest.
The problems of "administrative distance" will be treated in 
more depth in Chapters Four and Five; however, it might be briefly 
noted that the term relates not only to the tremendous physical 
distances separating Peking from the various localities of China, . 
but also relates to basic problems of government communication. A 
study of "administrative distance" entails a review of governmental 
techniques, used to achieve a centralized uniformity of policy 
implementation at the various levels of political organization in 
the many regions of China.
We will want to focus on several inter-related problems of 
government communication. How, for example, was the centre to achieve 
a uniform implementation of policy and maintain discipline and a 
system of priorities at the local levels, without seriously com­
promising the exercise of local creativity and initiative? How was 
the CCP leadership to insure a bottom-to-top, top-to-bottom flow of 
information, necessary to the formulation of policy? We can, for 
example, explore the conference techniques used in the course of 
the government's attempts to restore and develop the urban-rural 
interflow of trade. One might also note that one of the most 
difficult problems the centre faced in terms of the early attempts 
at the planning of capital construction, was the building-up of an 
adequate storehouse of information, and here again one must refer 
to the significance.of inter-level conferences. The problem of 
"administrative distances" related not only to how policy was 
formulated, but how an accurate understanding of policy was to be 
achieved at all levels of state administration. The system of 
"dual rule" with the high premium it pays in terms of the co-ordination 
of systems at the same level, as well as between levels, was 
particularly appropriate to the problems of "administrative distance" 
in the early 1950's, although at times it did pose difficulties in 
terms of the reconciliation of conflicting administrative 
jurisdiction,,
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We might begin this-discussion of the CCP's approach to 
government administration by placing the words ’’centralization" 
and "decentralization" in the political context of China in 1949.
The CCP in the main had won on the battlefield, but in terms of 
the creation of a centralized government structure, it was not 
simply a matter of taking possession of the enemyfs fort and 
running a new flag up the flag-pole. There was no national 
government structure to take over. The CCP had yet to build a 
truly national state administration in Peking. A national economy 
had yet to be created. Even had the leaders of the CCP wanted to 
(and there is reason to doubt that their ideological commitment to 
and their interpretations of themes of united front and democratic 
centralism would have predisposed them in such a direction), they 
did not have the resources to build a monolithic centralized state 
structure. Provincial administration had been badly shattered.
There was an acute shortage of personnel who were conversant with 
the CCPfs organizational techniques and policy emphases.
To return briefly to a perspective introduced earlier, in terms 
of the complications of the military situation in 1938, Mao had argued 
the necessity of "decentralized command in campaigns". Mao had then 
argued:
"The more extensive the area, the more complex the 
situation and the greater the distance between the higher 
and lower levels, the more advisable it becomes to allow 
greater independence to the lower levels in their actual 
operations... . " H
In 1938, the CCP related to the complexities of the military 
situation in a very flexible fashion, insuring on the one hand 
overall direction of military operations, yet on the other preserving 
the initiative of the local commanders to meet the ever changing 
military conditions at the local level. This tact was repeated in
11. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in Guerilla War Against 
Japan", SW, Vol.II, p.115.
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the sphere of state administration in the course of the Yenan 
experience. Indeed, an explanation for the later exercise of 
power at the GAR level must be seen in these same terms. The 
problems, explicit in the 1938 situation, were nowhere near 
as complex as those problems with which the CCP had to contend, 
when it suddenly became responsible for the implementation of 
policy throughout China in 1949.
One might well assert that circumstances almost compelled a 
certain course of action in 1949 and 1950, and we shall see that 
an early -.attempt in 1950 to achieve a rigid vertical centralization 
in certain spheres of government administration failed. That the 
possibilities for centralization within a vertical structure were 
limited is evident in the following examples of the development of 
administrative structure.
George Ginsbur^ and Arthur Stahnke researched the early
development of the People’s Procuratorate and concluded that the
system’s general regulations, which had first been drafted in
November 1950, had to be revised as they were found to be premature
and unworkable in the context of prevailing political conditions,
and hence "dual subordination" (Franz S c h u m a n n ’s "dual role") was
applied in the functioning of the regional offices of the People’s
12
Procuratorate until September 1954.
The prevailing pattern of unevenness in political integration 
and the structural weakness of the Central People’s Government, 
necessitated the involvement of regional governments at the GAR 
level in government activity, -which under any normal constitutional 
set-up would have been placed firmly under the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the central government, hence a national customs 
conference, which was convened in November 1950 with the object of 
further centralizing custom posts throughout China, found it 
necessary to concede regional governments the responsibility for the
12. George Ginsburgs and Arthur Stahnke, "The Genesis of the People’s 
Procuratorate in Communist China, 1949-51", CQ, No.20, October- 
December 1964, pp.1-37, here p.12.
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supervision of custom houses within their respective regions.
The MACs also became involved in the administering of the with­
drawal of foreign charity and education organizations from the 
Chinese scene during the Resist US Aid-Korea movement, and this 
activity clearly involved the regional governments in foreign affairs.
Prevailing conditions necessitated the existence of an inter­
mediate level of government, which could reduce the "administrative 
distance" between Peking and the provinces. The same conditions 
affected the development of united front and popular organization.
In the case of the Chinese People's Relief Association, which was 
a popular organization, designed to assist work in natural disaster 
areas, branches were set up in the various provinces and 
municipalities in East China, but the Peking headquarters found it 
difficult to exercise direct leadership over these branches, and,
consequently, an East China Office had to be established to
14
supervise the several branches.operating in East China.
In the context of weak provincial administration, the centre 
had to rely on the GAR level to secure an adequate degree of 
centralization over local levels of government. In relation to the 
problem of "administrative distance", the CCP adopted a very rational, 
perhaps ingenious, course of action,"^whereby immediate questions of 
inflation, social disorder, economic dislocation and disrupted 
communications could be dealt with at an intermediate point in the 
national administrative structure. A great deal of government 
activity was then conducted at the GAR level at the same time as the 
building-up of the central ministries was taking place in Peking.
13. "Report on the National Customs Conference, CB, No.38, December 8th 
1950, p 03.
14. See Kuei Ting-fang, "Report on Relief Work", CB, No.160, February 
20th 1952, p.24 (from Shanghai,, CFJP, December 1st 1951).
15. Robert McColl in his analysis takes a contrary review, describing 
this new level of government as "naive". See R. McColl,
"Development of Supra-Provincial Administrative Regions in Communist 
China 1949-1960", P acific Viewpoint, Vol.4, No-1, March 1963, p.61.
1 10
The GAR regional governments oversaw the integration of 
provincial administration. Talcing into consideration the limited 
resources of the centre and the startling unevenness of the pattern 
of national political integration hitherto, one might suggest that 
circumstances dictated a certain course of action, in this case a 
centralization, achieved within a' "dual'i.nstitutional framework, but 
one must also take into consideration the CCP’s past experience, 
which undoubtedly predisposed the leadership to approach the 
problem of administrative distance from a vantage point, consistent 
with the administrative principle "centralized leadership and 
decentralized management", as well as with the structural emphasis 
on "dual rule".
There will be opportunity later in this discussion to review 
the evolution of the state administrative structure over the period 
1949 to 1954 in more detail; however, one must begin with an under­
standing of the provisional constitutional arrangements as they were 
set out in October to December 1949.
One can immediately clear away any misunderstandings as to the 
nature of the Military and Administrative Committee^chvTn-cheng wei- 
yuan hui) which was set up in four of the GARs, Central-South, East 
China, Northwest and Southwest China, by referring to the 
constitutional documents of late 1949, The Military and Administrative 
Committee, unlike the Military Control Commission, which was directly 
responsible to regional military headquarters, was essentially a part 
of state administration.
The constitutional documents, authorizing the creation of both 
GAR government councils and the MACs, originated with the Central 
People’s Government Council, (Chung-yang cheng-fu wei-yuan hui)a 
(CPGC), The CPGC, the highest state council in the land, was a very 
important body, especially in terms of what has already been said in 
relation to the "form of government".^
16. Donald Keesing, one of the very few to have written on the early
government structure of the People’s Republic, has suggested that the 
CPGC was merely a "showplace" for the parading of united front solid­
arity behind CCP policies; however, this observation belies the great 
constitutional significance of this council and underestimates the 
importance of united front structure in the newly liberated areas. See 
D.Keesing, "Use of Top-level Personnel by the Chinese Communist 
Government", Centre for International Studies, MIT, 1954, p.3.
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One immediately notes that.there were no sections either in
the Common Programme, or in the Organic Laws of the Central People's
Government cf the People's Republic of China, (OLCPG), which
detailed what constitutional powers belonged to xvhat level, or as to
what powers might be shared out between central and regional
governments. Powers, exercised by the local levels of government
were not enshrined in either of these two constitutional significant
documents, as had been the case in the 1912 Provisional Constitution
of the Republic of China, Articles 107 through 111 of which
detailed the constitutional prerogatives of local governments
According to Article Sixteen of the Common Programme, the
central government would define the jurisdiction of local people's
governments over specific aspects of governmental activity, and
these aspects would be established by the CPGC in conformity with the
17
"requirements” of both ^ national unity and local expediency” . The
CPGC had complete discretion to fill in the various blank spaces of
the Common Programme and the OLCPG. The sixty-three chairmen, vice-
chairmen and members of the CPGC possessed a constitutional carte
blanche to determine the structure of state administration. Article
Twelve of the ORCPG allowed the CPGC to enact its own organization 
18
regulations. Article Twenty-two, covering the organization of the 
Government Administration Council, (Cheng-wu yuan)* (GAC) empowered 
the CPGC to create and dismantle government departments at will.
Under this particular construction, the GAR Administrative 
Committees were later abolished. Article Thirty-one, which follows, 
further enhanced the discretionary powers of the CPGC:
17. See English text in Theodore Chen, The Chinese Cpmmunist Regime, p.38.
18. Chinese texts for the important documents of the Chinese People's
Political Consultative Conference, namely, the Organic Law of the 
Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China,
(OLCPG), the Common Programme and the Organic Law of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, can be found in the
special supplementary volume of the Jen-min shou-ts'e. (The 
people's handbook) for the year 1949, or in Chung-hua jen-min Icung-ho 
lcuo lc'ai-kuo wen-hsien, (Collected documents on the founding of the 
People's Republic of China). Hie former is henceforth cited as JMST, 
while the latter will be cited as KKWH. English translation are 
available in T.H.E. Chen, The Chinese Communist Regime.
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"The right of amendment of the Organic Law of 
the Central People’s Government belongs to the Plenary 
Session of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference: when the latter is not in session, it
belongs to the Central People’s Government Council.
Hie right of interpretation of this Organic Law belongs 
to the Central People’s Government Council."19
Hie Greater Administrative Regions were specifically mentioned
in Section Nine ofArticle Seven of the OLCPG, which provided the
CPGC with the power to appoint upon the recommendation of the GAC
the chairmen, vice-chairmen and chief administrative personnel of
the regional level. Hie responsibility for the actual supervision
and direction of local people’s governments was entrusted to the
GAC.
Significantly, Tung Pi-wu in his report concerning the drafting
of the OLCPG stressed that the characters meaning "to approve the
appointment or dismissal of" (p *i-chun ien-mien) were especially
incorporated into the text to stress the fact that before such
personnel were presented to the CPGC for final approval, they had
20
to be elected at the regional or provincial level. It is important 
to note that in 1949 Tung Pi-wu anticipated that regional people’s 
congresses were to be convened at a future date and that these 
congresses would elect regional government councils.
What specific details there were concerning the functions and 
powers of the regional governments were outlined in the Organic 
Regulations of the Greater Administrative Region People’s Government 
Councils (ORGAR), which were passed on December 16th 1949, in the 
eleventh session of the GAR. The actual process, whereby the specific 
organic regulations of the various administrative levels took on the 
force of law, represents an interesting delegation of authority. The 
CPGC enacted its own organic regulations and approved the regulations 
of lower levels of government administration, but the lower levels 
drew up their own regulations in the first instance. The procedure, 
whereby regulations were drafted and subsequently approved, is 
clarified in the following article of the ORGAR:
19. T.H.E. Chen, p.51.
20. Relevant excerpts from Tung Pi-wu’s report can be found in 
KKWH, p.244.
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"The various People1s Government Councils of the 
Greater Administrative Regions must within the scope of 
these regulations and in accordance with the concrete 
conditions of each particular region draw up draft articles 
of organization, and after these draft articles have been 
submitted for approval to the Government Administration 
Council and subsequent to a trial period of implementation, 
they will then be submitted to the Central People's 
Government Council for ratification."21
One notes that the organic regulations of the various North China 
border region assemblies also placed a great deal of emphasis on the 
adaptation of general principles to concrete local conditions.,
The provincial people’s government councils were to follow a 
similar procedure., Section Three of Article Four of the Organic 
Regulations of the Provincial People’s Government Councils (ORPPG) 
charged the provincial governments with the responsibility for 
drafting their own organic regulations. These draft regulations 
were then submitted to the GAR governments, which then forwarded them
99
to the GAG.
Article One of the regional government regulations further 
stipulated that during the initial phase of liberation, it might be 
necessary in order to facilitate military control and the 
establishment of the new revolutionary order to create Military and 
Administrative Committees and that these councils would provisionally 
exercise the same powers and responsibilities as people’s government 
councils.
As it happened, there was only one functioning people’s government 
at the GAR level in the early fifties, namely that of the northeast.
The North China Central Control Region initially came under the 
jurisdiction of the CPG Ministry of North ^ i n a  Affairs while Military 
and Administrative Committees were established in Northwest, South­
west, East and Central-South China. These four MACs clearly came 
under the jurisdiction of the GAC. It would be incorrect to assume 
that the GAR governments were not involved in military operations^
21. For the ORGAR refer to "Ta hsing-cheng ch *u jen-min cheng-fu wei-yuan 
hui tsu-chih t ’ung-tse"9 in Jen-min nien-chien (People’s Almanac), 1^90^ 
Section 4, p.51, Article One.
22. The Organic Regulations of the Provincial People’s Governments were 
passed on January 6th 1950 at the 14th meeting of the GAC. See "Sheng 
jen-min cheng-fu tsu-chih t *ung~tse", in Chung-vang jen-min cheng-fu f a- 
ling hul-pien, (Compendium of the laws and regulations of the Central 
People’s Government), 1949-1950, p.212. Henceforth cited FLHP.
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they were particularly responsible for the conclusion of military 
operations, the creation of a new revolutionary order and the
establishment of the people*s democratic state power. It would be
equally incorrect that the MACs were administrative extensions of 
the People’s Revolutionary Military Council.
We have already noted in Chapter Two that the CCP in 1946
argued in favour of democracy at the regional level before national 
unification became an accomplished fact, thus the CCP did not accept 
the KMT’s arguments in favour of Sun’s three stages of political 
development. One must, therefore, define the nature of the MAC in 
such terms as would emphasize the inter-relation between the 
establishment of people’s democratic state power and military 
control.
Liu Shao-ch’i was quite explicit on this very point when he 
addressed the third session of the Peking All-Circles People’s 
Representative Conference in March, 1951:
"Certain people are of the opinion that it is 
neither desirable nor possible to realize democracy when 
we have to carry out military control or that it is not 
possible to realize democracy when the country is still 
under a state of military exigency. They have thus 
considered military control by the People’s Liberation 
Army as diametrically opposed and inimical to the 
implementation and development of the people’s democratic 
rule. This view is however completely wrong. It is 
important at the moment, a state of war still exists in 
China, fighting is actually going on in various parts of 
the country, and the entire nation is still under a state 
of military control, yet at the same time, we have also 
been successfully promoting democracy throughout the nation 
by the regular convocation of all levels of people’s 
representative conferences, and carrying out the election 
of all levels of people’s representative conferences, so 
as to have all national and local policies to be discussed 
and approved by the people and the people’s representative 
conferences. As a matter of fact, fighting and military 
control have not kept the people from the realization of 
democracy, while the realization of democracy by the people 
has not in fact obstructed the fighting and implementation 
of military control. Quite on the contrary, these two 
phases of work have always complemented and strengthened 
each other,," ^3.
23. L i u ’s speech is translated into English in SCMP, No.84,
March 15-17 1951, (NCNA, March 12 1951). This excerpt is found 
on pp.46-47.
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Hie question naturally arises as to whether or not there was 
any indication that the new regional level of administration was 
viewed as transitional, and if this was the case, was there a 
schedule for its termination. Quite clearly the organic regulations 
envisaged the end of the initial phase of military control, but the 
regional level was meant to outlive the winding up of military 
operations„ Article Two of the ORGAR is particularly relevant to 
a discussion of the intention of the CCP leadership in 1949. the 
Article reads as follows:
"When conditions permit, All-Circles P e o p l e d  
Representative Conferences of the various Greater 
Administrative Regions must be convened, and these 
conferences will provisionally exercise the functions 
and powers of People*s Representative Congresses and 
will establish Greater Administrative People*s 
Governments. In those Greater Administrative Regions, 
where military operations have ceased, where land 
reform has been thoroughly carried out and where all­
circles people’s representatives have been fully 
organized, general elections will be held and Greater 
Administrative People’s Representative Congresses will 
subsequently be convened. These Congresses shall 
formally elect the People’s Government Councils of the 
Greater Administrative Regions. Once People’s 
Government Councils of the Greater Administrative Regions 
have been established, the Military and Administrative 
Committees will be formally a b o l i s h e d . " 2 ^
The foregoing statement would seem to justify the conclusion that in 
1949 the CCP leadership planned to include the regional administrative 
level in the building of a National People’s Congress and, therefore, 
the regional level was to be a more or less permanent feature of 
government administration in the period of new democracy.
However, the organic regulations for the various regional all­
circles representative conferences were never promulgated separately. 
Instead the final article of the Organic Regulations of the 
Provincial All-Circles People’s Representative Conferences was 
drafted to read: "These regulations will apply equally to the
24. Article Two, ORGAR, JMNC, No.4, p.51.
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All-Circles People’s Representative Conferences of the Greater
■25
Administrative Regions." Furthermore, the Organic Law of the
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference was not precise
in defining what was meant by "local committees" of the CPPCC.
Article Eighteen of the Law reads:
"Local committees of the Chinese People*s Political 
Consultative Conference may in accordance with the 
resolutions of the National Committee of the Chinese 
People*s Political Consultative Conference, be set up in 
major cities, important areas and provincial capitals as 
organs for consultation and ensuring the implementation 
of resolutions by the democratic parties and groups and 
people’s organizations in these p l a c e s . "25
The GAR administrative level was more than simply a processing 
point of governmental correspondence, which was being passed up 
and down the administrative ladder. In a crucial characterization 
of the nature of the GAR people’s government council, Article 
Three of the ORGAR refers to it as "the representative organ 
through which the Government Administrative Council of the Central 
People’s Government Council exercises leadership over local govern­
mental work", but the same article also refers to this council as
"the highest local organ of state power" (kao-i-chj ti ti-fang 
* * 26
cheng-c h ’uan chi-kuan). The double administrative personality 
of the GAR, as explicitly sanctioned in the constitutional 
documents of 1949, was consistent with the Yenan emphasis on 
"dual rule" and democratic centralism in state administration.
While the 1949 documentation failed to enumerate or define 
the responsibilities of local government with any degree of 
precision, the commitment to "local expediency" in state 
administration was rendered quite explicit. Article Sixteen of the 
Common Programme underlined the importance of both "national unity" 
and "local expediency" in the following way:
25. See English translation of this Organic Law in the China Weekly 
Review, October 22 1949, pp.123-124. Chinese text in the special 
supplementary volume of JMST, 1949, pp.1-7„ The wording "important 
areas" (chung-yao ti-ch*d) is ambiguous; it is not clear whether 
such areas include the GAR.
26. JMNC, Section 4, p.51.
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"Hie jurisdiction of the Central People’s 
Government and the local people*s governments shall 
be defined according to the nature of the various 
matters involved, and shall be prescribed by the 
decrees of the Central People’s Government Council 
so as to satisfy the requirements of both national 
unity and local expediency.”27
Article Thirty-three promised more precise definitions of 
local government powers at a later date. The last sentence of 
the following translation of this article reiterated the concern 
for the free play of local creativity and initiative:
"The Central PeopleTs Government will at an early 
date draw up an overall plan for the various ministries 
concerned with the restoration and development of the 
national public and private economies. This plan will 
define the parameters of the division and co-ordination 
of labour and in unified fashion will co-ordinate the 
inter-relating of the various economic departments of the 
centre and the localities. The various central economic 
departments and the various local economic departments 
shall under the centralized leadership of the Central 
People’s Government give free play to their own creativity 
and init i at ive."^ 8
Tlie constitutional and organic regulations of late 1949 clearly 
demonstrate a commitment to "dual rule". At each level of 
administration, there was joint governance, and the building of 
state power at any local level was under the supervision of more 
than one higher level of administration. Building at the provincial 
level, for example, was supervised generally by the GAC and more 
closely by the GAR governments. The involvement of the latter 
insured a more immediate supervision and a reduction of the 
administrative distance between centre and provinces„
It hais been suggested that the constitutional documentation 
of late 1949 lacked precision as to the spheres of authority and 
prerogatives of different levels of government, and that this lack 
of precision is related to the fact that unlimited constitutional 
power was reserved to the centre to determine future state 
administrative reorganization. Obviously, in the absence of precise
27c T.H.E. Chen, p.38.
28. JMST, 1950, Secti0n3, p.10.
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definitions, the notion of joint governance becomes especially 
problematic in terms of administrative realities.
A distinction does seem to have been made between ’'leader­
ship" (ling-tao) and "guidance" (chih-tao); for example, the 
ORGAR relate "leadership" and "guidance" in the following article 
which covers the relation between the army and state at the 
regional level: "The military organs of each Greater Admini­
strative Region are under the orders of the People*s Revolutionary 
Military Council and are to comply with the leadership of the 
People*s Revolutionary Military Council and the guidance of the
29
People»s Government Council of the Greater Administrative Regions".
Similarly, the principle of joint governance seems to apply 
in the following case:
"As for schools, hospitals, libraries, museums and 
cultural enterprises of national significance, which are 
to be transferred to central management, they will all be 
under the direct leadership of the Central People’s 
Government and, moreover, they will comply with the 
directives of the People’s Government Councils of the 
Greater Administrative Regions.
One might well ask how can the same organ assimilate instructions
from two different sources? What happens if the instructions
from two different sources are inconsistent? The dichotomy of
"leadership" and "guidance" does suggest that the event of such
inconsistency, the agency, which possesses "leadership", prevails,
and this is consistent with "democratic centralism". "Leadership"
implies an ability to determine principles as opposed to the
definition of specific administrative regulations. Often "ling-tao"
as opposed to "chih-tao" resides in committees, which co-ordinate
systems, while individual departments only exercise "chih-tao".
One must, however, note that while "legislative power" was perceived
as indivisible, "ling-tao" was exclusive neither to the central
government, nor to the Party’s Central Committee. A Military and
29. Article Eight, ORGAR, JMNA, Section 4, p.53.
30. Article Seven, Section Three, ORGAR, JMNC, Section 4, p.53.
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Administrative Committee, for example, possessed “ling-tao11 in
relation to the departments under its committee structure as well
31
as in relation to lower local levels of government organization.
Analysis is complicated by the fact that even under the same 
basic constitutional construction, levels of administration inter­
related differently in specific temporal and spatial contexts, 
hence a pattern of centralization, attempted within one depart­
mental complex, need not necessarily reflect the pattern, achieved 
in another department.
Victor Li hsd studied the pattern of state administration in 
relation to customs and foreign trade. According to his analysis, 
there were variations on the basic formula of “dual leadership".
He concluded that generally the upper level tended to “lead" (ling- 
tao) while the regional governments usually "guided, supervised,
and assisted" (chih-tao< chien-tu, ho hsieh-chu) the work of local
32
units. Li suggests that "leadership" by the upper level entailed
the fixing of the financial plan and business plan of the lower
33
level, but also notes that the regional government in some cases 
"led" the political and educational work of local units. This 
latter point should be placed in the context of the spring 1951 
decentralization, which resulted in the increased responsibilities 
of regional government departments and Party bureaux in relation 
to state enterprise.
Article Five of the ORGAR was to a degree more precise as to 
the question of how various levels of state administration would 
inter-relate. This article bound the regional governments to
31. Refer to Article Four, Section Seven of the ORGAR.
32. See Victor Li, "State Control of Foreign Trade, 1949-1954", 
unpublished paper, presented to a conference on legal aspects of 
foreign trade of the People*s Republic of China. The conference 
was held under the auspices of the Contemporary China Institute, 
London, September 13-17 1971, p.29.
33. Ibid., p . 30.
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submit reports to the GAC on any important matter which arose 
within their jurisdiction, but these reports were to be submitted 
only after action had already been taken at the GAR level.
Provision was made in several sections for exceptional circumstances. 
In matters of national significance, the regional governments had 
first to seek the approval of the GAR before proceeding. It was 
not made clear as to how to draw the line between national and 
regional significance. Presumably, the CPGC would draw the line 
when necessary. Hie same article outlined the different channels 
of communication. There was to be up-down communication between 
central-level ministries, committees, etcQ, and their counter­
parts at the regional level relating to specific matters, which 
were already covered by fixed government policy. But in matters of 
a general nature correspondence and directives would be passed to 
the government councils of the j different levels for examination.
The same article provided for direct communication between the 
central and provincial governments in order to deal with "special 
problems", although the centre was to keep the regional government 
informed in such cases.
As might be construed from the discussion above, there was a 
fairly close structural resemblance between central and regional 
administrative organization. Article Seven of the ORGAR allowed 
the regional government councils to establish administrative 
agencies in accordance with the needs of their work and also out­
lined in principle the various types of agency which were to be 
established.
The CPG committees of political and legal affairs, economic and 
financial affairs, cultural and educational affairs and people’s 
supervision were duplicated at the regional level. The regional 
departments within these general systems for the most part corres­
ponded to the central ministries, although, depending on the 
importance of the matters handled by the different agencies, the 
regional authorities had the option of establishing a lower level 
administrative unit, designated as a "bureau" (cliu) as opposed to 
a department (pu). Furthermore, from region to region there were
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34.
35.
36.
variations in the number and types of departments and bureaux 
due to the different problems.faced by the various regional 
governments.
If we briefly compare the organization of the NWMAC with
that of the ECMAC, we would note that the former had a Department
of Animal Husbandry, but lacked Bureaux of Planning and Co-operative
Enterprises, while the ECMAC possessed the latter two bureaux and
in addition had a Bureau of Fisheries, which was one bureau not
34
included in the organization of the NWMAC.
It should be stressed that regional organization had to be
approved by the CPG; for example, on February 17th 1950, the GAR
in its twentieth meeting passed a list of appointments to the ECMAC
and at the same time amended and passed the organic regulations of 
35
the ECMAC. Similarly on May 6th of the same year, the organic
regulations of the North-east People*s Government were passed at
3 6
the thirty-first meeting of the GAC.
Although a great deal of administrative discretion was allowed 
to accumulate at the regional level during these early years of the 
Communist regime, the power of appointment and dismissal was firmly 
lodged with the members of the CPGC and the GAC. Prior to the 
passing of the organic regulations of the various levels of govern­
ment administration, the GAC, during its eighth meeting of November 
28th 1949, passed the "Provisional Procedures for the Appointment 
and Discharge of Personnel", (Chung-yang ien-min cheng-fu cheng-wu 
yuan leuan-yil jen-mien kung-tso jen-yuan ti tsan-hsing pan-fa).
The GAR under these procedures could recommend to the CPGC for 
appointment or dismissal the following first grade officials of 
the regional governments, namely, the chairmen, vice-chairmen,
Refer to "Regional Organization in China", C.B., No.37, December 
7th 1950, for a breakdown of each regional administration together 
with a listing of responsible personnel at that level.
JMJP, February 17th 1950, p.4.
JMJP, May 6th 1950, p.l.
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secretaries-general, assistant secretaries-general, members of 
government council, department'heads and assistant department 
heads, as well as the mayors and deputy-mayors of cities, which 
came under regional jurisdiction. On its own initiative and 
authority the GAR was empowered to appoint or discharge the 
leading personnel of bureaux, (chu), offices (t 1ing) and sections 
(chbu) of the regional, provincial and municipal governments.
It still remains to define more closely the administrative 
relationship between the regional and provincial governments.
The third article of the ORPPG specified that provincial government 
was to be under the direct leadership of the appropriate GAR 
people*s government council, and in cases where the latter council 
had yet to be set up, the provincial government was reponsible to 
the direct leadership of the GAC. The fifth article of the same 
regulations spelled out in terms similar to the fifth article of 
the ORGAR, the nature of the relationship between provincial and 
other levels of administration0 The pattern, established in the 
first section of this article, is as follows:
"As for important tasks which come within the 
jurisdiction of the Provincial People’s Government 
Councils after these tasks have been dealt with, the 
Provincial People's Government Council will make a 
report to the Greater Administrative Region People's 
Government and the report will then be passed to the 
GAC. As for matters which have regional or national 
implications, before they can be dealt with, the 
Provincial People's Government Council must either 
request instructions from the Greater Administrative 
Region People's Government Council, or through the 
offices of the latter seek instructions from the GAC 
and then submit a report once the matter has been 
dealt with."37
The above discussion makes it clear that certain matters 
were to be left to the discretion of the appropriate level of 
local administration, although in the final analysis the CPG would 
intervene to determine what matters were to be handled by what 
level of administration.
37. ORPPG, FLHP, p.122. One might note here that in the translation of
these various articles, one often encounters this ambiguous "or” (huo) 
construction, and it is never made clear which procedure, A or B, is 
to be applied in what specific instance.
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To recapitulate, the CPGC possessed almost unlimited con­
stitutional authority, but the administrative philosophy, which 
was evident in the constitutional arrangements of late 1949., 
called for a devolution of administrative responsibility in 
accordance with "local expediency". Obviously the latter emphasis 
involved a devolution of responsibility in terms of the implementation 
of policy, but the more important and somewhat more difficult 
question is to what extent were GAR governments involved in the 
shaping of policy.
One can immediately note that policy implementation and policy 
formulation are not as readily separated in practice as in theory. 
Policy formulation inevitably involves the inter-reaction of levels 
of administration. Lower levels provide the basic .information, 
which helps shape policy. Personnel, who may not have formal 
positions in relation to the shaping of policy, nonetheless, have 
a hand in deciding how and what information is processed and trans­
mitted to superior levels.
There was no real devolution in terms of the formulation of 
general principles. One, however, can say that the front-rank 
leaders of GAR organization undoubtedly participated in CCPCC debate 
as to general principles by virtue of the important positions which 
they held on the CCPCC, CPGC and PRMC. The regional governments did 
have a great deal of discretion in terms of the refining of general 
policy to fit local circumstances. We shall see in later chapters 
that the GAR governments sometimes promulgated regulations even 
before the GAC set out corresponding national regulations. There 
will also be opportunity to discuss inter-level exchange in relation 
to the development of mass campaigns, as national regulations, \diich 
determined the policy emphases and structure of the mass campaigns, 
were often based on the experience of regulations, which had been 
formulated and applied at the regional level.
Given the severe shortages of experienced and policy-conscious 
personnel at all local levels, and given the tremendous unevenness
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in patterns of national political and economic integration 
achieved hitherto, the active participation of the GAR level in 
the direction of the campaigns was almost inevitable. The admini­
stration of the campaigns had of necessity to be decentralized; 
for example, at a time when there was hardly any uniformity in 
the timing and conditions of land reform from hsien to hsien, let 
alone from region to region, the centre, with only very limited 
resources at its disposal, would not have been able to conduct a 
mass campaign of such complexity within a rigidly vertical: 
structural framework0 Furthermore, any attempt to conduct a mass 
campaign within such a framework would have stood in contradiction 
with the totality of the CCP’s wartime organizational experience. 
Given the tremendous unevenness of the national pattern of political 
integration, the question of timing and preparations assumed great 
importance and in the area of operations the GAR level assumed 
special responsibility.
The Agrarian Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China 
recognized the need for a pragmatic region-by-region approach to 
the development of land reform; Article Thirty-eight specifically 
stated:
"The time of starting agrarian reform in various 
places shall be regulated by decree and made public by 
the people*s governments of the big administrative areas 
(or the military and administrative committees) and 
the provincial people’s governments."38
Chou Fang has in his comments on the GARs described the
devolution-of administrative responsibility to meet the prevailing
uneven patterns of political integration in the following terms:
"Because conditions in the different regions were 
complicated during the initial period of liberation, our 
work progressed unevenly, and we created state organs at 
the level of the Greater Administrative Region in order 
to facilitate centralized, unified leadership, and by 
needing local circumstances, we made headway in our
38. Sed'Agrarian Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China", CB, 
No.42, December 22nd 1950, p.8.
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work: this was especially necessary and appropriate,.
In terms of destroying the power of counter-revolutionary 
remnants, healing the wounds of war, restoring the 
national economy and furthering various social reform 
movements, these administrations all made great 
Contributions,"39
Over the course of the period of economic restoration a 
great many responsibilities were devolved from the centre to 
the GAR level, as the following editorial comment indicates:
"Except for military, diplomatic and public 
security work which were placed under the central 
leadership of the Central People*s Government, all the 
other work (during the period of the Military and 
Administrative Committees) was carried out by the 
leadership organs of the different regions."40
We have covered how in theory the state machinery was to 
function, but it remains to trace the actual pattern of central­
ization as it developed through the years 1950*54. This pattern 
will be generally described here, and then explored in greater
detail in Chapter Four.
Despite repeated emphases in 1949 on the importance of a
flexible administrative approach involving the tapping of local
creativity and initiative, and the devolution of responsibility
within a dual structure of administration, the economic and fiscal
crisis of early 1950 was met with a high degree of centralization.
The centre responded to the chronic imbalance of state expenditure
and revenue with the GAC*s decision on the unification of financial
and economic work, promulgated on March 3rd 1950. In the practical
terms of the implementation of the decision, the Yenan emphases on
"finance through economic development" and "centralized leadership
and decentralized management" were abandoned. No doubt the
decision itself was necessary in the light of the crisis, which
was exacerbated by fiscal irresponsibility at local levels; however,
in the course of implementation, the central authorities went to an
extreme, and the Ministry of Finance siphoned off the fiscal
resources of local levels of government with adverse effects on
commerce and economic restoration.
39. Chou Fan, WKKCCK, p.81.
40. See "Meaning of the Recent Reorganization of Government Organs to 
mEet Economic Construction", in SCMP, No.460, p.29 for the trans­
lation of an editorial appearing in Ta-kung pao„ Hong Kong, Nov.27, 1952.
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There was obviously a continuing debate as to the kind and
degree of centralization necessary at that time. There were
those who advocated more emphasis on "direct leadership of various
systems" (ko hsi-t*ung chung-chih ling-tao) and less emphasis on a
"system of local unified leadership" (ti-fang i-yuan hua ti ling
tao chih-tu). Hie line or argument was clearly drawn in a Chang-
chiang iih-pao editorial of December 16th 1950. The editorial
emphasized the building up of important CPG ministries, involved in
the administration of trade, capital construction, finance and 
41
currency.
As we have already noted in Chapter Two, the concept of 
"unified leadership of the Party*’ (Tang ti i-yuan hua ling-tao) was 
especially well defined in terms of the specific leadership problems 
which the Party faced at the time of the KMTfs blockade of the 
border regions and the Japanese "Three-Alls". At that time military 
operations had become more dispersed. Party and state tended to 
separate, and the Communists found that they had to concentrate 
their action at lower levels of organization. "Unified leadership" 
was then described in two-dimensional terms. There was a need to 
co-ordinate different levels of Party, state and army organization, 
and there was a concern that the Party Committees at the various 
levels insure the co-ordination of different , systems at the same 
level. Hence, it was stressed that local Party Committees include 
Party cadres who worked in Party, state and military departments. 
Higher level army, mass organization and government decisions were 
taken with the approval of the Party Committee of the corresponding 
level.
But to return to the point of view, outlined in the above 
editorial: it was argued that "unified leadership of the local
Party Committee" (ti-fang tang ti i-yuan hua ti ling-tao) had been 
especially important during the war when villages were isolated
41. "Chin-i _pu k*o-fu ling-tao chi-leuan ti ping-chtin chu-i tso-feng 
ch^uan-li tso hao t fu-lcai chung-hsin lcung-tso", (Advance over­
coming the egalitarian work style of leadership organs exerting 
all effort to take agrarian reform as the centre of work). CCJP, 
December 16th 1950, also available in Kan~pu hsueh-hsi tzu-liao. 
No.26, February 1951.
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and when enemy lines cross-crossed CCP held territories. At that 
time state administration rarely transcended the level of the 
Special District, and "sub-region management", (fen-ch'u lcuan-li) 
was the order of the day. Even with victory, "the unified 
leadership of the local Party Committee" was still significant, 
but the argument then stressed the distinction between tasks 
involving social revolution and tasks involving economic construc­
tion. As for tasks involving the latter, it was argued that 
"direct leadership" by specialized ministries was more appropriate. 
However, we might readily note that this view did not represent 
a firm consensus of opinion; for example, Lin P.iao, Chairman of 
the CSMAC, in a report on the activities of the CSMAC, stressed 
horizontal co-ordination and local creativity. The following 
point in relation to work method was stressed:
"The Commission assumes leadership of these organs 
["i.e. the committees and departments under the CSMAC] , 
but gives them a free hand to manifest to the fullest 
their own capabilities, their initiative and their 
creative p o w e r . "42
In the spring of 1951, the GAC, under the active leadership 
of Chou En-lai, made an abrupt u-turn, reversing the earlier trend 
towards vertical centralization. A GAC decision of March 19th li951, 
firmly established a three-grade financial system and authorised 
a federal scheme of tax-sharing. Similarly at its 83rd session 
the GAC announced the "Decision on Division of Functions and Power 
Between Central and Local Governments in Managing Financial and 
Economic Work". In effect a philosophy of administration, which 
had evolved out of wartime experience in Yenan, gained increasing 
significance in a period when the CCP was attempting political and 
economic integration across the length and breadth of China.
42. See CB, No.39, December 9th 1950, p.8.
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The net set of policies, which emerged in 1951, were based 
on a philosophy of government administration, which maximized local ex­
pediency. This philosophy of administration involved a downward 
thrust of administrative responsibility and a greater sharing of 
power within the overall context of general principles and 
policies, defined at the centre. 1949 emphases on local expediency, 
which had been lost in the fiscal centralization of 1950, were re­
established. A strategy, based on the thane of self-reliance, 
emerged. The centre was to focus on certain lcey-points in the 
economy while the local governments would be allowed greater 
initiative to develop local construction. The rationality for 
these policy emphases was clearly articulated in a Jen-min .jih-pao 
editorial covering the March 29th decision. The following point of 
view was advanced:
"Moreover, in a country like China with so large an 
area and so great a population and with so complicated a 
situation, to concentrate everything on the Central Gov­
ernment would overburden the Central Government organs 
with too heavy administrative duties and would cause the 
danger of relaxing attention to the general policy of 
state. To properly transfer certain power and 
responsibility to local governments under unified leader­
ship, thereby to realize local expediency, would, rather 
than causing any harm, further consolidate the central ^
leadership through the manifestation of local initiative."
Editorial comment specifically placed the March 29th decision in
the context of the 1949 oiiphases on local expediency, as it was
stated:
"Very obviously the Decision fully accords with the 
principle of "beneficial both to national unification and 
to local expediency" as laid down in Article 16 of the 
Common Programme and also the principle of "defining the 
financial spheres of central and local governments" as laid 
down in Article 40 of the Common Programme, while the spirit 
of "local expediency" is the main feature of the d e c i s i o n . "44
43. "Centralized Leadership and Divided Responsibility is Correct Policy of 
Financial Work", SCMP, No.91, p.17, (from JMJP, Peking April 5th 1951).
44. Ibid., p.17.
129
In the preamble to the GAC decision to establish a three” 
grade financial system, Chou En-lai wrote:
"For the salce of consolidating the centralized 
management and leadership over state finance and of 
conforming with the economic situation and working 
conditions in regions, provinces and municipalities 
throughout the country, thereby to facilitate local 
expediency, this council has decided to divide the 
system of government system of government finance for 
the year 1951 into three grades — * Central, Regional 
and Provincial (Municipal.
The second section of the decision defined "local finance", and, 
as is clear from the following excerpt? entrusted the GAR govern­
ments with the responsibility for the structuring of local budget­
ary arrangements:
"The central Ministry of Finance shall apportion 
part of the designated receipts and the approved regional 
budgets as receipts and disbursements allotted by the 
Central Ministry of Finance and according to concrete 
conditions in the provinces (municipalities) under its 
jursidiction, the Administrative Region shall divide the 
financial system into Regional Finance and Provincial 
(Municipal) Finance, and shall report to the GAR Committee 
on Financial and Economic Affairs for record."46
The March 29th decision also set forth in precise terms the
tax prerogative of the central and regional level governments.
The decision specified that certain taxes, such as commodity tax,
industrial and commercial taxes, stamp tax would be shared between
central and regional governments, but it also outlined exclusive
tax-levying prerogatives. Customs, salt taxes and revenue from
state enterprise under direct CPG jurisdiction were exclusive to
the central Ministry of Finance, whereas the regional governments
were granted an exclusive collecting prerogative in terms of the
revenue from state enterprise, managed at the regional level,the
47
slaughter tax, real estate tax, certain judicial fees, etc.
45. "3-Grade Government Financial System Instituted by the GAC to Con­
solidate Centralization of finance", SCMP, No.91, p.12, (from JMJP, 
Peking, April 5th 1951).
46. Ibid., p.13.
47. Section 4, March 29tli decision, SCMP, No.91, p. 15.
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The wording of the March 29th decisions as well as the 
covering Jen-min jih-pao editorial was such as to indicate that 
there had been opposition to the new set-up. First, there was the 
question as to whether or not under the new arrangements the local 
levels could be depended upon to insure the annual revenues of the 
central government. The Jen-min jih-pao editorialized on the point 
that section Eight of the decision guaranteed local fiscal 
discipline within a national budgetary framework, and furthermore 
emphasized the past performance of the people's governments, as 
is evident in the following comment:
"..•the various grades of people's governments have 
all along been faithful to the decisions of the Central 
People's Government and they will certainly do satisfac­
torily in guaranteeing the fulfilment of the central 
financial task."48
There had also been criticism on the point that the devolution 
of fiscal responsibilities would further aggravate regional economic 
disparities. As the following statement indicates, the Jen-min 
jih-pao met this criticism with the assertion that the centre was 
not abdicating in its responsibility to insure development in all 
regions, and that regional inequalities would be taken into account 
under the centre's "unified plan":
"As there are different economic situations and 
states of revenue in various localities, does the 
institution of the GAC decision lead to the grave 
phenomenon of unequal poverty and prosperity? That is 
unlikely while local revenues differ from one locality 
to another and while local projects to be undertalcen 
differ in scope, the standard of supply in different 
localities and investment in state economic construction 
are worked out by the Central Government under unified 
plans, talcing into account the concrete conditions of 
various localities,"49
Despite this reassurance, this criticism, raised in 1951, does
seem to point to a major weakness in the strategy for economic
development, based on the concentration of centrally directed
effort at lceypoints in co-ordination with exploitation of self-
48. "Centralized Leadership and Divided Responsibility if Correct 
Policy of Financial Work", SCMP, No.91, p.18.
49. Ibid., p.17-18.
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reliance at the local levels. The possibilities of self-reliance 
were greater in some localities as opposed to others, and, if the 
centre was in fact to adjust its unified plans so as to insure a 
sensitive approach to regional inequalities, this ivould require a 
massive degree of central intervention at the local level in con­
tradiction to the spirit of self-reliance, which accents the 
devolution of government responsibilities.
As we have seen, the problem surfaced in relation to the 
"co-ordinated economic regions", when C h ’en Ytin in 1959 suggested 
that a choice would have to be made between regional self-reliance 
and national economic development. In his view, the reduction of 
regional inequalities might well conflict with an emphasis on a 
system of priorities in determining industrial sites.
Hie decision of May 4th 1951, as to the division of functions 
and powers between central and local governments goes into some 
detail as to the reasons for the new administrative arrangements 
of 1951. It was then argued that the extraordinary difficulties 
of 1950, such as runaway inflation, currency instability and the 
tremendous pressure on the central treasury to payroll the ranks of 
the PLA, and the new government, which had been greatly swollen by 
large numbers of retained KMT military and government personnel, had 
at that time necessitated a strong centralization. However, it was 
broadly hinted that this centralization had been excessive due to 
a lack of administrative experience as well as certain lack of 
precision in the defining of the responsibilities of the various 
levels of state administration.
It has already been emphasized that the relevant organic 
regulations and documents of constitutional significance, which 
were drafted in late 1949, provided a very high degree of flexibility, 
but did not spell out in a one-two-three fashion the definite 
sphere of authority and responsibility of each level of government.
In 1949, for example, the ambiguous distinction between matters of 
regional importance and matters of national importance had been 
noted, but not really defined, hence problems arose in the unravel­
ing of conflicting jurisdictions; the following problem of admini­
strative jurisdiction was cited in the May 4th decision:
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"As an example, the state trade work failed to 
distinguish between business of comparatively greater 
local importance, and uniformly put them under the 
direct leadership of the respective special trading 
companies, thus restricting some business of compara­
tively greater local importance from exercising "local 
expediency"...."50
Furthermore, the following point was drawn out:
"...no clear provisions were made in the past as 
to what powers belonged to the Central Government and 
what powers belonged to local governments; this would 
make it difficult for local authorities to exercise 
any control over enterprises existing in their locality 
but directly managed by the Central Government."^-*-
The Jen-min jih-pao editorial, covering the May 4th decision,
reaffirmed in so many words what Mao had said in 1949 with
reference to China being a big country, and, therefore, needing
regional governments; it was specifically claimed:
"...in our country with wide area, vast population 
and not highly developed communications facilities and 
still passing through the great transformation of people*s 
revolution, numerous things require local management..."^2
Significantly, the editorial defended regional management in terms 
of democracy. The regional governments, it was argued, were to 
be viewed in the context of the collective strength of the masses 
and served to illustrate the correct thinking behind Mao*s teaching, 
"up from the masses and down to the masses".
Chou's policy of "centralized leadership and divided respon­
sibilities" (tung-i ling-tao-^  fen-chi fu-tse), was consistent with 
the emphasis on local expediency explicit in the constitutional
arrangement of 1949, and, furthermore, was consistent with the Yenan 
formulation, "centralized leadership and decentralized management".
50. "GAC Decision on Division of Functions and Power Between Central 
and Local Governments in Managing Financial and Economic Work", 
SCMP, No.108, p.22, (from JMJP, May 26th 1951).
51- Ibid. „ p.22..
52. "Division of Functions and Power Between Central and Local 
Governments in Managing Financial and Economic Work", JMJP 
editorial of May 26th 1951, translated in SCMP, No.108, p.23.
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Hie May 4th decision also reveals an increasing anphasis on 
the importance of political perspectives, in particular the need 
for the exercise of political control at the local level over the 
development of state enterprise. The decision referred to two 
categories of state enterprise, but, as the following instruction 
indicates, even in the case of state enterprise directly managed 
by central ministries, political work was to be the responsibility 
of local authorities:
"...part of state enterprise or part of financial and 
economic business to be transferred in totality to local 
management, for example, local industrial, financial, trade 
communications enterprises. Except guaranteeing the 
unification of state policy plans and systems, all manage­
ment and political work in these enterprises shall be 
placed under the responsibility of local governments. The 
second category consists of enterprise (scattered in various 
localities and directly managed by the Central Government 
financial and economic departments) the political work 
therein shall be placed under the leadership of the local 
authorities designated by the People*s Governments of the
administrative regions."53
In relation to this rather curious arrangement, the Jen-min .jih-pao 
could only query somewhat apologetically:
"In such a vast country like China where state 
enterprises are scattered, how can the Central Government 
finance and economic departments know everything about 
the ideological state, political understanding, working 
conditions, labour attitude of each personnel of an
enterprise?"54
One must place these decisions regarding the financial and 
economic system of government in the context of the GAC*s strategy 
for industrial development in the year 1951. Chou En-lai was of 
the opinion that the centre had had too much to do. It was decided 
that central ministries would concentrate on large-scale capital 
construction, but in the Yenan tradition of capitalizing on all 
positive economic, factors, local governments were given the green
53. JMJP editorial in SCMP No.108, p.23.
54. "Centralized Leadership and Divided Responsibility is Correct 
Policy of Financial Work", SCMP, No.91, p.18.
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light to go ahead and develop local industry using local resources
and manpower. The April 6th 1951, decision, relating to state
55
industrial production, provided the concrete administrative frame­
work through which the new strategic emphasis could be appliedo 
The centre offered incentives in order to revive local industry, 
which had languished under the tight fiscal centralization of 
1950. Surplus equipment was to be transferred to local enter­
prises and the centre was to handle depreciation costs. Depart­
ments of trade and the banks were instructed to sponsor local 
industry. As for the profits of such industry, once obligations 
to the treasury had been met, any remaining profits were to be 
ploughed back into local industrial expansion.
In July 1951, there was a national conference of secretaries- 
general, who were attached to the general offices of the various 
government councils and committees. Hie conference focused on 
Chou En-la^s formulation, "centralized leadership and divided 
responsibilities". The government strategy, which was then elabor­
ated upon, stressed that the centre would reserve its energies, 
grasping "key-points", but also keeping an eye on the overall 
situation. Under the new division of labour, local levels were to 
relieve the centre of some of its work load. The following point 
was brought out:
"Between the various grades, the system of assuming 
responsibilities by separate levels should be strengthened 
in accordance with the nature of work. Ordinary and routine 
work should as far as possible be left to the various 
offices and departments for disposal at their own 
responsibility. Do not concentrate everything at the top 
so that the heads are confined within the narrow circle of 
plodding at routine.
The conference called for an emphasis on the horizontal in govern­
ment administration. Note the following point:
t i  t r
55. "Cheng-wu yuan kuan-yu i-chiu-wu-i nien kuo-ying kung-yeh sheng- 
chan chien-she ti chueh-ting", (GAC decision relating to 1951 
production and construction of state industry), HHYP, Vol4, No.l, 
pp.137-139.
56. See SCMP, N0 .147, August 1-2 1951, p.18, (NCNA, Peking July 27th 
1951).
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"In conformity with the division of business, the 
organizational structure may develop in a horizontal way, 
gradually changing the former large and all-inclusive 
organizational set-up,,"5?
In 1951, we can already see the clear outlines of an admini­
strative philosophy and a strategy for economic development, vdiicfr 
later emerged as canon in Mao Tse~tung*s formulation of the "Ten 
Great Relationships". In 1951 the issue was not resolved, and a 
course was not unalterably set. The policies set out in the spring 
of that year were viewed as temporary. Indeed, the following state­
ment, which appears in the text of the May 4th decision, would seem 
to anticipate another pattern of administration and a downgrading 
of regional participation in economic construction:
"Later, when coming to a certain phase in the devel­
opment of the national economy, if more concentration is 
beneficial to the people and the work itself, the local 
governments will certainly support more concentration.
Hence, this decision will on no account affect concen­
tration when things are different and times are 
different."59
In 1951 the CCP was especially preoccupied with problems of 
political integration and economic rehabilitation. However, in 
late 1952, the CCP leadership dared to think in more bold and 
expansive terms than simply economic rehabilitation. They could 
then entertain the prospect of more Russian credits in 1953. The 
Three-Antis Campaign had served to insure political consolidation 
within the bureaucracy, and the campaign had been followed by 
vigorous recruitment in the state and Party administrations. 
Furthermore, provincial administration had started to stabilize, 
as some of the more irregular features of the 1949 administrative 
demarcation were adjusted. There was a flurry of activity at the 
GAR level in anticipation of plans for large-scale capital con*- 
struction; for example, the North China Administrative Committee 
sponsored the North China Economic and Finance Conference, which met 
from October 21 to November 2nd. Tie conference approved a shift
57. SCMP, No.147, August 1-2 1951, p.19.
58. SCMP, No.108, "Division of Functions and Power", p.24.
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in the centre of work to capital construction, and the call went 
out to strengthen leadership in building companies and to train 
adequate numbers of cadres. It was the beginning of a new stage 
in the Chinese revolution.
In preparation for this new era of large-scale capital con­
struction, the CPGC availed itself of its extraordinary constitu­
tional powers and brought about a wholesale reorganization of the 
state structure. The November 15th 1952, "Decision on Change of 
the Structure and Tasks of the People's Governments (or MACs) of 
the Greater Administrative Regions", called for the reorganization 
of the regional governments of 1949 into administrative committees. 
These successor committees did not have the status of their ante­
cedent councils as they were not described as the "highest local 
organs of state power". The reason for the change was clearly 
spelled out in the preamble of the decision as follows:
"To meet the new situation and new task of nation­
wide large-scale and planned economic construction and 
cultural construction shortly to be started in 1953, 
the Central People’s Government should further unify 
and centralize the leadership over the various phases 
of work, and the organization of the Central Peopletfs 
Government should be further strengthened in order to 
increase the responsibility of leadership at provincial 
and municipal levels. Consequently, the structures and 
tasks of the people's governments (MACs) of the admini­
strative regions should be changed a c c o r d i n g l y ."59
An article appearing in the Kuang-ming jih-pao on December 
25tli 1952, took up the same argument, observing that more central­
ization was required in preparation for large-scale capital con­
struction. The 1949 administrative system was then rationalized 
in the following terms:
" In relation to the tasks of state administration 
in 1949 the people's government (MACs) of the admini­
strative regions would have to have greater power and 
larger organic structure to conduct local affairs 
independently. However work conditions were different
59. See SCMP, N0 .453, "Hie CPGC Holds 19tli Meeting", pp.17-18, 
(NCNA, Peking November 16th 1952).
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in various places. For instance, economic construc­
tion was carried out in the Northeast region in 1950, 
while at the same time land reform was being carried 
out in East China, Central-South and Northwest and 
bandit suppression, anti-despot, rent-reduction and 
deposit refund campaigns were being carried out in the 
Southwest. As the degree of work was different in 
various places, a strong leadership organ capable of 
representing the central government had to be depended 
upon in the administrative regions to timely and pro­
perly guide the local governments at all levels to 
concretely and thoroughly implement the unified pro­
grammes and policies of the central government."^
The implication was that the united front aspect of the 
GAR people’s government council had been necessary because of 
the very great regional variations in the level of political 
integration, but that now that a reasonable degree of political 
integration had been achieved nationally and the nation was 
poised for the struggle to build large-scale capital construc­
tion, the status of the GAR governments as the "highest local 
organ of state power" was no longer necessary.
As the regional governments had lost this status, the 
necessity for the convening of people’s congresses at the 
regional level was no longer as compelling, and it is, therefore, 
not surprising that the Election Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, which was subsequently passed during the twenty-second 
meeting of the CPGC on February 11th 1953, failed to mention con­
gresses at the GAR level. Such an omission naturally reduced the 
significance of the regional governments as institutionalized forms 
of the united front; however, it should be stressed that despite 
this, omission, united-front style organization continued to persist 
at this level. The regional headquarters of national organizations 
such as the New Democratic Youth League, All-China Women’s Fed­
eration, Sino-Soviet Friendship Association, etc., continued to 
function down to autunm 1954, when the GAR level was completely 
abolished.
60. See translation in SCMP, No<>494, January 17-19, 1953, p 037o
138
There was no suggestion in late 1952 that the regional level 
of administration was to be phased out in the near future, and in­
deed this level was still deemed appropriate to the development of 
a rational pattern of centralized administration. The regional 
administrations before and after the decision of November 15th were, 
nonetheless, involved in preparing for large-scale economic con­
struction. In fact the wording of the decision was such that there 
was even provision for an increase in the number of bureaux at the 
regional level. The regional administrations were seen as the 
instruments for the furthering of administrative centralization 
under the GAC, hence the Southwest Committee of Financial and 
Economic Affairs set up a capital construction office to exercise 
leadership over all capital projects in the region.^
While the regional departments were reduced to the status of
bureaux Cchti), there was no diminution in terms of the variety of
governmental functions, handled at the regional level. Prior to 
the November 15tli decision, the regional bureaux of the CCPCC had 
been actively engaged in study sessions in economic theory for 
senior-level cadres of the regional governments in preparation for 
regional participation in economic construction. Although the new 
Election Law did not make any provision for the convocation of 
regional congresses, the regional administrative committees were 
nonetheless involved in the building of people’s democratic state 
power at other regional levels. The East China Administrative
Committee, for example, accepted responsibility for the following
major tasks in 1953: "To strengthen coastal defence and support
the resist-US struggle in Korea; to strengthen guidance over 
industrial production and capital construction work; to develop 
mutual-aid and co-operative movement and improve leadership of rural 
work; and to enforce universal franchise and convene people's
62congresses at provincial (municipal), hsien and hsiang levels".
61. SCMP, No.457, "Capital Construction in All Regions", p.l.
62. SCMP, No.519, "East China Administrative Committee Holds Full 
Session", pp.30-31, (NCNA, Shanghai, February 25th 1953).
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Not surprisingly the number of the various administrative units 
under the East China Administrative Committee had to be increased. 
Previously, under the old ECMAC, there were twenty-five committees, 
departments and bureaux; however, as a result of reorganization,
which began on December 2nd 1952, this number increased to thirty-
63
nine committees, bureaux and offices.
The organizational pattern of government, which emerged after 
the reorganization, was complex; it was a hybrid form of govern­
ment, incorporating both "dual" and "vertical" elements. Article 
Three of the November 15th decision stipulated that some bureaux 
would be subject to direct leadership of the competent ministries 
of the CPG, while other bureaux would still be subject in the 
first instance to either the regional administrative committee 
itself, or one of its subordinate committees. Inasmuch as some 
bureaux were directly integrated with the parent ministry in
Peking, the whole system of government moved towards Franz
64
Schurmann's conception of "pu-men", but a degree of horizontal 
authority was, nonetheless, preserved despite the reorganization, 
because the grouping of the various regional bureaux under the old 
committees of political and legal affairs, educational and 
cultural affairs, etc., was carried over, A greater degree of 
vertical centralization took place in terms of the GAR bureaux, 
involved in capital construction. Also the centre wished to 
strengthen itself while consolidating provincial and municipal 
governments. The new hybrid administrative structure included 
systems with dual channels of authority as well as systems which 
related to the centre vertically, hence the bureaux of the new 
administrative committees were placed in one of two categories. 
Bureaux such as that of health and civil affairs were responsible 
to the "leadership" (ling-tao) of the administrative committees, 
but had also to honour the "guidance" (chih-tao) of one of the
63. Ibid., p.31.
64. F. Schumann, p.199. Schumann suggests the term corresponds to the 
Russian ottasl* and is used to describe central ministries, which 
have direct control over an extensive network of branch agencies, 
situated at various administrative levels.
140
major committees such as the Committee of Political Affairs, 
whereas bureaux of the second category, for example, the Commercial 
Enterprises Bureau, were placed under the "leadership" of a central 
ministry; it was explained:
"Inasmuch as these bureaux and offices [of the second 
category] are set up by the Central People's Government in 
the administrative regions, they should certainly be 
subjected to the supervision (chien-ch* a) and guidance 
(chih-tao) of the administrative committee and concerned 
committee (e.g. Committee of Financial and Economic 
Affairs) in the region. However, the administrative 
committees should not directly exercise power of leader­
ship (ling-tao) over them, because their direct superiors ^
are the concerned organs of the Central People*s Government."
During the course of 1953, the GAR committees participated in the 
preparations for large-scale capital construction and in the 
establishment of the people's democratic state power.
Official explanations notwithstanding, the decision, taken at 
the thirty-second meeting of the CPGC on June 19th 1954, to dis­
mantle completely entire regional military, Party and state 
machineries does seem somewhat perplexing. The regional machineries 
were eulogized with unsparing rhetoric, as the following comment 
illustrates:
"These machineries have produced important 
effects and victoriously fulfilled their missions in the 
thorough implementation of Central Government policies, 
the enforcement of measures for the people's democratic 
political machinery construction, the promotion of various 
other tasks in economic construction, culture construction 
and construction in other phases."66
65* "Chia-chiang kuo-chia lcung-tso ti chi-chung hsing ying-chieh ta-
kuei mu ching-chi chien-she", (Strengthen direct centralization 
of large-scale construction in state work), JMJP, November 17th 
1952, p.lo Translated in SCMP, No.455, November 19th 1952, pp.3-5.
66. Chinese text available in JMJP, June 20th 1954, p.l. The English
translation used above is provided in SCMP, N0 .832, "CPGC
Decision on Abolition*... *.", pp.8-9.
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As has already been emphasized by the CCP*s definition of 
"centralization" in 1951 and 1952 did not preclude the existence 
of regional governmental machineries. In fact these machineries 
were viewed as centralizing agents, which were responsible for 
achieving a degree of uniformity in policy implementation and 
political integration. Furthermore, "centralized" government was 
government which respected "local expediency" —  government which 
devoted its energy to general policy-making and was effective 
partly because it did not become bogged down with local detail in 
the implementation of programmes.
It would seem that the CCP was employing a new definition of 
"centralization" in 1954—  a definition which perhaps reflected a 
less inhibited adaptation to or greater appreciation of Russian 
economic planning technique. This second definition was one which 
seemed to push to an extreme of "vertical rule". The reasons given 
for the abolition of the regional level of government administration 
were consistent with this second definition of "centralization". It 
was argued in 1954 that the central government would gain a more 
concrete understanding of conditions at the provincial level once 
the intermediate level of administration was eliminated. The 
abolition was also justified on grounds of efficiency.and the need 
for personnel at other levels. Previously, the regional admini­
strative machinery had been regarded as useful in facilitating 
centre-provincial understanding, but in 1954 the leadership took 
the view that this machinery was redundant. The later re-emergence 
of regional bureaux of the CCPCC as well as the demaraction of "co­
ordinated economic regions" would seem to suggest that such a level 
of administration was not altogether irrational in the context of 
Chinese administration, and casts some doubt on the official 
explanations of 1954.
We now have a general idea of the constitutional prerogatives 
of the various levels of government administration. Obviously, 
the organization plans of the CCP leadership as set down on paper 
left many options open. There was plenty of room for improvisation 
if not sweeping institutional reorganization. Over the months and
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years of the early 1950rs the central government defined and 
redefined administrative procedures. By looking at the specific 
directives, policies and administrative actions of the several 
regional governments relating to the prosecution of agrarian 
reform, the unification of financial and economic work, the 
restoration and development of urban-rural trade interflow, 
the . Three Seasons Campaign;, the early attempts at state 
planning of capital construction, the three- and five-antis 
rectifications, we will not only be in a position to draw some 
conclusion as to the role of the Greater Administrative Region 
administrative machineries in the building of state power in the 
early 1950*s, but will also profit from a richer perspective on 
the larger problems of government communication and the nature of 
"regionalism" in a period seminal to the political consolidation 
of the People's Republic of Chinao
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III
iii) Towards a Reassessment of ’’Regionalism*'
Thus far discussion has been confined to the formal terms 
of organization and theory, and it would now seem appropriate 
to our analysis of the role of the GARs in the process of 
national political integration to focus more sharply on the 
structuring of power relations. However, one might begin with 
a long and hard look at the general theoretical problem at hand 
before turning to a more discrete analysis of the circulation of 
GAR personnel and the determination of the identity of GAR 
personnel as either "regional" or "national".
There have been many attempts to broach the subject of 
"regionalism" from the vantage point of the elite theorist, 
but there is little consensus as to the methodology to be employed 
in the correlation of patterns of intra- and inter-elite associa­
tion and political behaviour. Elite theory in its application to 
the functioning of the Chinese political system is subject to 
severe limitations; for example, due to a lack of hard information, 
there is the tendency to stress public visibility as an indicator 
of power and influence. Attempts to assess the power of important 
leaders are often related to the formal positions, which a given 
leader holds, but there is good reason to suggest that shifts in 
the distribution of political influence within the hierarchy of 
leadership often outstrip the formal recognition of an individual's 
power status. The CCP's emphasis on the organization of social 
forces and the tendency to create ad hoc political structure are 
often not considered when hypothetical constellations of power are 
advanced for discussion. In the Chinese context, it is difficult 
to establish the primary institutional identity of any particular 
leader, for Chinese Communist organizational experience has been 
characterized by a high degree of inter-system co-ordination and co­
optation, Indeed, analysis of elite circulation in the course of 
political consolidation in the early 1950's is especially problematic. 
The early '50's were characterized by organizational emphases on
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the horizontal inter-relation of different systems, by an 
exceptionally high degree of co-optation between systems and 
a high degree of concurrent office-holding which spanned different 
administrative levels as well as systems.
What is of fundamental concern is the fact that the possible 
variables of elite association, whatever they may be—  common 
provincial origins, common institutional perspectives, similar 
historical experience, common ideological commitments, etc.—  
need not be regarded as constant in relation to the emergence 
of a possible faction or node of power.
There may be a cas$ for arguing that elite theory, based as 
it is on certain explicit assumptions concerning the nature of 
man and his continual quest for power, tends to downgrade the 
significance of ideological factors in the political decision-making 
process, as political action is defined almost exclusively in terms 
of the inter-relation of factions, which either act to protect their 
own power base, or act to deny the accretion of power to a rival 
faction,’*' A prominent elite theorist once observed that.V.. .elite 
studies are subject to abuse especially if they are undertaken in 
isolation from the total environment which surrounds the political 
actors1.1. Elite theory, as it is applied or misapplied to the 
Chinese political context, is predicated upon the expectation of a 
"routinazation of charisma". In short, there is a tendency to anti­
cipate the perpetuation of warlord or Republican patterns of political 
behaviour in post-1949 China.
1. See Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics", CQ,
N0 .53, January-March 1973. Nathan seems to be suggesting (p.47) 
that there is a tendency within the Chinese political system to 
downplay ideological disputes which would disrupt the balance between 
different factions. Nathan argues that the shifting of factions 
reduces the significance of ideological commitments, but he concedes 
on p.36 that his model deals only with organizational constraints on 
political behaviour, and does not include consideration of either 
ideological or cultural constraints.
2. Robert Scalapino, ed., Elites in the People's Republic of China, 
introduction, p.v.
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One might alternatively stress that the unity of ideolo­
gically committed Party members provided the foundation upon 
which a national state structure was erected. In the period 1949- 
54, the confidence of the CCP leadership in the unity of the Party 
was such that they did not hesitate to meet the immediate problem 
of political consolidation and economic rehabilitation with what­
ever degree of institutional decentralization, deemed necessary.
One is justified in expressing grave misgivings as to any 
attempt to reconstruct political events on the basis of post-purge 
generalized statements and rationalizations concerning the action 
of fallen CCP leaders. A study of "regionalism" is particularly 
problematic as terms such as "independent kingdom" (tu-li wang-kuo), 
and "warlprdism"■(chun-fa chu-i) are loosely and indiscriminately 
applied in rationalizations of intra-Par-f-y struggle. These epithets 
are rich in pejorative connotations, which immediately evoke the 
spectre of warlord China; however, one cannot readily assume that 
such rationalizations accurately characterize post-1949 political 
processes. Formerly, a warlord-'-s command of troops was based on 
personal loyalty and a pattern of client relationships; he often 
enjoyed financial independence. To suggest that such character­
istics were perpetuated in the course of the creation of the new national 
government would mean disregarding the essential historical 
differences between KMT and CCP political experience.
What then can be said in relation to the GARs and the mani­
festation of "regionalism" in the Chinese body politic? In late 
1949, Mao, in a reference to the creation of the GAR governments 
argued that the possibilities of regionalism under the new people's 
regime were negligible as "....the historical conditions giving
3
rise to past feudal partitioning of the country have been eliminated".
3. S.B. Thomas points to the significance of this remark in his
study, Government and Administration in Communist China, revised 
edition, p.83; original reference, China Digest. Hong Kong, 
December 14th 1949, p.28.
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He went on to say that '’...only with the establishment of these
strong regional organizations could things be done properly in
4
a big country like China". It will be argued particularly in 
relation to later discussion on the implementation of policy in 
the administration of the new national economy that the GAR 
administrations acted to facilitate the processes of national 
political and economic integration.
At the outset, one must come to grips with a rather basic 
question, namely, should the leaders of the GAR governments be 
viewed as members of several regional elites or as part of a 
national elite, designated as the "centre". There is one variable 
of elite association, which we can dispense with rather quickly.
The possibilities for the development of a "regional" personality, 
based on cultural and historical identities at the GAR level, were 
sharply delimited. There were no imperial precedents for the GAR 
administrative demarcation as a whole. One can speak generally 
off a North-South cultural animosity, but it cannot be linked in 
a meaningful fashion to GAR administrative demarcation.
William Whitson, in his study of the field army system, has 
presented arguments for viewing the several field army commands 
as regional elites. In terms of elite association, he has stressed 
the inter-relation of these elites as a form of "federalism", 
whereby a balance is maintained through the transfer of military 
personnel, or more specifically, through the exchange of
5
"ambassadors" and "hostages" between field army systems. Whitson
4. S.B.Thomas, op.cit., p.83.
5. See William Whitson, "Field Army in Chinese Communist Politics", CQ,
N0.37, January-March 1969, pp.1-30, especially p.11 and also William
Whitson, The Chinese High Command, p.93. Often this study is cited
as an example of the successful application of elite theory, but Whit­
son, himself, conceded that he has made no attempt to measure the 
"depth of individual loyalties", p.2 of the above article. Whitson 
has attempted to establish a hypothetical pattern of elite association, 
but this pattern has yet to be conclusively correlated with political 
behaviour. See William Parrish, "Factions in Chinese Military Polit­
ics", CQ, No.56, October-December 1973, p.667. Parrish concludes that 
Whitson*s data could equally well validate the contrary conclusion 
that post-1949 transfer of military leaders was random rather than 
"purposeful". Whitson has replied to Parrish*s criticism in CQ, No.57, 
January-March 1974, pp.146-148.
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correlates the assignment of posts in the PLA with past field 
army designations and suggests that the same correlation may 
also be meaningful in terms of the disposition of Party personnel.
The various regional military commands were almost identical 
with the top memberships of the GAR governments and Party bureaux. 
Alternatively, we might view the front-rank GAR leaders as 
members of the ''centre", and the transfer of front-ranlc GAR 
personnel could be seen in terms of the "federalization of the 
executive m a c h i n e r y " S o m e  GAR leaders shuttled back and 
forth between Peking and GAR capitals. Several returned to the 
centre in 1952 to participate in the preparation for large-scale 
capital construction. In late 1953, as the preparations for the 
new stage of transition to socialism and for the creation of a 
new national state structure became increasingly evident, the 
jockeying for position in the new state structure became intense 
and culminated in the Kao-Jao affair.
Hie pattern of elite "federalization" was clearly manifest 
in the movement of "national" figures such as Lin Piao, Tung Pi-wu, 
Po I—p o , etc., since 1945. During the Civil War, part of the 
CCPCC leadership, including Kao Kang, C h ren Yun, Lin Feng, Peng 
Chen, Li Fu-ch*un, was despatched to consolidate the Northeast.
In 1949, the CCPCC leadership again divided itself, designating 
certain lieutenants as responsible for the political consolida­
tion of the several GARs. These leaders were not then reduced to 
"regional" leaders, especially as they held down important positions 
in Peking at the same time.
The CCP leaders, who had been active in the Northeast Admini­
strative Committee and in the North China People’s Government in
7
1948-49, later moved to Peking to help build up the centre. In
60 S.B. Thomas coined this phrase to describe the sending down of
important CCPCC leaders to the GARs in op.cit., p.83.
7. See H.A. Steiner’s comments on the relation between North China
administration and the new central government in "New Regional 
Governments in China", Far Eastern Survey* Volo 18-19, May 1950, 
pp.112-116, especially pp.114-115.
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the early life of the national state administration, the NCPG 
provided an organizational base for the creation of a national 
state structure, and many high-ranking personnel of the post-1949 
Ministry of North China Affairs concurrently held positions in 
CPG ministries and committees. The personnel base at the top 
of the new state structure was further built up by the transfer 
in this period of leaders such as Ch'en Yun and Li Fu-cli'un from 
the northeast. By the end of 1954 all these leaders had 
returned to the centre.
If one were to attempt to establish a distinction between 
"regional" leaders and a central elite on the basis of formal 
position, the argument would not stand as the data reveal a high 
degree of concurrent office-holding, which transcended various 
levels of administration. To cite a brief example, 18 of the 
34 (52.9 per cent) of the chairmen and vice-chairmen the NCAC,
NEPGC, CSMAC, ECMAC, NWMAC, SWMAC were members of the highest 
state authority, the CPGC. Similarly i8 of the 34 (52.9 per cent) 
were regular or alternate members oc the 7th CCPCC. 15 of the 34 
(44.1 per cent) held down membership on the highest military 
committee, the PRMC. 10 (29.4 percent) concurrently held member­
ship on all three committees, CCPCC, PRMC and CPGC. These 
percentages drop slightly when the 16 vice-chairmen, newly 
appointed to the GAR level in late 1952, are taken into account.
After the 1952 reorganization, GAR representation at the centre 
stood at CPGC, 38 percent; CCPCC, 42 per cent; PRMC, 44.1 per cent. 
The drop in percentages undoubtedly reflects the pull to the centre 
of the first rank national leaders and the promotion of 
second-line GAR personnel, who had demonstrated their abilities as
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8
committee members and department heads.
The question, which continues to fascinate elite theorists
and students of "regionalism" in China is whether or not an 
informal law of avoidance, such as was known in Ching administra­
tive practice, is evident in the pattern of personnel circulation 
since 1949. Some scholars might argue that the presence of large 
numbers of personnel in the "newly liberated areas" of South China, 
who were native to provinces outside the regions in which they 
were posted, effectively demonstrates that indeed the national 
leadership feared "regionalism" and wished to insure local comp­
liance through the placement of outside personnel in the locali-
9
ties of South China.
8. Listings of GAR level personnel are available in several 
sources; for example, a listing cf the members of the NEPGC, 
NWMAC, ECMAC, CSMAC as well as several provincial listings is 
available in HHYP, Vol.l, N0.3, 1950, pp.601-609. For the 
SWMAC, which was formed later than the other GAR committees, 
refer to JMST, 1951, Section IV, pp.34-37. An alternative 
listing of the early GAR committees, which is inclusive of 
former institutional identities of the personnel,involved,
is in Jen-min nien-chien, 1950, Section I, pp.34-43. A listing 
which appears in SCMP, No.494, January 17-19 1953, includes 
the provincial origins and institutional identities of NCAC 
(November 1952), ECAC, NWAC, SWAC, CSAC and NEAC personnel.
This listing can be double-checked with the official Chinese 
listing in JMST, 1953. A listing of the pre-November 1952 
NCAC is available in CB, No.161, February 20th 1952, pp.9-10. 
Several collected biographies were consulted to establish 
the career details of personnel under study. These biographies 
included the following; Klein and Clark, Biographic Dictionary 
of Chinese Communist, 19211965; Union Research Institute, Who^s 
Who in Communist China* 1965; Gendai Chugoku Jimmei Jiten 
(biographical dictionary of contemporary China), Tokyo, 1957;
Huan Chen-hsia Chung-kung chun-ien chih (A Biographical dictionary 
of Chinese Communist generals), Hong Kong, 1968.
9. Refer to Ezra Vogel*s argument, "From Revolutionary to Semi- 
Bureaucrat: The Regularization of Cadres", QC, N0 .19, January- 
March 1967, p.40.
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On the contrary? one cannot assume a high percentage of 
'’outsiders" means that locals were squeezed out of the embryonic 
state structure in the "newly liberated areas" and hence that a 
law of avoidance was operative. One might alternatively suggest 
that the large-scale transfer of personnel in Southbound Work 
Forces reflected the lack of political integration in the "newly 
liberated areas". In the absence of local State and Party 
structures and cadres, the export of policy-conscious personnel 
was a matter of absolute necessity. Indeed, "policy-level", 
(cheng-t fse shui-p1ing) , becomes an increasingly important per­
spective when we turn to matters relating to the implementation 
of policies for agrarian reform, urban-rural trade and financial 
and economic unification. In so far as there was an underground 
network as well as organized activists, the Party could build on 
a local base, but one must take into consideration the narrow 
dimensions of that base.
One must also take into account the CCP's own definition 
of political integration. It is difficult to make meaningful 
reference to the law of avoidance, as it operated under the Ching 
dynasty, as the whole question was complicated by the relation­
ship between Manchu and Han. More importantly, the CCPfs view of 
political organization was fundamentally different from that of 
the Ching, and political integration, as understood by the CCP, 
meant mass assimilation of ideology. It was understood that 
ideological truth could not be imposed on a locality from without. 
These assumptions are especially explicit in the CCPfs development 
of united front at the local levels even after a military victory 
had been won over the KMT, and similarly in the CCP's policy 
towards the national minorities.
In addition to this perspective on ideological assimilation 
being cultivated within the locality, as opposed to being imposed 
from without, we must also consider what has already been said in 
relation to CCP administrative strategy for national economic 
development. In terms of economic policy, the prevailing emphasis
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on New Democracy involved the exploitation of all positive 
economic factors and the inter-relation of different types of 
economic organization. The general gendency towards multi-sided 
economic development was consistent with a well-developed 
perspective on the relation between large-scale and small-scale 
enterprise. In terms of the administration of economic organization, 
the CCP was historically predisposed to a flexible approach to 
policy formulation and implementation, which would maximize local 
initiative and expediency within the parameters of general 
policies, set out at the centre in accordance with overall 
national interests.
A law of avoidance would be ideologically unacceptable as 
it is suggestive of the maintenance of distance between cadres 
and masses and, thus, contravenes the CCP’s mass line, but this 
does not mean that the CCP was unaware of localism; and it is 
not to suggest that personnel circulation was unaffected by a 
desire to insure regional compliance.
A review of the circulation of members of GAR MACs and 
People’s Governments, would tend to confirm the contention that 
in personnel terms the GARs reinforced central administration.
The members of GAR committees concurrently served as MAC 
department heads, deputy department heads, united front workers, 
leaders of regional popular organization and leading provincial 
administrators.
In terms of the GAR level, the operation of a law of avoidance 
is not particularly obvious. In fact the GARs, which demonstrated 
the greatest degree of regional mix in the composition of the top 
GAR committee, were North China and the Northeast; in other words, 
the greatest number of outsiders sitting on GAR government 
committees were to found in the two GARs which encompassed most of 
the "old liberated regions". Of the 39 chairman and members of the 
NCAC of January 1st 1953, 16 came from provinces from outside of 
North China. 41.1 per cent of NCAC members were outsiders.
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Similarly 37 of -8 (54.4 per cent) of the members and chairmen 
of the NEPG and NEAC originated from provinces outside the North­
east, whereas, in. the Southwest with its vast "newly liberated" 
area, the composition of the MAC was more indigenous to the 
provinces of that region. Only 21 per cent of the members and 
chairmen of the NWAC were from provinces from outside the North­
west. In the CSAC, the percentage stood at 3 0 5  per cent, and
10
in the ECAC, 36.3 per cent.
Of the 102 chairmen and members of the SWMAC and SWAC, the 
provincial origins of 88 are known. 31 of the 88 (35.2 per cent) 
came from provinces outside the SWGAR. Szechwanese provincials, 
who accounted for another 31 of the 88, dominated both the SWMAC 
and SWAC. The comparatively large membership of the SWMAC/AC 
reflected on the one hand the weakness of provincial organization, 
for example, responsible cadres of the Szechwan-Sikang Provisional 
Work Committee were included in GAR committee membership, while on 
the other hand, SWMAC/AC membership included comparatively more 
representatives of new united front organization, such as 
organizers from the SWGAR branch and provincial branches of the 
KMT Revolutionary Committee as well as organizers from the China 
Democratic League and China Democratic National Construction 
Association. Membership of the four MACs, which between them 
were responsible for the most of the "newly liberated areas", 
probably reflected a greater concern for united front organization, 
the development of which had lagged behind the PLA's swift advance 
south.
Given the weakness of provincial organization in the "newly 
liberated areas", it is not surprising that relatively more* members 
of the Central-South, East China, Northwest and Southwest MACs/ACs
10. See SCMP, No.494, January 17-19 1953, p p d - 2 7  for a comprehensive 
listing of Administrative Committee personnel.
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11.
12.
13.
became involved in provincial administration, whereas relatively 
more personnel of the NBPG/AC and the Ministry of North China 
Affairs and NCAC became involved in central administration. For 
example, at least 40 of the 102 personnel of the SWMAC/AC (i.e.
39.2 per cent) gravitated to CPG ministries, central PLA head­
quarters, national popular organization and NPC committees by
the end .f 1954, whereas another 37 focused on work at the 
11
provincial level. By way of comparison note that 27 of the 39 
(69.2 per cent) of the personnel of the NCAC moved to take up 
responsibilities at the centre by the end of 1954. Southwest 
committee members were, however, obviously involved in the build­
up of the central headquarters of the PLA and in the creation of 
national level popular organization, the CPPCC and NPC. Six 
deputy ministers of CPG ministries as well as a member and vice- 
chairmen of the State Planning Council, had come from the
SWMAC/AC, whereas two ministers, five deputy ministers and a
vice-chairman of the State Planning Council as well as a chairman 
of the State Capital Construction Committee moved to the centre 
from the NCAC, the membership of which was half that of the SWAC.
32 of 53 (60.3 per cent) of NEPGC/AC members transferred to the 
12
centre in 1949-54. The greatest concentration of industry was 
situated in the Northeast, and the planning of capital construction 
was more advanced there than elsewhere, hence it is not surprising 
that transferred Northeast personnel tended to dominate CPG 
departments of industry and planning.
As John Gittings has suggested, in the early years of the
PRC regional military control varied in degree from region to
13
region, but was most extensive m  the Northwest and Southwest.
The details of some careers were either insufficient or lacked 
specificity, hence only 77 members are dealt with.
See appendix for a list of key Northeast personnel who moved 
to important posts in the CPG.
John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, p.270.
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What is particularly striking in terms of personnel circulation 
.is the level of inter-system co-optation, which existed in 
those years. Given the weakness of local Party and State organ­
ization, there was a tendency in the Southwest -to co-opt 
military personnel into the nascent state structure; however, 
this type of co-optation also occurred in urban. China.
The Military Control Commission in the cities acted as a 
half-way house, facilitating the transfer of military personnel 
to the state system. The high level of concurrent office- 
holding on the part of personnel, holding down positions in 
both the MCCs and parallel municipal governments facilitated 
the relatively smooth transfer of power in the cities. That a 
smooth transition from military control to civilian rule took 
place everywhere in China effectively argues against theoretical 
perspectives suggesting either a new form of warlordism or a 
struggle for power between the PLA and CCP.
Inter-system co-optation appears to have proceeded on a 
rational basis. A review of the membership of the SWMAC Economic 
and Finance Committee establishes that 13 of 44 members were co­
opted from the PLA. One can compare these military personnel with 
committee members, who had had previous experience in state admini­
stration. Five had previously worked in state offices of Special 
Districts. Three had had banking experience, and another three 
represented state-owned enterprise, and one came from the South­
west state trading organization. Most of the 13 military officers 
had previous experience in finance and economic administration 
within the army. Five had been co-opted from rear service depart­
ments, which of course were involved in the allocation of supplies 
and communications. Four members had been moved from MCC economic and
finance departments. Two came from PLA political departments, and the
14
remaining two were former KMT generals, who had gone over to the CCP.
14. Appointments approved by the 8th meeting of the CPGC, JMJP, 
August 6th 1950, p.5.
155
By way of contrast, the nine members of the 68-man Educational 
and Cultural Affairs Committee of the SWMAC, who had been co-opted 
from the PLA, came from army departments, which handled educational 
and cultural matters. Five of the nine were from political 
departments, two from health departments; one was a vice­
principal of a Northwest military academy, and the ninth man 
was a military historian.
'Ftie question of "regionalism'* in China in the early 1950*s 
has received a great deal of attention in the light of the Kao-Jao 
Affair. Indeed, Mao commented in his speech, "On the Ten Great 
Relationship^* of April 25th 1956, on this question, linking the 
abolition of the GARs and the Kao-Jao Affair when he said:
"Take our own experience, the system of the 
greater administrative area instituted in the early 
days of our Republic was a necessity of that time, and 
yet it had shortcomings which were later exploited to 
a certain extent by the Kao Kang-Jao Shu-shih anti- 
Party alliance. It was subsequently decided to abolish 
the greater administrative areas and put the provinces 
directly under the central authorities; that was the 
correct decision. But neither was the outcome so 
satisfactory when matters went to the length of dep- ^  
riving the localities of their necessary independence."
Mao did not at that time elaborate as to what these "shortcomings" 
were, nor did he repudiate the GAR structure, itself; it had been 
a "necessity". That he did not explicitly repudiate the GAR 
structure is not surprising in consideration of the fact that this 
structure was an extension of united front organization and its 
organization reflected administrative emphases, which originated 
in the Yenan period. The fact that "shortcomings" had been 
"exploited to a certain extent" should be weighed in the balance 
along with a consideration of the June 1954, eulogy on the imp­
ressive contributions made by this level of administration in 
furthering national political and economic integration.
15. My thanks to Professor Stuart Schram for bringing this statement to 
my attention. See Peking Review, No.l, January 1st 1977, for an 
official English translation of the text. Hie reference here is to 
p.17.
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How do we interpret the Kao-Jao affair? Is Kao to be viewed 
as a shadowy figure #10 made a bid to capture the centre from the 
remote fastness of his mountain-top kingdom in the Northeast?
One must also ask whether there were any proven instances in 
which Kao had favoured regional over national interests.
Kao Kang in the early 1950's was as much a "national” 
leader as Lin Piao or Peng Teh-huai. His appointment as Chairman 
of the State Planning Committee in November 1952, as well as the 
transfer of Jao Shu-shih to Peking to head the CCPCC's Department 
of Organization should be viewed as examples of circulation 
within the overall context of "federalization" of the central 
executive machinery. As the process of political integration in 
the various regions became more advanced, more and more GAR 
leaders were pulled into the centre to participate in the reorgan­
ization of central ministries, in the preparations for the planning 
of large-scale capital construction, the drafting of the constitu­
tion and the preparations for nationwide elections. There is, 
therefore, reason to doubt folk wisdom such as: "When you take the 
tiger from the mountain, he is finished".*^
The chairmanship of the State Planning Committee was of no 
small importance, hardly to be used as bait to lure the "tiger" 
from the mountain. It was a pivotal position in relation to the 
drafting of the First Five Year Plan; and the committee was on a 
par with and not subordinate to Chou En-lai*s GAC. Kao's leadership 
of the rear base area of the Korean War had qualified him for 
promotion as a vice-chairman of the PRMC in November 1951. His 
experience in overseeing the planning of the greatest regional 
concentration of capital construction in China qualified him to 
chair the new national planning organization.
16. For an example of a reconstruction of the Affair, based on such a
scenario see Albert Ravenholt, "Feud Among the Red Mandarins . How 
Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih Challenged their Comrades", American 
University Field Staff Reports, East Asian Studies« Vol.XI, No.2, 1964.
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The confrontation between Kao Kang and his colleagues on 
the Politbureau came to a head at the fourth plenary session 
of the seventh CCPCC in February 6-10 1954. Mao was conspic-^ 
uously absent, and Liu Shao-ch’i took charge of the proceedings.
The main theme of the session was "dispersionism", and a resolu­
tion was duly passed emphasizing Party unity. Kao was not named, 
but the resolution specifically called attention to the fact that 
there were cadres in the Party who had forgotten Party principles. 
Puffed up with pride, these preening cadres would only talk of 
their achievements, and they rejected criticism and self-criticism.
They even viewed their own departments and areas as their
17
"independent kingdoms". The resolution warned that CCPCC 
members and Party committee members of the provincial level and 
above are particularly responsible for insuring Party unity.
A leading article by Yang Hsien-chien, which subsequently
f t
appeared in the March issue of Hsueh-hsi, focused on the resolution
and eulogized the importance of collective leadership (chi-t1i
ling-tao). Referring to the authoritative Politbureau decision of
September 1st 1942, Yang stressed the Party’s tradition of
"centralized and unified leadership of the base areas". Yang
charged that there were high-ranking Party cadres, who had forgotten
18
historical materialism and who had stressed the role of heroes.
This inference to a certain person or persons dwelling on the 
heroic individual’s role in history undoubtedly relates to later 
disclosures that Kao Kang had perpetrated the "theory" that there 
were two parties, that of the "revolutionary bases and the army" 
and that of the "white areas". Presumably, Kao had attempted to
17. See "Chung-kuo kung-chan-tang ti ch* i chieh chung-yang wei-yuan
hui chu-hsing ti-szu t z ’u c h ’uan-t’i hui-i ti kung-pao". (Communi­
que of the fourth plenary session of the 7th CCPCC), dated February
18th 1954, in HHYP, No.3, 1954, pp.9-11, especially p.11.
18o Yang Hsien-chien, "Chi-t*i ling-tao shih tang ti ling-tao ti tsui-
kao yuan-tse", (Collective leadership is the highest principle of
Party leadership), reproduced in HHYP, No.3, 1954, pp.13-15, and 
available in SCMP, No.778, March 31st 1954, pp.1-6.
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capitalize on his role as a guerilla leader in the Shen-Kan-
19
Ning Border Region.
On March 31st 1955, Kao was publicly named, and it was
then disclosed that he had committed suicide "as an ultimate
20
expression of his betrayal of the Party". On March 31st,
Mao commented at length on the Kao-Jao Affair at a national 
conference of the Party® He was concerned over confusion 
within the Party, particularly as some cadres could not see the 
link between Kao and Jao Shu-shih. His remarks suggest that 
there was some disquiet over the fact that there was no written 
evidencey indicating an "alliance" between the two. Mao repeat­
edly emphasized that the conspiracy was to be viewed in terms of 
an "anti-Party alliance", and not simply as two separate 
instances of "independent kingdoms".^
If we were to define "independent kingdom" on the basis of 
what Mao had said on this occasion, the definition would relate 
almost exclusively to the creation of an "anti-Party alliance"
(fan-Tang lien-meng). Mao defined "anti-Party alliance" in crude 
terms of political manoeuvring by Kao Kang within the Polit­
bureau. It is important to note that Kao was not a "regional" 
leader trying to assault the "centre" from the outside. Perhaps 
the most significant revelation in this respect had to do with an 
alleged plot on the part of Kao and Jao to circulate their own 
list of Politbureau members to leading cadres in the CCPCC 
Organization Department, as well as to unnamed persons in southern
19® See "Resolution on the Anti-Party Bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shu 
shih", in Documents of the National Conference of the Communist 
Party of China* Peking, 1955, p.14. Chinese text available in 
HHYP, No*5, 1955, pp.2-3. Also see Klein and Clark, Biographic 
Dictionary of Chinese Communism, Vol.l, p*434*
20. "Resolution on the Anti-Party Bloc...®", op0cito« p.14.
21. See Mao Tse-tung*s concluding remarks at the National Conference of 
the CCP, March 31st 1955, in Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi, 
(Peking, 1977), Vol.V, p.146.
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provinceso Mao informed the conference that there had been
two headquarters in Peking. One headquarters had been operating 
in an open and above-board fashion in broad daylight under his 
leadership, while a second headquarters had operated surrep-
23
tiously behind other people*s backs under another leadership.
Mao did not develop his comments in terms of a conflict of 
line over policy emphases as opposed to the style of Party life 
and Party principles. The draft of the First Five Year Plan was 
presented at the same national conference, which passed the 
March 31st resolution condemning Kao and Jao to the halls of 
infamy in Party history. The opportunity passed and no relation 
was developed between the plan and the Kao-Jao Affair. The 
resolution, which was passed on the same day as Mao gave his 
speech, played down policy and emphasized "unprincipled" 
struggle for power:
"The characteristic of the anti-Party bloc of 
Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih was the fact that they never 
openly put forward any programme against the Central 
Committee of the Party in any Party organization or at 
any Party meeting or among the public. Their only 
programme was to seize supreme power in the Party and 
state by conspiratorial means „"24
The resolution noted further Kao Kang had advocated the
reorganization of the CCPCC and CPG so that he, himself, would
become secretary-general or vice-chairman of the CCPCC and
premier of the State Council.
A Jen-mln jih-pao editorial of April 10th, announced a
great victory in the history of the party and noted:
22. Ibid., pp.146-47.
23. Ibido, p.147.
24. "Resolution on the Anti-Party Bloc of Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih", 
op.cit., p.16,
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M If they had come out openly against the 
leadership of the Central Committee, their anti- 
Party conspiracy would at once have been exposed 
to the ^arty and the people, and they would have 
met with ignominious defeat. That is why they 
didn't dare publicly to bring forward any programme 
or principle in opposition to the Central Committee 
of the Party; on the contrary, on formal occasions, 
they were loud in professions of loyalty.,f25
Hie editorial did not define any specific policy dispute, but
concentrated on the Affair in generalized terms, portraying
it in terms of a hugger-mugger attempt at counter-revolutionD
The conference resolution of ^arch 31st had in fact
developed this theme of counter-revolution as it declared the
conspiracy had had "deep historical and social roots".2^
The conspiracy was said to reflect the "sharpness of class
struggle" and an intensification of struggle between the forces
of imperialism and socialism. Party history is replete with
examples of "good" men, who were belatedly discovered to have
been "bad" throughout their entire Party careers□ Kao and Jao
opposed Mao, hence they were the "agents of the capitalist class 
27
within our Party".
Hie visible reckoning, subsequent to Kaofs disgrace, seems 
to have been confined to the CCPCC*s Northeast Bureau. Only two 
of the 68 manbers of the NEPG/AC were dismissed, and Mao*s reck­
oning did not fundamentally affect the pattern of transfer of 
highly placed northeast government personnel, who had been at the 
forefront of planning, to the committees of the CPG.
When Kao took up the chairmanship of the State Planning 
Committee, he brought with him into the committee, Ma Hung, a 
deputy secretary of the NEB, and An Chih-wen, deputy director of
25. "Iflng.-ti. li-shih fihang ti cluing.-la shsng-li", "A great victory in 
the history of the Party), JMJP, April 10th 1955, reproduced in 
HHYP, No.5, 1955, pp.6-7; and translated in Documents of the Nat­
ional Conference of the Communist Party of China., p.49.
26. March 31st 1955, resolution, Documents of the National Conference 
of the Communist Party of China, p.15.
27. Ibid.. p.16.
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the NEPG Department of Industry. Ma was implicated in the 
Affair and was not appointed to the new State Planning Council 
of November 1954, which incidentally was placed under the juris­
diction of the new State Council. One can only speculate as to 
why the State Planning Committee had originally been placed on 
par with the GAC. It might be interpreted as a mutually agreed-^pon 
division of labour between Kao Kang and Chou En-lai or as.a concession t( 
Kao Kangfs increasing influence within the centre. An was promoted 
to become vice-chairman of the State Capital Construction Committee. 
Also, despite the Kao-Jao Affair, Ku Chuo-hsin, a former vice- 
chairman of the NEAC's People*s Economic Planning Committee, became 
a vice-chairman of the new State Planning Committee. Despite the 
Affair, Ni Wei, former deputy director of the NjgPG Department of 
Finance, Liu Ming-fu, former deputy secretary-general of the 
North-east PeopleTs Planning Committee took up responsibilities 
as members of the new national planning organization.
The March 31st resolution named seven men, who were allegedly 
implicated in the Affair. One immediately notes that only one 
of the seven had the same provincial origin as Kao Kang. More 
important, however, is the fact that the link which drew together 
six of the seven was service as high-ranking cadres of the NEB.
Four of these six had held top posts in the N e b ’s Department of 
Organization. In his March 31st comments, Mao drew attention to 
the fact that Jao Shu-shih was head of the CCPCCfs Organization 
Department, and that this department had taken Kuo Feng as its 
"core" (ho-hsin)_ Kuo had been prominent in the NEBfs Organization 
Department, and we might reasonably infer that he was one of the 
most important links between Kao and Jao.
The documentation is not specific as to the nature of the 
conspiratorial relationship between Kao, Jao and the seven fallen 
comrades. It is not certain whether their crime was having failed
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to fulfil their responsibilities in investigating a violation 
of Party discipline, or whether they actively conspired against 
Mao, or the Party. An editorial, which appeared in the Jen-min 
.jih-pao on April 10th, referred to "certain comrades" who were 
aware of Kao and Jao's "anti-Party slanders", but failed to
2 g
warn these two to put their views to the Party formally»
One of the most important repercussions of the Affair was 
the reorganization of the Party's structure for investigation 
of infractions of the Party*s principles. The Party had failed 
to investigate, itself, and here we may have touched upon the 
"shortcomings" that Mao referred to in his April 1956, reference 
to the Kao-Jao Affair and the GARs. A Jen-min jih^pao 
editorial of April 14th argued that one of the lessons to be 
learned in relation to the Affair was the importance of 
systematic "investigation" (chien-tu) to insure against problems 
of Party discipline particularly in a time when the process of 
socialization was getting under way. The paper cited the failure 
of the NEB's Disciplinary Inspection Committee in exposing Kao 
Kang:
"The former discipline inspection committee of the 
Northeast Bureau of the Party's Central Committee is a 
case in point. This inspection committee was under the 
direction of K ao Kang, ringleader of the anti-Party bloc.
His followers Chang Hsiu-shan, Chen Po-tsun, and Kuo Feng 
held concurrent positions as secretary and deputy secre­
taries of the same committee respectively. Because of this, 
the committee could not check on Kao Kang's anti-Party 
activities and could not work according to Party 
principles.
28. April 10th JMJP editorial in HHYP, No.5, 1955, p.7.
29. "Tung-yuan ch'uan-tang ch'uan-min t *ung huai-.ien huai-shih tso 
tou-cheng", (Mobilize the whole Party and the whole people to 
struggle against bad men and their misdeeds), JMJP, April 14th 
1955, translated in Documents of the National Conference of the 
Communist Party of China, p.60.
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It was decided at the conference to replace the old struc­
ture of central and local discipline inspection committees 
(chi-lu chien-ch1 a wei-vuan hui) with a new structure of 
central and local control committees (chien-ch*a wei-yilan hui).
The Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of April 14th underlined the need 
to strengthen the investigation process so as to prevent a 
reoccurence of the Kao-Jao style of conspiracy, and at the same 
time it was stressed such a strengthening was especially necessary 
in the light of the fact that contradictions within and without 
the Party would become more sharp as the process of socialization 
of agriculture and industry became more advanced.
The editorial drew attention to the conference decision to
grant a local control committee the right of appeal against a
decision taken by a Party Committee of the same level to the
Party Committee at the next highest level, noting that the former
discipline inspection committees had been too much under the
control of the Party Committees at the same level. It was claimed
that Hsiang Ming, the only one of the seven implicated in the
Affair who came from Bast China, had used his- position as second
secretary of the Shantung Sub-Bureau to restrict the action of the
discipline inspection committee attached to the Shantung-Sub-
Bureau. He had practically expelled from Shantung personnel sent
30
by the Central Discipline Inspection Committee.
There will be further opportunity to discuss problems of 
concurrent office-holding and "officials protecting officials" in 
relation to action, taken by GAR level discipline inspection 
committees during the Three-Antis Campaign, but it would seem 
crucial to our discussion of "regionalism" to comment further on 
this reorganization of 1955. The reorganization of the Party*s 
investigatory structure did not offer an institutional solution 
to the problem of leadership conflict within the centre. Kao Kang
30. Ibid.a p.60.
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was not simply a regional satrap; he was part of the centre.
An investigation of any violation of Party discipline on the
part of a man, who concurrently acted in his capacities as
Chairman of the State Planning Committee, Vice-Chairman of
the CPGC, Vice-Chairman of the PRMC and a member of the CCP's 
31
Politbureau, would have had to been instigated by the Central 
Disciplinary Inspection Committee2
The reorganization was consistent with the time-honoured 
principles of "unified Party leadfership" and democratic 
centralism in that it insured compliance of local levels to 
higher levels. The right to pronounce on any case was reserved 
to the next higher level of leadership. Even within the context 
of the disciplinary inspection committees, these principles had 
been successfully applied to reduce the potential development at 
local levels of conscious or unconscious challenges to Party 
discipline, but neither the old nor new structures of investi­
gation offered an institutional solution to leadership conflict 
within the centre. According to the principle, "unified Party 
leadership", all power was concentrated in the CCPCC; there was 
no higher level of Party Committee to which to appeal; there 
was no other outside institutional agency to which to make an 
appeal. "Independent kingdomism", defined in terms of local 
leadership levels resisting the centre, could be dealt with 
through the application of "unified Party leadership", but what 
was and still is the source of the greatest political instability 
in the PRC is the problem of "independent kingdomism", or more 
precisely "departmentalism" within the centre.
31. There is uncertainty as to when Kao Kang became a member of the 
Politbureau. Klein and Clark, Vol.l, p.433, assert that Kao was 
definitely a Politbureau member at the time of his appointment in 
November 1952, as Chairman of the State Planning Committee. The 
US Consulate General’s list of November 1951 in CB, November 15th 
1951, p.5, identifies Kao and Tung Pi-wu as "probable" members.
165
TBie precipitious fall of Kao Kang had an adverse effect on 
the quality of intra-Party debate over policy issues, and Mao, 
in April 1956, pointed to the fact that the purge of Kao Kang had 
contributed to a muting of democratic centralism. He suggested 
that his colleagues draw a distinction between the proceedings of 
a recent conference on financial and economic matters and those 
of the February 1954 plenary session of the CCPCC. In the 
following statement, Mao called for a more genuine exchange of 
views:
"Before the fourth plenary session of the Central 
Committee, there were certain instances of political 
sabotage, and we had to deal with this. We had to clear 
away the Kao-Jao subversion, but now some people stick 
to the finest details and do not speak out on national 
issues. We must make a clear distinction between the two 
kinds of national affairs. On the one hand there is that 
such as Kao-Jao which is subversive of the state while on 
the other there is that which is conducive to the proper 
functioning of the state and of which we must talk at 
length. During the economic and finance conference some 
comrades adopted the wrong line of discussion and were 
criticized for it, but this must be distinguished from 
the Kao-Jao matter."-^
Furthermore, Mao was concerned lest the Kao Kang Affair have 
an effect of furthering centralization at the expense of local 
creativity and initiative; he noted early in his remarks:
"If the various localities want a division of powers, 
they should not be afraid of creating a disturbance over the 
aspect of independence. The centre has yet to make a 
decision, and the matter is open to discussion. The 
various localities can initially put forth articles, 
small points of principle, methods and constitutional 
statutes. We want to encourage creativity and liveliness 
in the various localities."33
Later in his remarks, Mao again focused on the ramifications 
of th= Kao-Jao Affair in the context of the division of labour,
32. Mao Tse-tung, "Tsai chung-yang cheng-chih chu kuang-ta hui-i shang 
ti chiang-hua1^  (Speech at an enlarged meeting of the Politbureau), 
April 1956, Mao Tse-tung ssu-hsiang wan-sui„ 1969, pp.35-36.
33. Ibid., p.35.
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which was to prevail in economic organization. He reaffirmed 
the Party Committee system, but urged everyone to study the 
ways in which the division of labour necessitated a certain 
degree of independence, and he noted:
"We |probably meaning the PolitbureauJ are not Kao 
Kang's independent kingdom. On the contrary we should 
encourage open, legal "independent kingdoms" (not above 
the constitution) and only then can we managed things .
well, otherwise we won't be able to manage anything well."
In the context of the Kao-Jao Affair, the primary
connotation of "independent kingdom" was conspiracy. "Independent
kingdom" was a pejortative epithet, used in relation to the
denial of "collective leadership". Cadres who had failed to
honour the principles of Party life, and who had failed to
submit their views for democratic discussion, could be said to
be guilty of "independent kingdomism", thus the Jen-min iih-pao
used the term in relation to the fourth plenary session
resolution as follows:
"As to those who resort to covert or over 
suppression and retaliation against critics, they have 
actually become kings of "independent kingdoms" and 
already made themselves unworthy of the title of 
Communist Party member...«
The term is used to identify "bad" comrades with KMT 
political practices, but there is little evidence to suggest a 
meaningful parallel between the political situation in the KMT 
era and the situation in China as of February 1954.
34o Ibid., p.37.
35. "Study the Resolution of the 4th Plenary Session and Properly 
Develop Criticism and Self-Criticism", SCMP, N0.779, April 1st 
1954, pp.1-4, from JMJP, March 22nd 1954.
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IV
THE DYNAMICS OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN
t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  of a  n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y
i) Administrative Strategy and Policy Emphases in the Barly 1950*s
The CCP*s theory of leadership and philosophy of administration 
have already been discussed in general theoretical terms5 however, 
it remains to be seen how practice related to theory in post- 
liberation China. A discrete review of the CCP*s attempt to create 
and administer a new national economy will hopefully shed some light 
on this question of relating theory and practice.
This relation is described in terms of the CCPrs ability to 
overcome administrative distance in the course of creating a 
national economy, and of particular relevance to an assessment of 
this ability is the extension of the concept of democratic centralism 
to the sphere of state administration. Whether one chooses to 
treat this notion as essentially a borrowing from Lenin, or as an 
example of a foreign transplant, which was totally transformed in 
the soil of Chinese genius, there can be no doubt as to its 
significance in terms of the ultimate resolution of the difficulties 
of administrative distance in modern China.
To narrow the parameters of our inquiry and sharpen the focus 
of discussion, this chapter has been divided so as to treat three 
important areas of administration, in which the Greater Administra­
tive Regions were actively involved, namely, the unification of 
economic and financial work, the restoration and development of 
urban-rural trade interflow and the initial planning efforts in 
economic construction.
In Imperial China, although the government bureaucracy achieved 
a very sophisticated degree of development, control of the economy 
was* nonetheless, uneven and often varied in terms of the distances 
between different areas and the capital. Often the capital achieved
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1
control over one ’’key economic area” , but control in other areas 
tended to be more haphazard. Traditional perspectives on the 
economy to a large extent were determined by the need to supply 
the imperial bureaucracy, while at the same time insuring the 
population a s.ufficiency of food. Hie CCP's perspectives of course 
were more complex., The Party was committeed to the development of 
a truly national economy. In 1949, the leadership hoped to capital­
ize on existing concentrations of heavy industry in the northeast.
From the point of view of short-term strategy the particular 
concentration would serve as a base for national economic development, 
but the long-term goal, nonetheless, represented a transposition of 
perspective on border region self-sufficiency to the plane of 
national economic development. There was then a long-term commitment 
to the development of all regions of China, not only in terms of 
agriculture and the supply of food, but in terms of industrialization.
Aside from obvious political factors such as the development of 
organizational techniques for mass mobilization, it would seen that 
the basic distinctions between "traditional" and "modern” China 
relate to the multiplication of the economic functions of the state 
and the degree and pervasiveness of state intervention in the economy. 
We will want to pursue the political aspects of the multiplication of 
functions and expansion of economic organization. Questions as to how 
well policy is communicated to the great mass of cadres, to what 
degree does policy formulation and implementation take into account 
concrete conditions at the local levels are important, especially in 
terms of the political complexities of New Democracy.
1. See Chi Ch*ao-ting, Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, passim. 
Hie -thrust of Wittfogel's research might seem to suggest a high 
degree of central economic control? however, recent research 
focuses on the variety and multiplicity of water conservation 
works, the bulk of which was undertaken without reference to 
the centre, hence the level of intervention by the centre in the 
localities was the exception rather than the rule. See Mark 
Elvin, "On Water Control and Management during the Ming and Ching 
Periods," Ch*ing-shih wen-t*i. Volo3, No.3, November 1975, 
pp.82-103.
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The process by which separate border region economies 
were integrated into larger liberated economies did not commence 
until late 1948. As of October 1st 1949, the new central govern* 
ment had yet to effect its control over a national economy. The 
vast areas, south of the Yangtze, which came under the CCP's 
control during the PLA's lightning advance, had experienced only 
a semblance of economic integration under the KMT, the level of
economic integration reflecting a low level of political integra-
2
tion. The land tax had been under provincial control and many 
provincial authorities and warlords enjoyed a degree of fiscal 
independence, which varied from place to place depending on the 
need of KMT funds to ward off CCP infiltration and advance.
In North China, the CCP had prosecuted the war on the basis of 
self-reliance, and the tendency to encourage the development of 
self-sufficient border region economies was explicit in the prolif­
eration of different currencies. The question as to what extent 
the CCP's border region experience could be judged as appropriate 
to the process of national economic integration has yet to be 
answered. There were unquestionably problems in that certain 
specific border region practices inhibited the process of integra­
tion in the early 1950's, In terms of the interflow of trade, for 
example, leadership cadres had to overcome the tendency on the part 
of local cadres towards self-reliance, which inhibited the circula­
tion of goods outside their localities. Fiscal policies associated 
with the border region supply system inhibited the introduction of 
new systems of economic accounting necessary to economic planning.
Much of the ensuing inquiry related to the CCP's ability to use 
the tools of finance and "modern'’ business practice to further the 
process of national economic integration. In the imperial context, 
the remission of tax revenues was often patchy due to extensive 
decentralization in tax collection and the non-separation of central
2. See Hung-mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China 
1927-1937.
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and local revenues. We will want to review the CCP*s struggle 
to implement a centralized budgetary process, guaranteeing the 
rational remission of revenue to the centre, but we shall also 
want to pursue a second perspective, which will hopefully raise 
the subsequent analysis above the level of a discussion of the 
minimal requirements for national economic integrity so that we 
can deal with controversial aspects of state control over the 
national economy in terms of the developing socialization of 
industry and commerce.
It is ‘useful to approach the above perspectives with 
reference to the wealth of documentation relating to the admini­
strative activities of the various governments of the Greater Admin­
istrative Regions. These governments played a significant role in 
the achievement of national economic and fiscal unification during 
the years of economic restoration. As of November 1952, we can 
assume a national budget and central economic and fiscal integrity; 
however, the relation of the five sectors of the economy was not 
the same in all regions of the country—  a factor which fundament­
ally affected the formulation of the First Five Year Plan. Also 
differences in the level of economic integration between various 
parts of the country undoubtedly had a direct bearing on the 
debates within the CCP as to the pace of socialization in industry 
and commerce, and the degree to which the state sector would not 
only lead but expropriate other sectors of the economy.
Given the perspectives, introduced above, what significance 
can be ascribed to the Greater Administrative Regions? This level 
of administrative provided much needed flexibility in the implemen­
tation of the central governments policies in areas, differen­
tiated by varying degrees of political and economic integration.
In the introductory chapters, the flexibility of Chinese Communist 
administrative philosophy was reviewed in terms of its relation to 
military strategy. The problem of administrative distance was met 
through a centralization within a dual framework of administration.
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The CCP1 approached the problem of regional differences in political 
and economic integration with a threefold distinction. In terms of 
unevenness in cultural construction and agrarian reform, the CCP 
adopted different tactics to cope with differences between "old" 
and ’'semi-old’1 and "newly liberated areas", whereas in terms of 
economic development, there was the tendency to distinguish advanced, 
intermediate and backward areas—  a distinction,which was consistent 
with the demarcation of the "co-ordinated economic regions" in July 
1957. The threefold distinction is basic to the CCPfs administra­
tive tactics; for example, experience gained in advanced areas or 
key points serve as a yardstick for intermediate and backward areas, 
and the momentum achieved in one area, propelled other areas 
forward.*^
In the context of shattered provincial administration, the 
Greater Administrative Regions, which were structural duplications 
of the central government, made a significant contribution to, on 
the one hand, overcoming the administrative distance between centre 
and localities, and on the other to overcoming the disparities 
between "old", "semi-old" and "newly liberated areas" within GAR 
jurisdictions.
To meet the problems of administrative distance, the CCP*s 
central committee was divided up into several teams, charged with
4
the responsibility for running several supra-provmcial governments.
3. Hence it was argued in the introduction that at the time of 
administrative demarcation in 1949, there was an attempt to 
include as much "old liberated" sections in East China, Central- 
South and North-west China as possible. The idea of using a key- 
point as an entering wedge in predominantly "newly liberated 
regions" is particularly relevant to the way in which the agrarian 
reform campaign infolded in various parts of the country. See Chapter 
Five of John Wong's Land Reform in the People's Republic of China.
4. In October 1966, Mao touched briefly on the division of the centre 
in the late 1940's: "After the Seventh Congress there was nobody 
at the Centre. When Hu Tsung-nan marched on Yenan the Centre was 
divided into two armies, I was in North Shensi with En-lai and 
Jen Pi-shih; Liu Shao-ch'i and Chu Te were in the north-east.
Things were still relatively centralized. But once we entered 
the cities, we were dispersed, each devoting himself to his own 
sphere." ,Stuart Schram, (ed.), Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed. p D267.
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This pattern was essentially a repetition of what had happened 
with the Japanese surrender in 1945 when one third of the CCPCC 
was assigned to lead 20,000 cadres in the North
In the early *50's, there were chronic shortages of 
experienced cadres at all levels and in all departments; for 
■example, according to Po I-po at least ninety per cent of the 
government's tax collectors were retained KMT personnel.
Similarly high percentages prevailed at all levels in judicial 
departments. The division of China into GARs was especially 
compelling, given the problem of control, which arose with the 
generous co-optation of KMT personnel in the course of the 
application of the Peiping and Suiyuan patterns of military 
conquest. During 1948-49, the Party had ordered the transfer of 
100,000 cadres from "old" to "newly liberated areas"; however, 
this number was hardly adequate to cover the administrative areas 
involved. Ihere was a tremendous problem in terms of "policy level" 
(chenfc-t'se shui-p'ing), or awareness on the part of cadres as to 
the details of government policies. Simple announcement of policy 
by the central government was not enough to insure implementation in 
all regions in a uniform manner. A continuing process of education 
in government policy —  a process which would bring together practice 
and theory —  was necessary at all levels.
In the early *50‘s, the problems of "policy level" existed at 
the highest levels, even within the first grade administrative 
machinery of the GARs. The following mea culpa by Wang Ti-min, 
director of the Office of Capital Construction of the Economic and 
Finance Committee of the ECMAC, briefly illustrates this point:
5. NCNA, Peking, November 22nd 1953, in SCMP, No.699, December 2nd 
1935, pp.11-16.
6. Po I-po, "On the Question of Tax Readjustment", June 15th 1950, 
second session of National Committee of the Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference, in New China's Economic 
Achievements, p.81.
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"It should be admitted that in the past three 
years, the various grades of leadership in the East 
China region, including the East China Committee of 
Economic and Financial Affairs, did not adequately 
understand and estimate fully the importance, the 
comprehensiveness and difficulties of capital 
construction. Still less did they raise capital 
construction to the level of political principle 
and correctly exercise ideological leadership."^
One of the most important administrative techniques, used to 
overcome the problems of administrative distance was the elabora­
tion of a conference system. In his closing speech to the second 
session of the National Committee of the CPPCC on June 23rd 1950, 
Mao drew out the importance of conferences as a means of furthering 
administrative democratic centralism:
"Not only have members of the National Committee of 
the People’s Political Consultative Conference taken part 
in the discussion but also many of the personnel of the 
Central People’s Government, People’s Governments, or 
Military Administrative Committees of the various Greater 
Administrative Regions and p eopled governments of the 
provinces and city people's conferences of all circles...'.
Thus we are able to draw together opinions from far and 
near, review our past and determine out future principles 
of work. I hope that the People's Government, or Military 
and Administrative Committees of the Greater Administra­
tive Regions, provinces and cities will also adopt this 
method.
If, in the early 1950's, state structure was especially character­
ized by an emphasis on the horizontal co-ordination and mutual 
inter-relation of departments of different systems under local 
committee structures, the most characteristic feature of the func­
tioning of the state structure was the conference system. Con­
ferences served as the means for educating cadres and various
7. Wang Ti-min, "East China's Capital Construction in the Past 
Three Years and Present Problems", CFCP., Shanghai, November 
16th 1952, in C.B., No.221, February lstrl953, p„8,
8. See Mao Tse-tung, "Tso i-ko wan-ch'uan ko-ming p ’ai". (Work 
for a complete revolutionary representation), Mao Tse-tung 
hsuan-chi, Vol.5, Peking, 1977, p.25. Translation provided 
in Summary of NCNA News Despatches, Supplement, No.3, June 
28th 1950, p.l.
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representatives from different circles on general principles 
of government policy. It was at these conferences that cadres 
hoped to maximize "local expediency", gain necessary information 
as to local conditions and work out the mechanics of policy 
implement ati on»
The conference system was consistent with the united front 
emphasis on democracy and not only brought together related 
government departments, but also the representatives of different 
citizens* bodies and popular organizations. To cite a brief 
example, if we take the fourth plenary session of the CSMAC, which 
met in November 1951, it will be noted that not only 73 of the 
95 MAC members were in attendance, but also there were large 
numbers of observers and representatives of different circles.
The plenary session of the MAC acted as a miniature People's 
Political Consultative Conference in conformity with Mao*s 
instruction above. The following breakdown of the delegates is 
instructive and invites conjecture as to the significance of Mao's 
early notion of a "great union of the popular masses", for the 
idea of representation by "circle" seems to outweigh considerations
of "class" in the 1949 elaboration of structure supporting the
9
people's democratic state power:
9. For the breakdown of the membership of this particular plenary 
session see "The Situation in the Central-South Region",
CB, No.157, February 8th 1952, p.4. The idea of representation 
by circle was crucial to the development of people's democratic 
state power. As for the origins of this notion of representation 
one can go back as far as Mao's "The Great Union of the Popular 
Masses", written in summer, 1919. Mao then linked all manner of 
groupings in the cause of Chinese nationalism, hence he wrote: 
"'Groups1 and 'societies' are precisely the 'unions* I am talking 
about. There are big groups and small groups, big societies and 
small societies, big unions and small unions —  they are merely 
different names for the same thing". Refer to Professor Stuart 
Schram's translation of this article in CQ, January-March, 1972, 
pp.79-80.
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10.
Members of MAC departments: 35
Members of committees under the MAC: 32
Members of provincial/municipal governments,
not on the MAC: 3
Representatives of disabled servicemen: 11
Representatives of FLA units in Central-South: 11
Representatives of workers and railway man: 101
Representatives of old revolutionary bases: 45
Representatives of national minorities: 15
Representatives of democratic parties and groups: 18
Representatives of youth and student circles: 9
Representatives of women’s circles: 11
Representatives of industrial/commercial circles: 60
Councillors of the MAC: 34
Obviously, the circles represented at various plenary session would
receive more or less weight depending on the type of business
before the MAC.
The GAR governments derived from the matrix of united front,
and this fact was not only reflected in the composition of the MACs,
but also in the emphasis on conference techniques; for example,
on July 15th 1950, Tseng Shan in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of
the ECMAC and Chairman of the ECMAC Economic and Financial Affairs
Committee stressed the importance of consultation in preparatory
conferences; the following comment stands as an elaboration on
Mao’s instruction:
"The various finance and economic agencies are just 
now engaged in calling a series of specialized conferences 
to effect systematic readjustment of industry and commerce 
of the entire nation, and have enjoined finance and 
economic units of East China to invite industry and 
commerce personages of various places to hold preparatory 
conferences. We ought to listen fully to the views of 
various local representatives and discuss them carefully 
order to insure the success of these conferences."10
In the third section of this chapter, there will be opportunity 
to discuss how a conference system w a s  created to deal with the 
problem of domestic trade. It was in the context of the GAR confer­
ences for the interflow of urban-rural trade that state commerce, 
co-operatives and private commerce intermeshed. The conference was
Tseng brought up the point at the second plenary session of the 
ECMAC. See CB, No.11, September 28th 1950, p.9.
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more than a passive exercise in education and propaganda, and 
to a certain extent was meaningful in terms of both a bottom- 
to-top and top-to-bottom exercise in actual administration.
In the fiscal sphere, taxation.policy was hammered out at 
national conferences, attended by representatives of the GARs 
and provinces. Hie delegates at the conference would rough out 
the tax assignment for each of the GARs. At subsequent finance 
conferences at the GAR level, representatives of GAR, provincial 
and municipal departments would brealc down the regional assignment, 
allocating specific fiscal burdens to specific provinces and cities.
In terms of their structure of representation, the various 
conferences furthered co-ordination between different systems and 
helped to bridge the gap between different levels of administration. 
The high degree of concurrent office-holding and the tremendous 
inter-system overlap of personnel undoubtedly contributed to a 
smoother working relationship between different levels and systems.
The foregoing discussion sheds some light on the question as 
to how the CCP approached the problems of administrative distance. 
Emphases on dual structure, particularly the co-ordination of 
different systems within the context of government committee struc­
tures and the elaboration of a conference system, which was to 
maximize "local expediency" and capitalize on the organizational, 
thrust of united front, were central to the CCP*s strategy to over­
come administrative distance. The GAR structures were consistent 
with this strategy. Supra-provincial administration was particularly 
necessary in the light of (a) a weak central government complex, 
resting on a narrow institutional base, provided by the former North 
China People's Government, and (b) the shattered provincial admini­
strations of "newly liberated" China. In terms of the above strategy, 
the GARs could act to cut down administrative distances and to 
adopt CPG policies to specific regional differences in the pattern 
of political and economic integration.
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Before moving on to a consideration of the relation between 
administrative strategy and practice, it would seem appropriate to 
discuss here the general policy emphases of the early 1950*s. Much 
of the ensuing discussion concerns a central perspective, which 
over the years has fascinated observers of "modern'' China, namely 
the relation between the Soviet model for economic development and 
the various border region policies, which together constituted 
the sum of the CCP's Yenan experience.
Initially, this perspective can be profitably exploited, if we 
base our periodization of these conflicting emphases on the distinc­
tion between the period of economic restoration (ching-chi hui-fu), 
and the period of large-scale construction (ta. kuei-mo ti chien-she). 
Indeed, this distinction is central to CCP historiography and 
should serve as a corrective to Western analysis, which tends to 
skip the policy emphases of "economic restoration", thus depicting 
a simple progression towards the "Soviet" model. Prior to the 
reorganization of state administration at the end of 1952, the 
Chinese government was mainly concerned with social reform and 
production. In the period of economic restoration, the government 
struggled to surpass pre-war peaks in industrial and agricultural 
production and made only tentative and limited efforts in the 
direction of capital construction.
Mao did not call upon the nation to achieve a "high tide in
learning from the Soviet Union" until February 1953. Indeed, a
Jen-min jih-pao editorial of March 1954, noted that during the
period of economic restoration, different groups of personnel had
had their own prejudices in favour of British, American, or German,
11
or Japanese construction techniques. After the announcement of 
the general line of state, any pattern of construction technique, 
aside from that of the Soviet Union, became ideologically suspect
11. JMJP, March 19th 1954, SCMP, N0.778, March 31st 1954, pp.8-12.
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and was considered "bourgeois" or "backward". The senior cadre 
study groups of the several Greater Administrative Regions only 
began a systematic study of Soviet economic construction after 
the announcement of the general line. The highly connotative 
expression, "capital construction", did not even penetrate the
12
corridors of the East China administrative machinery until 1951.
The level of planning and technology needed to further
economic restoration was obviously not as high as that needed in
large-scale capital construction. To restore production in a plant,
is one thing, but it is a different and much more complex matter to
create industry where none existed before. In the period of
economic restoration, Russian expertise was concentrated in the
Northeast, and development in the Northeast was exceptional in
relation to experience in other GARs.
What the CCP did in the early years in terms of its own
experience undoubtedly had an influence as to how and to what
degree the "Soviet" model was assimilated in later years of capital
construction,, and the very real similarities between policies,
pursued in 1951 and 1958, bears this observation out.
One might stress here that the men, who took charge of the
centre's economic and financial ministries, were the same men, who
oversaw production increase and austerity campaigns in the various
North China border regions in the Yenan period, and their understanding
of Russian economic techniques was not as real as their own experience
13
in handling practical problems of border region administration.
12. Wang Ti-min, op.cit0 . p.5.
13. Bill Brugger in his well documented study of "enterprisation" and
"democracy" in Chinese Communist enterprise suggests that Yenan 
experience was not seen as an alternative to Soviet ways of doing
things and doubts how far one can generalize on the basis of an
administrative experience, originating with "a few isolated industrial 
undertakings or hand-looms linked to an up-country political centre." 
Brugger, Democracy and Organization in Chinese Industrial Enterprise 
1948-53. p.55. One should, however, note that the policies of the 
period of economic restoration had their antecedents in the Yenan exp­
erience. Wl-jile this experience may not have been clearly articulated 
as an alternative to a "Soviet" model (and Brugger makes the rather 
important point that the connotations of "Soviet" are ambiguous), it 
should nevertheless, be stressed that this was the main store-house of 
exerperience from which the CCP leadership could draw on. Russian ex­
perience could not be easily assimilated over a short period of time, 
and there is nothing to suggest that the CCP was willing to eschew its 
past administrative experience, or regard its own experience and policies 
as merely "circumstantial".
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The problem of applying this central perspective to the 
history of the years 1949-54 are difficult as one need not expect 
to find in the Chinese leadership of the time a consistent con­
sciousness of, or understanding of what is meant by "Soviet” . 
"Soviet" has often been identified with Stalin, but even Stalin 
can be quoted to support antithetical statements.
Franz Schurmann has stressed that "Stalinist" administration 
was highly centralized and overwhelmingly "vertical" in structural 
emphasis. Schumann has argued that the trend in China towards a 
highly centralized and vertical government structure reached it 
zenith in 1954, yet in 1953 the Jen-min jih-pao advocated a 
formulation describing relations between party, state and mass 
organization, which was consistent with the September 1st 1942,
Central Committee resolution on the unification of leadership in
14
the anti-Japanese war bases. In 1953, it was argued that the
Party did have the right "to administer" as regards major policy,
but was not to supplant the state machinery and become entangled in
15
the day-to-day execution of policies.
Furthermore in 1954 Stalin was cited in defence of an economic
strategy, which was all-round and included the development of local
industry. The JMJP quoted the following excerpt from Stalin's
"Report on the Work of the Central Committee Before the 14th
Congress of the C.P.S.U." of 1925:
"We must not confine our strength to the development 
of all-Soviet industry because all-Soviet industry or 
our centralized trusts and syndicates can never satisfy 
the different demands and tastes of a 140,000,000 population. 
In order to satisfy these needs, it is necessary to bring 
to an upsurge the industrial activity in every district, 
every uyeza, every gubernia and every national republic.
14. See comments in the introduction, relating to the September 1st 
1942 CCPCC resolution on the unification of leadership in the 
base areas, p.
15. See JMJP editorial comment regarding the Party's -right ’fto 
administer". "Strengthen the Functions of Party Organization in 
Enterprises to Ensure and Supervise Industrial Production",
NCNA, March 18th 1954 in SCMP, No„770, March 19th 1954, p.17.
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Without developing the potential latent in economic 
construction in various localities, without developing 
all these forces, we shall be unable to attain the 
general upsurge in our economic construction as indicated 
by Lenin. "-I-^
One must also consider the fact that the Yenan formulation, 
’’centralized leadership and decentralized management" and the 
Common Programme*s emphasis on "local expediency" (yin-ti chih-i) 
were consistent with specific Russiam formulations.
In February, 1917, the USSR’s Supreme Council of National 
Economy, (Vesenkha). reviewed the structure of industrial admini­
stration and underlined the importance of "centralization of planned
leadership and control and decentralization of operational 
17
functions". One might attempt to see a parallel in terms of the
USSR’s administrative development during the time of the new economic 
policy and Chinese administrative development prior to November 1952. 
In the USSR, economic planning was not exclusive to the centre and
the republics, operating within a dual system of administration,
had a certain degree of initiative to formulate within the general 
mandate of the centre their own state plans under their own Vesenkha. 
In China, a great many planning personnel were concentrated at the 
level of the GAR. Similar to USSR’s republic, the GARs had budgets 
and responsibilities for the management of certain categories of 
capital construction.
GAR responsibility was perhaps the greatest in the Northeast 
over 1949-50 when the Northeast People’s Government drew up budgets
which, although approved by the centre, were not incorporated in the
* 18
national budget.
One might also note that the dual administrative structure in
the Soviet Union rapidly gave way to a more vertical structure with
16o "Fully Develop the Functions of L 0cal State-Operated Industry
During the Transition Period," JMJP, March 11th 1954, SCMP, No.777, 
March 30th 1954, pp.11-14.
17. E.H. Carr and R.W. Davies, Foundations of a Planned Economy 1926~ 
1929, Vol.l, p.378.
18. Article six of the "Provisional Measures of the Northeast Region 
Budget and Final Accounts" notes that the final accounts of the 
NEPG has to be approved by the GAC. Hie quarterly financial 
accounts of the NEGAR, provinces and municipalities were approved 
by the NEPGC itself.
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the advent of the First Five Year Plan. A similar administrative
19
metamorphosis occurred m  China during the First Five Year Plan.
The general thrust of the above discussion certainly indicates 
that the contrast as commonly drawn between the "Yenan" model and 
the "Soviet" model is deceptively simple, hence this relationship 
has to be spelled out in very precise terms as to the specific 
elements of Soviet and Chinese experience which are to be compared.
The policy emphases of the years of economic restoration were
not circumstantial, for they explicitly derived from a well of
past experience in border region administration. The thematic
axis, upon which all economic policy revolved, was production
increase and economy (i.e. austerity). During the early *50*s,
cadres in economic and finance departments never ceased to quote
the formulations set out by Mao in his December 1942 essay, "Economic
and Financial Problems". Senior level cadres often quoted the
following observation: "...while a good or bad financial policy
affects the economy, it is the economy that determines finance.
Without a well-based economy, it is impossible to solve financial
difficulties without a growing economy, it is impossible to attain
20
financial self-sufficiency." The key policy emphasis in the 
early 1950*s was "finance through economics" (i.e. through economic 
development), (tsung ching-chi tao ts* ai-cheng). State revenue was 
to accrue through increased production and reduction of administra­
tive expenditur e.
The significance of Mao*s thinking in these matters was even 
stressed during the first five year plan. When Po I-po delivered 
his budget for 1953, he stressed the old formulation, "crack troops 
and simple administration" and noted the continuing importance of 
the "five objectives", namely, "simplification", "unification", 
"efficiency", "economy", and "opposition to bureaucracy":
19. Edward Carr has noted in relation to the inexorable tide of central­
ization in the USSR: "The advance of planning and industrialisation 
strengthened the pressure for every form of centralization and intol­
erance of any resistance to it on national ground..." Foundations
of a Planned Economy0 Vol.II, p.194.
20. Mao Tse-tung, "Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti-Japanese 
War", SW, III, p.lll.
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"It is still apropriate to use words of Chairman 
Mao Tse-tung and to criticize many of our state 
financial and economic organizations and other admini­
strative organizations today. For this reason strict 
examination and supervision must be exercised over the 
size of staffs and the expenditure of the administrative 
organs of enterprises, institutions and government organ­
izations. The authorized size of staff and production 
norms must be enforced, grades must be reduced and proced­
ure simplified. Those who practice bureaucracy by 
sitting in their offices and issuing directives and orders 
without examining the carrying out of work must be 
opposed.’* ^
This central policy theme of production increase and austerity 
runs through the complete spectrum of CCP policy emphases. Most 
important of all, it was related to the basic unite!front economic 
strategy of "production on all fronts" (ssu-mien p a -fang fa-sheng). 
During the mass campaign for production in late 1952, the banner 
"better, faster and more economical" (hao, k *uai. sheng) was unfurled 
throughout China.
The characters, ssu-.mie.n pa-:fang explicitly referred to a set of 
inter-related policies which together formed the core of the economic 
programme of New Democracy, Mao had very early in the day come to 
the conclusion that the uneven development of China’s economy 
necessitated a policy which would capitalize at once 011 the different 
features of China’s economic landscape. In October 1936, on the eve 
of united front, Mao wrote the following concerning China’s economy:
"China’s political and economic development is uneven —  
a weak capitalist economy coexists with a preponderant semi- 
feudal economy; a few modern industrial and commercial 
cities coexist with a vast stagnant countryside; several 
million industrial workers coexist with several hundreds of 
millions of peasants and handicraftsmen labouring under the 
old system."22
Within the context of the second united front and its mass as opposed 
to class-line emphasis, Mao urged the coexistence and creative 
development of the different sectors of the economy,,
21. Po I-po*s Report on the 1953 Budget, NCNa, Peking, February 17th 
1953, CoB., N0 .230, February 20th 1953.
22. Mao Tse-tung, "Problems of Strategy in China’s Revolutionary War", 
SW, V o i d ,  p.196.
183
Ssu-xniei} pa-fang specifically related to the following policy
emphases: "consider both public and private" (kung-tzu chien-ku) ;
"mutually benefit capital and labour" (lao-tzu liang-li): "mutual
assistance between countryside and city" (ch feng-hsiang hu-chu);
23
"foreign and domestic trade interflow" (nei-wai chiao-liu). All
these policies were designed to capitalize on all the positive
features explicit in C h i n a * s  economy.
Ideally, private commercial and industrial enterprise would
inter-relate with state enterprises to their mutual benefit. The
class contradictions between workers and employers were not to be
pushed to the point were labour disputes disrupted production. The
state trading policy emphasized the importance of marketing native
products so that peasant purchasing power would be raised and the
countryside could then afford goods manufactured in the cities. While
trade with foreign countries was to be encouraged, it had to be
encouraged in a qualified fashion, avoiding the past mistake of
"over-emphasizing foreign and paying little attention to native"
(chung-yang, ching-t*u). China was not to rely on foreign sources
of raw materials, and a strenuous effort was made to find domestic
markets for native and special products.
It is difficult to credit Cultural Revolution claims that
Liu Chao-ch'i opposed Mao in attempting to consolidate "new
democracy" when the central policy thrust of the period was towards
24
Mao*s "production on all fronts".
23. For an example of the use of "ssu-mien pa-.fang" refer to "Tso
hao hua-pei ch*!! c h feng-hsiang wu-tzu chiao-liu k f ai lan hui
ti chi-pei kung-tso", (Do well the preparatory work for North
China urban-rural interflow of goods trade fair", JMJP, July 16th 
1951; also in HHYP Vol.4, Nc .4, August 1951, p.870.
24. For further comment on Cultural Revolution allegations, see
Kenneth Li^thal, "Mao vs Liu? Policy Towards Industry and 
Commerce 1946-49", CQ, No.47, July-September 1971.
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IV'
ii) The Struggle for the Centre's Economic and Fiscal Integrity
In this section we can trace in more detail the movement from 
a cpnditipn pf ’’dispersion" (fen-san) to "unity" (t'ung-i) in the 
course of the elaboration of national fiscal structure and the 
implementation of economic policy. Perhaps,one of the most important 
aspects of nation-building in China was the creation of a unified 
budgetary framework, which insured fiscal discipline at local levels 
Hie imposition of fiscal discipline on local levels of government 
was important not only in terms of the centre’s attempt to achieve 
unified economic planning, but also in that it insured against a 
reversion to the phenomenon of "ko tzu-wei cheng" (semi-autonomous 
administration by the various levels).
In late 1949 and early 1950, the CPG faced an economic and 
fiscal crisis of alarming proportions, as the gap between national 
revenue and expenditure dramatically increased day by day. Military 
conquest had rapidly outpaced political and economic integration in 
China, south of the Yangtze River. During the first months, when 
the CCP was hurriedly erecting a scaffolding of government in the 
vast "newly liberated areas", the centre had to lean on the resources 
of the "old liberated areas" to supply large quantities, of food and 
material to newly liberated cities in East China and Central-South 
Ch^na and to supply the rapidly expanding front in the Northwest 
southwest.
1. The degree to which the "old liberated areas" shouldered the
national burden is revealed in the transfer of grain. According 
to Liu Shao-ch'i in 1950, the Northeast People's Government 
transferred 2,600,000 tons of grain to the CPG in support of the 
ongoing military campaigns in China Proper and to provide relief 
in natural disaster areas. See Liu Shao-ch'i "May Day Address", 
Peking, May 1st *950^ in New China's Economic Achievements« p. 16. 
According to Ch'en Ytin, the CPG distributed a total tonnage of
4,500,000 tons to relieve the food situation in China Proper.
See Ch'en Yun, "The Financial and Food Situation", New China's 
Economic Achievements 0 p.57.
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It was difficult to insure a balance of revenue and expenditure
on the basis of the principle of "finance through economics".
Ch'en Yun, Chairman of the GAC Economic and Finance Committee and
Po I-po, the committee's vice-chairman, took the position that the
issuance of bank notes on a large scale would further aggravate
an already serious inflationary spiral. On December 2nd 1949, Ch'en
Yun delivered a speech before the CPGC. He could promise no more
than "blood, toil, tears and sweat". He warned his colleagues that
revenue from the newly liberated areas would increase only slowly 
2
and gradually. Initially, the 1950 deficit was covered by limited 
note issue and the issuance of Victory Bonds, and in this respect 
the leadership had to at least bend its basic tenet, "finance 
through economics", for these methods can only be regarded as a 
means of distributing the fiscal burden to the population at large.
Military and administrative personnel and educational workers
were instructed to continue to engage in production. Indeed, the
December 5th 1949, directive of the PRMC stressed that the PLA's
3
participation in production was not temporary but long-term. Ch'en 
would promise no increase in the wages of military personnel, 
administrative and educational workers; however the continuation of 
the supply system and the regular pegging of the "parity unit" to the 
commodity price indices may have helped to protect government 
personnel from the worst effects of inflation.
In discussing the central government's struggle to achieve 
unified management of finance and economy, one cannot but note the 
magnitude of the fiscal problem, which the centre faced in late 1949 
and in the first quarter of 1950, and it is here that we might find 
the explanation for the excessive financial and economic centrali- 
zation? which occurred during 1950. Ch'en Yun revealed that in 1949 
financial deficit constituted two thirds of expenditure. In the
2.
3.
4.
Ch'en Yun, "The Problem of Commodity Prices and the Issuance of 
Government Bonds", New China's Economic Achievements, p.37. 
JMJP, December 6th 1949, p.l.
Ch'en Yun, "The Financial and Food Situation", p.49.
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context of the debate concerning the unification of national 
economic and financial work, Articles 16 and 33 of the Common 
Programme seemed to have lost some significance, and the border 
region formulation, "centralized leadership and decentralized 
management” , was discredited in its association with "sub-region 
management", (fen-ch*u ching-ying).
The unification of CPG receipts and expenditure became one of
the three cornerstones of the CPGfs strategy to overcome inflation
and stabilize prices. The san-p* ing policy, as it was called, also
required the central allocation of important raw materials and
resources and the unification of regional currencies under the
.1 en-min pi. The biggest item on the debit side of the draft 1950
budget was military and administrative expenditure, which together
accounted for over sixty per cent of total expenditure. At a time
when tax collection had yet to be routinized and when various areas
of the country were suffering serious hardship due to natural
disasters, the government had to support nine million personnel, or
5
more than two per cent of the national population. This was in part 
the cost of the success of the cooptation plan, explicit in Mao*s 
"Peiping and Suiyuan Patterns". Basically, the government honoured 
its pledge to take over in toto former army and government personnel; 
however, while the CPG had become responsible for national expenditure, 
it did not have the advantage of a truly national tax collection.
In the "newly liberated areas", revenue collection was handled in a 
semi-autonomous fashion by local government agencies.
The GAC decision on the unification of financial and economic 
work, which.was promulgated on March 3rd 1950, particularly pointed to 
deviations in the collection of the public grain tax. A Jen-min jih-pan
5. Po I-po, "Draft Budget for 1950", New China*s Economic 
Achievements, p.41.
6. CPG GAC, "Kuan-yu t fung-j kuo-chia ts*al-cheng ching-chi 
kung-tso ti chtieh-ting", (Decision on the unification of 
financial and economic work), in Hua-tung chfti ts*ai-cheng 
ching-chi fa-ling hui-pien, (Compendium of East China Economic 
and Financial Regulations), Vol.l, pp.7*-8. Henceforth cited 
as HTCCCTC.
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editorial hailed the move forward from a condition of "dispersion11
7
(fen-san) to unity (t*ung-i). A policy of "decentralized manage­
ment", (fen-san ching-ying)a was seen as necessarily appropriate 
to the economic and political conditions during the War of Resist­
ance; however, it was argued that the situation had undergone a 
dramatic change with the liberation of large cities such as Shanghai 
and Hankow, and with the calling in of and the steady expansion into 
the "newly liberated areas" of the new currency, jen-min pi. The same Jet 
m in ,i ih-pao. edi-t-nrial, however, specifically posed the question whether 
or not "decentralized management" would continue to exist subsequent 
to the planned unification and answered in the affirmative.
The relationship between the centre and the localities in 
regard to agricultural production was cited as an example. After 
unification, the Ministry of Agriculture would formulate the 
general plan of production, but local governments would bear the 
responsibility of organization and leadership (ling-tao), hence 
the implication that the contemplated unification in theory was to 
take place within a dual framework of administration.
Ko Chih-ta, in his historical review of the budgets of the PRC, 
noted that at the time of the unification, there were cadres, who 
upheld the slogans, "more flexibility" (to chi-tung), and "more to
g
administer" (to pan-shih). These cadres had wanted to administer 
more projects, but inevitably left the centre with the financial 
responsibility.
In the early years of the new regime, there were serious 
administrative problems as regards the achievement of a centralized 
uniformity of local tax collection. There were also serious problems 
as regards the financing of economic development. In a Jen-min 
jih-pao editorial of March 10th 1950, Chang Chiang noted that not 
only localities but also CPG ministries had clamoured "prosperity on
"Wei-shemma yao t*ung-i kuo-chia ts *ai-cheng ching-chi kung-tso" , 
(Why do we want to unify national economic and financial work?) 
JMJP, March 10th 1950 and reprinted in Kan-pu hsueh-hsi tzu-liao. 
No.6, April 1950, pp.33-37. Henceforth cited as KPHHTL.
8. Ko Chih-ta, Kuo-tu shih-chfi ti chung-kuo yu-suan. (Chinese 
budgets in the transition period), p.40.
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all fronts" (pai-f a chii-hsing). Chang revealed that during the 
national finance conference of February 1950, certain localities 
and ministries had been criticized precisely for wanting to spend 
more and administer more at a time when the central government 
was in dire straits trying to achieve strict economy of expendi­
ture and bring about a balance of receipts and expenditure.
Hie problem was not new, and the CCP already had considerable 
experience in dealing with overly enthusiastic cadres who failed 
to maintain fiscal discipline. In December 1942, Mao bad warned 
that the emphasis on economic development, explicitly in the 
principle, "finance through economics" was not an excuse for 
"reckless or ill-founded expansion", and he roundly criticized 
certain wayward comrades in the following fashion:
"Some comrades who disregard the specific conditions 
here and now axe setting up an empty clamour for develop­
ment; for example, they are demanding the establishment 
of heavy industry and putting forward plans for huge salt 
and armament industries, all of which are unrealistic and 
unacceptable. The Party*s line is the correct line for 
development; it opposes outmoded and conservative notions 
on the one hand and grandiose, empty and unrealistic plans 
on the other. This is the Party's struggle on two fronts 
in financial and economic work."
On the same occasion in 1942, Mao found it necessary to 
criticize cadres for the incorrect viewpoint of "benevolent govern­
ment" (jen cheng). Hie problem was all the more serious in the 
context of the fiscal crisis of early 1950. Chang Chiang informs 
us that the viewpoint had survived in certain localities and 
ministries and that the policy emphasis on "finance through 
economics" had been taken to an extreme to justify the elimination
of tax burdens on the people. One might note in this connection 
a March 1950, directive of the CSMAC, which vigorously criticized
9. Chang Chiang, "Ts*ai-ching kung-tso ti hsin shih-ch*!".
(The new stage in economic and finance work), JMJP, March 10th 
1950, reproduced in Hsin-Hua yueh-pao, Vol.l, No.6, p 01396. 
Henceforth cited as HHYP.
10. Mao Tse-tung, "Economic and Financial Problems in the Anti- 
Japanese War", SWP Vol.Ill, p.113.
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11
"benevolent government". Central-South cadres were carefully
instructed that such a view would ultimately cause the people
great hardship; for example, it was pointed out that a reduction
in urban taxation would result in a heavier burden falling on the
countryside, which would adversely affect both production and
peasant purchasing power.
Departments and localities were criticized for having clamoured
for "flexibility", or greater initiative and independence in the
economic sphere. The JMJP in reviewing the proceedings of the
above February 1950 conference, cautiously noted that although the
conference delegates, including responsible financial cadres of
the GARs had rapped the tables, signifying their endorsement of
policies for the impending unification, conditions were not easy
by any means, and the possibility of an intense struggle loomed
12
large over the horizon.
In the months subsequent to the February 1950 conference, the
expression "decentralized management", was conspicuously absent
from the statements of senior cadres, responsible for finance. Mao
and Ch*en Yun referred to "centralized control and centralized
leadership", (t*ung-i kuan-li ho t'ung-i ling-tao). as opposed to
the familiar Yenan formulation, "centralized leadership and decent-
13
ralized management". "Centralized control" apparently did not 
necessarily imply a rigid vertical administrative structure, for 
the "Principles of National Taxation", promulgated by the GAC on 
January 17th 1950, while preserving the centre1e integrity as to 
the promulgation and implementation of regulations for the collection 
of taxes of national significance, had indicated that each level of 
of tax organization would be responsible to the dual leadership 
(shuang-chung ling-tao) of the next higher level of tax organization
11. "Kuan-ch * e shui-shou cheng-ts *e pao-teng .jen-wu wan ch'eng".
(Thoroughly implement urban tax policy insuring the completion of
assignments) KPHI-ITL, N0.6-, March 1950, p.64.
12. Chang Chiang, HHYP, p.1396.
13;- For example see Mao Tse-tung, "Wei cheng-ch*u kuo-chia ts * ai-cheng
ching-chi chuang-k*uang ti chi-pen hua chuan erh tou-cheng", (Fight 
for a fundamental turn for the better in the financial and economic’ 
siruation in China), I-chiu^wu-ling nien chung-kuo ching-chi lun-wen 
hsuan, (Selected articles on the Chinese economy in 1950), p.5.
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and the government of the same level. However, in the case
of conflict within this dual pattern of structure, the decision
of the next highest level of tax bureau was to prevail over that
15
of the government committee of the same level.
It is noteworthy that the March 3rd decision for the unifi­
cation of national and financial work anticipated that problems 
would arise at the local levels as the result of the implementa­
tion of the new regulations. Cadres, engaged in local admini­
strative work, were warned not to indulge in pessimistic and 
irresponsible attitudes in reaction to centralization. The GAC 
predicted that unified management would make it more difficult 
for local administrations to meet local expenses, but these diff­
iculties, it was argued, would pale in significance when compared 
to the much more serious problems5which would result from the non­
co-ordination of central revenue and expenditure.16
The centre in its campaign to balance the budget, bled the 
local governments white, and the initiative of local administration 
was seriously impaired as a result of rigid fiscal centralization 
and currency control. This episode in the early history of the 
regime is particularly important as it demonstrated the capacity of 
the centre at a time when its structure was embryonic, and at a 
time when a great deal of power was concentrated at the level of the 
GAR, to overcome administrative chaos at local levels. The three­
pronged policy to centralize control of national revenue and expendi­
ture, to centralize on a nationwide basis the use of important 
resources and to centralize control over currency, was to a certain 
extent successful. The CCP leadership proudly proclaimed a victory
14. Article 11, llC h tuan-kuo shui-cheng shih-shih yao-ts'e." (Principles 
of national taxation,), in Chung-vang shui-wu fa-ling hui-pien-chi, 
Compendium of central government tax regulations), Vol.l, p.5.
15. Article 22, ftC h ,uan-kuo ko-chi shui-wu chi chan-hsing tsu-chih kuei- 
ch*eng1T, (Provisional organic regulations of the various levels of 
national tax organization), Chung-vang shiu-wu fa-ling hui-pien chi, p.
16. HTCCCfC, Vol.l, p.12.
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over inflation, which was represented as proof of the strength 
of a people’s regime in comparison with the weakness of the KMT 
regime.
Already on April 13th 1950, C h ’en Yun was claiming that the
national deficit was two-fifths less than that allowed for in the
17
1950 budgetary estimates. But if success was sweet, it was 
hardly unqualified. The deputy minister of the CPG Ministry of 
Finance, Jung Tzu-ho, later admitted that although 1950 was marked 
by great achievements in financial and economic work, serious mis- • 
takes occurred during the implementation of policy. The decisions 
of the February 1950 conference had not been carried out in accord­
ance with Mao’s directive, "finance through economics", especially
X8
in taxation work in the months of March and April.
During 1950, the centre and the GARs were able to redress the 
earlier situation, whereby the "old liberated areas" were shouldering 
a disproportionate share of the national tax burden due to the 
default of the "newly liberated areas" in the remission of revenue. 
Total revenue intake in 1950 exceeded original budgetary estimate of 
1949 by 31.7 per cent. Over the year, remission of revenue to the 
centre increased quarterly while central subsidies to local govern­
ments decreased quarterly; for example, in the first quarter, the 
CPG received only 7.9 per cent of total 1950 revenues while it dis­
bursed to the regions 43 per cent of the year’s total subsidies, 
whereas in the last quarter 39.9 per cent of annual revenues were
remitted to the CPG and subsidies of the same quarter amounted to
19
14.7 per cent of the total annual subsidization.
Part of the reason why the CCP leadership was able to achieve a 
healthy budgetary situation was due to the effectiveness of GAR 
organization in facilitating the work of unification. From the out-
17. C h ’en Yun, "The Financial and Food Situation", p.48.
18. Jung Tze-ho, "I-cliiu-wu-llng nien ts’ai-cheng kung-tso tsung-chieh 
chi i-chiu-wu-i nien kung-tso ti fang-cnen ho jen-wu". (Summary of 
1950 financial work and the policies and tasks of work in 1951), 
April 1951, HHYP, Vol.3, No.6, p.1355.
19. Ibid., p.1355.
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set it should be noted that provincial budgets were approved at
the GAR level and subsequently incorporated into that level’s
budget. After the promulgation of the March 3rd decision on
unification, the various GARs convened financial conferences, and
during the last two weeks of March created the necessary structure
20
to facilitate the impending unification.
At the centre, two committees had been formed to oversee the 
battle to reduce expenditure and augment revenue. The Vice-Chairman 
of the GAC Economic and Finance Committee, Po I~po, presided over 
the National Committee of Personnel Registration, while the Chairman 
of the GAC’s Committee, C h ’en Yun, presided over the new National 
Committee for Inventory and Clearance. These two national committees 
were duplicated in each GAR as a result of the regional finance 
conferences in March. The committees, charged with personnel regis-
■fci
tration, were to weed out fictipus personnel, and to hold down the 
number of personnel so as to reduce the costs of the government’s 
supply system. The committees also took charge of the allocation of 
personnel, a function which undoubtedly provided GAR administration 
with experience in later drives to build up pools of technicians 
and workers for capital construction. The hiring of any additional 
personnel was rigidly centralized. Committees for inventory and 
clearance of surplus government stores, on the other hand, undertook 
to carry out an inventory of all government warehouses and to sell 
unneeded assets to as to assist the balance of government receipts 
and expenditures..
A similar committee structure was organized in the context of 
the later production increase and economy campaign. To take the 
CSMAC as an example, the CSMAC Economic and Finance Committee and 
Departments of Industry, Trade, Agriculture and Forestry, Conservancy,
20. MKo ta hsing-cheng ch’u chao-k’ai ts * ai-cheng hui-i t ’ui-hsing
t*ung-i ts’ai-ching chUeh-ting"« (Various greater administrative 
regions convene finance conferences to promote the decision to 
unify finance and economics), HHYP, October 1950, Vol.l, No.6, 
pp.1411-1413.
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and Health drafted plans for production and economy, and 
Central-South government organs and GAR state enterprise 
organized retrenchment and economy committees, which assumed 
leadership of the campaign and organized inspection groups to 
investigate corruption and waste at GAR, provincial and municipal 
levels.2'*'
The GAR level committees organized corresponding personnel regi­
stration and inventory clearance sub-committees at provincial, 
municipal, hsien and enterprise levels, for example. Under the 
Chairmanship of Teng Tzu-hui, the Central-South Committee for1 
Personnel Registration started formal registration of all Central- 
South personnel in May. The Committee’s specific terms of 
reference had already been defined by a CSMAC directive, which 
incidentally based the system of salaries in Central-South China 
on the principle of "three people’s rice to feed five people",
tt 22
(san-ko .jen ti fan yu wu-ko .ien ch’ih). The CSMAC acted to reduce 
the salaries of higher level cadres, while holding the line on 
lower-level cadres* salaries. Those cadres receiving more than 150 
catties (presumably by the month) were to have their salaries 
reduced to 150 catties, while those with under 150 catties were to 
receive the same as before; however, since the MAC acted to increase 
the number of categories of personnel, one suspects that there were 
other disguised reductions.
Liu Shao-ch’i frankly admitted that cadres were experiencing 
great suffering and deprivation as a result of government economies 
when he stated:
"As a result of economy in expenditure, several 
million army personnel and government functionaries 
continue to live under the frugal supply system, and it 
is impossible or hardly possible for them to look
21. See "Resolution on Measures for the Development of the Production 
Increase and Economy Movement", dated November 21st 1951 in CB.,
No.160, February 20th 1952, p.62 (from CCJP, November 28th 1951).
22. See CSMAC directive on unification of financial and economic 
work, dated March 22nd 1950, in KPHHTL, April 1950, No.6, ppD41-43.
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after their families, many of whom have to live a 
hard life or even a life of semi-starvation."^
The creation of a GAR budgetary system, which covered the
vast "newly liberated areas" contributed to the eventual balancing
of the centre's receipts and expenditures; for example, reference
to the "Provisional Regulations for the Southwest • Region Budgef
and Final Accounts" indicated that the Finance Department of the
SWMAC was charged with the task of controlling the supply system of
all levels of government in the Southwest, except for military
operation expenditure, which was to be unified by the Finance
Department of the Southwest Military Region Rear Services Section,
and except for the operational expenditure and investment in
enterprises under central management
How effective were the GARs in increasing the remission of
revenue and in the cutting of administrative expenditure? In his
report to the fifth session of the CPGC, as Chairman of the NWMAC,
Peng Teh-huai, noted that as of that moment in January 1950, the
centre was subsidizing expenditure to the North-west to the
■tune of 75 per cent. Moreover, in his report to the second
session of the NWMAC on July 10th 1950, Ku Chih^fu, Chairman of the
NWMAC Economic and Finance Committee, noted that the work of
unification was rendering impressive results. Whereas in March 1950,
revenue collection in the Northwest reached only 66 per cent of
planned receipts, the figure for May stood at 103 per c e n t o ^  Since
23. Liu Shao-ch'^, "May,,Day Address", New Chinalg.-^£hievements, p o20.
24. "Hsi-nan ch'u yu-chueh suan chan-hsing pan-fa", (Provisional 
regulations for the Southwest region budget and final accounts), 
CYTCCTFLPH, Series II,(tp.284.
25. Peng Teh-huai, "Kuan-yu hsi-pei kung-tso ching-lc'uang ti pao-kao", 
January 7th 1950, in CFKTPK, p.414. (Report on work conditions in 
the Northwest.)
' tt
26. Ku Chih-fu, "Kuan-yu mu-ch'ien hsi-pei ts1ai-ching kung tso 
wen-t '1". (Problems in present Northwest’ economic and financial 
work), July 10th 1950, CFKTPK, p.421.
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the first session of the NWMAC, military and administrative 
expenditure had been reduced by 20 per cent and expenditure 
relating to economic and cultural construction, had been reduced 
by 50 per cent.
The authorities in the SWMAC probably faced what was an even
more desperate financial situation than did Peng in the Northwest..
In his report on financial and economic work, Liu Tai-feng,
Vice-Chairman of the SWMAC Economic and Finance Committee, noted
that at the time of the March 3rd decision, various government
27
machineries had not even been set up. Liu also revealed that 
although the Southwest„■ government and military establishment 
supported a register of over two million personnel, centrally 
approved figures only allowed for the supply of 1.7 million personnel.
The Southwest, was exclusively "newly liberated area", and 
there had been no time for politicization prior to liberation; and 
government and mass organization was embryonic, hence the imbalance 
between revenue and expenditure was particularly chronic in the South­
west. During his report to the second session of the SWMAC on January 
29th 1951, Liu Tai-feng observed that the Southwest' region in 1950
had in fact basically completed centrally-assigned quotas for public
28
grain tax, urban tax and salt tax, and further claimed that success­
ful ,collection of public grain was the result of the organization of 
peasant masses, cadre enthusiasm and correct implementation of the 
centre*s agricultural tax policies.
He did, however, admit that during the first half of 1950, 
urban taxation had been slow in remission. As of the end of July 
only 22 per cent of the annual quota for urban tax had been fulfilled; 
however collection later improved in the course of rectification and 
criticism. The mentality, which judged unification as impracticable
27. Liu Tai-feng, "Kuan-yu hsi-nan ts1ai-ching kung-tso ti pao-kao". 
(Report on the Southwest economic and finance work), July 27th 
1950, CFKTPK, p.992.
28. Liu Tai-feng, "Hsi-nan i-nien lai ts * ai-ching kung-tso ti chi-pen 
c h H n g - k ^ a n g  ho i-chiu-wu-i nien ti kung-tso-jen-wu1*. (Basic con­
ditions in Southwfst’- economic and finance work over the past year 
and work tasks for 1951), CYTCCTFLHP, Vol.8, 1952, p.53.
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under the prevailing political and economic circumstances, came 
under attack. Despite the many problems; which existed at 
liberation, the SWMAC authorities were able to claim with some 
pride on the even of the announcement of the general line of state
that the SWMAC authorities had in the financial work passed from 
"supply finance", (kung-kei t s1ai-cheng) to "construction finance", 
(chien-she tsf ai-cheng).^
By way of contrast, financial and economic unification was much 
more rapid in the Northeast,, particularly as this region over­
whelmingly fell into the category of "old liberated area". The
second session of the Northeast Finance Conference was in effect a 
30
turning point.. The theme of local fiscal responsibility was high­
lighted at the conference. Local level cadres were urged to over­
come the mistaken viewpoints of the past when they had tended to 
rely almost exclusively on subsidies from higher administrative levels 
to resolve the problems of local finance. Mukden was singled out as 
an example. The Mukden municipal government had experienced serious 
fiscal difficulties in the first half of 1950. During the second 
half of 1950, there had been a struggle to correct "cheng-ts fe ssu- 
hsiang" (policy thought) and more effective budgetary discipline 
was maintained, as disbursements were cut back and revenue collection 
improved. During the conference it was emphasized that local levels 
had to develop their own fiscal strength and not drain the centre. 
Generally, the performance of local administration in the Northeast 
was much better in the second half of 1950.
Liaohsi, which had been in deep water at the beginning of the 
year, recovered its fiscal equilibrium by the end of the year. Laio- 
tung, after investigating expenditure, adjusting revenue collection 
and struggling to invigorate state enterprise management, was able to 
reduce its dependence on subsidies in the second half of the year.
29a Chen Hsi-ytin, "Hsi-nan ch *u san-nien lai ts * ai-cheng ching-chi kung- 
tso ti chfang-chiu", (Results of the past three years of finance and 
economic work in the Southwest), HHYP, 1951, N0.ll, pp.142-144.
30. See the following review of local level performance in the Northeast
during 1950, "Chin-^-i pu kung-ku sheng-shih ti-fang ts* ai-cheng yu-suan", 
(Progressively strengthen provincial and municipal local financial 
budgeting), Tung-pei jih-pao, February 22nd 1951, in HHYP, Vol.3, N0.5, 
March 1951, p o1098.
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In terns of urban taxation, the various provinces and muni­
cipalities achieved a collection which was 66 per cent over 
original estimates —  a particularly impressive achievement in 
consideration of the fact that some forms of urban taxation were
new to the Northeast. As late as October 1950, the SWMAC had
31
collected only 50 per cent of its original urban tax c^uota.
The final budgetary figures for the Northeast in 1950 revealed 
that revenue collection was 18.4 per cent higher than original 
budgetary estimates, whereas expenditure had been cut a further 
l i d  per cent. A Russian observer noted that the dismissal of
70,000 administrative employees from Northeast institutions and 
enterprises had resulted in a reduction of administrative expenses
3
from 7.7 per cent of total expenditure in 1949 to 5,per cent in 1950.
The struggle to achieve budgetary responsibility at local
levels continued on into 1951. The Tung-pei .i ih-pao drew attention
to the fact that despite the lessons of 1950, certain provinces and
municipalities were still prematurely pushing ahead with projects,
which they would ill afford to finance. The provisions of the 1951
budgetary estimates of Liaohsi, for example, had as of March already
been cut twice, yet the figures were more than double the subsidy,
which the Northeast authorities allotted the province in 1950, and
the 1951 estimates of other Northeast: provinces ran at even higher
33
levels of expenditure.
To sum up, the programme for economic and financial unification 
had achieved results in terms of balancing the national budget, but 
these results were achieved at some cost to the CCP's own political 
and administrative principles. Even though the structure of the 
government was "dual", the principle of flexibility in local admini­
stration was a casualty of a headlong rush to balance the national
31. See C.B., No.20, October 26th 1950, '’Special Articles Reviewing 
Development in Various Regions- in China During the Past Year",
Part VIII, "Work in the Southwest': in the Last Ten Months".
32. "Tung-pei ts*ai-cheng shou-chih ta tao p'ing-heng". TPJP, January
1st 1951, in HHYP, Vol.3, No.5, March 1951, p.1096. Excerpts from
M.V. Fomicheva, "Essay on the Economic Structure of Northeast'- China", 
are translated in JPRS NY-594 CSO-1391, July 28th 1958. The refer­
ence here is to page 3 of the JPRS translation.
33. HHYP, Vol.3, N0.5, March 1951, p.1098.
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budget. The structure of the GAR level was consistent with the 
need to talce into account regional variations in the pattern of 
political and economic integration, yet this level did facilitate 
a vigorous pattern of centralization.
That over-centralization could produce unexpected adverse
results is obvious. Kwangtung, not surprisingly, provides the
best illustration of this point. One of the reasons for the
persistent collection of irregular KMP imposts in Kwangtung was
the tremendous pressure, which higher finance organs exerted on
local levels. In the summer of 1951, Kwangtung officials had to
launch a campaign against the persistence of irregular taxation at 
" 34v
the hsiang and ch'u levels. Yeh Chien-ying at that time pointed 
out that the exaction of a plethora of local imposts at these 
levels could not simply be cast in terms of a persistence of the 
KMT's way of doing things, but was also a reflection of the fact 
that some cadres had been caught in the cruhch between excessive 
expenditure and the introduction of a unified system of finance, 
hence the willingness on their part to countenance the persistence 
of KMP fiscal practices.
Despite enormous problems of administrative distance, the 
chronic shortage of experienced cadres in the "newly liberated 
areas", the understandably low "policy levels", which affected the 
implementation of policy at all levels of state administration, the 
new regime successfully balanced national receipts and expenditures 
and won an impressive victory over inflation.
34. During 1950 the new regime had started the process of rationalizing 
the local tax structure in the "newly liberated areas". The CCP had 
consistently attacked KMT fiscal indulgence at the local level, cha­
racterizing it as "ko tzu-wei cheng"„ This "semi-independence" had 
led to the proliferation of different categories of local tax* See 
"Ch'uan-kuo ti-fang shui-yen lcung-tso hui-i'1, (All-China conference 
on local taxation) in HHYP, Vol.l, No.2, May 1950, p.114 from NCNA 
March 8th 1950. The problem in Kwangtung was, therefore, viewed with 
the greatest concern,, The NFJP noted: "...as the higher authorities
demanded the strict enforcement of the system of budget and final 
accounts, some cadres, in order to solve their immediate difficulties, 
have resorted to arbitrary measures in the collection of taxes to make 
good their budgetary deficit".. See CB, No.129, October 20th 1951, p.4 
from NFJP, August 27th 1951. The NFJP proposed that the list of local 
revenue be posted for public inspection and that the people of all­
circles undertake supervision of local revenue.
199
Basically a unification of financial and economic worlc had
been achieved by the spring of 1951. A respectable degree of
fiscal responsibility was achieved at the provincial level, and,
although as of April receipts still fell short of expenditure in
the majority of China*6 large cities, the phenomenon of irregular
receipt and disbursement, which had characterized municipal
35
finance in 1950, had been basically overcome.
In 1950, the CPG had sailed into the troubled waters of the 
Straits of Scylla and Charybdis., for on the one hand there was the 
need to develop the economy, while on the other there was the need 
to balance receipts and expenditures. To develop the economy meant 
avoiding a high level of fiscal extraction at the local levels and
the stimulation of local trading and industrial initiative, but it
was not only economically, but politically essential, if the CCP 
was to consolidate a new situation, qualitatively different from 
past experience of "semi-autonomous administrative by different levels", 
to insure fiscal responsibility at the local levels and firmly 
establish the centre’s ability to control the national economy.
As a national budgetary framework had been effectively achieved,
the leadership was confident in 1951 to reorganize state structure
and bring about a decentralization in accordance with the principle
of "local expediency". Indeed, in discussing the general question
of "regionalism", one must always bear in mind that the several
programmes of decentralization, which have been enacted since 1949,
were undertaken in the relative security of national budgetary
3 6
guarantees, and the possibility of a "new form of warlordism"
emerging would, therefore, sean rather remote.
35. For comment on municipal finance, refer to the preamble of 
"Decision on the Further Regulation of Municipal Finance", dated 
March 31st 1951, in SCMP, No.91, April 4-5 1951, p.18, from NCNA, 
Peking, April 4th 1951.
36. William Whitson’s field army hypothesis presumes the emergence of 
a new form of warlordism. See William Whitson, "The Field Army in 
Chinese Communist Politics", in CQ, No.37, January-March 1969, pp.1-30.
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ThiSp of course, is not to deny that there were tensions 
in the centre*s relation to local levels of administration. In 
discussing "regionalism'1;, one can note a dynamic in this relation, 
perhaps best expressed in the CCP*s term, "ti~pen chu-i" 
(departmentalism, or localism). Cultural or historical factors 
may render this dynamic more explicit, but are not necessarily to 
be viewed as the basic causes of "departmentalism"0 Local diss­
atisfaction over resource allocation, or local enthusiasm as 
expressed in "prosperity on all fronts" need not be taken as
signs of ill health in the body politic, nor can one assume that
lobbying for greater resource allocation by local authorities 
respresents a politically conscious challenge to the centre.
There were undoubtedly occasions when the part did not act 
after a fashion consistent with the interests of the whole, but
one must ask (a) whether or not such action is to be viewed and
accepted as a challenge to or denial of the integrity of the nation' 
stateD and (b) does the centre have the institutional capability to 
insure the implementation of its decisions? In the terms of this 
line of questioning, it \tfould seem that in the early 1950*8 the CCP 
leadership did lay a solid foundation upon which to build the new 
political and economic superstructure of the People*s Republic.
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IV
iii) GAR Administration and the Restoration of the Interflow of 
Urban-rural Trade
'Hie restoration and development of urban-rural trade inter­
flow was vital to the programme of economic rehabilitation as a 
whole. In the hard years- of the M3-Alls" and the KM^’s economic 
blockade, the CCP had come to appreciate the virtues of self- 
reliance. One might not surprisingly see a parallel between 
border region autarchy in 1941 and national autarchy in 1950.
Indeed, some of the major perspectives, which underlined trade 
policy in the early 1950’s, had already been developed in Mao’s 
December 1942 treatise, ’’Economic and Financial Problems".
In his treatise, Mao emphasized the importance of the 359th
1
Brigade Army-People Co-operative in supply and purchasing. This 
early model of trading organization had been formed in 1937 when 
T aiyuan fell into enemy hands and merchants fled panic-stricken.
At that time, goods from the city could not move into the country­
side, nor could native products move outwards to the city, and 
there were consequent shortages of daily necessities. While the 
emphasis on the unity of people and army was maintained in this 
early period, in the course of the transition from border region to 
national level organization this perspective did present difficul­
ties in that the continued involvement of the PLA in trading after 
the formation of the People’s Republic exacerbated the relation 
between state and private commerce and thus militated against new 
democratic economic policy.
The crucial perspective of the Yenan years was self-reliance.
In the context of the "3-Alls" and KMT economic blockade, the CCP's
policy emphasis was "sell native produce and boycott foreign 
2
goods" (t'ui-hsiao t*u-chan. ti-chih wai-huo). Mao emphasized 
selling goods made in the border regions and buying goods made in 
the border regions. Despite the change in the centre of gravity
!• Mao Tse-tung, "Ching-chi wCn-t ’i vii ts’ai-cheng wen-t ’i"
(Economic and financial problems) in Mo TalcutG shu (Tokyo 
1971), Vol.8, p.301.
2. Ibid., p.303.
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of Party work and the new focus on the city, despite "leaning 
to one side", trade policy in 1950 dramatized the importance of' 
expanding domestic markets for native and special products.
Mao and Chou returned from Moscow on March 4th 1950, in the 
certain knowledge that "leaning to one side" would not provide 
the answer to China’s economic problems. Undoubtedly, the Chinese 
leadership had cause to reflect on the dollars-and-cents value 
of fraternal comradeship in revolution, for the Sino-Soviet 
agreement on a loan to China provided US$3Q0,000,000 in credits, 
which was a mere $50,000,000 more than what had been extended to 
Chiang Kai-shek in 1938-39.^
In his "May Day Address" of 1950, Liu Shao-ch’i called on 
"countrymen of all circles" "to clench their teeth", and he spoke
4
of China*s industry becoming independent of imperialism. Chinese 
industry was to be supplied with Chinese raw materials. During 
1950 much greater stress was placed on domestic as opposed to 
external trade policy, and government administration actively sought 
to find more home markets for Chinese goods. The theme of self- 
reliance became even more crucial in the context of the blockade of 
coastal ports, and in policy terms domestic markets for local produce 
were considered primary while foreign markets were considered 
secondary.
3. There are many reasons for suggesting that even in the early 1950's
Sino-Soviet "friendship" was not what it seemed to be. Mao did not
repudiate Stalin; he said Stalin was 70 per cent right; but Mao 
also said: "When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was -.a
victory of the Tito type, and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure was
very great indeed". See Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Major Relations",
in Peking- Review, No.l, 1977, p.24. Apparently, there was an 
underlying current of tension over Mao’s status as a theoretician 
and the significance of the Chinese Revolution. See Philip Bridgham, 
Arthur Cohen, Leonard Jaffe, "Mao's Road of Development and the Sino- 
Soviet Split, 1953", in CQ, October-December, No.52, pp,67Q-698a
The English texts of the loan agreement together with the Sino-Soviet 
Pact of Alliance and Mutual Aid and the agreements relating to the 
Changchun Railway and the territories of Port Arthur and Dairen can 
be consulted in the Far Eastern Economic Review. Vol. VIII, No .20, 
March 1950, pp.307-308.
4. Liu Shao-ch’i, "May Day Address", p.16.
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The restoration and development of urban-rural interflow 
was important in terms of the supply of raw materials to 
industry, but it was also important in terms of the effort to 
bolster peasant purchasing power. Indeed, the ability of the CPG 
to achieve stable commodity prices and to bolster peasant 
purchasing power was orchestrated in CCP propaganda as notes of 
the regime's legitimacy.
Against the background of the above perspectives and 
emphases, we can further study problems of organization and 
political integration, reviewing in general terms the attempt to 
maximize the principle of "local expediency" and the mutual inter­
relating of different systems through the elaboration of a "dual" 
framework of leadership, but also reviewing more specifically the 
GAR conference system, which was designed to facilitate the 
emphasis on "domestic trade as primary" and the expansion of the 
urban-rural interflow of trade.
In a Jen-min iih-pao article, Yang Po reviewed problems
5
encountered in the unification of national trade. Yang did not 
argue the past success of the formula, "centralized leadership and 
decentralized management", and conceded that circumstances during 
the Civil War necessitated an administrative stratagem of "sub-region 
management",(fen-ch'u kuan-li ti fang-chen). In Yang's view, self- 
reliance and self-supply had been the order of the day in the con­
texts of guerilla and mobile warfare, blockade and encirclement;
however, with the liberation of large cities this administrative 
strategem had become a liability and was inconsistent with the new 
concrete conditions. Hie problem of supply had to be viewed at
levels above that of any one region. Fluctuations in commodity
prices in one region adversely affected other regions, and, as has 
already been stressed, the Northeast was for this reason isolated
5. Yang-po, 'Ktranjyu c V u a n -kuo mao-yi kung-tsp t 'ung-i wen-t'i ti 
shang-chip" , (A discussion of problems relating to the unifi­
cation of national trade work), JMJP, February 2nd 1950, p.5.
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from inflationary spirals in China Proper. Yang Po elaborated 
on the problems of trade in a second article, observing 
that past isolationist trade patterns persisted despite the 
advent of new concrete conditions. In fact, after liberation, 
part of Hupen, Shensi, Chahar, Honan and Hunan prevented the 
shipment of goods outward to other areas. Moreover, local 
cadres in Hopei and Pingyuan even prevented goods from moving 
out of their hsien and special districts to neighbouring admini­
strative areaso
Despite criticisms of border region administrative practices, 
the GAC’s decision of March 10th 1950, unifying state trade organ­
ization, nonetheless explicitly reaffirmed the principle of "dual 
leadership". In theory, the GAR trade departments were responsible 
to the dual leadership of the CPG Ministry of Trade and the
7
economic and financial committee of the GAR level. Similarly, 
each of the six trading companies established for domestic trading 
at the GAR level, was responsible to the "dual leadership" of the 
GAR Department of Trade and the respective parent trading company 
at the centre.^
Well-established policies such as "benefit both public and 
private interests" and administrative strategy such as "dual leader­
ship" were obscured by the administrative realities of early 1950. 
During a July 1950 rectification meeting, attended by cadres belong­
ing to the CSMAC economic and finance agencies, the Chairman of the
CSMAC Department of Trade, Tseng C h Tuan~liu reviewed the problem of
9
'dual leadership" at srome length. Indeed, the whole problem had
"Shang-yeh chung ti lcung-fzu kuan-hsi wen-tfi", (Problems of 
public-private relations in commerce), JMJP, June 2nd 1950, 
reproduced in HHYP, Vol.3, N0 .2, pp.602-603.
7. "Kuan-yu t Tung~i chTuan-kuo kuo-ying mao-1 ‘ shih-shih pan-f a ti 
chueh-ting", (Decision on the unification of national state 
trading procedures), HHYP, Vol.l, No06, p.1408.
8. Ibid., Section I, subsection iv.
9 0 Tseng C h ’uan-liu, "Chung-nan ch*u tang-ch*ien ti mao- l ' kung-tso",
(Present trade work in the Central-South), Chang-chiang .jih-pao» 
July 11th 1950, reproduced in HHYP, Vol.2, Nq 06 , pp.1352-1354.
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been exhaustively reviewed during an earlier national conference 
of GAR trade officials, which had resulted in the printing of an 
explanatory manual on the subject. Tseng conceded that in the 
first half of 1950, there had been no genuine exercise of top*-to 
bottom and bottom-to-top planning in Central-South state trading. 
During 1950, planning had been a admittedly top-to-bottom affair.
Tseng discussed the compilation of the 1951 trade plan, 
which was to incorporate more fully a bottom-to-top dimension.
In accordance with national economic conditions, the centre was 
to propose control figures to the GARs, and these figures were 
then to be discussed and supplemented with reference to regional 
conditions and, subsequently, passed from the GAR to the provincial 
level- Provincial authorities were then to convene conferences 
of responsible cadres of special district officers and managers of 
trading companies. Once the provincial governments approved the 
conference plans, they would be forwarded to the GAR level for 
editing, investigation and approval. Upon receipt of GAR plans, 
the centre would then proceed to finalize the national plan.
Tseng emphasized that while regulations prevented the various 
levels of government administrative committees from easily changing 
the regulations of superior level state trading companies, reasons 
of efficient administration dictated that the system have a "dual’' 
element built into it in order to avoid a situation whereby state 
trading companies would act in disregard of local conditions and 
ignore the guidance of local administrative committees.
On May 1st 1950, Liu Shao-ch*i hailed a new situation, 
characterzied by stable prices and approaching budgetary balance. 
Dwelling on an elaborate metaphor, Liu attempted to explain that 
childbirth is inevitably accompanied by labour pains, hence the 
following metaphorical circumlocution:
"At the birth of the new situation some pain and 
hardship might certainly be reduced if all the doctors 
and assistants in the maternity hospital of our People*s 
Government were first-rate and if there were sufficient 
equipment and medicines for midwifery. But unfortunately
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not every doctor and assistant in the hospital is 
first-rate and the equipment and medical preparation 
work are not sufficient. In their various creative 
activities they can only work and study at the same 
time, step by step drawing conclusions from their 
experience and adding to it."-^
There can be no doubt that an across-the-board, heavy- 
handed centralization in early 1950 contributed to a trade 
depression. Indeed, we have already noted that the May 4th 1951 
decision of the GAC concerning the division of power within the 
administrative system, rather explicitly underlined the fact that 
in 1950 problems in local trading had resulted from the failure 
on the part of state trading organization to insure a proper 
balance between ling-tao and chih-tao.
Hie trade depression, which had followed hard upon the new 
regime’s 1950 anti-inflationary policies, was described by the 
CCP leadership as temporary—  the unfortunate side-effects of 
''midwifery'1 associated with the birth of a new economyD Mao and 
Liu ascribed the crisis in urban-oural trade interflow to corrupt 
management, the too rapid release of large quantities of hoarded 
stocks, blind production, which had resulted in gluts. Some 
problems were seen as peculiar to industry and commerce, which
had in the past served imperialist and bureaucratic capital.
11Teng Tzu-hui in his report on the work of the CSMAC and 
similarly Li Yi-chang, in his report in the capacity as Vice- 
Chairman of the CSMAC Economic and Finance Committee, agreed that 
there were temporary factors which had contributed to the disloca­
tion of trade and market stagnation. More specifically, they argued 
that Victory Bond subscription and tax collection, placed a burden 
on the people and resulted in a tightness of the money market.
10. Liu Shao-ch’i, "May Day Address", pp.20-21.
11o Teng Tzu-hui, "Report on the Work of the CSMAC During the Past 
Half Year", C.B., No.39, December 9th 1950, pp.1-8.
20 7
^hey criticized state trading companies for dumping large stocks 
in their efforts to call in currency. Furthermore, state 
trading had proliferated, expanding prematurely into retail 
trading.
Teng also noted that private transport companies had
suffered unfair competition from trucks of military units and
state shipping companies. The continued involvement of military
units in trade in fact contravened central directives. CPG
directives, based on the December 5th 1949 directive of the PRMC,
placed the PLA under strict injunction not to become involved in 
12
trade.
Teng. recommended remedial action which to take the form of 
(l) suspension of bond subscriptions and postponement of tax 
collection for one month; (2) suspension of state retail trading 
(except in the case of daily necessities); (3) a de-emphasis on 
currency recall; (4) increased state processing orders for 
private industry; (5) emphasis on the unity between workers and
13
employers;; (6) relief for unemployed workers and intellectuals.
In compliance with instructions, issued by the CSMAC and
CS Bureau of the CCPCC, the CSMAC Department of Trade promulgated
detailed regulations concerning the adjustment of publie-private
14
relations in trading. The regulations were based on the CCP 
policy of "freedom for domestic trade", (nei-ti mao-i tsu-yu cheng- 
t s 1e ). Previous restrictions, designed to curtail speculation,
12. JMJP, December 6th 1949, p.l. Also see GAC Economics and 
Finance Committee directive regarding the suspension of trading 
by popular organizations and military units in CYTCCTFLHP, 
Series I, Vol.II, p.410. These decisions reflected a trend 
towards greater centralization and the stricter divisions of 
labour between systems in contrast to the Yenen way of doing 
things whereby party and state organizations and military units 
simultaneously engaged in trade.
13. Teng Tzu-hui, C.B., No.39, pp.5-6.
14. "Chu-t'i t Tiao-cheng kung-4su kuan-hsi", (Practical readjustment
of public-private relations), Chang-chiang iih-pao. June 4th 
1950, reproduced in HHYP, Vol.2, No.3, p.604.
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were lifted. The state retail of groin, table salt, petrol and
miscellaneous daily necessities were not to be expanded until
further notice, while state retail of coal, tea and food oils
15
was ordered suspended.
The readjustment of spring 1950, still did not solve the 
basic problem of interflow. Indeed, an investigation in August 
1950, of the Northeast. Trade Department, revealed that plans were
3.6 -
incomplete and inconsistent. The plan for the purchase of live
pigs, for example, did not provide for adequate handling facilities.
Similarly large quantities of eggs were purchased in the absence
of proper storage facilities. "Simple currency recall thought",
(tan-ch’un hui-lung ssu-hsiang), persisted in state administration.
The plan for currency recall was not coordinated with the centre’s
policy demand for "production on all fronts".
Throughout 1951, the GAR governments persisted in their
attempts to restore old markets and develop new ones in line with
17
the centre’s policy of "domestic trade as primary". Reports to 
regional governments continued to note the maladjustment between 
the state and private sectors of trading, which was evident in 
the diminishing differentials between retail and vdiolesale prices, 
and between the prices of areas of production and consumption. A 
Central-South report of April 1051, for example, noted specific
15. The same policies, whereby restrictions were lifted and credit 
facilities advanced in order to revive private commerce, were 
applied in the other GARs. The efforts of the ECMAC are of 
particular interest, as Liu Shao-ch’i acknowledged in his "May 
Day Address" that Shanghai had been hard hit as a result of the 
trade depression. For a detailed account of the attempts of the 
economic and trade departments of the ECMAC to revive the Shanghai 
area, refer to Tseng Shan, "Hua-tung ts1ai-cheng ching~chi kung-tso 
pao-kao", (Report on East China financial and economic work), dated 
March 10th 1951, in CYTCCFLHP, Series I-III, Vol.8, 1952, p.29.
16. "Tung-pei m a o - i' pu chien-ch’a mao-i'. chi-hua", (Northeast. Depart­
ment of Trade reviews trade plan), TPJP, August 11th 1950, HHYP,
Vol.2, N0 .5, p.1091.
17. See HHYP, Vol.3, N0 .5, pp01114-1116 for reports on the January 1950,- 
trade conferencesof the Great Administrative Regions.
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difficulties in the interflow of native produce- Firstly, 
during the course of agrarianreform, there were stoppages of 
rural workshops and small factories. Secondly, a lop-sided 
mass viewpoint suggestive of "benevolent government", had become 
manifest in "high price thought" (lcao-chia ssu-hsiang), whereby 
prices were kept artifically high to the point where the differen­
tials between production and sales area were equalized. Thirdly, 
"control thought", (t Tung-chih ssu-hsiang) . had throttled commer­
cial initiative in lower level markets, as intransigent cadres 
insisted on a fixed number of stores despite increased commercial 
activity.
Teng Tzu-hui, in his November 1951 report on the work of the
CSMAC, spoke in glowing terms of increased interflow, increased
peasant purchasing power, economic and financial unification, long'
term price stability, but he also conceded that certain private
commercial interests had suffered a ^depression in the midst of 
19
prosperity". Furthermore, Teng mentioned in passing that the
Central-South textile industry had ground to a half for one and
20
a half months due to an insufficient supply of cotton.
The problems, which state trading encountered in adjusting 
the market in winter 1951, were fully exposed in the national and 
regional press. Difficulties were especially serious within the 
China Miscellaneous Goods Company, which was the largest wholesale 
and retail supplier of consumer goods. The company's sales of 
October, for instance, only achieved 78.5 per cent of the planned 
target, which was a particularly poor performance in consideration
18. Li I-ching, "Kuan-yu chung-nan ts * ai-cheng ching-chi wei-yiian hui kung- 
tso ti Pao-kao"» (Report on the work of the Central-South Economic and 
Finance Committee), April 10th 1951, CYTCCTFLHP, Series I-III, Vol.8, 
1952, p.43.
19. Teng Tzu-hui, "The Situation in the Central-South Region", November, 
1951, in C.B., N0.157, February 8th 1952, p.18.
Ibid.. p.27. This dislocation would certainly suggest that the centre's 
planned Co-ordination of the supply of cotton between the North east 
East China, Northwest, and Central-South China had failed. Tseng Shan 
mentioned this plan in hxs March 20th 1951, report:.
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of the fact that October was normally a month of brisk sales 
activities.,
The East China branch achieved 72.31 per cent of projected
sales, whereas the Central-South and South-west branches respect-
21
ively achieved 64.02 per cent and 68.36 per cent. There was an 
alarming trend, manifest in heavy purchasing and light selling, 
which was leading to good mountains. Leading cadres were criticised 
for their conversatism. Their fears that selling would result in 
the running down of stocks were pooh-poohed as groundless.
The Chieh-fang jih-pao in shanghai placed the following inter­
pretation on events:
"During the past few months certain leading cadres 
in various branches of the General Goods Company in East 
China have upset the plans of supplies of goods and held 
up the turn-over of capital by showing reluctance to sell 
their goodso1,22
The East China branch had, in fact, been ordered to transfer to
other regions 100,000,000,000 yuan worth of goods, which had been
difficult to sell, but East China branch only transferred
36,000,000,000 yuan worth. The Central-South branch complained of
a sugar shortage, yet the Hunan provincial branch was ascertained to
have had 3,300,000 catties of sugar in stock.
Even in the Northeast, where economic accounting systems had
been introduced as early as 1949, there were serious problems in
state trading. A report released by the Northeast Peoplefs Economic
Planning Committee on April 10th 1952, revealed the following in
relation to the activities of state trading in 1951:
"At a certain period, there developed in state 
trading organs, a conservative thought of restricting 
sales, while efforts to curb speculative trading by 
private merchants in the winter and to effect supplying 
of the market by leadership throughout the year, did 
not produce sufficient results."2^
21. See SCMP, N0 .247, January 3rd 1952, ppo29-30.
22° Ibid.. p o30.
23, See C.B., N0 .177, May 5th 1952, p.6, or JMJP, April 15th 1952.
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With respect to the new regime's trade policy, there were 
several problem areas. In administrative terms, there seemed 
to be mal-co-ordination between different levels of administration 
and systems. In economic and political terms, there was maladjust­
ment between the various sectors of the economy, and we can discern 
a pattern, whereby state trading organization vigorously aggressed 
on private commerce in an attempt to centralize commercial activity, 
only to retreat suddenly in the face of market stagnation and goods 
shortages. It was a two-steps-forward-one-step-back pattern. An 
excessive and premature centralization brought on goods shortages 
as state trading was unable to fill the vacuum left by private 
commerce, hence overcentralization was followed by readjustments 
aimed at the enlivening of basic-level markets and the resuscitation 
of private commerce, which had to be lured back into the countryside.
Administrative disruptions were compounded by low policy 
levels, for as Liu Shao-ch*i had put it, there were "few experienced 
doctors in the maternity wards". Aside from the problems of 
communicating the subtleties of policy emphases, one can perceive 
a dialectical relation between competing organizational emphases.
On the one hand, there were consistent and well articulated 
emphases in 1951 through 1952 on the importance of relating national 
policy to local realities, on the horizontal in government structure, 
on the proper inter-relation of ling-tao and chih-tao. These emphases 
were best expressed the elaboration of urban-rural trade interflow 
conference systems. Despite the express articulation of an admini­
strative approach, which would maximize "local expediency", there 
seems to have been an irrestible tendency within state trading 
companies towards vertical centralization.
In September 1952, Tseng Shan reported on trade work in the
first six months of 1952 to a joint meeting of representatives of
24
tjie ECMAC departments concerned with trade. He systematically
24. Tseng-Shan, "Hua-tung ch'u shang-pan nien c h *eng-hsiang wu-tzu chiao- 
liu kung-tso tsung-chieh", (Summary of city-country interflow of 
goods work), JMJP, September 5th 1952, p.2.
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covered the basic problems in domestic trading, Tseng was 
especially critical of cadres id10 had yet to master the ABCTs of 
government policy. He noted the inability of state trading agencies 
to cope with seasonal variations. He urged cadres to transform a 
dispersed free-wheeling market into a relatively controlled market, 
but reiterated that the key to trade policy was Article 37 of the 
Common Programme, which guaranteed protection for all legitimate 
public and private interests in trade. "Freedom of domestic trade" 
was upheld, but it was to be freedom within the context of the 
unified state economic plan, and it was this aspect which separated 
new democracy from capitalism.
Tseng harangued those cadres who had failed to appreciate the 
positive contribution which private commerce could make to new 
democratic economic construction, but he also criticized other 
cadres for their flexibility to the point of corruption in their 
dealings with private traders.
Tseng spoke at length on the importance of correctly 
conducting conferences for the urban-rural interflow of trade. It 
should be stressed that in each of the GARs a conference system 
had been worked out in order to, on the one hand, exploit local 
creativity, initiative and expediency, and on the other to promote 
intra-provincial, inter-provincial and inter- and intra-GAR inter­
flow of goods. The problems involved were formidable, for even in 
an overwhelmingly "old liberated area" such as North China, trade 
in native produce was localized, limited to provincial boundaries 
at best, and often even to special districts and hsien.
The GAR interflow conference system reflected the ecctension of 
united front organization into state administration, as it acted as 
a major forum for the inter-reaction of the representatives of state 
trading companies, private trading companies and supply and marketing 
co-operatives. The conference system incorporated two primary 
aspects. Firstly, the system had a function in terms of information,
213
discussion and education; for example, within these parameters,
delegates might exchange experience, discuss the ways in which to
implement policy, adjust freight charges, establish credit arrange-
25
ments and simplify tax manuals. Such resolutions would then be 
passed on to the MAC for approval, hence the conducting of native 
products conferences (t^u*-ch^an hui-i) was actually an exercise in 
government. Secondly, either within the same overall structure, or 
contemporaneously within a more discrete structure of the "native 
product exhibition and interflow meeting", (t*u-chfan chan-lan 
chiao-liu ta-hui) active trading was sponsored.
In his September 1952, discussion, Tseng particularly stressed 
the importance of the conference system in the following terms:
"The urban-rural interflow of trade conference is 
the best way of bringing forth the positive aspect of 
private commerce under the leadership of the state 
economy, and is a form which favours new democratic 
commercial and industrial activity. It is the vital 
link, which brings together production and consumption, 
by which we can not only solve seasonal trading diffi­
culties, but enliven the market. Moreover, it has its 
uses in terms of a penetrating guidance of production 
and the guaranteeing of planned p r o d u c t i o n . "26
The system of conferences described by Tseng, was consistent
with a dual state structure, which placed a premium on horizontal
inter-departmental co-ordination and co-operation. Tseng pointed
to the mistakes of the past, warning cadres against blindly convening
such conferences, imposing formalistic ways of doing things without
reference to specific conditions and acting in a commandist fashion.
Judging by the -thematic thrust of his speech, Tseng was
concerned with emphases, similar to those which Mao had earlier
explored in "Economic and Financial Problems" —  emphases, which
derived from an appreciation of China's vastness and the need to
25. For example, see Tseng Shan, "Hua-tung t'u-chan hui-i ch*u-pu ' 
tsung-chieh" , (Introductory summing-up of the East China native 
products conference), in HHYP, Vol.4, No.3, June 30th 1951, p.866.
26. Tseng Shan, JMJP, September 5th 1952, p.2.
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insure the flexible implementation of the centre*s policy in the
27
light of differing regional conditions. Indeed, these emphases 
were consistent with the re-emphasis on administrative democratic 
centralism which characterized the policies of 1951.
Tseng urged the assembled cadres to see in the conference 
system the means by which they could study regional differentials 
and wholesale and retail differentials. The trade conferences 
were to provide the opportunity for cadre assimilation of specifi­
cally local social and economic conditions, and on the basis of the 
information, thus gleaned, deficiencies in the implementation of 
government policy would be corrected and the correct methods of 
market control established.
In the course of his remarks, Tseng described a hierarchy of 
conferences, distinguishing between higher level, intermediate 
and basic level conferences. At the apex of the hierarchy stood 
the East China Conference of Urban-Rural Trade Interflow, (Hua-tung 
ch*u ch*eng-hsiang wu-tzu chiao-liu ta-liui). Due to the large 
volume of goods involved, this level had a particularly significant 
impact on production and consumption. At this level, the state 
trading companies were the key organizational links, bringing 
together representatives of supply and marketing co-operatives and 
prominent industrialists and merchants.
One might note that the conference system was only part of 
a larger scheme of "dual'1 administration, and that "unified Party 
leadership" was another part of this scheme. The Party, which had 
always viewed production matters- as its special prerogative, became 
involved in interflow organization: for example, in the latter
half of 1952, the Urban-Rural Goods Interflow Committee of the 
East China Bureau held weekly sessions, bringing together Party
27. See discussion in Chapter Two relating to agricultural policy in 
the Shan-Kan-Ning Border Region. Mao stressed regional and 
seasonal differences and the importance of flexibility. Ultimately, 
the formula, "centralized leadership and decentralized management" 
derived from such a perspective.
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members from grade-one administrative machinery, such as GAR 
economic and finance committees, trade departments, co-operative 
organizations, etc., in order to foster inter-departmental 
co-ordination.
The middle-level conferences, which focused on intraprovincial 
and municipal trade, were similar in principle to the GAR confer­
ence, but of course the area and volume of transactions were 
smaller, and the level of management was not as concentrated. The 
basic or primary level was to take the wholesale and retail 
activities of the masses as primary. At this level, the co-opera- 
tives were to exercise leadership and the state trading companies, 
time and proximity permitting, would send representatives to buy 
and sell. Supply and marketing co-operatives were urged to 
establish leadership over the traditional "mule and horse markets" 
(lo-ma ta-hui)« the "herbs abd medicines markets" (yao-ts'ai ta-hui) 
and other fairs.
Despite the elaboration of a system of trade conferences 
problems in state trading persisted and another major readjustment 
of commerce was attempted in late 1952. A political fact, namely, 
the Five-Antis, had intervened to tr4p the delicate balance between 
centralized market control and the "freedom of domestic trade". 
Despite the Party's repeated reaffirmations of new democracy, it 
would seem that the effect of the Five-Antis was an aggression on 
the part of popular organization and state trading companies on the 
private commercial sector, which resulted in a trade depression and 
the disruption of urban-rural trade interflow.
Private merchants fared badly under Mao's scheme for the sorting 
out of the targets of the Five-Antis Campaign. The fivefold cate­
gorization of business firms, wbich was first applied in Peking under 
the leadership and Peng Chen and later adopted by the GAC as the 
unified standard for the whole country, were based on various
28. NCNA, Shanghai, August 4th 1952, available in SCMP, No.400, 
August 22-23rd 1952, p.23.
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principles of Mao, including "leniency for industrialists,
severity for merchants", and "leniency for ordinary merchants
29
and severity for speculators".
Problems in the pattern of domestic trading were already 
quite evident in August 1952. The Director of Planning of the 
Central-South Urban-Rural Trade Interflow Conference, Chou Fung- 
fu, then offered a diagnosis, stressing blindness in market 
control due to the lack of experience in planning and erroneous 
business practices. The imbalance in the relation between state 
and private commerce was evident in terms of the sale of popular 
goods. Chou claimed that private commerce wanted spot goods 
while offering only forward goods. Private commerce was criticized 
for its apathy and its exclusive interest in popular brands of goods. 
And during the Central-South trade conference private traders were 
more interested in buying than selling in contradiction to the 
state trading companies, which focused on selling as opposed to pur­
chasing. The conference ultimately adopted a compromise, whereby
lots of popular goods were offered for sale along with lots of less 
30
saleable goods. Subsequently, during the Central-South trade 
conference of November 17th to December 6th 1952, the state trading 
departments filliped private commerce by adjusting the prices of 
140 different commodities, including cotton, tea, daily necessities, 
petrol, coal, etc., and in the fiften days at Canton 2,900,000,000,000
tt 31
yuan worth of business was transacted.
29. See C.B., No.168, March 26th 1952, for "Standards and Measures
Set by the Peking Municipal People's Government for Dealing with 
Industrial and Commercial Establishments Classified into Various 
Categories in the 5-Anti Movement". Mao commented on these 
particular principles on March 5th. See Mao Tse-tung, Mao Tse- 
tung hsuan-chi, Vol.5, Peking, 1977, p.5. For further comment 
refer to V, iv, p. 32.7.
30. Chang-chiang jih-paoo Hankow, August 4th 1952, available in SCMP,
No.400, August 22-23rd 1952, pp.28-29
31. JMJP, December 14th 1952, p.2. 23.48 per cent of total business
transacted was on a cash basis.
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During the winter of 1952, the various GAR interflow 
conferences stressed the importance of organizing the basic-level 
markets. The state trading organization came in for heavy 
criticism for what w a s -'in fact a premature and misguided central­
ism at ion.
Ma Ming-fang, Vice-Chairman of the NWMAC, in his report to 
the sixth session of the NWMAC criticized the operations of state 
trading companies, noting that they had failed to give guidance to 
the peasants in production, had failed to supply the peasants with
daily necessities and had failed to secure the co-operation of!
32
private commerce. He cited as an example state trading efforts 
to fix the prices of cow and sheep hides and furs in order to 
adjust supply and stablize market prices. State trading adopted 
a very restrictive attitude and chased private commerce out of the 
market with the result that there was a cramp in the supply of hides 
to the handicraft industry and a stoppage of work.
Even more disconcerting were reports of difficulties in basic-
33
level markets in the "old liberated areas" of North China. While 
there was some satisfaction expressed at the fact that 400 basic- 
level interflow conferences had been concluded in North China hsien 
and market towns, it was then admitted that cadres in some areas had 
misconstrued the nature of interflow conferences and had regarded 
the participation of private commerce as of no consequence. The 
same cadres had failed to co-ordinate higher and lower level inter­
flow conferences, and as a result of their inadequate understanding 
of local economic conditions and mass purchasing power, their sales 
plans failed to meet demand.
During the North China Economic and Finance Conference, con­
vened by the North China Administrative Committee in late October
32. Ma Ming-fang, "Kuan-ytl hsi-pQ.i ch1!] t ^ ao-chang shang-veh wen-t1 i ti 
pao-kao" (Report on problems relating to the readjustment of commerce 
in the North-west), JMJP, December 2lst 1952, p.2.
33. "Hua-pe1 ch*u jo-kan ch*u-chi shih-ch,ang wei-shemma mei-vu ch*ung- 
fen huo-yueh ch* a.-lai" (Why is it that several basic-level markets
in Morth China have not been enlivened?), JMJP, December 19th 1952, p.2.
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1952, the decision was taken to activate basic-level markets
through the creation of price adjustment committees, which were
to bring together members of economic departments, co-operatives
and private traders from various districts for consultation on
34
ways to insure reasonable price differentials.
In December of 1952, the GAC announced a decision for the 
readjustment of commerce. Pricing was to be based on consideration 
of the three factors, transport, production and sales costs. The 
differentials between regions and between wholesale and retail 
were to be maintained at reasonable levels.
Even before the decision had been announced, the GAR inter­
flow conferences had adopted such principles to revive basic-level 
markets. Previously in mid-November, the CSMAC had promulgated
"Six Measures for the Enlivening of the Basic-Level Markets in
35
the Central-South Region". In line with the effort to promote 
greater interflow through freer trade, these measures removed 
restrictions on private merchants, abolishing transport permits 
and purchasing certificates, and eliminated restrictions on 
quantities-handled by private traders. It has already been 
suggested that part of the trade interflow problem could be traced 
to a premature and misguided over-centralization of the market, 
and the Central-South measures were particularly instructive on 
this point. Cadres of state-owned stores and co-operatives were 
verbally chastized for assuming administrative authority over 
industry and trade. They were reminded that they had no legal 
right to examine documents relating to purchases by merchants.
They were especially warned not to restrict free purchasing and 
sales by the peasants, themselves. In fact, Tseng C h ’uan-liu, 
Director of the Central-South Department of Trade, revealed that
34o See SCMP, N0.456, November 20th 1952, p.12.
35. See C.B., No.232, March 1st 1953, pp.1-9, for a translation of 
these measures.
219
not only state trading companies, but co-operatives, peasant 
associations and peoplefs militia had usurped the authority 
of government administrative departments, and attempted to 
control the market and restrict private trading* What had 
happened was that state trading companies and supply and 
marketing co-operatives had imposed misguided controls on the 
market.
Hie principle of "local expediency" often fell by the way­
side as the state trading companies attempted to assert control 
over private commerce and acted in a way such as to reduce regional 
and wholesale-retail differentials. GAR leaders, however, did 
attempt to right the balance between ling-tao and chih-tao, and . 
"local expediency" was highlighted within the structural context 
of the urban-rural trade interflow conference system.
Emphases on inter-system co-ordination, "dual leadership" 
and "local expediency", fluctuated to a certain degree in relation 
to the problems of socialization of trade and commerce. Organi­
zational development was heady and erratic. At one point, the state 
economy would be emphasized as the leading factor, and the whole 
administrative structure would lurch forward two steps, but the 
resultant cost in terms of trade depression often forced a measured 
step backward and an expedient revitalization of private commerce.
It is not surprising that while from within the interflow confer­
ence structure the leadership emphasized united front postures and 
the importance of adapting policy to local conditions, the state 
trading companies pursued an active policy of self-aggrandizement 
in a manner quite inconsistent with "dual leadership" and "local 
expediency".
36. Tseng Ch'uan-lit^"Strengthen the Leadership at the Basic Level,
Promote Further Interflow of Urban-Rural Supplies", C.B., No.232, 
March 1st 1953, p.7.
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IV
iv) Taking the State Plan as Law
The 1951 emphases on "local expediency" and the local
capitalization of local industry and the relative devolution
of fiscal and economic powers were conceived in the context
of a very sober recognition on the part of the CCP leadership
as to the immediate possibilities for economic development in
China. Indeed, Chou En-lai in the September 30th 1950, meeting
of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference warned of a lack of capital to develop
industry. In his view a complete understanding of China's economic
situation had yet to be achieved. He stressed that the 1951
budgetary allocations for economic construction would not be
impressive; he predicted economic rehabilitation would take
X
another three to five years.
Various factors such as the difficulties in the negotiations 
with fraternal comrades in Moscow over credit facilities, th6 
poor levels of investment in equipment, the blockade of coastal 
cities led to a vigorous assertion of earlier themes of self- 
reliance, production increase and economy and "crack troops and 
simple administration". Indeed, we already have in 1951, the 
general outline of that rationality, which achieved its greatest 
practical expression in "walking on two legs" in 1958. The 
tendency to see in the creativity and will of the masses an answer 
to the problems, caused by a lack of technology was already there 
in 1951.
One can readily appreciate that themes, which had been 
appropriate in the context of border region autarchy in the early 
1940’s were to a very real extent still appropriate in the 
conditions of national autarchy in the early 1950's. The Yenan
1. See Chou En-lai, "Fight for the Consolidation and Development
of the Chinese People's Victory". C.B., No.12, October 5th 1950.
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administrative principle, "centralized leadership and decentra­
lized management", for example, originated with perspectives on 
military command and organization. Guerilla units had based 
their operations on local resources, but they sustained military 
operations at the higher levels of mobile and positional warfare.
A similar perspective was later exploited in a time of peace in 
relation to industrial organization and strategy.. The beginnings 
of an industrial strategy were already explicit in Mao's December 
1942, treatise, "Economic and Financial Problem"; for example, 
note the following commentary on "big" and "small" enterprises:
"Our principle is "Centralized leadership and decent­
ralized management". Not only does it apply to industry 
but to agriculture and commerce as well.
Thus we make a twofold distinction in terms of state- 
operated agriculture, industry and commerce. There is 
large and small [enterprise]] . Large enterprise is to be 
centralized whereas small enterprise is dispersed; for 
example, if we take the food consumption of one or several 
units together, in order to overcome daily insufficiencies 
of food and clothing and the problems of administrative 
finance, these units can plant vegetables, raise pigs, cut 
wood, burn charcoal and engage in various other agricultural 
activities; they can make shoes, sew clothing, they can do 
milling and other type of handicrafts. To meet targets of 
consumption, to make a small profit and defray public 
expenditure, they can engage in co-operatiVes and small- 
shop commerce. In all these activities we must have 
"decentralized management". We must move forward in all 
places, and expand in all places. It is evident that all 
this activity cannot be centralized. This is one type of 
enterprise, but there is yet another; for example, to meet 
the specific food requirements of a whole army brigade 
or corps we would proceed with a great agricultural plan, 
in effect a plan for the military colonization of land 
j[t'un-t'ien chi-huaj. In order to meet the vegetable needs 
of many units or organization, we have to have control over 
large fields; to insure the clothing needs and everyday 
necessities of whole brigades, corps and many units of 
state organization there must be control over large work­
shops and factories; to meet the operating expenditures of 
entire brigades, corps and many units of state organiza­
tion there must be control over large commercial under­
takings. In all these activities, there must be unified 
planning, unified control and strict economy of expenditure. 
We cannot have the various units simply doing as they please; 
their activities must be kept in order down to the slightest 
detail."2
2o Mao Tse-tung, "Ching-chi wen-t * i yu ts'ai-cheng wen-t*i". 
(Hong Kong, 1949), p.103.
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In the later period of economic restoration, capital 
construction was ideally to be planned in accordance with a 
specific strategy whereby the centre would focus its efforts 
on certain key projects, #iile local administration developed 
local industry, using local resources and manpower so as to 
fill in the production gaps, left by centrally^directed industry,, 
This strategy went hand in hand with the philosophy of admini­
stration, outlined by Chou En-lai, in the decisions of ^arch and 
May 1951. Chou then emphasized "centralized leadership and divided 
responsibilities"—  an administrative concept which relates back 
to "centralized leadership and decentralized management". Ibis 
emphasis was to facilitate a decentralization of administrative 
machinery consistent with self-reliance and local expediency.
One notes that Po I-po in 1952 stressed the importance of 
developing light industry producing the means of subsistence and 
means of production, needed by the peasants in the countryside.
The following observation by Po indicates that' he, like Chou and
Mao, recognized the limitations for economic development which 
China*s backwardness imposed, and that economic problems must be 
attacked from different economic vantage points:
"But taking into account the backward industry of
China which for some time cannot possibly turn out machine-
made goods to fully meet the peasants* needs, it is 
necessary to give real consideration to the use and 
development of the handicraft industry. ...Handicraft 
industries abound in Phina, employing large numbers of 
workers, and if properly utilized and developed, may make 
up for the deficiency in the machine industry to a certain 
extent."3
Behind this elementary perspective were ranged the four principles 
of the CPG's policy towards local industry, which had been clearly 
set forth in the GAC's decision, relating to production and con­
struction of state industry in 1951: "Face the villages and solve
the deficiencies of the broad peasantry in materials for daily
3. Po I-po, "Strengthen the Party's Political Work in the Country­
side", C.B., N0 ol61, February 20th 1952, p.18.
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necessities and the means of production"; "local industry is to 
do processing jobs for state enterprises"; "emphasize the use of 
local materials"; and "use local capital and labour in under­
taking small and medium industry and especially in light industry
. . 4
which produces daily necessities".
We have already reviewed the elaboration of the fiscal frame­
work which was to facilitate the renewed emphases on self- 
reliance and local expediency. The March 29th and May 4th GAC 
decisions provided for a division of administrative functions 
and powers between central and local governments in managing 
fiscal and economic work.
The same emphases on self-reliance and local expediency 
were applied in the sphere of municipal finance. The GAR's March 
31st decision on the■regulation of municipal finance laid down 
the following precept:
"Certain necessary expenditures in cities should be 
guaranteed, but with limited state financial resources, 
it is not possible to grant subsidy to the local level, 
and efforts should be made for self-support•" 5
Under this policy emphasis, municipal governments were not simply 
to sit back and wait for subsidies from upper levels of government. 
The decision made it quite clear that subsidies would be forthcoming 
only in relation to absolutely essential projects. The munici­
palities were to organize actively whatever income could be obtained 
locally, and on this basis they were instructed to move away from 
a fiscal preoccupation with defraying expenditure towards con­
struction finance. It was not surprisingly conceded that the 
historical conditions of liberation varied from place to place, 
hence industrial and commercial surtaxes were allowed to range 
anywhere from 10 to 25 per cent, depending on the locality.
4. "Kuan-vii i-chiu-wu-i nien kuo-ying kung-yeh sheng-chan chien-she 
ti chueh-ting", (Decision relating to production and construction 
of state industry in 1951), in HTCCCTC, Vol.II, p.1033. Also refer 
to Carl Risken's remarks in "Small Industry and the Chinese Model of 
Development", C.Gh , No.46, April-June 1971, p.247.
5. "Decision on the Further Regulation of Municipal Finance", dated 
March 31st 1951, translated in SCMP, N0 .91, April 4-5 1051, p.18, 
(from NCNA, Peking April 4th 1951).
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While it has been convenient to construct a chronology,
separating the early period of economic rehabilitation from
the later period of large-scale capital construction, it should
be borne in mind that this is some senses is a heuristic deter-"
mination, and, like most chronologies is subject to qualification.,
One cannot squeeze the different policy emphases of the early 1950*s
into two mutually exclusive chronological settings. The above
perspective on local industry, which had been articulated by
"regional leaders" (more correctly, national leaders with specific
regional responsibilities) such as Po I-po, Ch*en HsiTyun, Liu
Lan-t*ao and Li I-ching did not disappear in the transition to
6
large-scale capital construction.
Thus, if we refer to the First Five Year Plan for an 
authoritative statement on the relation between local industry and 
centrally-directed heavy industry, we might note that the planning 
authorities anticipated a diminution in the value of local indust­
rial output during the life of the plan to the order of a mere 3.3 
per cento Hie emphasis on heavy industry was qualified in the 
following way:
"The planned development of local industries relying on 
the initiative and creativeness of local authorities and 
people is an essential part of our Five Year Plan. Indus­
trial establishments belonging to various sectors of the 
national economy...under local management account, at the 
present time, for a large proportion of the country*s 
industrial output. In 1952, these local industries 
produced goods to a value of 16,090 million yuan. This was
59.6 per cent of the total value of industrial output in 
the country. In 1957 the corresponding figures will be 
30,160 million yuan, or 56.3 per cent."?
6„ For example, see comments on the strategy for local industry by 
C h fen Hsi-yun, "Basic Conditions of Economic and Financial Work 
during the Past Nine Months and the Tasks Ahead", C.B., No.146, 
December 24th 1951, p.21, or see Liu Lan-t^o's comments in his 
directive of March 22nd 1951, "Several Important Work Tasks of the 
North China Region in 1951", CYTCCTFLHP, Series I-III, Vol.8, 1952,
p.11*
7. First Five Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the 
People*s Republic of China in 1953-1957* Foreign Languages Press, 
Peking, 1956, p.97.
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The following rider was added, thus indicating that the planners 
of the CPG were aware that the possibilities for the development 
of heavy industry were limited:
"...in those vast areas which still lack an indus­
trial foundation, we should devise measures suited to 
local conditions to develop local industries and handi­
crafts for the production of manufactured goods to meet 
local or national needs goods which state enterprises 
under the central authorities and older industrial cities 
cannot supply.. In doing this we must place reliance on 
local authorities and consider both local economic 
characteristics and over-all national needs for a 
balanced and co-ordinated industry."8
To a certain extent one can contrast Po I-po*s emphasis with 
that of Kao Kang. in a report, dated May 7th 1952, Kao emphasized:
"We must concentrate our strength in developing our 
heavy industry and national defence industry. We are 
opposed to the theory of so-called Tbalanced development* 
which argues from a partial viewpoint."9
Again in a speech of October 1st 1952, Kao stressed the importance
of heavy industry, reminding assembled comrades that the capitalist
path to industrialization relies on accumulation in light industry
to aid heavy industry while the socialist path was characterized
10
by the emphasis on heavy industry.
One must, however, resist the tendency to accept post-purge
rationalizations, vilifying Kao Kang as Stalin*s protege in the
North-east' . It was in the Northeast, where "one-man management"
was to have made its greatest inroads and where the lion*s share
of above-norm capital construction was located. Indeed, it was
also in the Northeast’, that the art of planning achieved its highest
11
point of development.
8. Ibid.. p.98.
9. Kao Kang, "The 1952 Industrial Plan for Northeast ■ China and Pro­
duction of Extra Wealth", in PeoP.le*s China. No. 12, June 16th 1952, p.7.
10. Kao Kang, "Usher in the New Period of Economic Construction", C.B.,
No.219, p.17 (from JMJP, October 1st 1952).
11. The pages of the Northeast- Department of Industry*s Tung-pei kung-veh.
(Northeast industry), provide a detailed history of planning in the
Northeast. Already in 1949, a composite plan had been drafted for 
Northeast industry, co-ordinating a production plan, detailing resources, 
control figures, productivity and quality standards with plans for trans­
port, distribution, marketing and the investment of capita. See Tung- 
pei kung-yeh, Vol..!, No.l, August 1st 1949, p.6.
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The documentation covering the fourth plenum of the CCPCC 
in February 1954, particularly emphasizes the problem of 
"dispersionism" and the denigration of the "unified leadership 
of the Party". Kao Kang was castigated for having violated the 
principle of collective leadership, and one is encouraged to 
assume a long history of attempts on the part of Kao and his 
associates to increase the state's power at the expense of the 
Party in the process of "taking the state plan as law” (kuo-chia 
chi-hua chiu shih fa-lu)
Franz Schurmann, for example, places the Kao-J.ao Affair 
firmly within the context of the Chinese effort in the early 1950*s 
to emulate Soviet experience, and has cast the February 1954 
emphasis • on Party leadership as opposed to "one-man management"
in the following terms;
"One-man management thus can be regarded as a form of 
industrial management which was an essential part of 
branch-type administration. The one-man manager was 
solely responsible to higher-echelon branch agencies.
Moreover, since one-man management was mostly implemented 
in the heavy industrial sector, it contributed to the 
power of the industrial ministries, over which Kao Kang, 
from his entrenched position in Manchuria and in the State 
Planning Commission, was able to exercise great power.
Thus the way to fight Kao Kang, ministerial power, and one- 
man management was by stressing the collective leadership 
role of the Party.
There will be further opportunity to comment on the fact that 
"dispersionism", in terms of the development of capital construction, 
was a general phenomenon, and not exclusively a manifestation of 
"independent kingdomism" in the Northeast..
What was the Party*s position in relation to state admini­
stration of industry prior to Kao*s February, 1954 discomfiture?
In the context of the shift in the centre of gravity of Party work, 
the Northeast. Bureau had acted very early to assert Party control 
evdr industry. In spring 1949, the NEB transferred 1,000 hsien
committee and veteran cadres above the rank of magistrate to
12. Franz Schurmann, 2nd edition, p.271.
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industrial organization. These cadres took up posts as factory 
managers, secretaries of factory Party committees, trade union 
leaders, and between April 1949 and June 1953, their numbers 
increased sixteen-fold. In fact a total of 70,000 cadres were 
transferred.'1'3
Was "taking the state plan as law" perceived as antithetical 
to mass-line politics, and did it necessarily involve the Party's 
retreat before the advance of the state in capital construction?
Since 1949, the campaign to introduce economic accounting systems 
into Northeast. enterprise bad been linked with mass mobilization 
and the setting of production records. The policy emphases, which 
emerged in the GAG decisions of spring 1951, do not suggest a 
simple impulse to emulate Soviet experience. In 1951, the leader­
ship was obviously concerned with horizontal as well as vertical 
co-ordination of different levels and systems of administration.
There was a perceived need to insure an institutional inter­
relation of ling*-.tap and chih-tao- and the stress on inter­
system co-ordination also meant greater emphasis on "unified 
Party leadership".
The Northeast Urban-Rural Work Conference of May 16th - 
June 2nd passed a resolution on Party leadership in state enter­
prise. According to the resolution, the Party had a fivefold 
function in relation to state enterprise, which included the 
"guaranteeing of" (pao-teng) and "supervision of" (chien-tu),
(a) state technical and financial plans; (b) the implementation of 
higher-level Party policies (cheng-ts1e) as well as the implementa­
tion of higher level state and economic department directives and 
decisions, particularly with respect to the introduction of economic 
accounting into enterprise and the implementation of worker insurance 
regulations; (c) the realization of the factory-manager responsibility
13. See "Speedily Assign a Large Number of Cadres to Strengthen the 
Industrial Front", SCMP, No.699, December 2nd 1953, p.2, from 
NCNA, Peking, November 22nd 1953.
22$
system and the democratization of management; (d) the cultivation 
of cadres and the distribution of personnel, insuring the correct 
implementation of policy relating to management and technical 
staff and the investigation of counter-revolutionaries in enter­
prise; (e) the handling of violations of law and discipline and 
14
policy. The Party*s role was stressed in terms of the leadership 
of political thought and the uniting of political and economic work. 
In his speech to the conference, Kao Kang stressed Party leadership, 
noting that in the past local Party and administrative organs had 
regarded the production status of state enterprises as the respons­
ibility of superior economic organs and had tended to shirk their 
responsibilities. Kao was critical of cadres in certain state 
enterprises, who had emphasized leadership of superior levels, and 
who had failed to respect the opinions of local Party leadership 
organs and the orders of local governments.
The Three- and Five-Antis mass campaigns were first launched
in the Northeast, under the leadership of the first secretary of
the NEB, Kao Kang, in November 1952, the Jen-min jih^pao
eulogized the virtues of the NEPG Department of Industry for the
fine way in which the department had organized the study of theory
15
for senior-level cadres in the last three years. The department's 
study group was commended especially for its success in overcoming 
the tendency to neglect politics in production. The department 
had eradicated "departmentalism" and "routinism", and it was claimed 
theory had been successfully linked to practice.
At that time there was an emphasis on "unified Party leader­
ship", but this emphasis was not seen in conflict with the "factory 
manager responsibility system" (i.e. one-man management).
"Unified Party leadership" (tang ti t Tung-i ling-tao) was 
developed along familiar lines, and the Jen-min iih-pao editorialized
14. "Chia-chiang cheng-chih kung-tso shih-hsing t*ung-i ling-tao"
(Strengthen political work and realize unified leadership), JMJP, 
July 3rd 1952, p.2 and in SCMP, N0 .138, July 19th 1951, pp.15-17.
15a "Pi-hsu chung-shih kao-chi kan-pu ti li-lun hsuen-hsi" (Must empha­
size theoretical studies of higher-level cadres), JMJP, November 
26th 1952, also in HHYP, N0.12, 1952, p.107.
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on. the importance of the following instruction by Mao in 
"Economic and Financial Problems":
"In a factory, administrative wortp, Party branch work 
and trade union work must be unified under a common 
objective and that is to carry out all possible economies 
(raw materials, tools, and other expenditure) and to\: 
produce as much as possible of the best possible goods, 
and, moreover, to sell these goods as quickly as possible 
under the best possible conditions. These three tasks of 
reducing costs, producing quality goods and the ready 
marketing of goods are equally the responsibilities of 
all three administration, Party branch and trade union 
acting in concetto A work method whereby each carries 
out these three tasks separately is completely wrong... 
on the contrary, it is the responsibility of the Party 
and trade union to insure the fulfilment of the 
production plan."^
In December 1952, the All-China Trade Union Congress passed
a decision to launch a emulation campaign, based on a model
17
factory in the Northeast. This Factory 53 was held up as a 
model in all regions as GAR, provincial and municipal trade union 
organization were instructed to conduct short-term study sessions 
on the way in which the mass line had been successfully applied in 
Factory 53. On the conclusion of study, work corps of seasoned 
cadres were to select one or two factories of key-points for 
developing Factory 53-type experience.
Liu Shih-hua, secretary of the Factory 53 Party Committee 
reported to the Basic-Level Work Conference of the All-China 
Trade Union Congress in December, 1952. He discussed inter-system 
relations, particularly with respect to the "factory-manager 
responsibility system". Commenting on the May 1951 decision of 
the NEB, which had set forth the concept, Liu criticized any 
tendency to view this system of responsibility as incompatible 
with the Party’s "unified leadership":
16. JMJP, December 28th 1952, reproduced in HHYP, N0.l, 1953, p.26.
17. See JMJP, December 24th 1952.
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"...the factory manager responsibility system is 
the policy and administrative strategy of the Party 
in enterprise. The factory’s Party committee must 
strictly and unequivocally guarantee its practical 
realization. How do we insure that the factory 
manager responsibility system is implemented? We 
must emphasize the strengthening of political thought 
leadership and employ the methods of combining 
political and economic w o r k . "18
Liu’s reasoning was consistent with the notion of "unified
leadership" as set forth in Mao’s "Economic and Financial
Problems". Although the Party was not to supplant the state
and was not to interfere with everyday operations, the Party
had prerogatives of "after-the-fact investigation" (chien-ch* a)
19
and "before-the-fact control" (chien-tu). Liu defined the 
relation between the Party’s leadership function atad the factory 
manager's responsibilities in terms of the drafting of the plans 
as follows:
"Prior to the establishment of the periodic 
(annual, quarterly, monthly) Party plan, the factory 
manager will report either to the Party Committee or 
its Standing Committee on production tasks, admini­
strative needs and problems in work, and the Party will 
then in terms of higher level directives and the con­
crete conditions of the specific factory organize study 
and discussion, unifying "fulfil-the-state-plan 
thought", clarifying key points and strengthening the 
methods whereby quotas are to be fulfilled and over­
fulfilled. The factory manager will subsequently 
submit plans to the factory management committee for 
discussion and further solicit o p i n i o n s ."20
One might draw attention to the fact that in February-March
1954, Kao Kang did not stand accused of having perpetrated the
"factory-manager responsibility system". An editorial in the
18. Liu Shih-hua, "Wu-san kung-ch’ang tang ti chieh-shap", 
(Introduction to the Party of Factory 53), Kung-jen iih-pao,' 
December 27th 1952, in HHYP, No.l, 1953, pp.29-36, here.p.35.
19. Franz Schurmann carefully draws the distinction between "chien- 
c h ’a" and "chien-tu". See his second edition, p.332.
20. Liu Shih-hua, op.cit., p.35.
231
Jen-min jih-pao on February 16th 1954, emphasized that this 
system was consistent with Unified Party leadership'1; the 
following statement clarifies the point:
"It must be emphasized that while stressing 
unified leadership of the Party we do not lose 
sight of the importance of a division of labour 
and responsibility under unified leadership.
...The superintendant responsibility system 
introduced in state factories and mines, for 
instance, is required by the very production 
process of modern industry. ...It is associated 
with democratization of management.... It does 
not contradict the collective leadership of Party ^
Committees in Party organizations in enterprises."
Kao was criticized for attempting to represent himself as the
leader of the "revolutionary base areas", and he was criticized
for having engaged in "unprincipled struggle" and for having
violated basic principles of Party life, but there is no suggestion
that he reduced the Party's role in state enterprise. It Is,
therefore, questionable whether Kao can be said to have championed
a Stalinist line, which favoured verticle branch-style admini-
22
stration at the expense of the Party's role in state enterprise.
In the light of the preceding discussion on planning and 
■ industrial strategy, we can move on to discuss the early attempts 
to plan economic construction, particularly reviewing the inter­
relation of different levels and systems of administration and 
the implementation of plans for construction and production,,
21. Hsu Pang-i, "Kuan-ch1e tsung lien-chien pi-hsu chien-chih tang ti
t'ung ling-tao ti yuan-tse". (We must vigorously grasp the principle 
of the Party's unified leadership to thoroughly implement the 
general line), JMJP, February 16th 1954, reproduced in HHYP, No.3, 
1954 and available in SCMP, No.775, March 26th 1954, p.14.
22. See William Biugger, " 'Democrat is ation* and 'Enterprisation* in 
the Chinese Industrial Enterprise - A Socio-Political Perspective", 
University of London PhD thesis, November 1971, p.313.
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From the very beginning the Chinese leadership stressed
its commitment to economic planning. Indeed, this commitment
23
was explicit in the san-p'ing policies of 1950. Despite the 
lack of statistics, despite problems of administrative distance, 
despite the problems of new democracy and the reconciliation 
of the five different sectors of the economy, despite the 
extreme unevenness in the introduction of modern business 
practices into government departments and enterprise, the centre 
planned.
In the years of economic restoration, there was no single 
composite national plan, but there were the many plans of specific 
CPG ministries as well as those of the Economic and Finance 
Committees of the GARs. Planning often lost its guilding role 
and often appeared as an after-the-fact collation of statistics. 
Often the planning process was disrupted by the late submission 
of regional plans and the late drafting of national plans. 
Ministries frequently failed to achieve targets in the first and 
second quarters and as a consequence had to do shock work in the 
last quarters.
During economic restoration, there was a tendency to devolve 
planning responsibilities to the GAR level. Although the Organic 
Regulations of the GAR People's Governments did not specifically 
include economic planning as a prerogative of the GAR governments, 
this devolution was rationalized in terms of the unevenness of 
economic integration.
23. There was even speculation in October 1950 that the Chinese 
would attempt a five-year plan for 1951-55. See S.B. Thomas' 
comments to Lucknow Conference of 1950, convened by the 
Secretariat of the Institute of Pacific Relations. S.B. Thomas, 
"Recent Political and Economic Developments in China", 
Secretariat Paper No.9, p.70.
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Together with the CFG ministries involved, the GAR
departments of industry drafted production and cost and labour
plans in accordance with GAC Economic and Finance Committee 
24
control figures. The production and capital construction
plans for local industry, not included in the centre’s plans for
25
local industry, were the special charge of the GAR level.
In the spring of 1951, Chou En-lai called for a greater 
division of administrative responsibility so that the over-burdened 
central authorities could concentrate on key projects. The circum­
scribing of the planning competence of the CPG Ministry of bight 
Industry reflects lessons, learned in 1950, and the new organiza­
tional emphases of 1951. The Ministry’s plans for match and paper 
production in 1950 ended in a fiasco. The 1950 match production 
plan had been drafted with the intention of limiting production so 
as to bring production in line with failing marketing conditions, 
but over the year many localities increased production without 
authorization, and the consequence was a mountain of matches at 
the year’s e n d . ^
The plan to increase paper production also ran awry, 
particularly as the cessation of foreign imports and the increase 
in demand, which materialized with the economic upswing in the 
latter half of 1950, exacerbated an existing paper shortage.
As for the Ministry’s 1951 plans, in the absence of adequate 
statistics as to production and marketing conditions, central 
planners felt compelled to abandon a comprehensive plan and focused 
on four local industries, paper, rubber, matches and medical supplies. 
As a result of a series of national conferences on local industry in 
1950, some statistics had been collated, and these four industries 
were credited with national significance. But except for the
24. See Section One of the decision in HTCCCTC, Vol.II, pp.1032-33.
25o See Section Three of the decision
26. CPG Ministry of Light Industry, "Tui ko-ti ching kung-yeh pien-
chih i-chiu-wu-i nien sheng-chan chi-hua ti piao-shih". (Directive 
regarding the drafting of 1951 plans for light industry production), 
HTCCCTC, Vol.II, pp.1103.
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production of medical supplies the Ministry lost is planning 
initiative. Regional variations were very great, as were admini­
strative distances, hence regional committees and industrial 
departments came to exercise ling-tao in relation to the planning 
of local industry.
To take the paper industry as an example, local public and 
private factories drafted plans in accordance with their partic- 
ular conditions of supply of raw materials, marketing possibilities 
and production capabilities. These factory plans were then 
collated by GAR departments of industry, or in the case of North 
China, by provincial bureaux of industry. Plans were subsequently 
drafted in the Context of regional production conferences, and
copies were forwarded to lower levels and to the Ministry of Light 
27
Industry.
"Centralized leadership and divided responsibilities" also 
meant that the opinions of GAR committees were sought prior to, 
and their agreement obtained subsequent to, decisions made at 
special conferences convened by CPG ministries to co-ordinate 
production plans. "The Provisional Measures on Capital Construc­
tion", promulgated on January 9th 1952, vigorously defined the
division of administrative responsibilities between centre and
28
GARs in relation to capital construction projects.
These measures provided for the setting up of special organs 
to supervise capital construction in the industrial ministries of 
the centre and in the Economic and Finance Committees of the GAR.
In the case of category "A" construction projects, the centre 
exercised a very close degree of control. In this category the 
initial proposals, or statement of plans, came either from the 
CPG ministries oi' the GARs, but responsibility
27. Ibid.. p.1101.
28. See CFJP, January 19th 1952, p.2, for the entire Chinese text.
A paraphrased translation is available in Chao Kuo-chun,
Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China: A Documentary 
Survey (1949-1957). Vol.l, pp.64-68. Complete translation in 
SCMP, No.469, December 10th 1952, pp.18-34.
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for the "preliminary design" (ch*u~pu she-chi) and the 'technical
plan" (chih-shu chi), clearly rested with the centre, and it was
the latter which provided the basis for the final blueprints.
However, in terms of category "B", which like category "A" only
covered above-norm projects, either the GARs, or central ministries
could assume responsibility for the approval of the "technical plan".
But the level of planning decentralization was greatest in
categories "D" and "C", and these two latter categories included
the bulk of local state industry; for example, the GARs bore
responsibility for the control of capital investment and planning
of construction of category "D" and "C" light industry such as
rubber, paper, leather, oil-extraction, flour milling, etc.
The centre's involvement in construction planning varied,
depending on the amount of capital outlay as well as the nature
of construction. Hie third article of the Measures, for example,
distinguished "new construction" (hsin-chien). "reconstruction"
(kai-chien) and "restoration" (hui-fu) The centre's involvement
particularly related to "new construction" in areas of production,
29
where there was no existing foundation upon which to build.
The structure of fiscal support for investment in capital 
construction, as outlined in the Measures was consistent with the 
rationale, outlined in Chou En-lai's March 29th 1951, decision. It 
was specifically stated:
"Financial estimates for capital construction shall 
be prepared and reviewed and the allocation of funds shall 
be according to either of the two administrative systems —  
the CPG (including enterprises entrusted to the care of 
the administrative regions) or administrative regions 
(including local enterprises) —  depending on which ever 
system to which a construction unit belongs."30
Except in the case of "above-norm" construction units, which had
to submit a statement of plans to the relevant CPG ministry for
forwarding to the GAC Economic and Finance Committee, all
29. See SCMP, N0<,469, p.18.
30. See Article 20, SCMP, N0.469, p.24.
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construction units under GAR leadership had to be approved under 
a procedure worked out by the different Economic and Finance
Committees of the various GAR governments.
During the period of economic restoration, the CCP leader­
ship was perennially confronted with a series of planning 
disasters. The shift in the centre of gravity of Party work 
was not easily accomplished as cadres, who had moved from the 
villages into the cities, knew little of the intricacies of 
economic planning. Hiere was often blindness in production due
to the persistence of "supply system thought" (lcung-kei ssu-hsiang).
Problems encountered in the Northeast in 1949 were greatly 
amplified in the "newly liberated areas" in 1950 through 1952. The 
lack of experience in terms of modern business practices and 
planning techniques was evident at all levels of leadership in all 
regions. Hie following editorial comment summarizes the problem 
for us:
"In the bringing forth of the industrial planning 
process from the midst of comrades in enterprise work, 
there is a series of many-sided and enormously difficult 
tasks. New systems must be established; old systems must 
be changed. Hie cadres will have to write various types 
of reports and will have to mobilize the workers and 
organize study. These tasks are completely new to us and 
we have little experience.
Presently, there are those cadres in enterprise work 
who often ask: "What is a plan?" "How do we plan?".
These questions show up the conditions which we are 
talking about."3:*-
These problems were experienced at the highest levels of CPG. 
Po I-po, who, as Minister of Finance from October 1949 to September 
1953, was greatly responsible for the national unification of 
economic and financial work, reviewed the centre's efforts to plan 
the economy during the years of economic restoration. Po did not
31. Chang Kuang-tua, "Kuo-ying ch1i-yeh ching-chi chi-hua ti pien- 
chih kung-tso", (Drafting of the economic plans of state 
enterprise), Chin-pu chih-paoa November 14th 1950, in I-IHYP, 
Vol.3, No.l, p.129.
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play with a metaphorical allusion to "midwifery"; he candidly 
admitted that his own ministry failed in leadership:
"We were short of cadres and had too many things to 
do, things mostly new to us. Consequently, less leader­
ship was given to concrete business of the various 
departments by the Committee of Economic and Financial 
Affairs, leadership work not being broad and deep..*.
Blind initiative in construction projects frequently 
smashed the state budget, yet the Ministry of Finance 
had not devised ways and means of changing this state 
of affairs. Nor has the Ministry of Finance exercised 
proper supervision and taken steps to change such a 
state of affairs as the waste of state funds, excessive 
outlay for non-productive purposes, expansion of 
personnel organization."32
Po did not underestimate the problems in central economic
planning; for example, In July 1951, the Ministry of Heavy
Industry had reported on an investigation of basic construction
under its jurisdiction. It was noted that the lesson of self-
reliance had yet to be learned as "asking for more money to do
more work" had adversely affected leadership thought at all 
33
levels. The GAC Committee of Economic and Financial Affairs in
a directive of August 1952, calling for the strengthening of
planning of capital construction, conceded that the centre was not
in a position to determine figures on productivity increases because
leadership departments had failed to carry out check-ups in a
34
serious, responsible manner in 1951.
A Jen-min jih-pao editorial attempted to justify the weakness 
in capital construction work over the last three years by drawing 
attention to the fact that the centre had been distracted by agrarian 
reform, the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries and ResiSt-US- Aid- 
Korea Campaigns, and in the economic terms the restoration of
32. See SCMP, N0 .492, January 15th 1953, p.5.
33. "Report of the Ministry of Heavy Industry on Inspection of 
Basic Construction Work of the Factories and Mines Directly 
under the Ministry", C.B. , N0o119, October 1st 1951, po7, 
from JMJP, July 28th 1951.
34. See SCMP, N0 .155, August 16th 1952, pp.11-16, from NCNA, 
Peking, August 14th 1951.
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production had had to be given priority. The paper went on to 
explain that the planning of capital construction had been con­
founded by both leftist and rightist deviations. Leftist 
cadres had taken the confusion in capital construction too 
lightly, had failed to see the difficulties of modern industry, 
simply equating such industry with handicrafts. If the leftists 
did not plan nearly enough, the rightists had overplanned to the 
point of preventing the start of work.
Difficulties in planning were manifest in all regions and
departments. The Northeast. had started early and there was a
heavy concentration of personnel there, hence it is not surprising
that planning was more successful there, but even in the Northeast
performance varied from department to department. In April 1951,
the NEPG People*s Economic Planning Committee reported that
Departments of Forestry and Trade as well as the Bureau of Inland-
Water Navigation did not fulfil their 1951 targets, whereas the
Department of Industry surpassed its 1951 target for total production
by 13.4 per c e n t - ^  In 1951, 80.8 per cent of planned capital
construction was achieved—  a respectable plan fulfilment in
37
comparison with other GARs, or CPG ministries.
By way of contrast, there were serious planning catastrophes 
in East China. Wang Ti-min, director of the ECMAC Economic and 
Finance Committee’s new Capital Construction Office, estimated that 
only 57 per cent of 1951 plans had been consummated. Wang spared 
neither himself, nor his department, and also seemed to be pointing 
his finger upstairs at the ECMAC Economic and Finance Committee 
itself, when he made the following damning statement:
35 * ’'Elk chi-pen chien-she fang tsai shou-vao ti-wei", (Give capital 
construction priority), JMJP, December 17th 1952, p.l, in HHYP,
No.12, 1952, p d 0 o
30c "Official Report on the Carrying Out of the 1951 People's Economic 
Plan in the Northeast, C.B., N0.177, May 5th 1952, p 02, from 
JMJP, April 15th 1952.
37o Ibid., p.8.
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"The distribution of investment could only be 
considered individually for different departments 
without calling together the various departments to 
make an overall plan. No fixed standard for comp­
ilation and consideration documentation of planning 
and only plans of a few organization units were con­
sidered and approved by this committee during the 
fourth quarter. The annual plans of construction 
units were placed on record, but were not yet con­
sidered by the East China Finance and Economic 
Committee, while the composite annual plans were 
still not completed towards the close of the year, 
thus in practice loosing their guiding role of
planning."38
In 1952, Wang could no longer plead "lack of fixed 
standards for compilation and consideration of documentation 
of planning", as the GAC Economic and Finance Committee took 
action to rectify the situation, promulgating on January 9th 
1952, "Provisional Regulations for Capital Construction Work".
Yet again in 1952, Wang had to report a various serious disruption 
in the plans for that year. He noted that the unfolding of the 
Three- and Five-Antis Campaigns had delayed the drawing up of plans. 
The composite annual plan for East China was only draim up in July,
and the provincial and municipal plans were reported only in mid-
39
September, whereas plans for industry, for example, should have 
been submitted to the CPG Ministry of Industry in late May.
Wang was excruciatingly frank in his diagnosis of the problems 
in East China planning. Some cadres in charge of planning were 
said to lack experience in large-scale planning. Theyfailed to co­
ordinate supply, production and marketing. Still under the influence 
of "supply thought", they failed to investigate costs and too freely 
asked for funds. One factory, which Wang singled out in his remarks, 
had actually drew up its annual plan in one half hour. Furthermore, 
the failure to acknowledge the distinction between production and 
capital construction funds was alarmingly widespread. Despite the
38. Wang Ti-min, C.B., N0o227, February 1st 1953, p.6.
39. Ibido, p.7.
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obvious lack of trained personnel (dramatically illustrated by 
the fact that there were only three people in the whole of the 
East China Department of Industry, who were engaged in the 
allocation of tens of billions of yuan in 1951), Wang refused to 
accept the rationalization of the basic-level units, which 
claimed that the superior levels had failed to send down adequate 
instructions. Such criticism, he felt, was quite one-sided, 
although he did concede that there was an element of truth in 
the common expression, "socialist target above but broken cart 
pulled by an old ox below".
The 1952 plan was similarly crude, inaccurate and late. 
Departments, provinces and municipalities, such as the East China 
Department of Industry, Anhwei and South Kiangsu requested 
additional items after plans had been submitted. Due to the delay 
in the submission of plans, of forty-five above-norm projects in 
categories "A" and "B" only eight (one in "A" category and seven 
in "B" category) were approved on time. Wang was especially con­
cerned as the planning load of the GAR level had been increased 
with a September 1952, directive of the GAC Economic and Finance 
Committee, which devolved the responsibility for dealing with 
comprehensive annual plans to the GARs.
In the course of the reorganization of state administration 
in November 1952, the centre attempted to reinforce its own 
planning capabilities by absorbing relevant GAR departments more 
directly into its vertical pyramid of administrative command.
Under the reorganization, CPG ministries acquired direct control 
(i*e. ling-tao) particularly over GAR bureaux, involved in 
economic activity and capital construction, although the leading 
committees under the various GAR administrative committees were to 
continue to exercise prerogatives in the more limited terms of 
"supervision" (i.e. "After-the-fact investigation", chien-ch* a) 
and "guidance" (chih-tao). The reorganization had the effect of
24a
downgrading GAR departments to bureau status and to a certain 
extent the emphasis on horizontal co-ordination was reduced as 
a result of the GARs* loss of status as local people*s governments.
Despite the reorganization, the GAR level was not disengaged 
from the sphere of economic planning. In fact, organization at 
the GAR level expanded in terms of the establishment of con­
struction, design and engineering units. Against the background 
of the reorganization, Li Hsien-nien in his report to the first 
plenary session of the new Central-South Administrative Committee 
outlined the responsibilities of GAR administration as follows:
"The Central-South Administrative Committee is the adminis­
trative agent of the Central People*s Government. The 
committee has the responsibilities of direct control 
[ling-tao^ and after-the-fact investigation jT chien-ch1 a| 
with respect to the work of the various leveis of people*s 
governments in the Central-South regions'and also has 
the responsibility to exercise guidance [ chih-tao] and 
before-the-fact investigation [ chien-tu j in relation to 
those organs in the Central-South directly under ministries 
of the Central People8s Government, and moreover the 
committee must take the responsibility of insuring that 
the centre’s policies and strategies are carried out 
correctly and that the national construction plan is 
faithfully implemented. Although the organizational form 
and responsibilities of the committee have been changed 
and although some organs have been transferred to the 
direct control of various central ministries and the 
committee’s relation with the various levels of people’s 
governments is slightly different than it was; neverthe­
less, the responsibilities of the Central-South Admini­
strative Committee have not been lightened."^
40. Li Hsien-nien, "Chung-nan ch’u kuan-ch’e i-chiu-wu-san nien 
san jjen-wu jti chu-t1 i an-p*ai ti pao-kao". (Report on the 
concrete arrangements for the implementation of the three 
great tasks of 1953), February 21st 1953, in HHYP, N0 .4, 
1953, p.73. Kao Kang also pointed out that while the 
decision to reorganize and centralize must be fully imple­
mented, cadres at the GAR level were not to relax their 
efforts. See JMJP, December 4th 1952, p.l.
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Prior to the reorganization, regional bureaux of the CGPCC 
and MAC departments had particular responsibilities in relation
41
to the rational employment and allocation of skilled personnel,
and units of GAR organization continued to operate in the same
functional context after reorganization. The SWAC, for example,
promulgated "Provisional Measures for the Unified Distribution
of Labour Force for Building Construction in the Southwest .
Region". The pattern was similar to that of the 1950 Southwest
Committees for Personnel Registration and Warehouse Inventory and
Clearance. Under the Measures, the SWAC attempted the unified
registration of the labour force, and all capital construction
units had to report their personnel needs to local organizations
for labour distribution. Distribution would then be in accord
with construction priorities, set at higher administrative 
42
levels. Such action reduced inter-departmental warfare over 
the assignment of scarce personnel.
During 1953, there were widespread problems in local industry 
despite the campaign launched by the regional bureaux to expedite 
"unified Party leadership". From the start of 1953, the GARs took 
capital construction as one of their basic tasks and initiated a 
round of conferences, sponsored by the CCPCC regional bureaux and 
the bureaux of the new administrative committees to lead the 
struggle against blind production, "supply thought" and 
conservatism.
41. For example, in July 1952, the JMJP reported that the 
authorities in Northeast, and North China drafted measures 
for the rational redisposition of technical personnel in those 
regions. See SCMP,,, No.398, August 19th 1952, p.14, from JMJP, 
July 28th 1952. On July 6th 1952, the NCNa  reported that 8,000 
Party cadres had been transferred to industry and large numbers 
of elite workers had attained Party membership in North China. 
See SCMP, No.369, July 6th 1952, p.23.
42. SCMP, Supplement No.677, October 22-28 1953, p.xxxii, from 
Hsin-hua .jih-pao, Chungking, July 29th 1953.
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We might take activity in the Central-South as an example.
In the first half of 1953, 789 Party cadres were transferred
from hsien-level and above to participate in capital construction
work. According to the statistics of eight Central-South
factories and mines, 2,330 cadres were transferred from production
units to capital construction units. In 1952, there were no more
than 10,000 workers involved in capital construction in all of
the Central-South; however, that number quickly increased to
45,000 in the first half of 1953; and the Central-South
Construction Bureau could boast nine planning units with more
43
than 1,000 personnel involved in planning.
But the Central-South authorities in the first half of 1953
achieved only 25 per cent of the annual plan and failed miserably
to meet the centre's demand for "better, faster and economical
results". Performance in the Central-South contrasted rather
sharply with performance in the Northeast. Considerable coverage
in the national and regional press was devoted to production
miracles in the Northeast. Local state industry there achieved
44
103.1 per cent of projected targets, but in the Central-South, 
leading GAR authorities found it necessary to readjust local state 
industrial enterprise. A rectification campaign exposed monumental 
planning errors. 4,000,000,000 yuan was spent to build the Hung- 
lciang Paper Mill in Hunan; however, the plant had not gone into 
production due to a glut of paper. 330,000,000 yuan had been spent 
building a special road to service the Yung-hsing Coal Mine in 
Hunan, before it was discovered that the mine's reserves were almost
43. "Chung-kung chung-yang chung-nan ch'ti chao-k *ai ch'uan-ch'u chi- 
pen chien-she hui-i"(Central-South Bureau convenes regional 
capital construction conference) in Chang-chiang jih-pao. August 
18th 1953, reproduced in HHYP, No.9, 1953, pp.138-139 for a review 
of capital construction in the Central-South.
44. SCMP, N 0.673, October 22nd 1953, pp.22-24, from JMJP, August 19th 
1953.
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exhausted. Cadres failed to make local industry serve state
industry, and the CSAC bemoaned the low rates of equipment
utilization in local state industry.
To certain extent the centre had to share part of the
responsibility for the problems in local industry. Teng Hsiao-
ping, who had newly replaced Po 1-po as minister of finance in
1953, noted in his budgetary remarks of 1954 that the Ministry had
failed to honour "local expediency"0 The principle set forth in
1951 to the effect that surplus revenue would be ploughed back
into enterprise was not observed with the result that tight
46
credit adversely affected local industry in 1953.
On the eve of the Second Five Year Plan, Chou En-lai
pointedly reminded his colleagues of the problems encountered in 
capital construction in 1953:
"...in 1953, in the construction work of some 
departments and localities there appeared the tendency 
to do everything at once and do it everywhere, taking 
no account of actual conditions, and recklessly running 
ahead. As a result, this affected the priority con­
struction projects of the state, gave rise to difficulties 
in finance and waste of manpower and material resources."4?
It is little wonder that publication of the First Five Year Plan
had been delayed!
In 1953, the 1951 strategy whereby a division a labour was to
be achieved so that the centre could co-ordinate "key points with
over-all arrangements" failed. The failure, however, should be
placed in the context of the heady political climate of the times,
ard one must also measure this failure against the problems of
administrative distance, particularly in terms of the prevalence
45o SCMP9 No.695, November 25th 1953, pp.26-21, from NCNa ,
Wuhan, November 21st 1953.
46. SCMP, N0 .832, June 19-21 1954, ppdl-17, here p.16.
47. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Proposals for the Second Five Year 
Plan for Development of the National Economy", 8th National 
Congress, September l6th 1956, Supplement to P e o p l e d  China4 
Nq o 21, November 1st 1956, p.7.
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of low policy levels and the lack of expertise on the part of 
leading cadres, who had found it difficult to make the transition 
from village to city.
Certainly, the planning of capital construction was one of 
the most problematic spheres of administrative activity, and one 
is reminded that Mao* when he later looked back on the year 1950- 
57, was ready to admit:
"We couldn’t manage the planning, construction and 
assembly of heavy industrial plants. We had not 
experience. China had no experts, the minister was 
himself an outsider, so we had to copy from foreign 
countries, and having copied we were unable to distin­
guish good from bad."48
The "copying", Mao refers to, became particularly evident in 1953
and 1954, but it does not seem to have had all that much to do
with the political fortunes of Kao Kang, as the trend, emphasizing
the vertical in government administration, became more pronounced
after Kao*s fall. Indeed, it is ironic that Kao Kang, as Stalin’s
"friend" in the Northeast, should have been singled out for
"dispersionism", as planning was less affected by "dispersionism"
in the Northeast' than elsewhere.
On January 13th 1954, in the Jen-min ,jih-pao attacked certain
cadres in certain ministries for their "small producer disper-
49
sionism" (hsiao-chan che ti fen-san chu-i). The editorial 
stressed that the complexities of industrialization necessitated 
a maximization of co-ordination between the different CPG ministries.
The "division of specialized responsibilities system" (fen-kung chuan­
ts e chin-tu) and co-ordination between ministries was stressed but there 
was no discussion of the 1951 emphasis on "divided responsibilities".
A Jen-min .iih-pao editorial, dated February 20th 1954, 
significantly re-emphasized the theme, "crack troops and simple 
administration" as being consistent with Soviet experience, and 
cited the authority of Stalin for a reorganization, which would
48. Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at the Chengtu Conference", March 1958, in 
Stuart Schram, ed., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p.98.
49. "Chia-chiang kuo-min ching-chi ko-pu-men ti p * ei-ho ho hsieh-tso", 
(Strengthen co-operation and co-ordination of national economic 
ministries), JMJP, January 13th 1954, in HHYP, No.2, 1954, p.138.
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bring leading organs closer to enterprise level* The following 
instruction calls for personnel allocation in favour of enter­
prise level:
"Therefore, all economic departments should, on the 
principle of contracting upper-level leading organs and 
augmenting the staff of production units and capital 
construction units at lower levels, retain only the 
essential personnel and transfer all the other cadres 
to factories and mines*"50
The following comment broadly hinted that China's leadership
were reconsidering the structure of state administration as a
whole:
"Consideration should now be given to abolition or 
amalgamation with similar organs of all those organi­
zational structures which are overlapping with unclear 
division of labour, or are required at one place but 
not required at another, or are required at present 
but not required in the future, or were required in the 
past but are not required at present*.."51
The following June, the CPGC determined that the present was no
longer to include the GAR administrative level.
In the process of coming to grips with the unevenness in
the pattern of political integration, and in the effort to move
from a condition of "dispersion" to "unity" and overcome to
phenomenon of "semi-autonomous administration by various levels",
the CCP drew on lessons and experience, gained in wartime China.
The sum of this administrative experience can be added up in the
policy decisions of spring, 1951* In certain respects the 1951
pattern represented a bold experiment in government and a creative
transposition of border region experience to a higher plane of
national integration, but it also represented a reaction to
50. "Ching-chien hsing-sheng chi-kou t 1i-kao kung-tsp hsiao-shuai"* 
(Simplify administrative machinery, raise work efficiency),
JMJP,' February 24th 1954, in HHYP, N©.3,“1954, pp.21-22.
Translated in SCMP, N0 .758, March 3rd 1954, pp.15-18. This 
editorial is viewed by Dorothy Solinger as leading up to the 
abolition of the GAR level. See D. Solinger, Regional Government 
and Political Integration: The Case of Southwest China 1949-54. p.54.
51. SCMP, No.758, p.17.
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compelling circumstances, as the CCP related to the over­
centralization of 1950o The emphasis on Soviet experience became 
more strident in 1953 and 1954, and in the course of the assertion 
of a more rigidly vertical pattern of centralization administrative 
emphases such as "local expediency" and "centralized leadership and 
divided responsibilities" lost certain currency-
2^8
V
MASS MOBILIZATION AS "POLITICAL INTEGRATION"
i) "Administrative Distance11 and Leadership Problems in the 
Activation of the Mass Line
In moving from a study of the dynamics of policy implementation 
in the administration of the new national economy to a review of mass 
politicization, it becomes necessary to broaden the frontiers of 
analysis so as to encompass larger connotations of ’'political 
integration". "Political integration", as it relates to the 
consolidation of new Party and state structure, must include 
reference to the mass line. In the CCP's scheme of the universe, 
political action can hardly be confined to formal structure. Hie 
popular organization of social forces was pivotal to both united 
front strategy and the guerilla experience in the countryside.
A full treatment of "political integration" would thus 
entail a detailed analysis of the relation between cadre and the 
massesj however mass mobilization is here discussed more in terms 
of the cadre and the limitations of the structuring and strategy 
of the mass line in relation to administrative distance. 
"Administrative distance" is defined in terms of the ability to 
convey and insure implementation of policy, in terms of the ways 
in which the leadership hoped to overcome abysmally low "policy 
levels" and the consequent proliferation of deviations in cadre 
work and also in terms of the attempt to co-ordinate various formal 
and informal systems of organization. Consideration of 
"administrative distance" will hopefully shed some light on the 
larger issues, in particular the degree to which "political 
integration" in its broadest sense of the generation of ideological 
commitment in the course of social revolution, was actually realized.
There are obvious advantages in approaching the larger issues 
with a consideration of "administrative distance". Firstly, one is 
keenly aware of the enormous methodological difficulties which arise 
in any attempt to demonstrate empirically the level of mass
2 W
consciousness in China. The quantitative indices, set forth 
"with fanfare" by the CCP, not only fail to conform with the 
primary emphasis of the CCP’s own definition of "political 
integration" as a genuine and voluntary act of internalizing 
ideology, but are highly suspect as empirical indices of 
"political integration". The totting up of millions of signatures, 
for example, does not stand as an adequate measure of the level of 
mass consciousness, as one can only speculate as to whether a high 
number of signatures represents an intensity of Party pressure or 
a genuine, voluntary assimilation of ideological statement.
Secondly, "political integration" is relative; it is an 
ongoing process, which can hardly be confined to a discussion of 
mass mobilization in the early 1950’s. At best the CCP in the early 
years achieved the organizational prerequisites for the exercise of 
the mass line throughout the nation. A great deal of the information, 
discussed below, suggests that the politicization of China's vast 
population was not to be encompassed in one or several campaigns.
Discussion in this section highlights the CCP's own definition 
of "political integration” in relation to the problems of leadership 
and the reconciling of contradictory policy emphases, which seemed 
to pull towards two different poles at the same time. On the one 
hand, production necessitated, and definitions of leadership 
required, an emphasis on organized social control, while on the 
other the generation of consciousness and the internalization of 
ideology was necessary to the furthering of "political integration". 
Needless to say, the implementation of policy, based on such 
competing emphases, was an exceedingly difficult task, particularly 
in the context of weak and embryonic Party organization at the 
basic levels of society.
Discussion, structured in these general terms, will hopefully 
serve as introduction to more specific remarks on the problems of 
strategy, explicit in "leaping from points to surface" in agrarian 
reform in the "newly liberated areas", and the parameters of the
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discussion can subsequently be expanded to include a review of 
"rectification" in the Three Seasons, Three- and Five-Antis 
Campaigns as a solution to organizational decadence and "counter­
revolution" .
The CCP's perspectives on "political integration" often stands 
directly at variance with many of the underlying theoretical 
assumptions, explicit in Western scholarly research. Behind the 
notion of "rectification", for example, stands an appreciation of 
the relation of ideology to organization. In the CCP’s vocabulary, 
"formalism", "usurpism", "mechanical viewpoint" are anathema. The 
manifestation of such pehnomena is antithetical to "political 
integration". Furthermore, in the CCP’s terms, organization, which 
lacks the motivation and discipline, which originates with 
ideological commitment, is not only counter-revolutionary, it is 
irrational. This perspective militates against sociological 
perspective, which capitalizes on the distinction between charisma 
and organization. In the CCP’s terms, the mass campaign need not be 
seen as an irrational disruption of a political process.
In the western mind, the mass campaigns commonly convey an 
impression of the grinding of monolithic political forces and a 
crushing degree of regimentation and conformity, and curiously this 
Orwellian depiction of the extremes of state control is often 
explicit in the same characterization, which would stress the 
campaigns as instances of bloody anarchy. This caricature of 
monolithic political forces belies the fact that the campaigns 
were highly decentralized. Furthermore, one is obliged to review 
more carefully the CGP's attempt to balance needs for social order 
and the generation of ideological commitment through struggle.
The sanctity of the individuals*s civil freedoms, the 
elaboration of an institutional structure, safeguarding those 
freedoms, are of course cherished in the Western liberal tradition, 
thus there is a tendency in some circles to view mass campaigns of 
the early 1950’s as irrational political phenomena, disruptive of
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the process of political consolidation and antithetical to the
development of organization. It is argued, for example, that
the mass campaigns inhibited the development of law in the
1
People’s Republic of China. It is argued more specifically in
the following statement of analysis that in the early 1950*s the
CCP’s leaders deliberately down-played the role of the People’s 
Procuratorate so as to insure that the agency’s reputation as a 
‘'guardian of latter-day normal legality" would not be "impaired" 
in the course of mass action:
"If the procuratorate were to become too closely 
identified in the public mind with the ’simplified* 
justice so lavishly meted out in the young years of 
the new order, its ulterior usefulness as a guardian 
of latter-day ’normal-legality' could end up so 
gravely impaired as to render it almost valueless 
from the regime's point of view."2
It seems almost pedantic to note that the "regime’s point of view"
did not originate with either John Locke or Max Weber.
Mao in his speech "On New Democracy", specifically indicated
what he meant by "the system of government" (cheng-t* i) :
"As for the question of *the system of government*, 
this is a matter of how political power is organized, 
the form in which one social class or another chooses 
to arrange it apparatus of political power to oppose 
its enemies and protect itself."3
The Chinese leadership accepted the Marxist view that the legal
system is to be utilized as a tool of class conflict. In the
course of agrarian reform^the Campaign to Suppress Counter-
Revolutionaries and the Five-Antis Campaign, this perspective was
applied to reality, and the system of "people’s tribunals",
1. See Alice Tay, "Gemeinschaft, Gesellschaft, Mobilisation and 
Administration: The Future of Law in Communist China",
Asia Quarterly, No.3, 1971.
2. George Ginsburgs, Arthur Stahnke, "The People’s Procuratorate 
in Communist China: The Period of Maturation, 1951-1954",
CQ, N0 .24, October-December 1965, pp.53-91, here p.65.
3. Mao Tse-tung, "On New Democracy", SW, Vol.11, p.352.
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operated alongside the formal judiciary structure and the people’s
4 . . . .
courts. Although the mass -line was operative m  relation to the
state legal system, it should be stressed that the Chinese leader­
ship shared Lenin’s abhorrence of spontaneity.
Much of what is said immediately below relates to this central 
problem of balance in the implementation of the mass line in the early 
1930*s. How did the CCP leadership balance the need to further political 
integration through the generation of ideological commitment in the course 
of mass mobilization and class confrontation and the need to insure 
social order and the clear exercise of leadership?
In 1950, the Party’s thinking was dominated by the need for 
production in the light of the economic and fiscal crisis, which 
developed over the first months of 1950. The re-establishment of 
social order was essential to production. It was essential to the 
restoration and development of urban-rural trade interflow; and it was 
essential to the fight against inflation, to the penetration of jen-min 
pi into the countryside, the collection of the public grain tax, etc.
The CCP’s leaders were aware that the new regime’s legitimacy rested 
on its ability to overcome inflation and quickly to achieve pre-war 
peaks of agricultural and industrial production.
Experience of land reform excesses in the Kiangsi period and again 
in North China in 1946-47, had left the CCP leadership with a profound 
impression of the importance of conducting class struggle under carefully 
controlled (as opposed to contrived) conditions. Social order was a pre­
requisite of class struggle! If the government could not demonstrate an 
ability to control the forces of anarchy and reduce endemic banditry, 
which persisted despite the nationwide military victory over the KMT, 
there was little hope of successfully launching class struggles in the 
vilages.
4. At times, democratic party personages and even CCP cadres in political 
and legal departments of theC'PG have argued for a more discrete 
functioning of the mass line in relation to formal state structure; 
for example, Lo Jui-Ching, Minister of Public Security, attacked non- 
Party "reactionaries" for having portrayed the mass campaigns as illegal. 
See ECMM, February 10th 1958, p.15, from Hsueh-hsi. No.l, January 3rd 
1958. Similarly in November j.959, the JMJP criticized those who talked 
of spontaneity in order to discredit the mass -line. SCMP, No2152, 
December 9th 1959, pp4-6, from JMJP, November lxth 1959.
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The CCP did n0t readily contradistinguish themes of production
and class struggle in the elaboration of policy emphases. For
example, it was claimed that agrarian reform would unleash
tremendous productive forces in the countryside. Although these
themes were not counterposed at the level of ideology, one can
discuss the different weights., assigned to these themes in the
adjusting of the ITcentre of work" (chung-hsin kung-tso). The
relation of production and class struggle was thus subtle and
complex, and it is not therefore surprising that there was
considerable confusion and disorientation amongst basic-level
5
cadres in the villages.
Sudden alterations in the "centre of work" over-taxed the
communication facilities of the new state and Party structures,,
Announcement of a new "centre of work " was not enough to insure
its implementation; it had to be accompanied by extensive application
8f fc8hf££ence and short training course techniques. Difficulties in
raising policy-level were apparent everywhere at the basic levels,
and there were even instances at the provincial and municipal levels
of failure to apprehend a change in the "centre of work". To cite a
brief example, on February 26th 1950, the North China Bureau of the
CCPCC issued a directive, demanding that the Pingyuan Provincial
Party Committee and its fraction in provincial government readjust
the "centre of work" to conform with the Party’s emphasis on
production. Senior provincial cadres had erroneously misplaced
their "centre", focusing their energies on rural tax collection,
agrarian reform, and Party rectification at the expense of the most
6
important task, production.
The preoccupation with production persisted into the second 
quarter of 1950 and carried great weight in national level 
deliberations over the shape of agrarian reform policy. The CCP
5. See Thomas Bernstein, "Problems of Village Leadership After Land 
Reform", CQ, N0.36, October-December 1968, pp.1-22, especially p„9.
6. JMJP, March 15th 1950, p.l.
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leadership drew a clear line* connecting the articulation of policy 
with a perception of military strategy. In his June 4th 1950, 
report Liu Shao-chfi vehemently criticized deviations, w h i c h  had 
resulted in an encroachment on middle peasants and the retarded 
development of commerce and industry in July 1946, to October 1947, 
but he stressed that prior to national liberation, the support of 
the poor peasants had been crucial to the survival of revolutionary 
forces. At a time when rich peasants tended to move with the land­
lords and the poor peasants alone had to bear the responsibility for 
supplying the revolutionary forces with grain and recruits, it had 
been politically and militarily necessary to requisition the surplus 
land of the rich peasants. In his report, Liu emphasized that in a 
time of peace the Party’s priorities could be adjusted. In his view, 
the basic task at that time was 'economic construction on a nationwide 
scale” , and he simply concluded: "Our present difficulties are
mainly financial and economic difficulties arising in the course of
7
the restoration, reform and development of the economy".
Liu’s perspective on the economy was reinforced by Mao’s 
perception of the political situation. In a directive of March 12th, 
Mao argued for a closely focused attack on landlords and a go-easy 
approach on the rich peasant question. In the following statement, 
his concern to relate the Party’s strategy to prevailing political 
circumstances is obvious:
"The reasoning behind such an approach £i.e. go-easy on 
the rich peasant^ is : Firstly agrarian reform is on a
scale greater than ever before and leftist deviations could 
easily arise, but if we only move against the landlords 
without touching the rich peasant, we would then be better 
able to isolate the landlords, protect the middle peasants 
and prevent indiscriminate beating and killing, otherwise 
this kind of thing would be difficult to stop. Secondly, 
the land reform which was carried out in the north in the 
past was carried out in a time of war. The climate of war 
affected that of agrarian reform, but now that there is 
basically no longer a war-time situation, agrarian reform 
takes on a strikingly different aspect. Agrarian reform
7. Liu Shao-ch’i, "On Agrarian Reform", Collected Works of Liu Shao- 
ch’i 1945-1957 (URI), Vol.l, p.225.
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will have a tremendously traumatic affect on society; 
the landlords will raise a great hue and cry. If we 
temporarily lay off the semi-feudal rich peasant, biding 
our time for a few years and then move on them, we 
will all the more have right on our side, that is to 
say we will all the more have the political initiative. 
Thirdly, we have a united front with the national 
bourgeoisie, which at present is manifest in political, 
economic and organizational terms. The question of 
agrarian reform is closely linlced to that of the 
national bourgeoisie and in order to stabilize the 
opinion of the national bourgeoisie it would be rather 
well-advised if we were to temporarily refrain from 
moving against the semi-feudal rich peasant.
Mao repeated the same argument in a less crude and specific
manner in his June 6th speech, "Fight for a Fundamental Turn for
the Better in the Financial and Economic Situation in China"o He
then stated:
"The work of agrarian reform should be carried 
forward by stages in an orderly manner. Since the war 
has virtually ended on the mainland, the situation 
differs entirely from the 1946-48 period...."9
It is important to note that M^o, like everyone else at that point,
stressed the carrying out of agrarian reform "stage by stage in an
orderly manner". It is also important to note that in 1949 united
front was not simply the "icing on the cake", but a very serious
point of strategy in the minds of China*s new leaders.
One cannot take the strategic emphasis, explicit in the June
1950 Agrarian Reform Law, as a repudiation of the exercise of the
mass line in struggle. Hie war was at an end; there was an
economic and fiscal crisis of alarming magnitude, and preparations
had to be thorough before the Party could move from a stage of
setting up models of agrarian reform to a stage of full province-
wide development of agrarian reform. However, by the autumn 1950,
8. Mao Tse-tung, "Cheng-hsun tui tai fu-nung ts'e lueh wen-t*i ti 
i-chien", (Seeking advice on the question of the strategy of 
handling the rich peasant), Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi. Vol.V, 
Peking, 1977, p.13.
9. See translation of Mao*s speech in New China*s Economic 
Achievements, p .6.
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considerable headway had been made in balancing the budget, in 
the unification of economic and financial work and in the 
reduction of inflation, and once again policy deliberations were 
fundamentally affected by a military factor, as China became 
irretrievably involved in the Korean War."^ The CCP leadership 
viewed American intervention north of the 38th parallel with the 
greatest anxiety. The possibility of an invasion from the north­
east or a counter-attack from Taiwan were seriously considered. 
Basic-level Party organization had yet to be consolidated in the 
"newly liberated" countryside. Party rectification had exposed 
the perpetuation of KMT practices and habits within the newly- 
created Party and state structures. China at war meant a heavier 
emphasis on the threat of counter-revolution. Initial investigations 
of agrarian reform brought out into the open the question of 
"peaceful land reform". The previous emphasis in the Peiping and 
Suxyuan Patterns, which underlined the generous co-optation of 
enemy KMT forces gave way as the Party criticized "boundless 
magnanimity" and emphasized instead "suppression with leniency". 
Agrarian reform and the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries 
were progressively entwined. The first stage of agrarian reform 
involved the establishment of social order in the countryside, and
10. Both Ezra Vogel and John Wong in their discussion of land reform
point to the Korean War as the most decisive factor in determining 
the new emphasis on radical implementation of agrarian reform in 
November 1950. Jeff Shillinglaw suggests that in fact, it was not 
so much the Korean War, but the initial results of agrarian reform 
which prompted the shift in emphasis. Undoubtedly a number of 
factors converged to determine this new emphasis, but it would seem 
that the Korean War was primary. At least the Korean factor is 
explicitly stated to be the reason by the Chinese leadership, while 
one can only infer other reasons. Failures in the first stage of 
agrarian reform in the "newly liberated areas" could possibly have 
reinforced the original strategic emphasis, explicit in the Agrarian 
Reform Law, ha d it not been for the war. Ezra Vogel, Canton Under 
Communism, p.98. John Wong, Land Reform in the Peoplefs Republic of 
China, pp.138-139. Jeff Shillinglaw, "Land Reform and Peasant 
Mobilization in Southern China, 1947-50", Agrarian Reform and 
Agrarian Reformism, David Lehmann, ed., p.132.
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hence the elimination of despots, special agents of the KMT and 
bandits, all of whom according to the CCP collaborated in counter­
revolution. The five categories of counter-revolutionaries, thus, 
included bandits, despots, special agents and the leading members 
of '’reactionary'1 parties and secret societies.
In agrarian reform, the CCP stressed "taking a free hand to 
mobilize the masses". Class struggle and mass mobilization were 
emphasized in the winter of 1950-51, but even under the new 
emphasis on the radical implementation of agrariai reform, mass 
action was nonetheless to be controlled. This perspective is 
particularly well brought out by a comment on "taking a free hand"
Cfang-shou)„ which appeared in the Nan-fang jih-pao on July 6th,
1951:
"The policy of taking a free hand is itself a question 
of leadership. In taking a free hand in the 
mobilization of the masses, we mean that a free hand is 
being taken under a proper leadership, in accordance with 
established policy, and with a definite object! ve<> "^ 1*
Hence "taking a free hand" was not interpreted to mean indiscriminate
struggle. Agrarian reform documents universally condemned
"indiscriminate beating and killing’ and constantly refer to "legal
struggle" (yung ho-fa tou-cheng). Excesses did occur, and wiien they
did the CCP had to delicately balance competing emphases. Cadres
were urged to persuade the masses that excesses were wrong, and
cadres were warned not to destroy the momentum of the mass line and
thus throw cold water on the masses. But cadres were also
instructed to firmly restore order.
Trials in generally were carefully controlled. Heavy sentences
and executions had to be approved by higher authorities at special
district, provincial and sometimes GAR levels. As always both
"usurpism" and "tailism" were criticized. Too much leadership was
bad as it led to perfunctory stage-managing, but too much "free hand"
11. In CB, No.128, October 15th 1951, from NFJP, July 6th 1951.
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or spontaneity was offensive to the principles of democratic 
centralism and unified Party leadership.
In theory, the Party could not accept a quick land reform.
As the following comment by Li Chien-chen, Vice-Chairman of the 
Kwangtung Agrarian Reform Committee illustrates, quick land reform 
was viewed as antithetical to "political integration":
"We could say the masses have already risen. But have 
they in reality? I don’t think we had better use * in 
reality* „ As for this so-called ’reality*, it is determined 
on the basis of whether or not the masses have self­
consciously become involved of their own accord.
Investigations of local conditions reveal that many of the 
masses feel that agrarian is something the work corps do for 
them, that it is for the work corps to call them to 
convene meetings and as a result work corps substitute for 
the masses, and confiscation is brought about by the work ^  
corps. This is why we dare not use the words *in reality*".
The Party could not, therefore, in theory bring about agrarian 
reform for the masses, nor could the Party accept a situation 
whereby a minority o± activists went through the motions of a 
campaign on behalf of the masses.
But what was the relation between theory and practice? In 
other words, did the Party have to accept in practice what it would 
not countenance in theory? There will be opportunity to develop 
this point in subsequent discussion of the specific details of 
specific campaigns, but here we might discuss in general the 
problems of administrative distance.
One might profitably turn to discuss in general terms 
(a) whether the ideological commitment to "political integration" 
from within and to localization was successfully applied against 
administrative distance, and (b) the necessity of devolution of 
administrative responsibility and of "dual" leadership structure 
in the exercise of the mass-line.
12. Li Chien-clien, "Kuan-yu fa-tung chun-chung ti chi-ko wen-t*i"« 
(Several problems relating to mobilizing the masses), November 
29th 1950, KPHHTL, N0 .26, February 1951, pp.80-81.
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In his speech of February 1st 1942, Mao had set out a
definite position in relation to the question of outside and
local cadres. In one of his moments of qualified self-criticism,
he admitted that he had been in northern Shensi for five or six
years, but that his knowledge of local conditions was still not
up to that of the local comrades. Mao then noted that conditions
in the anti-Japanese base areas started to develop only after the
arrival of outside cadres. Mao clarified his point as follows:
MOur comrades must understand that in these 
conditions it is possible for our base areas to be 
consolidated and for our Party to take root there 
only when the two kinds of cadres unite as one and 
when a large number of local cadres develop and are 
promoted; otherwise it is impossible."^3
Long-term political integration inquired the development and
cultivation of local cadres, but of course outside cadres were
necessary to the educating and training of local cadres in the
policies and techniques of the Party.
"Outsiders" were particularly necessary to the conducting
of agrarian reform in the "newly liberated areas" in 1950-51.
Indeed the exportation of experience is explicit in the CCP’s
strategy of using "advanced elements" to lead "backward elements".
In the conducting of agrarian reform in the "newly liberated areas",
the Party did not have the advantage of consolidated Party branches
capable of independent management. Only in 1952-53 did the CCP
focus on the reorganization and consolidation of hsiang-fevel
organization, separating the chaff from the wheat and expelling
opportunists and bad class elements. In 1954, in the context of
H
the campaign for mutual aids hsien and chTtu Party committees took
a more active interest in cultivating basic-level Party branches,
14
treating it as the "centre of work".
13. Mao Tse-tung, "Rectify the Party’s Style of Work", SW, Vol.Ill, p.45.
14. For comment on this reorganization refer to Thomas Bernstein, pp.cit., 
p. £> . Apparently one of the reasons for the failure of the programme 
for the planned purchase and supply of surplus grain in 1953 was the 
failure to organize properly the basic-level Party branches. See 
report on the CCP’s First All-China Conference on the Work of Basic- 
level Village Organization in JMJP, March 11th 1955, in HHYP, No.4, 
1955, p.30.
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During agrarian reform, activists gained experience on work 
teams, but the recruitment of new Party members was postponed for 
tactical reasons, which Mao alluded to in his remarks at the third 
plenary session of the CCPCC on June 6th 1950. Mao had then 
warned that if the Party*s doors were opened wide, the inevitable 
result would be serious ideological contamination, as large 
numbers of opportunists would take advantage of easy entry. A
moratorium was placed on recruitment in the villages of the ''old
liberated areas" to allow them time for consolidation and 
remoulding, and recruitment in the "newly liberated areas" was 
postponed, pending the completion of agrarian reform.
As of July 1950, the CCP had over five million members. Aside
from 1.2 million in the PLA, there were geographical concentrations
in terms of the disposition of members; 3.4 million were located in
15
North China, East China and the Northeast. There were relatively 
high concentrations in the "old liberated areas", but even there 
many of the cadres were new. The problem was most serious in the 
Central-South with its high population of over 136 million. East 
China had a similarly high population, but there were greater
expanses of "old" and "semitold" areas in East China, and Jao Shu-
shih in a speech of August 590, noted that there were 1,630,000
members of the CCP in East China.
The seriousness of the personnel problem was particularly well 
brought out by Peng Teh-huai, who in his December 3rd 1950, speech 
to the NWMAC, noted that not even 5 per cent of 12,764 cadres, 
thus far involved in Northwest agrarian reform, had any past
15. "Cheng-tun tang ti kung-tso tso-feng, kai-shan tang ti tsu-chili 
chuang-k*uang" , (Conditions to rectify Party work styles and 
improve Party organization), JMJP, July 1950, KPHHTL, No.12, 1950,
p. 80.
16. Jao Shu-shih, '"Ch&n-k*ai cheng-feng yun-tung. cheng-tun kan-pu tso- 
feng". (Develop the rectification; movement, correct cadre work 
style), CFJP, August 22nd 1950, in HHYP, Vol.2, N0 .5, September 1950, 
p.984.
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experience. Peng remarked that many cadres exported to localities 
in the Northwest felt estranged, and it was commonly said "going to 
the villages is like going to a foreign country". Peng reported 
that there had been considerable disorder and confusion at lower 
administrative levels, and he was concerned that already over-
17
worked senior cadres were required to go down to supervise work.
The situation was just as chronic ir the Southwest. As late 
as October 23rd 1952, the Hsin-hua jih-pao reported that 93 per cent 
of Northwest hslang were still without basic-level Party organization.
In May 1952, the CCPCC called for Party recruitment, and 
shortly thereafter the personnel directors of the CCPCC regional 
bureaux met to work out a strategy for the recruitment campaign, 
which lasted into the summer of 1953. In the course of the mass 
campaigns of the early 1950*s activists were recruited locally, but 
they were not inducted into the Party until these campaigns had 
run their course.
We have already considered the question as to whether or not 
the importation of "outsiders" into "newly liberated areas" should 
be taken as demonstrative of a Communist law of avoidance. Firstly, 
under the principle of democratic centralism, it is axiomatic that 
higher levels provide leadership and act to insure an understanding 
of and the correct implementation of the centre’s policies.
Secondly, the process of cadre education depended on the inter­
reaction of old and new cadres. One cannot, therefore, generally 
assume that the presence of a large number of "northerners" in the 
"newly liberated areas" is evidence of a "regional" resistance to 
the centre. Indeed, the CCP was aware of the dangers of localism 
and parochial loyalties such as the "five sames", but this awareness
must be seen in the context of an ideological commitment to the
18
building of truly local bases of popular support.
17. Peng Teh-huai, "Hsi-pei chun-cheng we1-yuan hui wu-ko ylieh-lai 
kung-tso pao-kao" (Report on the work of the NWMAC over the last 
five months), CFKTTK, 1950, pp.416-17.
18. See Ezra Vogel, "From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The 
’Regularization* of Cadres", OQ, No.29, January-March 1967, p.40.
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Obviously, the possibilities of local cadres relating to
the old social structure were considerably greater, but one
cannot assume that "outsiders" would always push harder for the
19
more radical implementation of policy; for example, during
agrarian reform old cadres were criticized for inhibiting "taking
a free hand to mobilize the masses". These cadres still had
vivid memories of the rectification which had followed the excesses
of 1946-47 in North China; they had in fact aired such views as
"If you want to prevent deviations then only you can do it L^-e.
for the masses 3 M and "Deviations necessarily follow ftaking a free
hand*, rectification necessarily follows deviations, if we don*t
20
*take a free hand1 there will be no deviations to rectify". The
role of the masses was thus usurped by old cadres.
The relation between the PartyT-s long-term commitment to
localization and the structuring of the mass campaigns of the early
1950*s is particularly complex. Due to the weakness of Party
organization, there was a tendency to ersploit united front
organization more fully in the "newly liberated areas"; for example,
as of January 1951, the greater part of the propaganda workers in
21
the Central-South belonged to non-Party propaganda organization.
The absence of firm local Party structure undoubtedly had its 
implications in terms of the strategy for personnel circulation; 
for example, over the course of moving "from points to surface" in 
agrarian reform, personnel were often concentrated at one key-point 
only "to leap" to another once the process of agrarian reform was 
underway at the initial point. At times higher levels would 
concentrate the greater proportion of cadres serving in provincial 
department%  to key areas, where a mass campaign had bogged down-
19. See comments by John Wong and Thomas Bernstein on local cadre 
collusion with landlords. John W Qng, Land Reform in the People*s 
Republic of Chinas pp.148-149. Thomas Bernstein, op.cit., p.7.
20. "Ching-ch'u wu-chieh, cheng-chueh chih-hsing fang-shou.fa-tung chun- 
chung fang-chen"a (Eliminate misunderstandings, correctly implement 
the strategy of taking a free hand to mobilize the masses), CCJP, 
December 26th 1950, in KPHHTL, No.26, February 1951, p.40.
21. SCMP, N0.54, January 23rd 1951, pp.10-11, from CCJP, January 16th 1954.
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One of the more interesting instances of strategic personnel 
circulation occurred under the supervision of the South China Sub- 
Bureau of the CCPCC. Main-line forces of the PLA were deployed in 
agrarian reform in the troubled province of Kwantung. In terms of 
the PLA’s subsidiary role as a "work force" this deployment might 
not seem so extraordinary, but how was the PLA’s involvement to be 
treated in terms of developing the mass line from within a local 
base? The South China Sub-Bureau rationalized the "reliance on 
the PLA" precisely in terms of the cultivation of a local base, 
hence the following statement:
"During the past two or three months, several thousand 
members of the People’s Liberation Army participated in 
the local peasants* movement in the rural areas. They 
possessed the fullest confidence in their work, penetrated 
deep into the masses, overcame difficulties of language, 
living conditions and ignorance of local conditions, and 
with their spirit of perseverance and serious devotion to 
duty as well as their attitude of democracy and co-operation 
with the masses, and loyalty to their class stand, had 
seriously affected the local cadres and educated them.
The reliance on the PLA, therefore, is not merely needed 
for the fulfilment of the mission, but also for the 
fostering of local cadres."22
Another dimension of the problem of localization had to do 
with the Party’s attitude towards cadres .-who had served in old 
revolutionary bases in the Central-South, which had been over-run 
by various KMT offensives in the Sino-Japanese and Civil Wars. In 
November 1951, Teng Tzu-hui outlined a position on this problem, 
declaring that in order to cement ties between the new people’s 
government and the people in the old revolutionary bases, the Party 
would actively admit old cadres into the service of the people’s 
governments. Teng brushed aside criticism as to their lack of effort
22. See Chou Tzu-yang, "Preliminary Summary Report on the Movement for 
the Reduction of Rent, Return of Deposit...", CB, October 15th 1951, 
p.20, from NFJP, September 5th 1951. Ezra Vogel notes that 10,000 
out of a total agrarian reform work force in Kwangtung of 123,000 
were from the PLA. Ezra Vogel, Canton under Communism, p.94.
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after the withdrawal of the main army, and he instructed on the 
following principle:
"Even if these old cadres manifested a passive 
attitude or committed seme rather unsatisfactory acts 
after the withdrawal of the Red Army, as long as they . 
are not guilty of gross misdeeds and still enjoy the 
confidence of the masses today, they will be 
unhesitatingly be given posts if the masses elect them 
to such posts.
Problems of administrative distance such as the weakness of 
basic-level Party organization, universally low policy-levels, the 
acute shortage of cadres with experience of the mass line, imposed 
certain limits on the structuring of the mass line. In effect, one 
could argue that the CCP in the early 1950’s worked with the same set 
of strategic and structural emphases which were broadly operative in 
the x940*s. "Dual leadership" and inter-system co-ordination were 
emphasized, as the running of the mass campaigns had to be effectively 
decentralized. Regional variations in the rate and quality of political 
integration were too great to be handled centrally. "Political 
integration" in the CCP’s terms was not something which could be 
institutionally imposed on localities from the outside, hence the mass 
campaign, tightly controlled within a vertical structure, was not only 
physically impossible, but ideologically suspect in relation to the 
mass line. One might also suggest that the development of united fronr 
organization reinforced the horizontal features of government structure 
such as "dual" leadership and the emphasis on committees and 
conferences, co-ordinating different levels and systems of administration.
In the course of the Campaign for the Suppression of Counter- 
Revolutionaries, for example, a tendency to sponsor a vertical 
structure was criticized. On S e p t e m b e r  5th i95i, the Jen-min 
jih-pao noted that the reinforcement of legal structure was not to
2d. Teng Tzu-hui, November zxst 1951, CB, Nol6u, February zOth 1952, 
p;52.
be undertaken at the expense of the people’s governments, and 
cadres?who had cultivated the erroneous viewpoint, onphasizing 
the independence of the judicial system from interference by 
local government, were admonished and instructed on the following 
point:
"...the Chinese revolution has only just won basic 
victory, and the political and economic unevenness 
brought about by the long rule of imperialism and 
feudalism as well as the unevennes in our present work 
can hardly be overcome completely within a short time.
For this reason under the present situation and the 
difficult conditions of shortages of cadres, if the 
various grades of work organs only emphasize the 
perpendicular centralized leadership of the Central 
Government and deny unified leadership according to 
local expediency (that is, dual leadership over 
concrete work), then in practice it will be impossible 
to speedily establish and perfect the organs and make 
a good job of work and it will be impossible to realize ^ 
the correct leadership over the national judicial work."
Hence emphases on a vertical chain of command and too close a
division of labour between departments were eschewedo Such
structural notions were viewed as inimical to the development of
the mass -line. And of course these notions were consistent with
the rationale, which underlined the GAC decisions of March and May
1951, which had called for a greater devolution of administrative
authority and the maximization of "local expediency".
In his May 11th 1951, report on political and economic work to
the GAC, Peng Chen had basically drawn out the same perspective;
he emphasized the political conditions necessitate^ "...the
strengthening of unified leadership in the localities, meaning
25
’dual leadership’ for facilitating all work". Peng said then 
that cadres.who were excessively concerned with the minute division
24. "Strengthen and Consolidate the People’s Revolutionary Legal System", 
JMJP, September 5th 1951, in SCMP No.168, September 6th 1951, pp.7-9.
25. Peng Chen, "Report on Political and Legal Work", in CB, N0.91,
July 10th 1950, p.7.
26G
of labour between government departments, were "shackling the 
masses while pleasing themselves in private".
Mass politicization had* to be dealt with on the basis of 
decentralized operations. Different areas had different 
concentrations of personnel. Some areas had had past experience 
of the CCPTs policies and mass-line techniques, while others had 
practically none. Policy-levels even at higher levels were 
appalling at times. For example, Tu Jen-sheng in his September 18th 
1950, report on agrarian reform in Central-South China made the 
following self-criticism:
"Agrarian reform committees of provincial grade have 
been formed one after another and operations have begun.
But as to how to expand its own operations and activities, 
how to collect work experience and correct opinions from 
all sides to direct work, even the Central-South L a n d ^
Reform Committee itself lacks systematic experience."
Tufs misgivings, notwithstanding, the GAR level proved to be 
particularly effective in directing mass line operations. Indeed, 
the June 19th 1954, GAC directive, relating to the abolition of the 
GAR level, particularly emphasized the point that this level had 
made an important contribution in terms of the development of the 
mass campaigns in 1951-52. The double personality of the GAR level, 
which at once acted as a united front apparatus, representing local 
state power and as a centralizing agency of the GAC, was consistent 
with the overall thrust towards "dual" organization in the leader­
ship of the mass campaign.
In terms of agrarian reform, for example, there was no single 
operational command in Peking. The agrarian reform committees of 
the four MACs in the GARs acted as several regional operational head­
quarters. The general principles of agrarian reform were set forth 
at the centre, but detailed regulations such as those relating to
26. Tu Jen-sheng, "Report on Agrarian Reform in the Central-South 
Region During the Past Half Year", September 19th 1950, in CB, 
N0.39, December 9th 1950, p.27.
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different types of land, complications of ownership, control of 
"law-breaking landlords", measures for the enforcement of agrarian 
reform regulations, etc., and the plan or strategy of implementation 
were worked out first at the GAR, and subsequently at the provincial 
level. There will be further opportunity below to discuss the 
strategy of implementation, particularly as it was defined by 
Central-South and East China leaders, such as Jao Shu-shih and 
Teng Tzu-hui. Their strategy of "from points to surface" was seen 
as the solution to administrative distance. The following comment 
by Chao Tzu-yang underlines the fact that this strategy was 
rationalized in terms of the tremendous unevenness of the pattern of 
political integration from hsien to hsien and village to village 
across the length and breadth of "newly liberated" China:
"The degree of political awakening and 
organization among the masses in different areas are 
not balanced, the comparative strengths of different 
classes in different areas are not balanced. The 
leadership lacks full experience, while cadres, 
especially backbone cadres, are insufficient in 
force. For these various reasons, it is necessary to 
acquire experience at selected points, to foster 
cadres, and to set up examples. Thus the movement 
must be developed from points to surface a r e a s . "27
In the following discussion, we can pursue our inquiries as to
whether in fact this strategy was effectively applied throughout
the "newly liberated areas".
27. Chou Tzu-yang, op.cit.. p.19.
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V
ii) T*Leaping from Points to Surface in the Newly Liberated Areas''
The CCP viewed agrarian reform as a test greater th.an that of
war; it was in all probability the single most important act in
the drama of political integration. The following discussion
broadly relates to the implementation of the June 1950, Agrarian
Reform Law in the "newly liberated areas". Within this general
frame of reference, our view-finder is adjusted to a specific
temporal and spatial setting.
Much of the following discussion in this section relates
particularly to the Central-South and East China GARs. There is
already a solid basis upon which to work in terms of the
availability of material and research which has already been
carried out. In particular, the problem of "localism" in the
Central-South has been researched in terms of the relations between
the GAR authorities in Wuhan and the authorities in the South China
Sub-Bureau of the CCPCC and the provincial government Kwangtung in 
1
Canton. Indeed Ezra Vogel in his study, Canton Under Communism. 
has argued that the CSMAC acted strenuously as an extension of the 
centre in insuring a centralized uniformity in the implementation of 
agrarian reform policy.2
The available material on the Central-South region is 
particularly good, and one might single out for attention the 
availability of Kan-pu hsueh-hsi tzu-liao (Cadres study materials). 
These volumes were published with the express purpose of educating 
the cadres, and one can gain some insight as to what the agrarian 
reform authorities considered to be the main problems as well as 
what they regarded as essential for cadre reading.
Together the two regions of Central-South and East China 
accounted for approximate 56.3 per cent of the total rural population
1. See John Wong, Land Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 
pp.139-15^ and Ezra Vfcgel, Canton Under Communism, pp.91-124.
2. Ezra Vogel, ibid., p.93.
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of 29 million was less than that of Shantung in East China. The
Southwest rural population, the last population to experience
3
agrarian reform, was approximately 90 million.
The Central-South region is of particular interest, as it 
seemed to be a problem area, not only in terms of "localism", 
but also in the larger terms of administrative distance. The 
problem of implementing a strategy of "from points to surface" 
was greater there than in East China. Prior to June 1950, agrarian 
reform had affected only 12 per cent of the Central-South rural 
population. East China, therefore, had the advantage in terms of 
the extent of area, exposed to agrarian reform, and a higher 
concentration of Party members. There was a greater "leading factor", 
or more reference points to facilitate the strategic development of 
agrarian reform m  East China. Indeed, the progress of agrarian 
reform in East China as compared with Central-South was smoothet, 
and one might note that there seems to be m  the East China 
documentation a greater emphasis on the inter-relation of proper 
leadership with "talcing a free hand to mobilize" the masses. East 
China was an area comparatively well developed in terms of urbahization, 
trade and light industry, and from this perspective one can argue 
that agrarian reform in East China was, therefore, technically more 
complicated. Deviations such as "peaceful land reform" also occurred 
in East China, but the frequency and extent of deviation seems to be 
less than m  the case of the Central-South.
In terms of the development of agrarian reform in the North­
west, there was some "old liberated area", which could be exploited 
in the transposition of experience from "old" to "newly liberated
3. See John Wong, op.cit., Table 5.1, p.129. Hie above percentages 
are also taken from this table.
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areas". The old Shen-K.an-Ni.ng Border Region acted as a "leading 
factor" in the Northwest, but in the Southwest, there was no 
"leading factor" to speak of- The SWGAR was the last region to 
be consolidated, and it is not surprising that agrarian reform 
came later than in any of the other three GARs affected by the 
June^l950, law.
In the Northwest, Southwest and to a certain extent the 
Central-South, agrarian reform was more complex due to the 
concentrations of national minority populations. One might 
speculate that the degree of control or leadership as opposed to 
the freer exercise of the mass--line,', explicit in the slogan,
"taking a free hand", related closely to complications such as 
population mix and production.
In city suburbs, for example, the balance between formal
administrative structure and popular organization of social
forces was tipped in favour of the former in order to shield
commerce and industry from the political disruptions consequent
upon the exercise of the mass-line- The state machinery acted to ,
insulate the cities from the influence of village struggle. Peasant
representatives, who came to the cities seeking landlords, had to
have letters of introduction from government agencies; Peasant
Association credentials were not sufficient. Upon their arrival,
peasant representatives were forwarded by the appropriate provincial,
special district of hsien authority to the City-Country Liaison
Committee Cc h *eng-hsiang lien-hp wei-yuan hui), which acted as an
institutional buffer against the penetration of rural social forces 
4
into the cities. Similarly, the process and timing of agrarian 
reform was more discrete and the leadership factor greater in areas 
with large national minority concentrations.
The following discussion relates particularly, but not 
exclusively, to East China and Central-South China in the crucial
P >i
4. For example, see "Chung-nan chun-cheng wei-yuan hui fa-shih tj_u-ti 
kai-ko ch * i-chien ch'u-li ch*eng-hsiang kuan-hsi ti chueh-ting" , 
(CSMAC directive relating to the handling of the city-country 
relationship during the period of agrarian reform), in KPHHTL, No.23, 
December 1950, p.94.
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period, winter51950, to spring 1951. This particular time 
setting is inclusive of the dramatic shift in emphasis towards 
a radical implementation of agrarian reform in November 1950.
In late autumn of that year the centre ordered an immediate 
readjustment of focus, and the regional agrarian reform committees 
had thereupon to redraft the operational plans for the extension 
of the movement to many more hsien in the slack season of 1950-51.
At that time the CCP, throughout the "newly liberated areas", 
attacked the "pure production viewpoint" (chien-tan ti sheng-chan 
kuan-tien). raising the slogan "taking a free hand to mobilize the 
masses", (fang-shpu fa-tung chtun^'ghun'g).
This particular temporal setting is of special interest to our 
study of administrative distance, for it was in the slack season of 
1950-51 that the development of agrarian reform came to a head, as 
the work teams moved from the stage of model-building and experiment 
to a stage of full province-wide development. In this period, a 
rural population of approximately 60 million in East China and 50 
million in Central-South China experienced agrarian reform.
According to Chou En-lai, work corps, totalling over 360,000 cadres, 
had been trained in areas of 150 million population in the "newly 
liberated areas", where agrarian reform had been developed.
Later CCP investigation, relating to agrarian reform carried 
out in this period, strongly suggests that the movement as an 
instance of political integration was less than successful. When, 
in the crucial period, cadres moved "from points to surface, linking 
up the points with surface" (yn-tien tao-mien, tien-mien chieh-ho), 
they worked under tremendous pressure from higher levels to get on
5. Chou En-lai, "Political Report to the Third Session of the National 
Committee of the People*s Political Consultative Conference", in CB, 
No.134, November 5th 1951, p.9, from NcNa, November 2nd 1951. In a 
report on East China agrarian reform, the Vice-Chairman of the 
ECMAC Agrarian Reform Committee, Liu Jui-lung noted that 170,000 
activists had been trained in East China work corps. The figures 
suggest that East China was better able than other regions to meet 
the Party*s objective of training one activist per every thousand 
of population. See Liu Jui-lung, "Report on Agrarian Reform in 
East China", in CB, N0 .92, July 10th 1951, from Shanghai'y Hsin-wen 
jih-pao. March 19th 1951.
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as quickly as possible, and this pressure proved to be counter­
productive in relation to "political integration". Local-level 
disorientation, which resulted from inadequate preparations, 
short training time, too much "leaping" "from points to surface", 
low policy levels, etc., produced in the CCP’s own parlance a bowl 
of "half-cooked rice" (chia-shenkfan).
The problems of policy implementation, discussed below, relate 
not simply to "localism", but to the much greater issue of 
administrative distance and government communication. Administrative 
distance was a concrete, physical problem in terms of the numbers of 
trained, policy-conscious personnel available in a particular are£, 
but it was also a problem of policy articulation, and we might 
summarize what has already been said on this point, as the clarity 
of policy emphases would seem to have some considerable bearing on 
the relation of practice to theory in the implementation of policy. 
CCP leaders wanted genuine struggle and the elimination of the 
"feudal" social order, but they also wanted the restoration and 
development of production. There had to be mass internalization 
of ideology through struggle, but class conflict had to be carefully 
controlled and the targets delimited to 5 per cent of the population. 
Ideological conviction was forged on the anvil of class struggle, 
but class struggle was developed in the context of united front 
strategy and organization.
In terms of agrarian reform the tactic was always "bring 
together the majority and isolate the minority" (t'uan-chieh to-shu, 
ku-li hsiao-chu), which was explicitly rendered in the Party’s line, 
"depend on the poor peasants and hired labourers, ally with the 
middle peasants, counter-balance the rich peasants and eliminate 
the landlords" (i-k ’ao lcu-p*inAt ’uan-chien chung-nung. chung-li fu- 
nung, hsiao-mien ti-chu). In the context of the armed struggle of 
the 1930*s, Mao had consistently put forward the tactic of
6. Fortta statement of this strategy see "Shen-.iu k*ai-chan Chung-nan 
ch’uan-tang ti cheng-feng yun-tung". (Penetratingly develop the 
all-Party rectification movement in Central-South), in KPHHTL,
No.16, September 1950, p.91.
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concentrating forces at a weak point in the enemy's line, and often
opposed over-extension and attacking in more than one direction. In
other words, there was always to be a main line of attack. The 
tactic was applied politically in relation to the development of 
united front, Mao repeated this tactical emphasis at the third 
session of the seventh CCPCC in June 6th 1950:
"To sum up, we mustn't hit out in all directions. To
hit out in all four directions and cause nationwide
tension would not be very good. We certainly cannot afford 
to create too many enemies. While on one front we must
yield ground and ease tensions, we will concentrate our
forces to attack on another front. We will certainly want
to do our work well so that the workers, peasants and 
handicraftsmen will all support us while the great majority 
of national bourgeoisie will not oppose us."1*
The subtleties of the relation between class struggle and 
united front strategy rendered the implemention of agrarian reform 
policy more problematic at the basic levels. T0o much emphasis on 
united front led to impurity of peasant association membership, as 
landlords and rich peasants were able to infiltrate these 
organizations. Similarly, with the November 1950, radicalization of 
agrarian reform and the sterner emphasis on suppression of counter­
revolutionaries, the CCP leadership?attacked the deviation of 
"suppression with magnanimity"—  a deviation, which one might argue, 
originally derived from the generous co-optation plan, explicit in 
Mao's Peiping and Suiyuan patterns. A Jen-min jih-pao article 
specifically berated cadres for confusing the policy of suppression
g
with the policy for consolidation of united front.
On the other hand, too little emphasis on united front led to 
leftist deviations, which took the form of attacks on the middle 
peasant. Cadres were instructed to heed the wisdom of the slogan
7. Mao Tse-tung, "Pu-yao szu-mien ch'u chi". (Do not hit out in all 
directions), Mao Tse-tung hsuan-chi. Vol.5, Peking 1977, p.24.
8. Translated in CB, No .i01, July 24th 1951.
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"under heaven all peasants are of the same family" (t * ien-hsia nung-
9
min shih i-chia). Cadres were urged to organize a broad united 
front against feudalism, but they were also urged to protect the 
purity of the peasant associations, the composition of which was 
ideally two-thirds poor peasants and hired labourers and one-third 
middle peasants.
To gain an accurate impression of the problems faced by the 
cadres in agrarian reform work teams, when the centre moved against 
"peaceful land reform" and raised "taking a free hand to mobilize the 
masses", one must review the situation of the spring and summer of 
1950. Reports on agrarian reform and documents relating to the 
three s e ^ n s  rectification of 1950, revealed that serious problems 
had emerged in the course of the first stage of agrarian reform in 
the "newly liberated areas", in terms of both the level of mass 
mobilization and the extent of deviations committed by basic-level 
cadres. Rent reduction, deposit refund and the elimination of despots 
were not particularly successful, and from the CCP's vantage point the 
spectre of counter-revolution hung low over the countryside. The 
observations of agrarian reform leaders all pointed in one direction —  
the landlords1 social prestige had survived the first stage of 
agrarian reform.
On September 17th 1950, Teng Tzu-hui, Acting Chairman of the
CSMAC, reported on the work of the CSMAC over the previous six months.
He spoke of riots in Hunan, Hupen and Kiangsi, and the fact that
several scores of millions of catties of grain had been robbed or 
10
burned. He regretted that landlords, rich peasants and some middle 
peasants had failed to understand government policy. The fear of 
confiscation of what had been sowed, the fear of cancellation of debts 
and that the hiring of farm labourers would be illegal and the fear
9. For and example of this emphasis, refer to Tu Jen-sheng, "Tang-
chTien t*u ti kai-ko chih-tao chung ti chi-kp wen-t1i" (Several
problems in present leadership of agrarian reform", November 18th 
1950, KPHHTL, NQ .25, January 1951, p.26.
10. Teng Tzu-hui, "Report on the Work of the CSMAC during the Past Half
Year", in CB, NO.39, December 9th 1950, p.3, from CCJP, September 
1950.
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that bumper crops would invite heavy taxation —  all these fears
ii hibited planting and resulted in poor harvests and had led to a
disturbing situation, in which poor peasants, hired labourers and
handicraftsmen lacked food and seeds, had no access to loans and
suffered unemployment. The Vice-Director of the Central-South
Agrarian Reform Committee, Tu Jen-sheng, made similar points in his
September 18th report to the effect that rich peasants stook in
ignorance of government policy, had not developed production and
11
refused to make loans or hire labour.
Tu also claimed that bandits and agents had aggravated the
situation by spreading rumours, inciting revolts, stealing public
grain, murdering cadres, burning granaries, etc. He admitted that in
the course of the attempt to extend the rent reduction and deposit
refund campaign, which in part was designed to serve the purposes of
social welfare relief from natural disaster, part of the Central-South
Region had launched an unguided grain-loan movement, which encroached
12
on the interests of the middle peasants. Tu concluded that the 
experience gained during the campaign dramatically demonstrated the 
importance of preparatory work.
The March 1st 1950, directive of the Central-South Bureau,
13
relating to the rent reduction campaign, touched on many problems.
It appears that cadres had relied excessively on peasant conference
representatives and neglected the organization of the masses into
peasant associations. Landlord resistance had resulted in a volatile
situation, in which resistance was greeted with increasingly extreme
methods on the part of cadres. The poor peasants, whose demands
remained unsatisfied, reportedly refused to honour their debts and
14
encroached on the interests of the middle peasants. Cadres were 
admonished for neglecting the demands of the masses and failing to
11. Tu Jen-sheng, CB, No.39, p.22, from CCJP, September 1950.
12. Ibid., p.35.r T1 I* t!
13. ,fChung-kung chung-yang chung-nan chu fa-shih kuan-yu chien-tsu yun- 
tung ti erh tz*u chih-piao", (Second directive of the CCPCC CSB 
relating to the rent reduction campaign), in KPHHTL, April 1950,
No.6, pp.86-89o
14. Ibid., p.86.
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provide leadership in the rent reduction campaign. They were even 
criticized for having failed to distinguish land reform and rent 
reduction. The CSMAC directive stressed ’'legal struggle” and. 
stipulated that a limit on the return of deposits must be observed 
once resisting landlords have been dealt with. The authorities were 
concerned that in some instances the insistence on one hundred per 
cent return of deposits, held by landlords with business interests, 
might adversely affect commerce and industry and contribute to an 
already bad unemployment situation.
Acute shortages of experienced cadres affected the Party’s 
ability to implement the mass- line at the village level, and serious 
problems emerged as the agrarian reform authorities attempted to co­
ordinate formal Party and state structure with the action of social 
forces, organized into popular organization. An article, appearing 
in CCJP, commented on the progress of rent reduction in Honan, Hupen, 
Hunan and Kiangsi, and noted that the most serious problem was the 
failure to mobilize the masses. Cadres were warned against usurping 
the role of the masses. Furthermore, action by activists was not to 
be regarded as a substitute for mass participation. The CCJP 
commented:
’’But we can see from the most recent reports that in 
many areas there are still a greAt many mistakes. Of these 
mistakes, the most serious is that out cadres do not 
conscientiously, painstakingly and penetratingly on the 
basis of thought and organization mobilize the masses in the 
struggle for rent reduction. On the contrary they simply 
dash about seeking form and numbers, and this is but to 
adopt a simple method of compulsion, which is substituted 
for mass struggle, or in other cases struggle is initiated 
by a minority of peasant representatives and activists, 
substituting for action by the broad masses.
The same CCJP article, citing a report on Chung-yang hsien,
Hupen, warned that without the genuine mobilization of the masses,
IT
15. "Chiu-cheng chien-tsu yun-tung chung ti hsing-shih chu-i” .
(Rectify formalism in the rent reduction campaign), in KPHHTL, 
No.9, May 1950, p.43.
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there would be no triumph over the landlords. In this particular
instance, the peasants were to have received 7,500 piculs in the
course of the deposit refund campaign; however, the total regained
only amounted to 3,700 piculs. In some areas of the hsien, there were
X 6
no returns, while in others the landlords took back the refunds.
According to one report, the problem of ’’peaceful land reform”
was already evident in East China before the promulgation of the
Agrarian Reform Law. Common sayings such as ’’There is no feudalism
South of the Yangtze”, ’’Landlords south of the Yangtze esqploit
slightly and are more civilized than those in the North” were popular,
and landlord resistance during the setting up of models in the latter
17
half of July took the form of selling and dispersing of property.
One particular Shantung landlord had committed the ultimate act of 
counter-revolution; he cut out and fried pastries in the shape of Mao. 
This arch-fiend allegedly said over his pastry: ’’This is to fry
Chairman Mao. Agrarian reform originated with him” .
At the second plenary session of the ECMAC in July 1950, it was 
decided to select two hsiang in every hsien for model agrarian reform. 
During the session Jao Shu-shih delivered a major address, the main 
points of which were in keeping with the line, set forth in Liu Shao- 
chfi Ts report of June 1950. Jao emphasized the need for cautious 
preparations. He was sure that with the new circumstances of country­
side liberation, land reform could be accomplished in a "peaceful 
fashion", despotic landlords be carefully distinguished from non- 
despotic landlords. Also according to Jao's reckoning, caution was 
particularly needed in the implementation of agrarian reform in areas 
close to Canton, Shanghai and Ningpo, which were characterized by 
high population density, food shortages and concentrations of self- 
employed workers and pedlars who owned land. Jao stressed "preserve 
the rich peasant economy" and it is obvious from the following statement 
that he was of the opinion that the problems of administrative distance 
necessitated a go-slow approach:
16. Rectify formalism in the rent reduction campaign, op.cit.a p°44.
17. Liu Jui-lung, "Report on Agrarian Reform in East China", CFJP, March
19th 1951, in CB, N0 .92, July 10th 1951, p.3. Chinese text in HHYP,
Vol.3, N0.6, April 1951, pp.1261-63.
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"Our cadres in terms of numbers and quality are 
inadequate and weak. Relations between outside and local 
cadres do not go deep. Old cadres are deficient in 
their experience of new conditions but new cadres have 
yet to be steeled in class struggle. For these reasons 
over the course of our leadership of agrarian reform in 
the various areas of East China we must choose an 
administrative strategy of moving forward in a cautious 
step by step manner.
The lack of experienced personnel in the "newly liberated areas"
led to difficulties in applying the mass line and insuring the
smooth co-ordination between formal structure and the popular
organization of social forces. A Chang-chiang jih-pao editorial of
August 16th 1950, pointed out that due to different local conditions,
people's tribunals were functioning in some areas, and yet not
19
functioning at all in other areas. The editorial expressed great 
concern over the lack of organization and the incompetence, which 
characterized the functioning of the tribunals. Cadres had failed 
to appreciate that these tribunals were not "kill-people courts" 
(sha-.ien t ’ing) or "struggle meetings" (tou-cheng hui). It was 
admitted that some judges were only temporary and had little training. 
Attention was drawn to the regrettable lack of uniformity in the 
application of regulations, which, it was feared, would lead to 
anarchy. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that there had been a lack 
of co-ordination between related agencies and popular organization. 
Peasants* representative conferences had been substituted for people's 
tribunals, and tribunals were confused with struggle meetings. It was 
further stressed that, although the people's tribunals were not under 
the direct leadership (i.e., ling-tap) of the people’s courts (jen-min 
fa-yuan). they, nonetheless, had to accept the courts* "leadership", 
(i.e. chih-tao) in relation to the specific interpretation of the laws.
18. Jao Shu-'&hih, "Wei wan-ch* eng hua-tung t *u-ti kai-ko erh tou-cheng" , 
(Struggle to complete East China land reform), in HHYP, Vol-2, No.4, 
August 1950, p.791, from CFJP, July 23rd 1950.
19. "T*u-ti kai-kp chung ti jen-min fa-t1ing" (People’s tribunals in the 
course of agrarian reform), in KPHHTL, N0 .15, September 1950, p.43.
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Similarly, there had also been some confusion as to the relation
between the tribunals and peasant associations and peasants*
20
representative conferences. It was emphasized that, although-the
tribunals received documentation, relating to accusations, from the
peasant associations and representative conferences, these popular
organizations were not to act as law enforcement agencies.
A Chang-chiang .jih-pao editorial of August 19th>1950, discussed
at some length the necessity of adequate political preparation prior
to the implementation of agrarian reform and underlined the point
that agrarian reform in the Central-South must be more careful and
systematic than in North China. Most significantly, the editorial
directed readers* attention to the phenomenon of "half-cooked rice” .
The cadres had gone through the motions of agrarian reform without
having actually mobilized the masses. The basic problem was seen as
one of leadership. Cadres were unfamiliar with the true political
condition of the masses, and during the anti-despot and rent reduction
stage of agrarian reform, they had erroneously overestimated the
enthusiasm of the masses with the result that work in only twenty
21
per cent of villages could be classified as satisfactory. Reports
from outside Central-South emphasized the same point, namely that the
22
basis of mass work and cadres* strength were unsatisfactory.
During the months of October and November, however, East China,
Central-South and Northwest summing-up conferences criticized
"peaceful land distribution", and called for a more radical
23
mobilization of the masses. This deviation was a challenge in 
basic principle in so far as "political integration" was to be defined 
as the mass internalization of ideological "truth".
20. "T*u-tl. kai-ko chung-ti jen-min fa-t*ing,F« pp.cit., p.47. • ' »
21. "Chung-shih t *u-kai pei kung-tso, tso hao t *u-kai ch.i-pei kung-tso", 
(Emphasize preparation work for agrarian reform, do*'agrarian reform
work well), CCJP, August 19th 1950, in KPHHTL, No.15, September 1950, p.35.
22. For example see Hsi Chung-hsun, "Kuan-yti hsi-pei ch*u t *u-ti kai-ko chi ■ 
hua ti pao-kao", (Report on the plan for agrarian reform in the Northwest 
region), July 14th 1950, in HH7P, August 1950, Vol.2, N0o4, pp.791-793.
23. See Liao Lu-yen, "On year of the Agrarian Reform Movement", NCNA, Peking, 
July 2nd 1951, SCMP, N0 .132, July 11th 1951, p.9.
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A December 5th directive of the East China Bureau noted the 
following point in relation to the new policy emphases in agrarian 
reform:
"American imperialism is now engaged in expanding wars 
of aggression. Counter-revolutionaries inside and outside 
the country are now stepping up their destructive activities.
East China is on the front line of national defence.
Imperialist and remnant KM'f forces have not yet been 
adequately eliminated. Only if we speedily complete agrarian 
reform can we consolidate victories, already won, and only 
then will we be in a position to bring about a new situation,
For these reasons we propose that an early completion of land 
reform is at present the most urgent task in East China."^4
At this point in time, the fear of restoration, or counter­
revolution and the possibility of an American invasion of China 
counted for more in determining the "centre of work" than the emphasis 
on production. Consistent with this new focus was the adoption of 
a harder strategy towards the treatment of counter-revolutionaries, 
as the CCP began to rethink the problems and dangers associated with 
its earlier policies of magnanimous co-optation. CCP leaders claimed 
that the Koreaft War had emboldened counter-revolutionaries and that 
landlord resistance to agrarian reform had dramatically intensified.
The GAR agrarian reform authorities responded by drawing up regulations
25
for the punishment of "law-breaking" landlords.
24. "Chung-kung chung-yang hua-tung chu kuan-yu t 1i tsao wan-ch1eng t*u-ti 
kai-ko ti chih-shih", (CCPCC CSB directive in relation to the early 
completion of land reform in East China), December 5th 1950, HTCC'CTC^
Vol.2, p.1996.
25. See "Hua-tung chTeng-shih pu-fa ti-chu tsan-hsing t* iao-lieh". 
(Provisional East China regulations for the punishment of law-breaking 
landlords), September 19th 1950, in HTCCCTC, - Vol.2, pp.2001-2004. The 
Central-South regulations, promulgated on November 19th, almost repeated 
verbatim the same provisions. See "Chung-nan chpn-cheng. wei-vuan hui 
kung-shih: Ch*eng-chih pu-f a ti-chu tsan-hsing t f iao-lieh" . (Provisional 
regulations for the punishment of law-breaking landlords, promulgated by 
the CSMAC), in KPHHTL, No.23, December 1950, pp.65-68. These provisions 
established a sliding scale of culpability, the seriousness of the crime, 
relating to the degree of political content. The regulations anticipated 
landlord attempts to disperse their properties through the use of false 
names, mortgaging, gifts, etc. Hie regulations further anticipated 
landlord attempts to slaughter livestock and to damage or destroy 
buildings and tools before distribution.
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The CCP leadership was not then prepared to accept '’half-cooked 
rice"; however, while there was an often stated recognition of the 
need for solid preparation in terms of cadre training and mass 
organization, higher Party and state levels generated a pressure for 
the speedy conclusion of agrarian reform, which fell with some force 
on lower levels„ Simply, the new tempo of agrarian reform stood in 
contradiction to the basic aim of agrarian reform, namely the 
development of political consciousness. Under the new timetable of 
agrarian reform, there was no time for really solid preparational 
work. This contradiction is explicit in December 1950, directive of 
the Kwangtung provincial people's government, in which it was noted 
that there was no time for an extended period of cadre training, and 
that it would be necessary to adopt the method, "the teacher taking 
along the disciple"*. It might well be asked whether such a method 
is consistent with the mass*line. The method was rationalized in 
terms of the importance to insure continuing momentum in class struggle, 
but is it consistent with a definition of political integration which 
is predicated on the importance of conscious ideological commitment?
The directive e:xplicitly repudiated those who felt that time was
27
too short to insure the full mbilization of the masses. But the 
reports c£ spring and summer 1950, which we have already discussed, 
indicated a serious lack of leadership at the basic levels and stressed 
the supreme importance of preparation. And the extent of deviations 
such as "peaceful land distribution", as apprehended by the leaders of 
agrarian reform, indicated all the more that there was a serious lack 
of preparation. One is, therefore, left to speculate as to the degree 
to which a "preliminary understanding of policy" and a "firm stand", as 
outlined in this December 1950, directive, would substitute for adequate 
preparation. Here, we are dealing with a point which is nothing less 
than central to the totality of Chinese Communist organizational experience 
as it relates to how closely can theory and practice be united.
26, Canton, NPJP, December 2nd 1950, in SCMP, N0„31, December 15-16, 1950, 
p.31.
27, Ibid., p.32.
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In terms of the history of CCP organization, circumstances had 
necessitated training 0n the job. As early as November 1928, Mao 
remarked on this problem in relation to the training of soldiers:
"Ordinarily a soldier needs six months' or a year's 
training before he can fight, but our soldiers, recruited 
only yesterday, have to fight today with practically no 
training,, Poor in military technique, they fight on courage 
alone. As long period of rest and training are out of the 
question, the only thing to do is to try and avoid engagements 
if possible and thus gain time for training,"28
However, in the post-1949 context and in the light of the June 1950, 
strategic emphasis on orderly stage by stage development of agrarian 
reform, presumably there should have been time for adequate 
preparation, and the question arises whether "a preliminary under­
standing of policy, of ways and means for adherence to the mass-line 
and of principles for the differentiation of class status" was 
adequate to the task at hand.
The CCP, in its attempt to come to grips with the basic dilemma 
of administrative distance, employed the law of "from points to 
surface, linking points and surface" (yu-tien tao mien, tien-mien 
chieh-ho). For an authoritative explanation of this "law" we can
refer to the speeches of two GAR agrarian reform leaders, Jao Shu-shih
29
and Teng~Tzu-hui„
The CCP leadership was confident that this strategy would help to 
prevent the dispersion of leadership and the dispersion of organizational 
resources during the course of class differentiation and land distribution. 
However, one might choose to implicit of Jao's combination of the three 
methods of "leading" (tai). "pushing" (t*ui) and leaping (t'iao), the 
contradiction between tempo and genuine mobilization. Momentum and 
speed were seen as to have a positive quality in that such emphases 
would help to demoralize the landlords, destroying their social prestige
28„ Mao Tse-tung, "The Struggle in the Chinkang Mountains", SW, Vol-1, p.82.
29. Jao Shu-shih, "Experiences in East China Land Reform Experiments Summed 
Up", in SCMP, No.39, December 29-31 1950, pp.43-45. Chinese text, "Hua- 
tung t'u-ti kai-ko tien-hsing shih-yen ching-yen tsung-chi" in KPHHTL, 
N0o26 February 195±, pp.65-67. For Teng Tzu-hui's idea on the subject 
refer to "Kuan-yu t'u-ti kai-ko ti chi-kp chi-pen wen-t*i", (Several 
basic problems with respect of agrarian reform), December 26th 1950, 
KPHHTL, No.26, February 1951, pp.19-36.
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and breaking the back of resistance; however, ldiat becomes critical is 
the ability to judge when conditions are sufficiently ripe so that 
cadres can "push" or "leap".
Jao certainly indicated that he wanted both solid preparation and 
momentum, and, hence, his three methods have to be seen in the context 
of the following qualification:
"Each step in land reform is the integration of previous 
experience in reform experiments with local conditions.
Hie work will then be extended to other districts, as each 
stage prepares the conditions for the next step. Hiis 
method is both steady and quick, and avoids the pitfalls of 
overhastiness and drag."30
However, one must ask whether or not cadres with only a "preliminary
understanding" of policy and the mass-line were able to make the subtle
distinctions, necessary, boldly mobilizing the masses when conditions
wwre ripe, but steadily advancing step by step when policy-levels were
low and the masses ill-prepared. Jao very clearly warned against bold
advance without preparation: "As long as leadership is not experienced,
or is not acquainted with local conditions, it is entirely correct and
31
necessary to stress the policy of care and steady advance.."
Indeed, implicit in this law of "from points to surface" is the 
notion of building step by step, reminiscent perhaps of the building 
of Kiangsi soviets. A key-point would be consolidated and would act 
as a model for and exert influence on Contiguous points. Once 
sufficient momentum was achieved, the points could be boldly linked 
and a plane or surface established. This method also implies a pattern 
of personnel transfer, which facilitates the concentration of 
experienced personnel at one key-point. Hie pattern is suggestive of 
well-tried principles of guerilla strategy, whereby a numerical 
superiority is achieved at weak spots in the enemy*s lines.
Jao described the pattern of personnel transfer between key-points 
and contiguous points in the following way:
30. Jao, "Experiences Summed Up, etc.", op.cit. . p.43.
31. Ibid., p.44.
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"The method to be used is to transfer a large group 
of experienced peasant cadres and members of land reform 
corps to development work throughout the ch*u« under the 
principle of covering the whole district and massing them 
at selective points* That is to say, on the one hand, one 
or two hsiang are to be selected as basic villages where 
cadres should be concentrated and where intensive work is 
to be carried out, in order to break through at the centre*
On the other hand, a certain number of cadres should be 
deployed at outlying villages for setting in motion the 
movement there. The outlying villages should 
rotation send cadres and peasant activists to the basic 
villages for study and basic villages should from time to 
time send cadres to outlying villages to report on their 
experiences."32
Jao wanted to use "basic villages" to lead the "outlying 
villages"5 however, his method required a particularly fine sense 
of timing, for if the tempo was too quick the relation between "basic 
villages", or key-pointy and "outlying villages", or prospective key- 
points, would become distorted* Rather sanguine, Jao expressed 
confidence that all would be well, provided the tempo of work in the 
"outlying villages" . .. kept a step or two behind that of the "basic 
villages"*
In theory the key-point method was a highly rational solution to 
the difficulties of administrative distance, Teng Tzu-hui, in his 
December 26th 1950, discussion of problems m  the implementation of 
agrarian reform, pointed out that more than twenty years of experience 
had adequately demonstrated the correctness of this method* M 0re
specifically, he outlined three reasons why this method wap particularly
' 33
appropriate to the Central-South-in December'1950.
First, he argued that the revolution had developed unevenly 
(indeed one might also note tnat all the mass campaigns of the early 
1950fs developed unevenly)* The difference in terms of the relative 
strength of peasants and "feudal" forces between two hsien or two 
hsiang- cowaU  Teng argued, be as great as that between heaven and earth. 
Tena like Jao, was very aware that this pattern of unevenness placed a 
very high premium on localization if agrarian reform was to succeed, and 
he pointedly remarked:
32* Jao, "Experiences Summed Up, etc.", op*cit*. p.44* 
33* Teng, "Kiian-yu t fu-ti kai-ko etc", pp.cit.. p.30.
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"..ooften in one hsien the peasants' revolutionary 
dictatorship will already have been established and yet 
in the next hsien the peasants will be under either the 
overt or covert control of feudal forces- Under such 
conditions, we cannot simply rely on outside forces and 
the substitution of administrative fiat for mass 
mobilization
To achieve successful results, the key-point method depended on the 
recruitment of local activists as well as the circulation of 
experienced cadres with tested leadership ability.,
Secondly, Teng conceded that there just was not enough cadres. 
There were very few cadres who had experience of land reform and 
the mass- line and who also had a correct grasp of policy. Teng 
claimed that often there were only one or two such cadres per hsien. 
Teng observed that had there been enough cadres, experienced in class 
struggle, then a wider front would have been possible, but victory 
had been too sudden, and the newly liberated area of Central-South 
was too vast while the number of cadres was too small- A blitz, 
whereby all points were attacked simultaneously, was completely 
impracticable..
Thirdly, arguing from the perspective of a union of theory and
practice, Teng claimed that the land reform regulations of themselves
were of less significance than the accumulation of experience- Land
reform was a new experience,. The masses did not have experience, nor
did the majority of cadres. To his mind, the key-point strategy
provided an unparalleled opportunity to train cadres on the spot and,
thus, develop their creativityP
Teng explained that there were two ways of going "from points to
surface", which entailed two different ways of circulating scarce man-
35power resources, and capitalizing on the experience of old cadres, 
first, he considered applying the key-point strategy in a "wave-like" 
action, taking one basic village and expanding the circumference of 
action to include up to ten other villages- The basic village would 
give impetus to and assist the other villages, and during this process 
many cadres would be cultivated.
34. Teng, "Kuan-yu t.Tu-ti kai-ko, etc.", op.cito, p.30o
35. Ibid.. p.31. In this particular passage, Teng's use of the words 
"peasant dictatorship" (nung-min chuan-cheng) casts sane doubt oh his 
understanding of Marxism-Leninism.
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The second method of "leaping", implied greater momentum 
in as much as cadres could, given favourable local conditions, be 
transferred, before the initial key-point had been consolidated, to
TT
other hsiang or c h fu 0 Teng specifically suggested that, if work was 
going well at the key-point, a few cadres could be retained at the 
key-point to consolidate work, while the rest of the cadres could be 
grouped into three units and despatched to create three new key-points.
As for the final stage of linking points to surface, Teng 
instructed hsien and ch*u leadership organs to pay close attention 
to eight cardinal rules paraphrased as follows: (1) in the course of
preparing one point and then the next, insure an appropriate distance 
between points; (2) initially restrict work to ch*u and hsiang 
levels; (3) to maximize the effect of victory in one hsien or ch'tu
M
mobilize peasants in neighbouring ch*u to send representatives to the 
basic villages to witness and link up with the experience there;
(4) once a keyepoint has been penetrated, focus on transfer of cadres 
to work in new key-points, but also take care to consolidate old key- 
points, hence all cadres are not to be transferred at once; (5) once
M
several key-points have been penetrated, call an all-ch'ti and all-hsien 
peasants* representatives conference to discuss the agrarian reform 
laws and the experience of work in key-points; the conference is to 
be used as forum for enlarging propaganda activity, exchanging
experiences and cultivating activists; (6) at the appropriate time,
"  ^ ^ "  convene all-ch*u united struggle meetings; (7) the hsien and ch*u
agrarian reform committees must at the appropriate time convene meetings
m it
meetings of all responsible cadres m  the hsien or ch*u to summarize 
work at key-points; (8) hsien and ch*u agrarian reform committees 
must resolutely grasp agrarian reform as the centre of work, co­
ordinating various related types of work in order to further that task. 
As described by Teng and Jao, the key-point method appears as 
a highly rational strategy to overcome the uneven pattern of political 
integration in rural China and also a way of overcoming the difficulties 
of administrative distance. The key-point strategy was integral to 
the success of failure of many of the mass campaigns of the early 
1950*s, but it was probably most developed in the agrarian reform 
movement.
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In the case of the wu~fan movement, the time elapsed between
key-point investigation and demonstration of models and the extension
of the campaign "from points to surface" as often a matter of weeks,
hence one suspects that the strategy was more of a perfunctory impulse
than anything else. Perhaps leadership in the cities was more
concentrated, and, hence, there was less need for such a strategy. At
any rate, the strategy was once again applied on a nationwide scale
in terms of preparing elections at all levels in 1953.
However, the real test of a strategy is in its implementation.
One more than suspects that the dimensions of the ''peaceful
distribution" deviation were such that the pressure to get on with
agrarian reform militated against the rational application of the
lcey-point strategy with the result that more "leaping" was done, and
the appropriate distance and relationship between basic and outlying
villages became problematic*
On November 29th 1950, it was reported that the CSMAC had
approved requests from the provincial governments of Hunan, Hupeh and
Kiangsi for the extension of the area, earmarked for agrarian reform
in the winter of 1950 and the spring of 1951 At that time, it was
noted that there would be no extension in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, where
bandit bands had not been completely eliminated, and where conditions
were not considered ripe; however, on December.2nd 1950, it was
reported that the Kwangtung government had received CSMAC approval to
37extend the agrarian reform area from three to eleven hsien.
Similarly, in late November during the second conference relating 
to models of agrarian reform experience in East China, Jao Shu-shih 
switched to an emphasis on "talcing a free hand to mobilize the masses 
under proper leadership", and in the beginning of December, the ECMAC 
approved an expansion of the area to be covered in the 1950-51 slack 
season; for example, the number of hsien affected in Fukien, jumped
36* NCNAp Hankow, November 29th 1950, in SCMP, NOo20, November 30th 
1950, pp.8-9o
37. SCMP, N0.22, December 3-4 1950, p„18, from Nf j p ? December 2nd 1950.
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from six to forty-three. The projected total of rural population, 
covered under the revised programme, was 66 million, representing
38
an increase of 19 million over the original subject population.
CCP propaganda concentrated on the theme of counter-revolution,
explicit in the "peaceful land reform" deviation. When Tu Jen-sheng
reported on November 19th 1950, as to problems in the leadership of
Central-South agrarian reforr^,he .treated "peaceful distribution" as
a regional and not simply a Kwangtung problem. He observed that out
of every 100 hsiang. twenty could be characterized as "good", while
39
thirty could be said to be "very bad". The Chang-chiang iih-pao
in an editorial of December 6th 1950, claimed that "peaceful land
reform" had infected thirty per cent of village land reform 
40
demonstrations. "Peaceful land reform" was related to liberalism, 
and, hence, stood antithetical to Marxism-Leninism. The editorial 
was also critical of cadres, who were preoccupied with the technical 
aspects of distribution. This "8-step 3-relationship" thinking, which 
over-emphasized orderly step-by-step progress and the importance of 
leadership, reportedly down-played the significance of struggle, and 
thus contributed to the "peaceful land reform" deviation.
The CCP continued in its emphasis to the effect that different 
tactics were to be adopted in different areas; however, the 
reasoning behind the "peaceful land reform" deviation was vigorously 
attacked. Hence the arguments that the south was different from the 
north in that the patterns of land tenure were different south of the 
Yangtze, were viewed as erroneous in so far as they related to the 
degree of feudal oppression exhibited in any given region.
38. Liu Jui-lung, "Report on Agrarian Reform in East China", March 19th 
1951, CB, N0 .91, p.3.
39. Tu Jen-sheng, "Tang-ch*ien t *u-ti kai-ko chih-tao chung ti chi-ko 
wen-t*i" . (Several problems of present day agrarian reform leader­
ship), KPHHTL, N0.25, January 1951, p.21.
40o "Chiu-cheng ho-pT ing fen-t1ien ssu-hsiang fang-shpu fa-tung chun 
chung". (Rectify peaceful land distribution thought, take a free 
hand to mobilize the masses) in KPHHTL, N0 .25, January 1951, p.31.
For example, Chang Ken-sheng, in his analysis of the pattern
of land ownership in Central-South refuted the notion that land
was more dispersed in the south than the northo He argued that
under the "reactionary rule" of the KM1^  bureaucrats and landlords
41 ‘
had managed to acquire large land holdings. In the Tung-ting
Lake region, for example, many big landlords had allegedly connived
with the government to secure large areas of lake-shore each year.
Chang similarly contended that warlords and bureaucrats in
Kwangtung had managed to gain ownership of one third of the land.
As for clan land, which in the Kiangnan areas of Hunan, Kiangsi and
Hupeh, accounted for more than fifteen per cent of land (the figure
ran as high as thirty per cent in parts of Kwangtung), Chang argued
that such land contributed to the feudal domination of landlords,
42
who controlled the clans and secret societies.
Given the extent of the "peaceful land reform" deviation, one 
can readily see the problems of policy implementation at the basic 
levels —  problems which no doubt arose out of overt or covert 
resistance on the part of landlords and widespread peasant mis­
understanding of policy, but which also stemmed from the 'lack of 
an organizational network, staffed by experienced cadres.
The extent to which the key-point strategy was rationally 
implemented is revealed in the detailed summaries of land reform 
experiences, which were included in reinvestigation documentation.
This documentation, concerning the later stages of agrarian reform, 
strongly suggest serious problems in leadership at the basic levels 
and tends to support the view that the CCP did not achieve its primary 
objective in agrarian reform, namely the generation of genuine 
political consciousness on the part of the masses in the "newly 
liberated" countryside. One of course must approach the reinvestigation
41. Chang further develops tiis critique of the "South is different
argument" in a CCJP article of November 12th 1950 in HHYPA Vol.l,
No.3, November 1950, pp.45-47. Here refer to Chang Ken-.sheng "Chung- 
nan chTu lcp-sheng nung-ts *un she-hui chleh-chi ching-k’uang yu tsu- 
t fien kuan-hsi ti chfu-pu t *iao-chia" . (Preliminary investigations of 
the relation between class conditions in villages of the various 
provinces of the Central-South Region to rented lands) in KPHHTL3 
No.15, September 1950.
42. Chang Ken-sheng, KPHHTL, N0.15, Sept'emDei* 1950, p.64.
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documentation with a considerable degree of circumspection as these 
cases of problem hsiang received publicity as "bad examples". These 
cases were used to highlight agrarian reform implementation 
difficulties and, thus, to educate cadres; therefore, one might 
anticipate that some problems were purposefully exaggerated in order 
to achieve an heuristic end.
In his June 16th 1951, report on land reform in East China
villages, Hu Kung reckoned that between mid-December 1950 and mid-
January 1951, 35,656 hsiang (i.e. 81 per cent of total East China
43
hsiang) had experienced land reform. Hu reported that due to 
different conditions in work and personnel, the movement had not 
developed evenly, and he established three rough categories to deal 
with this unevenness. 30 per cent of hsiang, according to H u ’s 
reckoning, belonged in the first category. Agrarian reform had been 
satisfactorialy conducted in these hsiang. Not surprisingly,
50 per cent of hsiang were placed in the intermediate category. The 
hsiang in this category had basically completed agrarian reform, but 
the cadres in these hsiang had been over hasty in the classification 
of individual’s class status and had not yet distributed all the 
fruits of reform. The districts of the third category, accounting 
for roughly 20 per cent of hsiang, cadres had usurped the role of the 
masses, and in many cases protected landlords.
In his report at the third plenary session of the ECMAC, Liu 
Jui-lung indicated general satisfaction with the progress of land 
reform in East China. Liu did admit that excesses had occurred in 
November-December 1950, when feelings over the Korean War were 
running high. Apparently, uneducated masses had then punished land­
lords, stripping them, beating them and making them eat cow dung, and 
leading cadres, who had been distracted by preparations for war, had 
initially failed to rectify the situation. But according to Liu, the 
situation was rectified after Jao Shu-shih issued directives on 
December 24th 1950, and January 4th 1951, urging cadres to restore
43. Hu Kang, "Land Reform in East China Villages", NCNa , Shanghai, 
June 16th 1951, SCMP, N0 .119, June 19th 1951, pp.4-6.
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discipline in the villages. On the whole, Liu was satisfied that in 
the majority of hsien, agrarian reform had been implemented properly.
He proclaimed the success of East China agrarian reform in these terms:
"Agrarian reform in East China has been carried out 
under leadership and in an orderly fashion. Preparatory 
work in various localities was relatively complete and 
under the leadership in the various localities, the policy 
of mobilizing the masses with a free hand under proper 
leadership was effectively grasped from beginning to end.
Hie distinction between various policies for agrarian 
reform were rigorously upheld. The general line of 
relying on poor peasants and hired labourers and uniting 
with middle peasants was thoroughly carried out, and the 
strategy of model danonstrations and linking points to 
surface was grasped from beginning to e n d . " ^
Liufs colleagues in the Central-South had less reason for
congratulatory messages. In the Central-South Mhalf-cooked rice"
situations were common where key-points had not been consolidated,
and where the move "from key-points to surface" was often premature.
A report based on the reinvestigation of Peng-hsing c h fu , Siao-kan
hsien, in Hupeh, noted serious problems in "intermediate" hsiang in
Hupeh. It was reported that landlords had escaped the rigours of class
struggle by buying protection from peasants and having themselves
misclassified as rich or middle peasants. It was furthermore
asserted that many village peasant associations functioned in name
only. Attitudes of the peasants after agrarian reform suggested a
very low degree of politicization. The report concluded: "Thus
although there are a few activists, the peasant masses as a whole
tend to be preoccupied with production and indifferent towards
45
political questions." The problem of peasant collaboration was 
particularly vexing; for example, in No.8 Village half the peasants 
were alleged to have helped landlords disperse their property.
A directive of the Central-South Bureau, dated December 28th 1951, 
re-emphasized steady advance and the thorough preparation of key-points
44. Liu Jui-lung, "Kuan-yti hua-tung t *u-ti kai-ko kung-tso ti pao-kao",
CFJP, March 29th 1951, in HHYP, Vol.3, No.6, April 25th 1951, p.1263.
45. Hankow, CCJP, August 28th 1951, SCMP, No.179, September 21-22 1951,
pp.30-32.
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The Honan provincial authorities subsequently stressed that it would 
be better to leave agrarian reform uncompleted in some hsiang until 
after spring ploughing rather than rushing the process through.
Hupeh responded by concentrating on "advanced” and "intermediate" 
villages, postponing action in villages of the third category until 
after spring ploughing. Kwangsi and Kiangsi similarly contracted 
the front of agrarian reform.
A bulletin of the CSMAC Agrarian Reform Committee summed up the 
situation as follows:
"Yet owing to the fact that there are a large number 
of soldiers, but not enough generals, forces of leadership 
became more and more scattered as tljgy spread wider and 
wider and grew weaker and weaker."
In other words, personnel transfer, as envisioned in the key-point
strategy had failed.
This bulletin of February 3rd 1952, also drew attention to
statistics, covering several hsien. which had revealed that 50 per
cent of peasants in these hsiang had been deceived by the landlords'
tactics of scattering their properties and that even more alarming
10 per cent of the peasants had actually collaborated with the land-
47
lords in their cover-up of their real properties» It was estimated 
that 20 per cent of cadres had committed errors. The following 
statement helps to explain why so many deviations occurred:
"Owing to the fact that there is a pressing schedule 
of work, leading organizations have not been able, nor 
has it been possible to conduct this work in a planned 
manner."48
The CCP Central-South authorities quite explicitly recognized that the 
tempo of agrarian reform during the extension of the movement, 
initiated in the latter part of November 1950, had militated against 
the rational implementation of the key-point strategy. Cadres had 
rushed ahead without adequate preparation "from points to surface".
The bulletin also recognized that the Central-South*s meagre manpower 
resources had been overcommitted and anticipated unavoidable
46. Hankow, CCJP, February 5th 1952, SCMP, N0 .282, February 26th 1952, 
p. 33 a
47. Ibid., p.35.
48. Ibid.. p.36.
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distraction as leading authorities and organizations divided their
49
attention between agrarian reform and the current san~fan movement.
The results of reinvestigation in Honan province confirmed the
February 3rd assessment of the Central-South Bureau in rather
startling fashion as Honan had earlier been held up as an example of
50
good preparation and consolidation in agrarian reform work,
Chao Ping-yeh, in an article entitled ’’Serious Problems Concealed
in Advanced Hsiang in Honan", which appeared in the January 16th 1952,
issue of Chang-chiang ,jih-papq placed his findings in the context of
the concern pervading the leaderships thinking over the threat of
counter-revolution and the possible contamination of CCP cadres,
exposed to large numbers of retained KMT personnel. Chao claimed
that in Yu-chuang hsiang and Hsu-chfang hsien (areas which had
achieved "advanced" status), the "feudal rulers" had survived the
high tide of class struggle. The landlords, according to Chao, had
5i
managed to perpetuate their power by bribing cadres. Chao also 
accused leading cadres of leaving village mobilization to village 
cadres and activists. He reported that the masses were only 
interested in production and not interested in class enemies.
P Tei Meng-fei in his reinvestigation of "advanced" hsiang;' in 
Honan similarly criticised old cadres for failing to go deep into 
the masses and for usurping the role of the masses. The following 
comment regarding the implementation of the key-point strategy is 
particularly revealing:
"Another reason why it has not been possible to penetrate 
into the midst of hired farm hands and poor peasants is that 
the leading organization has forsaken its duty. Hie 
establishment of key-points in every c h U t has broken the 
combination law of points and surfaces. This has shifted 
leading organization to a passive position and thrown it into 
bustle and confusion,,"52
49. Hankow, CCJP, February 5th 1952, op.cit., p.35.
50. For example see the CCJP editorial of August 12th 1950, which 
eulogized the success of a twenty-four day rectification meeting, 
called by the Honan Provincial Party Committee, in KPHHTL,-,"No. 16, 
September 1950, p.91.
51. Hankow, CCJP, January 16th 1952, SCMP, N0.268, February 5th 1952, p.19. 
520 Hankow, CCJP, February 22nd 1952, in SCMP, N0 .296, March 16-17 1952,
p.32.
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The CCP explicitly recognized that difficulties in agrarian 
reform stemmed from cadre leadership and in the final stages of 
agrarian reform in the Central-South a movement to purify and 
reorganize the rank and file was initiated in March and April 1952, 
Cadre conferences in the hsien and special district levels were then 
convened to review cadre standpoint, work-style and ideological 
conviction.
On March 1st, the Chang-chiang jih-pao reported that the 
Central-South Bureau had ordered the reorganization of the ranks in 
Honan, In the decision, which was circulated throughout Central- 
South China, the Bureau accepted reinvestigation allegations and 
expressly stated:
’’This data shows the impurity of the ranks of land 
reform cadres is serious. Particularly terrible is the 
serious impurity of the c h Tu cadres who lost their
political stand and protected landlords and counter­
revolutionaries. '*53
The following comment indicates that the Central-South Bureau 
perceived that the rush, which had taken place in agrarian reform
after November 1950, had led to the irrational implementation of the
key-point strategy:
’’The failure to lay stress on the reorganization of the 
ranks during 1950-1951 when ground work was laid for land 
reform and re-examination work, has been a painful lesson. 
Hereinafter, we must reorganize the ranks (both in the 
course of the present land reform and re-examination work 
and in the course of the future "three-anti" campaign in 
hsien, ch*u and hsiang) in order to ensure thorough, 
victory of the struggle for social reform in the 
countryside."^4
According to the data on Kiangsi, then available to the Central- 
South Bureau, 6 per cent of land reform cadres were seriously impure 
and another 22.6 per cent had to be subjected to Party discipline.
The report stressed that 60 per cent and in seme cases 90 per cent
53. Hankow, CCJP, March 1st 1952, SCMP, N0.299, March 20th 1952, 
p.12-14.
54. Ibid.. p.11.
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of village cadres manifested impure ideology and working style,
and to underline this fact it was duly noted: "This estimate is
55
not exaggerated and accords witli the practical situation."
Judging by the tremendous concentrations of personnel in 
Kwangtung and the extended life of agrarian reform there, that 
province proved to be the toughest "nut1* to crack. On April 
16th 1952', T Tao Chu, fourth secretary of the South China Sub- 
Bureau spoke in rather forceful terms to an enlargened cadre 
conference, convened by the Party Committee of the Central Kwang­
tung Special District. Reorganization of the rank and file was 
crucial in T ,ao,s view for the problems in Kwangtung did not simply 
stem from the lack of experience on the part of cadres. The 
problems were fundamentally ideological, stemming from improper 
style of work and lack of firm standpoint.
T?ao then looked back on the last two years of agrarian reform 
in KwAngtung and revealed his own frustration as to the overall 
question of communication, which bedevilled the land reform 
experience when he said:
"The present question is, we have gone astray so much 
and there is still not a path that is relatively straight.
This is what defies explanation. Why has it often been 
difficult to fulfil the policies? Why have we always gone 
astray? You point out to them £i.e. basic-level cadres^ 
that it is wrong to stage colourful demonstrations and' 
they stop struggle completely and the rest is silence. You 
point out to them that "peaceful agrarian reform" is out 
of the question, and they stage colourful demonstrations, 
indulging in riotous struggles and riotous distributions.
They are always reluctant to mingle with the peasants and 
to accept the "3 together" principle. Especially to be 
mentioned is the tendency of violating the law and 
discipline, indulging in wilful practices, protecting 
landlords either openly or illicitly, employing depraved 
persons, abetting the landlords animus, suppressing the 
voice of the peasants —  these things have occurred 
incessantly.
55. Hankow, CCJP,March 1st 1952, op.cit.» pp.12-14.
56. See "The Agrarian Reform Movement and Reform of the Cadres in South 
C h i n a %  CB, N0 .1S4, June 12th 1952, p.27.
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Obviously agrarian reform was of far reaching significance in 
terms of the consolidation of the CCP*s hold over the countryside.
The CCP crashed through the hsien barrier to attempt politicization 
at the basic levels of society, but there is room for doubt as to 
the significance of the movement in terms of "political integration", 
defined as the generation of mass consciousness in the course of
social revolution. The Party had a theoretical solution to
administrative distance, but it seems obvious that "leaping" "from 
points to surface" on the basis of a hypothetical "firm stand" on 
the part of basic-level cadres was not adequate to the task at 
hand. The reorganization of 195Z-54 at the basic levels casts doubt 
on the policy-level and political consciousness of the cadre work­
force which had brought about agrarian reform., In theory and m
directives, proper leadership and adequate preparations were stressed 
the agrarian reform leadership constantly stressed the carefully 
timed movement "from points to surface"; but thcs emphases were lost 
in the momentum of the campaign, and the pressures, which built up 
within the Chinese political system at the time of the Korean War 
and the Suppression of the Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign 
exacerbated the weaknesses m  the structuring of the mass line and 
over-taxed the CCP*s embryonic system of communications.
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V
iii) The Measure of "Counter-Revolution" in Victory
One is immediately struck by the fact that there is no 
established norm inhich can be utilized in the measuring of 
political integration. How much political integration is enough 
political integration? Maoist perspective would seem to suggest 
that there never is enough. While Mao celebrated man*s ability to 
scale mountain tops, if he would only dare, there is in Mao*s 
concept of rectification and in his theory of contradictions an 
implicit^ if not explicit, comment on the nature of man. Mao 
warned that the "new" man who emerged from the revolution in the 
countryside had, nonetheless, to wash his face every day, or lapse 
into the degenerate attitudes, which had characterized "old" China.
This perspective is fundamental to the definition of the 
relation between leadership and the mass line. Throughout his 
revolutionary career, Mao had stressed the importance of doing 
investigation and study, of going down and getting the facts 
straight by linking directly with the masses. If a cadre did not 
wash his face, if he did not practice criticism and self-criticism 
and instead remained in his office chair sifting through papers, 
his leadership style would deteriorate. Such a cadre could only 
practice a subjectivist, bureaucratic method of leadership.
On numerous occasions Mao warned against organizational 
decadence and the deterioration of leadership. Furthermore, he 
emphasized that the recruitment of new virtue Cte) and ability 
(t s 1ai) was necessary to healthy organization. This view was 
explicit in personnel policy articulated in the later stages of the 
Three-Antis Campaign. In the context of this campaign an undue 
emphasis on past merit and seniority was eschewed as "meritism".
Western sociological perspective nearly counterposes organization 
and charisma. Institutional stability is thus perceived as a 
prerequisite to political integration. Approaching the history of 
CCP organization from this perspective, one might naturally conclude 
that the exercise of the mass line was inimical to the development 
of organization. One might even suggest that there is explicit in 
the CCP's continuing preoccupation with bureaucratism a disdain for 
organization. These perspectives, however, do not further -
x^s
our understanding of the relation of the mass line to political 
integration in China. An emphasis on the inevitability of 
contradictions may be consistent with a tendency to anticipate 
organizational decadence, but it is not necessarily demonstrative 
of an anti-organizational point of view. The assimilation of 
Leninist concepts of leadership was unquestionably essential to 
the CCPfs coming to grips with the problems of political 
disintegration.
It was noted earlier that agrarian reform strategy was based 
on the differentiation of "old'1, "semi-old” , and "newly liberated 
area". Central to the development of the campaign was the summing 
up of experience at key-points or model hsiang. This summing up 
facilitated the move to link points to surface, as advanced hsiang 
were related to intermediate and backward hsiang. This inter­
relation was fundamental to the training and education of large 
numbers of activists. A similar perspective is explicit in the 
Maoist approach to rectification. Rectification is a process of 
education, basic to the healthy exercise of leadership and the 
cultivation of a good work style. Rectification involved personnel 
turnover, and it provided the mechanism whereby organization could 
be regenerated through the induction of activists.
Mao summarized these points in his June 1st 1943, discussion of 
methods of leadership. He then characteristically divided the 
masses into three groups, the relatively active, the intermediate 
and the relatively backward^ and he clarified the relation between 
the mass line and the development of organization in the following 
terms:
"If we compare these three groups of people, then in 
general the two extremes are small, uhile the middle group 
is large. The leaders must therefore be skilled in uniting 
the small number of active elements to form a leading group, 
and must rely on this leading group to raise the level of the 
intermediate elements and to win over the backward elements.
A leading group that is genuinely united and linked with the 
masses can be formed only gradually in the process of mass 
struggle, such as in rectification or study campaigns, and 
not in isolation from it. In the process of any great 
struggle, the composition of the leading group should not and
I
j
i
x ^
cannot remain entirely unchanged through the initial, 
middle and final stages; the activists (heroes) who come 
forward in the course of the struggle must constantly be 
promoted to replace those original members of the leading 
group who are inferior by comparison, or who have 
degenerated.
The notion of "from the masses to the masses" has, of course, 
important ramifications in terms of the general approach to 
to government, but is particularly important in terms of the 
structuring of a mass campaign. The mass line is activated at 
key points, and the experience gained is summarized. It is only 
after these tests have been made that the Party will formulate the 
regulations governing the development of a campaign on the greater 
regional or national level. Hence structure is often thrown up in 
the course of, rather than prior to, a campaign. There was 
inevitably as a result of the attempt to unite theory and practice 
a regional unevenness in the first stages of a campaign. The process 
also seems to imply an initial decentralization in order to serve the 
process of centralization, as the Party formulated policy in the very 
act of uniting theory and practice. This approach to government seems 
implicit in the following instruction:
"Formulate general ideas (general calls) out of the 
particular guidance given in a number of cases, and put 
them to the test in many different units...; then 
concentrate the new experience (sum it up) and draw up 
new directives for the guidance of the masses generally.
Comrades should do this in the present rectification 
movement, and also in every other kind of w o r k . "2
The mass line was of crucial importance in terms of the
strengthening of leadership and organization, and in the following
discussion of the development of the Three Seasons and Three-Antis
1. Some of the important nuances of this passage have been deleted
in the translation of this June 1st 1943, directive, which appears 
in Mao Tse-tung, S.W., Vol. Ill, hence refer to Stuart R. S’chram, 
ed., The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, pp.315-316.
2 o Mao Tse-tung, "Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership",
June 1st 1943, SW, Vol.Ill, p.120.
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rectifications and the expansion of san-fan into wu-fan, we can 
review the problems which emerge I as the CCP attempted to 
elevate its theory of organization to the plane of administrative 
practice. One might, however, note at the outset that in 
attempting to balance mobilization and control in the course of 
rectification, the CCP seems to have generally erred in the 
direction of control. In terms of rectification, the element of 
discipline as opposed to flexibility, seems to have figured more 
predominantly. In terms of our discussion of the structure and 
functioning of the GAR level of administration, it would seem that 
even though this administration was "dual*' and the GAR governments 
acted as the "highest local people’s governments", the vertical 
element of the GAR institutional personality came to the fore. 
Rectification necessitated a rather vigorous imposition of 
discipline through a vertical command structure.
Although rectification must be seen as a Maoist response to 
the problems of bad leadership style and organizational decadence, 
and the tensions generated were purposeful in terms of the 
strengthening of organization, there were many instances in which 
the shock of the experience had definite short term effects on 
institutional performance. We have already seen that the unfolding 
of the three- and five-antis rectifications in East China led to 
a disruption of planning in that region. No doubt the campaigns had 
a similar effect on planning at the centre, particularly as cadres 
in the CPG economic and finance ministries, due to their close 
proximity to the national bourgeoisie, were on the firing line in 
the initial period of central, government rectification.
Agrarian reform was also affected as leadership cadres 
increasingly turned their attention away from the problems of 
policy implementation at the basic levels to deal with the 
development of tht Three-Antis Campaign. While Maoist strategy 
had always been calculated on the basis of a target group of five
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per cent, the net shock of rectification affected substantially 
greater numbers of cadres, and it is difficult to determine with 
any degree of precision at what point the psychological effect, 
consequent upon the yelling at cadres, "You are sick!" became 
counter-productive to the strengthening of organization.
In the border regions of North Region, rectification had 
assumed crucial significance in terms of the maintenance of Party 
discipline in a period of united front. Liu Shao-ch*i summed up 
the problem rather succinctly in his speech of July 2nd 1941:
"During the long period of the United Front, the 
possibility of the bourgeoisie influencing the Party 
has also increased. Counter-revolutionary elements 
hidden in the Party have used every method to develop 
and support liberalism within the Party, and consequently 
the tendency of liberalism has developed."3
The problem of counter-revolution became even more critical
as the CCP extensively applied the Peiping-Suiyuan patterns in
the closing stages of the Civil War. These patterns derived from
united front strategy. On March 5th 1949 Mao reviewed with a new
nationwide perspective the problems of establishing a firm foothold
in China south of the Yangtze and elaborated on the application of
united front strategy:
"In each big or medium city, each strategic region 
and each province, we should develop a group of non- 
Party democrats who have prestige and can co-operate 
with us. The incorrect attitude towards non-Party 
democrats, fostered by closed-door style iri our Party 
during the War of Agrarian Revolution, was not entirely 
overcome during the War of Resistance Against Japan, and 
it reappeared in 1947 during the high tide of the land 
reform in the base areas. This attitude would serve only 
to isolate our Party, prevent the consolidation of the 
peo p l e d  democratic dictatorship and enable the enemy to 
obtain allies.
3. Liu Shao-ch*i, "On Intra-Party Struggle", translated in Boyd 
Compton, ed., Mao*s China, p.204.
4. Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Session of the Seventh 
Central Committee", SW, Vol.IV, p.373.
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But Mao was fully aware of the dangers inherent in this strategy 
and he said of the Peiping pattern: "For the purpose of rapidly
eliminating the vestiges of counter-revolution and liquidating its 
political influence, the solution is not quite as effective as 
fighting".5
The inter-relation of armed struggle with political and 
economic development such as the building of people*s democratic 
state power, the promotion of social reform and economic 
reconstruction broke down as the Peiping-Suiyuan patterns were 
extensively applied throughout the summer and winter of 1949. The 
CCP had started a training programme in 1948, but there were not 
enough cadres to meet demand, particularly in the "newly liberated 
areas", and the retention of large numbers of KMT personnel in 
their former positions was a logical necessity. United front was 
obviously essential to the strategy whereby a numerical superiority 
could be achieved against class enemies, but it posed difficult 
problems in terms of sustaining the revolutionary spirit within the 
Party.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Mao in the very moment 
of countrywide military victory should have seriously considered 
the problem of counter-revolution. Mao feared that cadres, who had 
suffered the deprivations and hardships of war would, upon entering 
the cities, fall to the "sugar-coated bullets" of the bourgeoisie 
and he warned:
"With victory certain moods may grow within the 
Party —  arrogance, the airs of a self-styled hero, 
inertia and unwillingness to make progress, love of 
pleasure and distaste for continued hard living.,..
There may be some Communists;who were not conquered 
by enemies with guns and were worthy of the name of 
heroes for standing up to these enemies, but who cannot 
withstand sugar-coated bullets; they will be defeated 
by sugar-coated bullets. We must guard against this 
situation."6
5. Mao Tse-tung, "Report to the Second Session of the Seventh 
Central Committee", op.cit., p.361.
6° Ibid.. p.374.
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In the early days of the new regime, however, the leadership 
was distracted first by the financial and economic crisis of the 
immediate post-war period and then with problems of consolidating 
the revolution in China*s "newly liberated countryside and the 
effort to sustain the CPV effort in Korea. Despite apparent 
widespread manifestation of improper cadre working style, the 
Party could not in 1950 afford the political consequences of a 
full exploitation of the mass line techniques in rectification. 
Hence the Three Seasons rectification of 1950 did not go deep 
in terms of the extensive application of discilinary procedures, 
involving trials, demotions and dismissals., The Three Seasons 
Campaign was primarily an exercise in education and study. It 
unfolded from top-to-bottom. There was no real question of from 
bottom-to-top. At the bottom there was little organization to 
speak of. There was, however, a universal problem of policy-level 
and political consciousness. The great mass of lower-level cadres 
had hardly mastered the ABC*s of Marxism-Leninism, and they were 
only vaguely aware of general policy. 1he Three Seasons 
rectification was essentially a study campaign designed to 
facilitate the implementation of policies. Study was immediately 
related to the concrete tasks of political consolidation.
In May 1950, the CCPCC directed its regional bureaux in the 
GARs to draw up plans for the development of rectification in 
accordance with the concrete tasks in each region, thus East China, 
Central-South, Southwest and Northwest CCPCC Bureaux and the South- 
China Sub-Bureau were instructed to carry out rectification before 
the autumn, as it was thought that the training and study, which 
accompanied rectification, would provide a solid foundation for the 
launching of the first stage of agrarian reform in the "newly
7
liberated areas" in autumn, 1950,
7. JMJP, July 1st 1950, p.3.
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The regional plans revealed the top-to-bottom aspect of 
the campaign. First old cadres were educated, then new cadres 
were educated. First, study was conducted at higher levels and 
then the higher-level cadres were sent down to educate the lower- 
level cadres. Hsi Chung-hsiin, for example, instructed at the 
first plenary session of the NWMAC upon the following point:
nThe steps to be taken in the leadership of the 
rectification movement are to be fron top to bottom.
First improve leadership and only then penetrate to 
lower levels."®
In East China, the first priority was attached to the
training and education of cadres at hsien and above levels, and
once trained, these cadres were set down to direct programmes at
sub-hsien levels. The process encompassed three steps. Cadres
at hsien and above levels were transferred to provincial and
regional Party Committee schools for rectification to be completed
in three half-monthly instalments, beginning in June 1950. In the
last part of July, the mass of hsien and ch*u cadres, involved in
agrarian reform were to be assembled by local Party Committees and
Party training corps for a period of training to last from twenty
days to a month. Beginning in August, hsien Party committees were
to conduct classes, which would draw on cadres from ch*!! and hsien
9
levels in rotation for a period of fourteen to twenty days.
The Southwest authorities stressed two methods in the
10
prosecution of "rectification". At the GAR and provincial levels 
the first half of the day was to be devoted to routine business 
and the second half of the day to study, reading of documents, 
summarizing work, etc. The various organs and departments were to 
organize "rectification-study committees" (cheng-feng hsuen-hsi 
wei-yiian hui), which were to plan and direct study. The second:' 
method, which was to prevail at local levels in the Southwest, 
was simply the calling of rectification meetings, bringing together 
important local cadres for ten days to half a month. However, it
8. Hsi Chung-hsiin, "Chieh-ho shih-chTa chieh-chlieh wen-t1 i". 
(Co-ordinating the practical solution of problems", September 
11th 1950, JMJP, in KPHHTL, No.18, October 1950, p.31.
9. JMJP, July 1st 19 , p.3.
10. JMJP, August 10th 1951.
365
was candidly admitted that this method had only been adopted in
part of the region because cadres were too dispersed and work in
the "newly liberated areas" was exceedingly difficult.
During the campaign, the Party became vitally concerned with
"bureaucratism", defined in terms of the weak link between cadres
and the masses, in terms of work which lacked a "centre", and in
terms of a tendency at the local levels towards "operationalism"
and "commandism".
Hsi Chung-tungfs report on commandism and bureaucratism in
the Northwest drew attention to the inaccuracies of cadre.
reporting.^ Those cadres, who wanted no more responsibilities,
submitted "bad news" reports, over-emphasizing their difficulties,
while other cadres committed the leftist error of underestimating
12local conditions and sent in "good news" reports.
The problem was especially serious in the context of the 
food situation in the Northwest; for example, the Northwest 
Department of Finance did not have an accurate understanding of 
the local grain situation in Shensi due to inadequate reporting.
An investigation at the end of 1949 established that there was 
sufficient food up until the summer of 1950. Investigations of 
March and February also indicated that the food situation was under 
control. However, a conference of the NWMAC Economic and Finance 
Committee belatedly discovered that in fact there was an alarming 
shortage.^
Similarly, Hsi revealed that bureaucratism in the Department
of Agriculture and Forestry had disrupted the NWMAC’s plans to
increase cotton acreage. The biggest single project under the
aegis of the department involved the purchase of 260,000 catties of
cotton seeds. The project was a massive failure, involving the loss
of more than 3,000 million (yuan),, and leading state organs had
14
failed to investigate the situation.
11. Hsi Chung-hsiin, "Fan-tui kuan-liao chu-i, ming-ling chu-i", (Oppose 
bureaucratism, oppose commandism), in KPHHTL, No.10, July 1950, pp.115-1;
12. Ibid., pp.119-120.
13. Ibid.. p.119.
14. Ibido, p . H 8 .  Apparently different qualities of seed had been indis­
criminately mixed and local authorities had failed to provide adequate 
storage facilities with the result that seedling germination was in 
places as low as 30 per cent.
30S
Hsi also reviewed problems involving the co-ordination of
different systems; for example, the United Front Work Department
of the Northwest Bureau of the CCPCC had sent a representative to
the Northwest Tax Bureau to gather information; however, the
Bureau promptly returned the representative, claiming that he had
15put on affected airs and had engaged in disruptive criticism.
Hsi had to insist on a proper divison of labour, reminding 
ch'u and hsiang governments as well as tax agencies that they did 
not have the powers of arrest, and he noted that the Sian municipal 
authorities had erroneously punished 800 business f i r m s . H s i  
was very concerned that the cadres were forgetting the difference 
between the KMT and the CCP.
In a speech, urging the development of three seasons
17
rectification, Jao Shu-shih covered the same main points. Jao, 
too, was concetned that KMT-style bureaucratism was taking root 
under the "peopleTs regime". He, too, commented on the suddenness 
of victory, the vastness of the "newly liberated areas", the 
complicated conditions prevailing therein, and the paucity of 
experienced cadres and the lack of education amongst the majority 
of new cadres.
Bureaucratism in the East China Food Company had disrupted the
smooth functioning of the GAC Economic and Finance Committee*s grain
transfer policy. The East China Food Company had failed to alert
the centre as to inadequate storage facilities in Shanghai, and the
result was that the Shanghai authorities were deluged with grain,
which they could not store properly. 140,000,000 catties of grain
(out of a total of 460,000,000 catties) were ruined due to improper 
18storage.
15. Hsi Chung-hsun, Oppose bureaucratism, etc., op.cit.. p.127.
16. Ibid.. p.123.
17* Jao Shu-shih, "Chan-k^i cheng-feng. cheng-tun kan-pu tso-feng".
(Develop the rectification campaign, correct cadre work style), CFJP, 
August 22nd 1950, in HHYP, Vol.2, No.5, September 1950, pp.984-988. 
18. Ibid.. p.985.
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Jao also criticized the harsh commandist tactics of 
the tax collectors and stressed the distinction between the 
CCP’s principle, "That which is taken from the people is to be 
used for the people" (ch *u chih yu-min yung chih yu-min), and 
the KMT’s principle, "That which is taken from the people, use 
for yourself" (c h ’u chih yu'-min, yung chih yu-chi) . ^  Jao also 
repudiated the compulsory sale of victory bonds. He admonished 
cadres, reminding them of the difference between public security 
agencies of the KMT and the CCP. Indeed, the CCPfs concepts of 
"bureaucratism" and "commandism" derived from the CCP’s perception 
of the K M T ’s approach to government.
Jao Shu-shih vociferously took to task those cadres who 
"loafed" and were lax in investigation and study. He expounded 
on a more acute form of bureaucratism, characterized by a lack of 
centre in work and the failure to link up with the masses. Cadres 
failed to pay attention to regional differences. They failed to 
distinguish the primary from the secondary aspects of a problem. 
Higher level cadres were at fault for flooding lower levels with a 
deluge of documents. Cadres only reported good things and they 
failed to accept criticism in the spirit of democracy. When in May, 
the Hsin-wen jih~pao criticized the East China Department of Trade, 
the East China Miscellaneous Goods Company actively opposed the 
newspaper’s criticism.
In 1950, the thorny problems of co-optation and retained 
personnel were put to one side as the Party concentrated on cadre 
education. The Three Seasons Campaign did not involve extensive 
disciplinary action against senior cadres and much of the rhetoric 
seemed to relate more closely to commandism at the lower levels.
This distinction of commandism and bureaucratism, although it may 
have been consistent with the from-top-to-bottom development of the 
campaign, seems to conflict to a certain extent with the mass line; 
for example, the following editorial comment of September 6th 1950, 
implies different treatment for cadres at different levels of
19. Ibid.« p.987
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administration in a way which perhaps contradicts an earlier 
egalitarian spirit, explicit in concepts such as the unity of 
officers and men:
"The various departments under the Central-South 
Bureau and CSMAC are different from administrative 
organs at the provincial, municipal and hsien levels.
The difference is this: The cadres are relatively
more centralized and there are more leadership cadres; 
moreover, there is not a direct relationship with the 
broad masses, but it is the various lower-level 
administrative organs and the cadres at those levels, 
who can have direct contact with the broad masses. The 
general responsibilities at the GAR level are to clarify 
conditions, grasp and work out policy and to guide policy 
implementation on a regionwide basis. It is these 
special characteristics which obviously distinguish the 
GAR and its cadres from lower level administrative organs 
and from cadres working at the lower levels. For this 
reason distinctions must be made in terms of the content, 
methods, steps and timing of rectification; there must 
of necessity be a distinction between higher and lower 
level administrative organs and between higher and lower 
level Party cadres."2^
The idea of acting according to different conditions of work is
quite acceptable an terms of Maoist organization, however, the
emphasis on the differences between administrative levels is so
great as to cast doubts on the applicability of a method whereby
advanced, intermediate and backward elements would inter-relate in
the process of cadre educatioh.
The above contrasts with the actualities of the Three-Antis
Campaign. This rectification cut deeply into the ranks of higher
21
level as well as lower level cadres. . In fact, the three-antis
20. "Tsai pu-t'ung pu-men chung cheng-feng yun-tung ying yu pu-t*ung 
ti nei-.jung fang-fa ho pu-ch'ou", (Rectifications in different 
departments have different content, methods and steps), CCJP, 
September 6th x950, in KPHHTL, No.IS, October 1950.
21. Sherwin Montell in his discussion of the Three-Antis Campaign 
alternatively suggests that it was not a "major purge". (The 
term "purge" does not really do justice to the concept of 
rectification?) Montell also suggests that the campaign did not 
affect important CCP personalities. Sherwin Montell, "The San- 
fan Wu-fan Movement in Communist China", Harvard Papers oh China, 
Vol. VIII, pp.147^148. How important is "important"? Politbureau 
members were not exposed and investigated during the course of 
the campaign, but many first-grade cadres at the central, GAR and 
provincial levels were "purged".
3 Oc>
rectification developed in a manner consistent with Mao's 
perspective on the inter-relation of advanced, intermediate 
and backward. In this rectificatxon important government, GAR 
and provincial personnel were brought down. The express purpose 
of "tiger-hunting" at the higher levels was to provide the lower 
levels with models and the psychological incentive to "clean 
house" at their own levels. It was understood that resistance 
to rectification on the part of first-grade personnal had to be 
overcome before the movement could be successfully unfolded at 
lower levels, hence in North China, for example, "tiger-hunting"
was combined with the re-examination of "medium" and "small"
22
corrupt elements. Furthermore, during the later stages of the 
campaign, activists were inducted into Party and state organization 
and new cadre* were promoted on the basis of ability and virtue, 
as opposed to seniority.
During the campaign the CCP took the position that there was 
a broad social foundation, which encouraged the spread of 
corruption, waste and bureaucracy. This social foundation derived 
from (a) large number* of retained personnel, present in the 
people's government, and (b) the effect of the entry into the 
cities on weak cadres. The Party finally moved into position to 
deal with the problems of co-optation and retained personnel.
A Jen-min jih-pao editorial of November 23rd 1951, for example, 
commented on the problem of retained personnel:
"Although most have undergone reform and acquired 
the concept of serving the people after having ridden 
themselves of the corrupt style of work, yet many of 
them have not been thoroughly reformed or remained 
unchanged and have inherited much of the KMT 
reactionaries "bad behavioui".
22. Refer to SCMP, No.307, April 1st 1952, p.15, frcm NCNA, Peking, 
March 25th 1952, for a detailed description of the three stages 
of development in the three-antis rectification carried out In 
top-level North China organization.
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It was not, however, simply a question of the attitudes of
retained personnel, but also a problem of the susceptibility
of the CCP’s cadres to the temptation of urban life. C h ’en Yi
put it rather baldly:
"Just as some of our cadres confessed, after they 
entered the city, they have undergone a change in 
attitude towards the state of corruption and waste; 
while first abhorring it, gradually they got used to 
it and finally loved it."23
The earlier policy of magnanimous co-optation of KMT personnel
was qualified with the repudiation of boundless magnanimity during
the Suppression of Counter-Revolutionaries Campaign. There was
further qualification in terms of registration; for example,
the CSMAC’s "Regulations for Registration of Personnel of
Reactionary Parties and Corps, Secret Service Organizations and
other Counter-Revolutionary Elements in the Central-South Region",
required the registration of former members of the KMT’s branch
committees as well as chiefs of sub-groups and above of the San-Min 
24
Chu-I Youth Corps. Ordinary members of "reactionary parties", who
had previously worked in government agencies, schools and enterprises,
also had to register.
Inner-Party jargon revealed the CCP’s sense of priorities, for
in the course of the suppression of counter-revolutionaries, the
Party distinguished the nucleus Cnei) from an inner Cchung) and
outer (wai) layers. Counter-revolutionaries in society at large
Cwai) had had to be eliminated, but first priority was given to
"nei", meaning within the Party and second priority was given to
25
"chung" 9 indicating the army and state administrative organs.
23„ See SCMP, No.267, February 3-4 1952, p.9,, from Canton,
NFJP, January 23rd 1952.
24. SCMP, No.158, August 21st 1951, pp.12-14, from Hankow,
CCJP, August 13th 1951.
25o See part 4 of "Chung-kung chung-yang cheng-chih chtj kuang-ta
hui-i chueh-i yao-tien". (Important points of the decisions of 
the enlarged session of the CCPCC Politbureau), February 18th 1951, 
in Mao Tse-tung, SW, Vol.V, Peking, 1977, p.35.
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In the sphere of state administration the san-fan 
rectification focused on ecomonic and financial departments.
And one might note the underlying link which drew together the 
Three- and Five-Antis Campaigns and the Production Increase and 
Economy Campaign. Politically it was necessary to deal with the 
threat of counter-revolution from within. Economically it was 
necessary to establish efficient, rational and honest economic 
organization to facilitate the development of planning and the 
move towards large-scale capital construction. Effective economic 
accounting, for example, was essential to planning.
A Jen-min iih pao editorial of January 22nd 1952 noted that
over the last three years various levels of economic administration
and state enterprise had absorbed large numbers of working
personnel. Many of these personnel, in fact, were unreformed
businessmen, managers and functionaries of the old KMT bureaucracy.
The dangers of corruption, waste and bureaucracy were high, as
these departments had the closest relation to the national
bourgeoisie.^ The Jen-min ,jih-pao also discussed the problem in
terms of state finance departments. While it was stressed that great
efforts had been made in the struggle to unify financial work by
state finance cadres, the problems of corruption, waste and
bureaucracy were particularly serious in this sector of state
activity. As the finance departments were at the heart of state
administration, as these departments controlled the budgetary
process, corruption in this sector would definitely affect the work
27
of other departments.
On January 9th 1952, Po I-po in his capacity as Chairman of the 
CPGfs Economic Inspection Committee, reported on the development of
26. "Chien-ch.ileh su-chfing tzu-chan chieh-chi tsai kuo-chia ching-chi 
chl-kuan chung ti p*o-huai huo-tung" . (Steadfastly eliminate 
wrecking activities of the capitalist class in state economic 
organs), JMJP, January 22nd 1955, in HHYP, No.2, 1952, p.26.
27. "Tsen-yang tsai tsfai-cheng hsi-t*ung chung k*al-chan fan t *an-wu 
fan lung-fei« fan kuan-liao chu-i yiin-tung", (How to develop the 
anti-corruption, anti-waste, anti-bureaucratism movement in 
financial systems), JMJP, January 12th 1952, HHYP, No.2, 1952, p.25.
28
the campaign at the centre. 1,670 cadres had thus far been 
exposed, including such senior personnel as the Director and a 
deputy director of the General Office of the Ministry of Public 
Security. The Director was exposed for the graft of 700 million 
yuan. A deputy director of the Health Bureau and the Minister of 
Railways were exposed for collusion in the sale of one hundred 
catties of morphine.
There were problems even in the vital sector of public 
security. In a report to 'Party cadres of the Ministry of Public 
Security and Peking Security and Peking Municipal Public Security 
Bureau, Lo Jui-ching informed his colleagues that large numbers of 
public security personnel and police retained from the KMT regime 
had continued in their old way of corruption. Lo urged a free 
mobilization of the masses to inform on public security personnel or 
police, who had extorted money, accepted bribes, forged accounts or
29
enjoyed "strong man" shares in companies.
The rectification was systematically developed in the top
organs of the GAR governments. In East China, for example, GAR
judicial and supervisory organs dealt with 615 cases of corruption,
involving a total loss to the nation of ¥124,200,000,000. Jao Shu-
shih reported on these cases to a meeting of 2,000 cadres from
30first-grade departments and bureaux of the ECMAC. The majority
of cases (i.e. 470) involved cadres in finance and economic
departments. 256 of the 615 cases involved retained personnel,
as compared to 133 newly recruited personnel and 226 old cadres.
The large number of old cadres exposed to disciplinary action, does
suggest that the CCP leadership was serious in its struggle to
31
root out "meritism".
28. SCMP, No.255, January 15th 1952, pp.4-11, from NCNA, Peking, 
January 9th 1952.
29. See SCMP, No.247, January 3rd 1952, p.18, from NCNA, Peking, 
December 26th 1951.
30. SCMP, No.254, January 13-14 1952, pp.14-19, Shanghai.CFJP, 
December 30th 1951.
31. "Kung-ci^en" of course is rich in historical connotations. In 
imperial China outstanding generals or officials expected 
perquisites and privileges from the court for demonstrating merit. 
Veteran CCP cadres also anticipated the fruits of victory.
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The rectification reached high-ranking GAR cadres. Again
taking East China as an example, at an enlarged session of the
ECB of the CCPCC on March 10th 1952, it was decided to relieve
from all duties Li Chien-hua, Deputy Director of the ECMAC
Department of Labour, Yun I-ch’un, Chief of the ECMAC Press and
Publications Bureau and former editor of Chieh-fang iih-pao. Li
Kuo-pin, former Assistant Secretary to the ECMAC Party Fraction
and Chou Li-hsing, director of the Religious Affairs Office of
32
the ECMAC Cultural and Educational Affairs Committee, etc.,
Li Chien-hua had entered the Party in 1934, while Yun I-ch’un 
had registered in 1938. Presumably, Li Kuo-pin and Chou Li- 
hsing were post-liberation cadres. Li was characterized as a 
capitalist, who had failed to mend his ways, while Chou was said 
to have hailed from a landlord background.
Two celebrated cases, handled by the Central-South 
authorities, are reviewed below in order to gain perspective on 
the inner-workings of rectification. In reviewing these two cases, 
certain problems of conceptualization are kept immediately in mind. 
Of primary importance is the nature of resistance to rectification. 
Furthermore, it is important to consider what these cases reveal in 
terms of the structuring of the campaign, or to put it more simply, 
what was the relation between discipline and flexibility.
The Sung Ying case, which lasted over a lengthy period from 
September 1950 to February 1952, was a good example of the problem 
of "officials protecting officials".(kuan-kuan hsiang-hu). In this 
case, it would seem that Party and municipal government officials 
closed ranks in an effort to shield one of their peers from the' 
rigours of Party discipline.
Action was precipitated when in September 1950, an anonymous 
letter implicating the Deputy Director of the Wuhan Health Bureau 
in a case of theft, was sent to Mao. Deputy Director Sung Ying 
was supported by Deputy Mayor Chou Chi-fang. Chou was not only a 
prominent member of the Party fraction of the Wuhan Municipal 
People’s Government, but also the husband of Sung Ying.
32. CFJP, March 20th 1952, in HHYP, No.4, 1952, p.56.
On October 18th 1950, the Wuhan Health Bureau attempted to
33
trace the person who had written to Mao. Mayor Wu Teh-feng
allegedly stood by with his hands in his sleeves while the Deputy
Director of the Wuhan. Bureau of Public Security (and concurrently
a deputy mayor), Hsieh Fan-chih not only acquiesced in the cover-up,
but at one point arrested Sung Ying’s accuser.
In May 1951, the Wuhan Party Committee under its first
34
secretary, Chang P*ing-hua launched an investigation. Chou Chi-
fang allegedly slandered the letter as "libel" and "unlawful", hence
35
Chou "suppressed" democracy. Sung Ying allegedly made a back- 
handed self-criticism, in which she stressed her own "merit". On 
July 13th 1951, the Party fraction of the Wuhan Municipal People’s 
Government officially informed the Wuhan Municipal Party Committee 
that Sung Ying had made a self-criticism, and advised that the matter 
be discreetly dropped. The recommendation was accepted and no 
disciplinary action was taken. However, the matter quickly assumed 
national importance in the context of the Three-Antis Campaign, and 
served as a model of ,ta bad example.
On August 16th 1951, the Disciplinary Inspection Committee of 
the Central-South Bureau instructed the Wuhan Municipal Party 
Committee to take disciplinary action. Sung Ying had, in fact, made 
a second self-criticism, but the episode had reached a point in 
development where the issue of suppression of mass criticism, rather 
than theft became the main point of contention. Self-criticism was 
not enough, but the Wuhan Party Committee demurred.
On September 11th 1951, the case was highlighted in the 
"Party Life" column of the Jen-min jih-pao, and the implications
33. See "Party Life" column of JMJP, September 11th 1951, in CB,
No.138, November 20th 1951, p.7.
34. See biographic entry under Chang P ’ing-hua in Klein and Clark,
A Biographic Dictionary of Chinese Communism. Vol.l, p.46.
35. JMJP, September 11th 1951, CB, No.138, p.7.
of the improper investigation by the Wuhan Party authorities 
were stressed. On September 14th, the CSB censured the Wuhan 
Municipal Party Committee and demanded action within a week.
On the same day the wider implications were treated in the "Party 
Life" column of the Chang-chiang .]ih-pao. Some cadres, even 
responsible cadres, it was claimed, had viewed the matter as 
"going too far", and had disliked open criticism in the newspapers,
which they felt was not consistent with the dignity of meritorious
3 6
Party cadres. On October 9th, the Wuhan Party Committee passed
a decision against the suppression of mass criticism and violation
of Party discipline. In December, the first secretary of the
Committee made a guarded self-criticsm.
The case officially came to a close when it was reviewed at an
extraordinary session of the CSMAC in February 1951. Chang was
demoted to become deputy secretary of the Wuhan Municipal Party
Committee under Secretary Li Hsien-nien. Hsieh Pang-chih, Chou
Chi-fang and Wu Teh-feng were all dismissed from their posts.
Chang P Ting-hua, Wu Teh-feng and Hsieh Pang-chih all made political
come-backs later on. Chang recovered his equilibrium and in
November 1954, he regained his former position as first secretary.
37
Hsieh Pang-chih later went on to become ambassador to Bulgaria.
The question of suppression or democracy did not figure as 
large in the Kiangsi case, but one notes the extent of resistance 
to higher-level investigation by Central-South authorities and the 
fact that high-ranking Kiangsi personnel in an effort to protect 
themselves forged accounts and attempted to pressure lower-level 
authorities to collaborate in the deception of the Central-South 
authorities. The case essentially involved fiscal discipline at 
the provincial and special district and hsien levels. On February 
1st 1951, the Jen-min .jih-pao brought pressure to bear for an 
investigation of the Kiangsi Civil Affairs Bureau. The Bureau had
36. "Party Life", Hankow, CCJP, September 14th 1950, in CB, No.138, p.16.
37. Klein and Clark, Vol.l, p.46.
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allegedly forged accounts and concealed large amounts of relief
grain. The article further charged that the people behind the
38
forgery were in "highest authority".
In March 1951, the Central-South P eopled Supervisory 
Committee acting jointly with the CCPCC CSB Disciplinary 
Inspection Committee sent down investigators to Kiangsi to review 
the grain situation there. They found that many'-hsien' organizations 
had misappropriated government grain for the establishment of 
"small family undertakings". Cadres had failed to report over­
fulfilment of grain taxes and had concealed surplus grain. The 
investigation was concluded in April, and the Central-South 
People's Supervision Committee advised that the Kiangsi authorities 
conduct a more thorough examination and also recommended that no 
action be taken against the rank-and-file cadres, but that 
responsibility for the various breaches of financial discipline 
be traced.
On July 25th, the Central-South People's Supervision Committee 
posted the report and suggestions to the Kiangsi provincial 
authorities. The provincial government demurred. On September 
13th, the CSMAC ordered the provincial authorities by telegram to 
report. Against the Kiangsi authorities demurred. In October, 
the General Office of the CSMAC called long distance to Kiangsi.
The provincial government's vice-chairman answered and premised 
an investigation and a report. Similar promises had been made to 
the fourth session of the CSMAC.
The Kiangsi authorities, fearing an audit by the Central-South 
authorities* forged accounts to substantiate false figures of 
expenditure, and the provincial Civil Affairs Bureau allegedly sent 
cadres down to the Administrative Offices of Nan-chang, Fu-chow 
and Yuan-chow to insure the complicity of cadres in those areas in 
the falsification of accounts. Despite provincial reports to Mao
38. For a complete account of this case refer to Hankow, CCJP, 
February 9th 1952, SCMP, No.287, March 4th 1952.
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and the CSMAC, the Kiangsi authorities persisted in the
attempted fiscal deception, and in June they invested the
excess amounts of grain in local industry.
The showcase confessions of the provincial governor and
deputy governor of Kiangsi, dwelt on the problems encountered
when the Party had moved from the countryside to the city; for
example, part of the confession read: " ...in our minds still
remained vestiges of the old outlook of scattered management in
39
the period of isolated occupation of rural bases".
There is a clear parallel between this case and the case of 
summer .1951, involving the continued collection of irregular tax 
imposts in Kwangtung province. Apparently, the Kiangsi 
authorities had also been caught in the crunch between budget cuts 
and pressure to expand local industry. The following excerpt* 
extracted from the confession of Kiangsi Provincial Chairman, Shao
Shih-pfing and Vice-Chairman Fan Shih-jen, seems to bear out this
point:
"On the one hand, in view of the fact that the 
national expenditure for 1951 was to be cut, we were 
afraid that allowances for various projects might 
possibly be reduced. On the other hand, we were 
worried that notwithstanding the financial 
difficulties in this province, the necessary expenses 
for various projects must be met. We were thus given 
to that departmentalism which takes consideration only 
of individual interests and ignores total interests , and 
committed depraved acts by violating financial and 
economic discipline."40
These repentant provincial officers accepted responsibility 
for "depraved acts", but this acceptance should not obscure the 
fact that the problem originated in part with tension in the 
centrefs policy. On the one hand there was great pressure to 
economize and reduce expenditure while on the other, the centre 
urged localities to relate general expediency and promote self- 
reliance projects. Obviously the Kiangsi authorities did not have 
sufficient resources to promote such projects and still honour 
fiscal commitments to the centre.
39. SCMP, No.287, p.28.
40. SCMP, No.287, p.27.
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One can make several generalizations on the basis of the 
details of these two cases. There was in each case resistance 
to criticism and rectification, but it is important to define 
that resistance correctly. Resistance is not taken to mean an 
explicit challenge to the integrity of the nation-state. Regional 
interests, of course, were involved, but these interests were not 
consciously articulated in contradistinction to national 
interests.
To a considerable extent the interpretation of resistance 
turns on the psychological aspect of rectification. Previously 
in the Three Seasons Campaign, the Party had found it difficult 
to initiate rectification based on self-criticism. Cadres did 
not all at once rush out and engage in self-criticism. Similarly, 
in the Three-Antis Campaign, there was reluctance to accept 
criticism. Some cadres even objected to newspaper coverage of 
Party rectification.
In terms of cadre work style there was often a failure to 
penetrate thoroughly and investigate fully, as cadres acted in 
a fashion consistent with the traditional Chinese pattern of 
’'officials protecting officials". Resistance was not simply a 
matter of regional particularism, but was universal, thus the 
question arises as to how the Party was able to break down the 
psychological barriers to criticism and rectification.
In the above two cases, action was rather protracted. The 
Central-South authorities played out the action, only resorting 
to outright disciplinary action in the later stages of 
investigation. In a limited sense this can be interpreted as 
an emphasis on democracy. The Central-South authorities waited 
out local investigations. It was relatively late in the day that 
the CSMAC and CCPCC CSB "lowered the boom" on the culprit officials. 
Resistance was initially countered by press coverage and the 
initiation of investigations by the CSBfs Disciplinary Inspection 
Committee and the CSMAC People's Supervisory Committee. The above
details would, however, suggest that the level of resistance 
related to the overall structural context; in other words, 
resistance was all that much greater as a result of a high 
degree of concurrent office-holding, which was particularly 
rife in a time of severe personnel shortage, and in a time when 
great importance was attached to the maximization of inter-system 
relations in a dual structure.
As for mass action, although there was mass mobilization, and 
the masses were reportedly free to make accusation, mass action 
was, nonetheless, carefully structured by the Party, and it was up 
to the Party to decide whether or not to make an issue out of any 
particular accusation. The initiative in terms of the actual 
investigatory process, for the most part rested with the Party's 
Disciplinary Inspection Committees and the People's Supervision 
Committees. The task of exposure, however, fell to the Economic 
Investigation Committees.
The East China Production Increase and Economy Committee, for
example, mapped out the strategy for the exposure of bad elements
in the top-level organs of the ECMAC. In the first stage of the
campaign, from February 9-16th 1952, "six armies" were organized
under the Committee's general command to conduct investigations
and organized "shock brigades" for attack. In the second stage,
the Committee regrouped its forces so as not only to attack "lone
tigers in the hills", but also "groups of tigers in caves", hence
the problems of "officials protecting officials" were obviously 
41
appreciated.
First the investigations focused on the "big corrupt elements", 
and in the case of East China we have seen that rectification in 
top-level GAR organs' culminated with the dismissal of several 
important party personages in the March 1st 1952 meeting of the ECB 
of the CCPCC. Once model cases had been dealt with at the GAR level, 
the campaign achieved greater momentum at the lower levels. As in
41. SCMP, No.283, pp.7-8, from NCNA, Shanghai, February 21st 1952.
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the case of agrarian reform, there was the attempt to gain 
experience at key-points, but agrarian reform experiments were 
first carried out at hsiang level in contrast to rectification, 
which worked the other way, from top to bottom.
M a o fs 1943 emphasis on the inter-relation of general calls 
with specific guidance, was applied in the structuring of mass 
campaigns in the early 1950*s, and here we may have hit on the 
reason why these campaigns appear to have developed in such a way 
that the activation of the mass line out-paced the formation of 
structure. Mass campaigns were often announced even before the 
centre had worked out the basic structural pattern and detailed 
regulations, governing the campaigns. This characteristic 
reflected the CCP*s perspective on the unity of practice and theory. 
Temporary structure was thrown up in the course of each specific 
campaign in order to co-ordinate the popular organization of social 
forces with formal legal structure of Party and state systems.
Hence, in the san-fan rectification, the detailed regulations 
governing the disposal of cases of corruption, waste and bureaucracy, 
were passed by the GAC on March 8th 1952, yet 1,670 personnel had 
already been exposed at the centre and model investigations of 
"tigers", or "big corrupt elements", in top-level organs at the 
GAR level had already been conducted.
During agrarian reform and the suppression of counter­
revolutionaries, a backlog of cases had threatened to swamp the 
formal legal process of state administration. At that time the 
Party sponsored the proliferation of people9s tribunals at lower 
levels so as to expedite the processing of the increasing number 
of cases relating to counter-revolution. A similar problem emerged 
in the final stage of san-fan. The GAC*s March 8th regulations 
established a dead-line for the disposal of cases of waste, 
bureaucracy and minor corruption. Corruption cases were given first 
priority, but all other cases had to be disposed of by the 
appropriate tribunal before March 20th, the reason being that it was 
necessary to "...remove promtly the anxieties of the absolute majority
32.1
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of minor corrupt elements " One strongly suspects that
a full rectification rationally executed at the lower levels of 
administration was, in the early 1950's, beyond the CCP's, 
organizational capabilities.
In agrarian reform the CCP had insisted on genuine "political 
integration", based on the conscious assimilation of ideology, but 
the time-tabling of the movement took on a life of its own and 
more "leaping" took place than was appropriate to local conditions. 
It is therefore not particularly surprising that the CCP at times 
resorted to storm tactics in the development of the san-f an 
rectification.
Dissatisfied with the progress of san-fan in the Northeast,
Kao Kang served an ultimatum on higher-level cadres attending a
Northeast Bureau conference in mid-January 1952. Kao made the usual
distinction between advanced, intermediate and backward areas. He
placed those areas where the movement had lost momentum due to
inadequate mass mobilization and cadre confusion, in his second
category. Cadres in charge of areas in the second category were
summarily given two days upon returning to their posts to regenerate
the campaign or face immediate dismissal. Those cadres who happened
to be in charge of areas placed in Kao's third category, were
magnanimously given five days, no doubt in consideration of the
seriousness of the problems encountered in their areas, where the
43
movement was at a complete standstill. The CCP had a rational 
strategy for political integration; however, in the course of 
uniting theory and practice, psychological and political pressures 
militated against the rational implementation of strategy.
The mass campaigns were waged with the intent to strengthen 
leadership and organization. During the san-fan recification,
"small men" (hsiao .ien), who defied the Party*s .revolutionary 
spirit and sought to expand their own "independent kingdoms", were 
identified and disciplined. Personnel policy was redefined in the 
course of the campaign to accord with Mao's emphasis on virtue and
42. CB, No.168, March 26th 1952, p.7.
43. SCMP, No.270, February 7th 1952, pp.10-11, from JMJP, Peking, 
January 24th 1953.
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ability as essential to the health of organization.
A leading Jen-min iih-pao editorial« "Boldly Promote the 
Cadres", admonished those cadres who sought to establish seniority 
as a criterion for promotion, and urged the active promotion of 
new cadres. The paper adopted the following position:
"As those organs and enterprises are actively 
engaged in restoring and establishing regular work 
and business they are confronted with the urgent 
problem of cadres [i.e. the many vacancies due to 
suspensions and dismissals during the rectification].
It is incumbent upon us to boldly promote activists 
discovered during the 3-Anti and 5-Anti campaigns to 
be cadres for the various fields, those of especially 
good quality and capable of becoming excellent cadres 
should be given special promotion irrespective of 
grades and ordinary practice."44
The editorial was critical of those who argued that old cadres
were indispensable, as state organs had been upset, and that they
were needed in "putting together the pieces again". The Jen-min
.1 ih-pao countered with the argument: "We must first remove the
45
gangrene before healthy growth of flesh will be possible'.'.
374,500 cadres were promoted in the few months following the 
conclusion of the Three-Antis campaign.
But if the forces of counter-revolution were quelled, they 
were not eliminated. San-fan rectification had hit hard at official 
corruption, but the level of "bureaucratism" remained a cause for 
great concern, and in the following comment, An Tzu-wen stressed 
that the struggle against bureaucratism would go on for a long time 
to come:
"As far as concerns such forms of bureaucracy a 
lack of knowledge by the leaders of the difficulties 
experienced by the masses, lack of knowledge of local 
conditions, simultaneous assignments to the lower 
organizations of numerous tasks without checking on 
their fulfilment, these still exist. The san-fan 
movement was directed mainly against waste and
44. Refer to "The Problems of Old Cadres, 1950-52", CB, No.180, 
May 10th 1952, p.25.
45. Ibid.« p.25c
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corruption. The struggle against bureaucracy demands 
a much longer period, since the bureaucracy that exists 
now in China has deep historical roots and a broad 
economic foundation, and cannot be eliminated at one 
blow."**6
The development of the theme of the "sugar-coated bullet"' presaged
later theoretical development of the notion of the persistance of
. . . 47
contradictions m  the stage of transition to socialism. An
ominous note was struck in South China when T*ao Chu observed:
"In South China, bourgeois ideology is especially 
seriously reflected within the Party. There have of 
course been achievements in the struggle developed in 
the provinces and cities in April last [1952 J against 
bureaucratism, against petty bourgeois ideology, and 
against the work style of the Kuomintang. The mass 
view point of the cadres has been strengthened, and 
there has been improvement in their work style. But 
due to the fact that ideological leadership lev e l o f  
the Sub-Bureau [i.e. South-China CCPCC Sub-Bureau J was 
not high and it failed in its examination ahd education 
of the cadres to raise to a high degree the principle of 
the reflections in the Party of the bourgeois ideology, 
there remains within the Party in South China, the 
universal reflection of that ideology, and the change 
brought about has not been great."48
46. An Tzu-wen, "The Consolidation of Party Organization", P e o p l e d  
China. No.13, July 1st 1953, pp.5-10.
47. Mao*s new fifth volume reveals that one of the most prominent 
leaders of the Three-Antis and Five-Antis Campaigns, was brought 
down for a December 1952, proposal that the new tax structure be 
based on the principle, "equal treatment for public and private" 
(kung-tzu i-lu p ting-teng)0 This principle resembles Mao*s own 
principal,„"benefit both public and private", but on August 12th 
1953, Mao chose to emphasize that Po had been hit by the proverbial 
"sugar-bullet". P o Ts case was then regarded as being symptomatic 
of the trend on the part of the bourgeoisie to take up battle 
positions within the Party. Mao Tse-tung, "Fan-tui tang-nei
tj tzu-chan chieh-chi ssu-hsiang". SW, Vol.V, Peking, 1977, p.90.
48. T*ao Chu, "The Tasks of Party Organization in South China During 
the StateTs Five Year Construction Plan", in SCMP, No.703, December 
8th 1953, Supplement, pp.iv-xxv, here p.xx, from Canton, NFJP, 
October 31st 1953.
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The Five-Antis Campaign against bribery, tax evasion, theft 
of state property, cheating in government contracts and theft of 
state economic intelligence, revolved on the same central 
thematic axis as the Three-Antis Campaign, namely, the influence 
of urban, KMT China on the revolutionary spirit, born of struggle 
in the countryside.
In his August 31st 1951, speech, which launched the Five-Antis 
Campaign in the Northeast, Kao Kang linked wayward cadres with 
"treacherous" merchants and reactionaries. In a second speech 
of January 24th 1952, entitled "Overcome the Corrosion of Bourgeois 
Ideology: Oppose the Rightist Trend in the Party", Kao attacked
cadres for failing to understand that they must lead the peasants 
towards collectivism. He retorted: "On the contrary they [those
unnamed cadres, inhibiting collectivismjconsider it their 
responsibility, after economic conditions have improved, to lead 
the hired farm hands to the status of rich peasants... ."^Not only 
did Kao see the rapid development of usury and speculative activity 
in the Northeast countryside, he saw the influence of urban China 
on the Party*s revolutionary spirit, and he expressedly linked the 
Three- and Five-Antis Campaigns.
Kao want on to describe the methods*employed by the bourgeoisie 
in subverting the cadres0 Firstly, the "capitalists" adopted the 
so-called "pull in" (la-kuo c h 1# ) tact, whereby they would bribe 
cadres, especially those in economic and financial organs for 
favours. Secondly, the "capitalists" schemed to get their friends 
and relatives into key positions in state- and public-operated 
enterprises, and this was known as "sending in" (p^i-chih lai).
49o Tpjp, January 21st 1952, and also in JMJP, January 24th 1953, in 
SCMP, No.270, February 7th 1952, p.7. "K To-fu tzu-chan chieh- 
chi ssu-hsiang tui tang tj ch*in shih, fan-tui tang-nei ti yu- 
ch*ing ssu-hsiang". HHYP, February 1952, pp.12-16.
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During the nationwide campaign, targets were distinguished
on the basis of a fivefold catagorization set out by the Mayor
of Peking, Peng Chen, in March 1952. These five distinctions,
"law-abiding*', "basically law-abiding", "semi-law-breaking",
"serious law-breaking" and "completely law-breaking" encompassed
a sliding scale of culpability, which was to a.large extent
based on (a) the amount-of money involved, and (b) Mao's principles
of Ci) leniency for past mistakes, severity for present and future
mistakes, (ii) leniency for the majority and severity for the
minority, (iii) leniency for industrialists, severity for merchants,
50
(iv) leniency for ordinary merchants, severity for speculators.
These distinctions seemed to be related to a loosely defined 
definition of morality and to hie necessities of "people’s finance" 
rather than to "class", as determined by a relation to a particular 
mode of production.
Po I-po later estimated hi at 450,000 private firms in nine 
major cities had been investigated. 18,000 firms had fallen into 
the "seriously law-breaking" category, while another 4,500 had 
fallen into the fifth category of "completely law-breaking". In 
these last two categories, one might expect to find substantial 
evidence of corruption; however, the other categories, which 
included the overwhelming majority of firms investigated, are more 
problematical, especially as the fine line between the exchange.of 
business courtesies and "corruption" was, at times, so fine as to 
be imperceptible.
50. See Mao's March 23rd 1952, directive in SW, Vol.V, Peking,
1977, p.55. The reference here is to "Standards and Measures 
Set by Peking Municipal People's Government For Dealing with 
Industrial and Commercial Establishments Classified into 
Various Categories in the Five-Anti Movement", CB, No.168, 
March 26th 1952.
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In January 1952, Kao Kang instructed that all cities were 
immediately to convene people’s representative conferences to 
press forward with the movement for confessions, and at the 
conclusion of this campaign, federations of commerce and industry 
were to be responsible for the organizing of commercial and 
industrial circles by trade to sign and commit themselves to 
patriotic compacts. One might add parenthetically, that this is 
a good example of a mass campaign which, although waged in a* 
relatively unstructured context resulted in greater organizational 
consolidation and political control. In the final stage of the 
wu-fan movement, in April and May 1952, preparations were made at 
the national level for the creation of a Federation of Industry 
and Commerce.
While "wu-fan" was viewed as a counter-attack against an 
offensive by the bourgeoisie, it was not a movement calculated 
to destroy the bourgeoisie as a class in the way that agrarian 
reform had been prosecuted for the purpose of eliminating the 
landlord class in the countryside.
Apparently during the campaign, some cadres did misinterpret
the basic intent of "restrict, utilize and reform" to mean the
stamping out of the class ideology of the national bourgeoisie, Ihis
view was at times even expressed in the newspapers, but it was
51
sharply repudiated by the Party. The Party also ivarned its cadres
51. For example, see Cheng Hui’s article, "On the Question of 
Standards for Ideological Reform", which appeared in the 
August 1st 1952, issue of Hsueh-hsi. Cheng specifically 
criticized Fan Hsing-chih’s article, "Refuting Absurd Speeches 
of the Bourgeois Class", which had appeared in CCJP, March 13th 
1952. Fan had mistakenly advanced the view that the bourgeoisie 
were expected to remould their ideological system by means of 
Marxism-Leninism and the teaching of Mao Tse-tung. Cheng also 
criticized the March issue of Hsin-min wan-pao, (Shanghai), for 
suggesting that the bourgeoisie had to adopt working class 
attitudes and abandon profit-seeking altogether. Generally, 
Cheng.argued that the Party’s line towards the bourgeoisie, 
namely, "restriction, utilization and reform", was consistent 
with the precepts of the Common Programme, and that any talk 
of eliminating the class ideology of the bourgeoisie was 
premature and erroneous. Cheng’s article is translated in 
SCMP, No.402, August 26th 1952, pp.24-27.
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against the impossibility of using the qualifications for CCP
membership as a yardstick with which to measure -the ideological
52
standards of - government cadres generally.
During the campaign, the ec on cany .inspection committee played 
the role of ihe agrarian reform committee as the operational head­
quarters, co-ordinating popular organization with formal state 
structure. Initially, the committees mobilized workers and shop 
assistants to make denunciations and thus furnish headquarters 
with relevant data. The committees -then sponsored training classes 
to educate large numbers of workers and shop assistants, who were 
grouped into work corps. These work corps penetrated -the shops 
and factories. Merchants and industrialists were crudely 
distinguished by the amounts of yuan which they had allegedly 
grafted. The trade unions, while important, did not figure as 
large in -the development - of the Five-Antis Campaign as did the 
peasant associations in the countryside, as the notation of "class'* 
was soft-pedalled. As soon as the campaign was initiated in 
Shanghai, for example, the Shanghai Economic Inspection Committee 
raised the slogan, "No delay in both 5-Anvti Campaign and Production",
and during the first stages of the campaign, the committee
53
insisted that normal production.be maintained.
In agrarian reform hie Party.had attempted to balance ihe need 
for order with the need to generate consciousness, hence fang-shou 
(bold mobilization) was stressed, but it was stressed in the 
context of proper leadership. In the Five-Antis Campaign the 
Party similarly stressed full mobilization with close control. In 
agrarian reform the coming together of political perspective,
52. SCMP, No.402, p<27.
53. CB, No.201, August 12th 1952, p.23, from NCNA, Shanghai, 
June 7th 1952.
54. For example see comment on the campaign in Shanghai and 
Canton in CB, No.201, August 12th 1952, p.24, from NCNA, 
Shanghai, June 7th 1952, and p.28 from NFJP, June 28th 1952.
32$
based on "political integration" as die conscious assimilation 
of ideology, with temporal limitations, imposed in accord with 
production necessities, no doubt encouraged premature "leaping 
from points to surface". After the crucial linking of points 
to surface in the first quarter of 1951 the CCP reverted to
55
spring planting as the "centre of work", and the "Ten Policies" 
were set forth in a bid to stimulate production. In the cities in 
the spring of 1952, the rigours of rectification were quickly 
followed by commercial and industrial readjustments to revive the 
depressed private economy. The CCP was particularly anxious to 
lure private commerce back into ihe countryside in order to 
alleviate the disruption of urban-rural trade interflow.
Tbng Tlsu-hui, in a summing-up to a higher level cadre
conference, convened by the CSB of the CCPCC in late January 1952,
noted that san-fan had had to be broadened into wu-fan in order to
deal effectively with cadres hit by sugar bullets. While Tfeng
affirmed that the CSB was not making the slightest change in policy
towards the bourgeoisie, he was concerned to protect ihe interests
of law-abiding industrialists and merchants. Teng outlined six
points, relating to the treatment of cases, which had emerged in
the five-antis struggle. There was to be no penalty for those who
presented a small gift as a matter of general business practice, and
those who had presented large sums of money and gifts were to be on
56
condition that they make a thorough confession.
55. These points represent what Kao Kang would have referred to as 
"rightist deviation" in the countryside. While the "Tfen Points" 
supported mutual aid, the main emphasis was on the encouragement 
of peasant initiative in production. The hiring of labour was 
allowed and perhaps even encouraged, as was the voluntary borrowing 
and lending of money. The peasantfs freedom to market his native 
products was guaranteed, and the general principle of "Ye shall sow 
what ye reap" was upheld. For the ECMAC "Ten Points" of February 
2nd 1951, refer to HTCCCTC, ■ Vol.2, pp.11 -1140. The CSMAC
"Ten Points" of March 17th are essentially the same as those of the 
ECMAC, and are available in HHYP, Vol.3, No.6, April 1951, pp.1315-16.
56. SCMP, Noo272, p.19, NCNA, Hankow, February 3rd 1952.
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In March 1952. the GAC placed a moratorium on -the 
development of -the campaign in towns below the hsien level in 
order to protect spring sowing, and on June 13th, -the GAC 
called for "sternness in struggle, magnanimity in the disposal 
of cases".
During the months of June and July 1952, when the movement 
entered its final stage, there was increasing emphasis on enlivening 
the economy and developing production. Such an emphasis was, of 
course, qualified as the leadership did not want to sabotage the 
political aims of -the movement, and both cadres who approached the 
disposal of cases with too much magnanimity, as well as those who 
demonstrated too little sternness, were admonished. On the other 
hand, the June directive of the GAC, covering different questions 
arising during the conclusion of the campaign, heavily criticized 
leftist cadres for 1heir reluctance to "rationally lower the 
relatively excessively computed amounts of industrialists* and’ 
merchants* ill-gotten income". The directive admitted:
"During the 5-anti campaign, owing to longer retro­
active period, higher conversion rates, broader scope of 
computation, different standards used and other reasons, 
the computation of industrialists* and merchants* ill- 
gotten income in some cases has been too high and too 
broad."57
The policy of "restriction, utilization and reform", (i.e. 
of private capital) was no doubt motivated in part by a desire to 
bring the private economic sector more closely within the purview 
of state economic planning in preparation for the dawning of the 
new era of large-scale capital construction. Heavy fines, imposed 
on private enterprise during the campaign, were often met by the 
offer of shares to the government in liau of payment of fines, so 
that many private enterprises emerged at the end of the campaign 
as joint public-private enterprises.
Generally the strategy of the key-point implied a qualified 
degree of decentralization, and indeed this strategy was the natural 
extension of Mao*s idea of combining the general with -the particular
57. Translated in CBj> No.201, August 12th 1952, pp.4-5.
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in the total process of policy formulation and implementation.
'The mass line, furthermore, implies an emphasis on democracy as 
well as decentralization. In terms of agrarian reform, the mass 
line was activated within the context of a dual strueture and the 
co-ordination of popular organization of social forces with formal 
legal structure.
Ihe operational headquarters at the GAR level was fitted nicely 
into this general structural context. The GAR governments possessed 
a dual legal personality as (a) agent of the GAR, and (b) the highest 
local state authority, hence in theory and to a certain extent in 
practice, the structural emphases of this administration offered 
flexibility, which was appropriate in the prevailing context of 
tremendous regional differences in the pattern of political 
integration, yet at the same time was consistent with the need to 
insure "leadership" (ling-tao)^over lower.levels of administration; 
and this was particularly the case in instances where "free 
mobilization" (fang-shou) had to be balanced with proper leadership 
and also where the psychological barrier, or resistance to criticism 
in rectification, necessitated a stronger expression of vertical 
leadership.
In the course of the ‘Three Seasons rectification, the Party 
related theory to the concrete practices and policies of agrarian 
reform and a large-scale training programme was initiated to raise 
the policy-level and political consciousness of the cadre population, 
but the weight of this campaign fell mainly at the hsien level, and a 
great many deviations and the widespread phenomenon of impurity of 
the ranks apparently marred the progress of agrarian reform under 
the cadres at the chTu level.
Having wages agrarian reform, the Three- and Five-Antis 
Campaigns, the CCP was more confident to expand Party organization, 
and the June 1950 moratorium on recruitment .in the "newly liberated 
areas" was lifted. After these campaigns, -there was a greater 
concern to further localization. In the summer of 1952, the regional 
bureaux arranged for study programmes in their respective regions, 
and the directors of the Organization Departments of the several
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bureaux met to map out a strategy for Party recruitment. Pressure 
was applied on hsien Party committees to create sub-hsien 
organization, capable of independent management.
Political integration is, of course, an.ongoing concern, and 
hence it is difficult to judge the net effect of the campaigns 
under discussion in terms of political integration as the 
assimilation of ideology and in terms of the relation between the 
mass line and leadership. It is obvious that new organization was 
strengthened, but we cannot overestimate the problems of deviations, 
which occurred at the basic levels. Agrarian reform reinvestigation 
documentation in particular revealed the extent of error and 
deviation. T*ao ChuTs lament, "...we-have gone astray so much...", 
undoubtedly bears repeating. One must ask whether a ''preliminary 
understanding" of policy was adequate to the circumstances of the 
"newly liberated areas". Given the tremendous problems of 
administrative distance, it was only too easy to "leap" and disrupt 
the timed relation between "basic" and "outlying villages". One
might also consider the efficacy of the short-course training,
58
which was vital to the application of the mass line.
58. On occasion the CCP has itself stressed that "shock"rteducation 
was not enough to consolidate basic-level organization. The 
following comment in a NCB directive of December 1953 draws out 
this point particularly well: "However this kind of education
[" i.e. short-course training in campaigns 1 is only good for the 
purpose of making shock attacks. If not followed up with 
regular education, the achievement it brings cannot be consolidated 
and made to last. ...During the winter of 1951 when North China 
carried out localized Party reorganization, many places relaxed 
their regular education of Party branch members. As a result 
problems occurred again only a few months after reorganization....'1 
See SCMP, No.710, December 17th 1953, pp.19-21, from NCNA, Peking, 
December 3rd 1953. The programme launched in May 1952, to build 
up hsiang Party branches, encountered many problems and these have 
been dealt with in a highly subjective, but nonetheless, interesting 
fashion by Fang Shu, who has brought together a great deal of the 
newspaper comment on these problems. Fang Shu, Campaign of Party- 
Expansion of the Chinese Communist Party in 1952, (Communist China 
Problem Research Series, Hong Kong, 1953).
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The level of political integration achieved must be 
judged in relative rather than absolute terms. Firm basic 
level organization had yet to be achieved, but relative to 
the situation of October 1st 1949, the CCP had marched a long 
way. The vast "newly liberated areas" were consolidated and 
the Party was preparing to enter the new era of capital 
construction. And something of great historical import was 
achieved —  a nation-state was created in the Middle Kingdom.
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VI
CONCLUSION
The pattern of national political integration was 
characterized by the transposition of a philosophy of 
administration, which had emerged as a response to conditions 
of political disintegration in the late Kiangsi and Yenan periods 
to the plane of national political development. Central to this 
philosophy was a dialectic of aspects of flexibility and discipline. 
This dialectic influenced the structuring and functioning of all 
Communist systems of organization. It was manifest in the notion 
of "unified Party leadership". The structuring of military 
organization was based on the principle, "centralized strategic 
command and decentralized command in campaigns and battles". Further 
more, the dialectical inter-relation of "centralized leadership" 
and "decentralized management" was explicit in the economic 
organization of the Yenan period.
This philosophy was inclusive of explicit emphases on (a) the 
inter-relation of horizontal and vertical components of organization, 
and (b) a division of labour between general systems of army, Party 
and state. Under "unified Party leadership", there was not only an 
emphasis on the unity of command, but also an emphasis on the 
horizontal co-ordination of these systems. This co-ordination was 
furthermore consistent with the mass line, which encompassed a 
structural inter-relation between formal organization and the popular 
organization of social forces.
"Unified Party leadership" meant the primacy of the Party, but i 
also incorporated a division of labour. In 1942, "unified Party 
leadership" was stressed in reaction to the earlier separation of 
Party and state during the first stage of the second united front. 
Under the new circumstances of 1941-42 border region contraction, 
there was a greater emphasis on mutual inter-relation (and not the 
mutual integration) of systems.
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In the early 1940’s, Mao argued that the dispersion of natural 
resources and the difficulties of border region communications in 
a time of guerilla warfare necessitated a decentralized response to 
problems of disintegration. In particular, Mao emphasized 
"decentralized management" in relation to small industrial enterprise. 
Mao also urged that agriculture be based on "adopt different methods 
according to different regions". Decentralization was consistent 
with the emphasis on self-reliance and was explicit in both the mass 
line and united front. Mass mobilization was organized in a 
decentralized context. In structural terms, the total sum of these 
emphases was "dual rule", based on a dialectic of aspects of 
flexibility and discipline.
This sum was explicit in the organic and constitutional 
arrangements of 1949. These arrangements highlighted a division of 
labour, based on inter-system co-ordination; these arrangements did 
not reflect a vertical conception of organization, based on the 
discrete separation of government functions as well as the discrete 
separation of general systems. One must take into account the 
organizational emphases of the early 1940’s in relation to the CCP’s 
understanding of "one-man management" in the early 1950’s. As the 
mass line was progressively related to production in the Northeast, 
these emphases were reasserted. In the context of the Factory 53 
emulation campaign, for example, the relation between Party and state 
in enterprise was described in terms of a division of labour within 
the over-all context "unified Party leadership".
An appreciation of Maoist epistemology is crucial to our 
understanding of the transposition of border region experience to 
the plane of nationwide political integration. A trilateral inter­
relation was explicit in the CCP's epistemological emphasis on the 
unity of theory and practice. This inter-relation was explicit in 
the combining of general calls with specific guidance. The CCP’s 
approach to administrative demarcation also reflected this inter­
relation. In large geographical terms, there was the calculated
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inter-relation of "old",,"semi-old" and "newly liberated areas".
This kind of geographical inter-relation later assumed significance 
in terms of the CCPTs approach to economic development. The 
demarcation of "co-ordinated economic regions" was not a division 
based on the absolutes of natural economy; it reflected the concern 
to inter-relate advanced, intermediate and backward economies. It 
was the same perspective which on another level sustained the inter­
relation of large, medium and small enterprise.
At the heart of these trilateral inter-relations was the 
epistemology, explicit in the mass line. Activists were to be 
inter-related with intermediate and backward elements, not only in 
the course of rectification, but in the combining of general calls 
with specific guidance in all work. The structuring of mass campaigns 
reflected an attempt to strengthen organization through the union of 
theory and practice. This union was fundamental to the processes of 
cadre training and education. In agrarian reform, for example, one 
sees the inter-relation in terms of the momentum of the campaign as 
advanced elements "pulled" forward backward elements. Backward 
"outlying villages" were caught up in the momentum of "base villages". 
The same trilateral inter-relation has persisted in the mass campaigns 
of the 1950’s and 1960Ts, thus in the Great Leap Forward there was 
the "three-in-one" (san-chieh ho) combination, which brought together 
in an education experience leading cadres, experts and the masses.
This was to be the key to the technological revolution in China, 
Similarly in the Cultural Revolution the "three-in-one" combination 
assumed a new connotation as veteran Party cadres were inter-related 
with representatives of revolutionary mass organization and the 
representatives of the PLA in the process of consolidating political 
organization. The constituent elements changed over the years, but 
the strategic inter-relation of advanced, intermediate and backward 
remained constant. This inter-relation was essential to the 
education experience explicit in the process of political integration, 
and it was also essential to the induction of activists and the 
recruiting of virtue and talent necessary to Party life and the health 
of organization.
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The transposition of experience from the 1940Ts to the 
1950’s is particularly relevant to our discussion of the pattern 
of national political integration and the role played by the 
Greater Administrative Region therein. The early 1950’s cannot 
be case in exclusive terms of the emulation of the "Soviet Model(s)". 
There is a tendency in Western historiography to skip the 
development of organization in the period of economic restoration.
It should be stressed that it took years to assimilate the "Soviet 
model" and then again this assimilation reflected earlier organizational 
concerns. In the early 1950’s Stalin was cited in defence of 
decentralization! The experience of the 1940’s was not simply erased 
from the consciousness of the Chinese leadership.
The philosophy of administration, which we have discussed, was 
reflected throughout the government structure of the early 1950's.
The importance of combining "national unity" and "local expediency" 
was underlined in the Common Programme. Government structure revealed 
an emphasis on inter-system co-ordination through committee structures. 
Earlier perspective on the importance of this co-ordination was not 
abandoned in favour of the creation of discrete vertical systems.
And the relation of ling-tao to chih-tao was consistent with this 
perspective on the importance of committee structures.
In the early 1950’s the style of government was government by 
conference. The conference system represented a practical 
manifestation of the education process and leadership method, explicit 
in the mass line. The creation of a three-tiered conference system to 
promote the interflow of urban-rural trade, for example, was consistent
1. Franz Schurmann has argued that the early 1950’s were characterized 
by a high degree of centralization and emulation of the "Soviet 
model"; for example, he has written: "The Chinese Communists
entered the cities not knowing how they would govern, beyond the 
conviction that it had to be through total organization. Their 
initial effort was to introduce the apparatus of Soviet-type 
organization into China". See p . 14 of Professor Schurmann's 
Ideology and Organization in Communist China, 2nd edition, and for 
further comment refer to pp. 166, 213 and 300.
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with muss line emphases. Through this conference system a forum 
was established, facilitating the inter-relation of private 
commerce, supply and marketing co-operatives, and state trading 
organization. It was hoped that cadres would gain knowledge of 
locaLmarket conditions and that there would be a maximization of 
"local expediency" within the conference context.
While the articulated strategy for political integration 
reflected a dialectic of flexibility and discipline, the actual 
realities of the union of theory and practice did not always sustain 
this dialectic. The pattern of centralization differed in different 
temporal and spatial settings. In 1950 fiscal centralization violated 
"local expediency", and there was even an attempt to establish 
vertically discrete economic systems at the expense of "unified 
Party leadership". This attempt, however, was heavily criticized 
and did not reflect a general pattern. In the sphere of trade 
interflow, we have noted that while GAR leadership emphasized united 
front postures and mass line techniques within the conference system, 
there was an undeclared tendency on the part of state trading 
organization towards over-centralization and away from "local 
expediency". The structure of government was, nonetheless, "dual" 
and the policy was "centralized leadership and divided responsibilities". 
However, in actual practice one can detect competing organizational 
emphases.
The policies of 1951-52 particularly represent an expression of 
the philosophy of administration which had emerged in the border 
regions of North China. The GAC decisions of March 29th and May 4th 
1951, were based on Chou En-lai's principle, "centralized leadership 
and divided responsibilities". As we have seen, Chou engineered a 
decentralization of economic and financial work in 1951. Greater tax- 
sharing between centre and regions was one of the results. The 
thrust of the strategy of 1951 was to maximize "local expediency" 
while the centre concentrated its resources on above-norm projects, 
which mainly involved new heavy industrial construction, financed by 
Russian credits. This strategy reflected an earlier division of 
labour, explicit in Mao’s discussion of large and small industrial 
enterprise in "Economic and Financial Problems",
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The March 30th decision on municipal finance called upon the 
municipalities to move away from a preoccupation with defraying 
expenditure towards construction finance, based on local resources.
The 1951 decisions also called for greater political control at the 
regional level. The call went out to "face the villages" and the 
four points, relating to capital construction in 1951, anticipated 
the inter-relation of large, medium and small, explicit in the 
industrial strategy of the Great Leap Forward. Self-reliance 
assumed special significance in relation to financial policy.
There was renewed emphasis on "from economics to finance" in reaction 
to the over-centralization of 1950. The slogan, "crack troops and 
simple administration" was exploited in a campaign to increase 
production. "Production on all fronts" re-emphasized policies which 
had been worked out in relation to the development of new democracy 
in the 1940Ts, and the relation of the mass line to production became 
explicit in the slogan, "better, faster and more economical".
In 1951, centralized government, as it was understood by the CCP 
leadership, was government which incorporated an earlier dialectic 
of aspects of flexibility and discipline. This dialectic was manifest 
in a strategy which freed the centre to concentrate on over-all 
arrangements, but which at the same time furthered the capitalization 
of "local expediency". A division of labour was believed necessary 
to the centre's ability to formulate general policy, and top-heavy 
central government was believed inconsistent with centralization.
The GARs played a significant role in the pattern of national 
political integration in the early 1950's. This administrative level 
facilitated a centralized uniformity of policy implementation, but 
also acted in terms of the dialectic of flexibility and discipline.
The structure and functioning of this level was greatly affected by 
the historical inter-relation of armed struggle with social revolution, 
the creation of a democratic representative structure and economic
3,y$
2 . 
reconstruction. The differences in the inter-relation of these
processes in the different regions of China highlighted the
importance of flexibility and "working in accordance with different
conditions".
To a great extent the inter-relation between armed struggle
and social revolution had been achieved in the "old liberated areas"
of North and Northeast China. In the Northeast in 1949 a new
"centre of work" was already an established reality, and the unified
planning of capital construction was initiated on a regionwide basis.
In the Central-South, East China, Northwest and Southwest China, GAR
authorities focused on mopping-up operations, the re-establishment of
social order, the elimination of "so-called guerilla warfare", the
localization of PLA units under unified leadership, and rent
reduction and deposit refund, which acted as the basis for local
social welfare. The inter-relation of the various programmes for
political integration had yet to be achieved in the "newly liberated
areas" south of the Yangtze. In a retrospective comment on the early
1950’s Chou Fang explained the CCP’s strategy for political integration:
"...we created state organs at the level of the Greater Administrative
Region in order to facilitate centralized, unified leadership and by
3
meeting local circumstances, we made headway in our work..."
2. It must be stressed that this inter-relation was fundamental to 
the nature of GAR government. The MACs were not military 
organizations! Elite theory, as it is often misapplied to the 
Chinese political system, tends to disregard the history of 
Communist organization in order to speculate on power struggles 
between the CCP and the PLA. Parris Chang’s statement that in 
1954 the "military administrators in the provinces" handed over 
their responsibilities and "returned to the barracks" is incorrect. 
See Parris Chang, "The Decentralization of Power", Problems of 
Communism, July-August 1972, Vol.21, No.4, p,71.
3. Chou Fang, Wo-kuo kuo-chia chi-lcou, (China’s state structure),
p.81.
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The irter-relation of factors of flexibility and discipline in 
the functioning of the GAR administration varied temporally and 
spatially. Although the structure of this level was "dual" and 
although its constitutional persona as an agency of the GAC and the 
highest local state power was dualistic, in 1950 the horizontal 
aspect of this administration was not particularly conspicuous in 
the unification of economic and financial work. ’’Local expediency" 
in terms of investment in local self-reliance projects, and in terms 
of the marketing of local produce was the casualty of a rigid 
imposition of fiscal discipline on the localities. The precipitous 
draining of local resources in the service of the financing of the 
centre’s budgetary deficits and the strict policy of currency recall 
did nothing to further the principle of "from economics to finance". 
But the GAR authorities did perform valuable services in rectifying 
"prosperity on all fronts" and in the rationalization of local tax 
structures.
This over-centralization of 1950 must be placed in perspective, 
for the integrity of the new national government was at stake. The 
budget had to be balanced for obvious political and economic reasons. 
The centre had to create a firm budgetary system in order to 
eliminate "ko_ tzu-wei cheng" (semi-autonomous government by various 
levels). Once the centre had established a national fiscal super­
structure, which insured the centre's ability to finance co-optation 
and more importantly insured the centre's ability to manage the 
national economy, the CCP leadership opted for a programme of 
decentralization.
This programme involved the devolution of considerable 
responsibility for economic planning to the GAR level, and this 
devolution was rationalized as follows:
"...due to the unbalanced development of the local 
economy in different areas, due to the differences in the 
time of liberation and enforcement of democratic reforms 
in different areas, uniform measures could not be applied 
all over the country, and the Central People’s Government 
accordingly authorized the leadership organs of the 
administrative regions to attend to the task of restoration 
and the development of the economy in keeping with local
conditions, and in fixing priority and attaching 
greater importance to such issues as considered 
proper."4
Thus the GARs assumed planning responsibilities for some of the 
category "B" capital construction projects and most of category 
"C" and "D" projects. In the November 1952, reorganization of 
state administration, the Peking ministries asserted a greater 
degree of vertical control over GAR economic departments, involved 
in capital construction and planning, but in 1953 the GAR level, 
nonetheless, continued to play a role in terms of the registration, 
training and unified distribution of manpower in capital construction. 
Furthermore, GAR departments had attempted to rationalize the 
planning of local industry so as to improve relations between local 
state industry and centrally-directed state industry. In rationalizing 
the unified distribution of technical personnel in 1952-53, GAR 
committees acted against inter-departmental warfare over the 
disposition of such personnel.
In terms of the efficacy of planning, it is not surprising that 
the planning authorities at the CPG and GAR levels often fell 
considerably short of their targets. The timed staging of inter­
level planning often broke down, and planning often lost its guiding 
role to become an after-the-fact collation of statistics. However, 
a degree of financial control was achieved as both central and GAR 
authorities contended with deviations such as "asking for more money 
to do more projects". And the fact that a rudimentary division of 
labour between centre and regions was achieved on the basis of self- 
reliance, was an accomplishment in itself.
The functioning and s tructure of supraprovincial organization 
in the early 1950's revealed a continuing perspective on the mass line 
and the attempt to combine general calls with specific guidance. For, 
example, this perspective was explicit in the strategy of "from 
points to surface", which characterized the development of agrarian
4. JMJP, November 17th 1952, in SCMP, No.455, November 19th 1952, p.3.
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reform in East China and Central-South China in the winter of 1950.
GAR leaders articulated a building-block method of leadership,
whereby experience was gained at selected key-points, summarized
and then applied extensively. Hence Jao Shu-shih described the
development of agrarian reform in the following way: "Each step
in land reform is the integration of previous experience in reform
5
experiments with local conditions".
Despite well-laid plans of GAR agrarian reform authorities, 
indiscriminate "leaping" took place, and the balance between social 
control and mobilization was not always maintained. Preparations 
and training had to be squeezed into the cycle of production, and 
this, in itself, militated against a strategy in which each step 
taken was to be based on the '"integration of previous experience".
The ability to implement policy was limited due to chronic problems 
of administrative distance. In East China, where there was a larger 
"leading factor" and where there was a greater availability of 
leadership facilities, the Party was better able to conduct bold 
mobilization within proper leadership. Undoubtedly, the renewed 
emphasis in November 1950, on class struggle and the developing 
Chinese involvement in Korea, contributed to a psychological climate 
which affected cadre performance and encouraged premature "leaping". 
But supraprovincial leadership was particularly necessary in 
agrarian .reform in terms of the assertion of proper leadership in 
the implementation of a strategy relating "points to surface". The 
centre was too far away from the basic levels to react to concrete 
local conditions, and provincial leadership was weak. If it had not 
been for GAR agrarian reform authorities, there most likely would have 
been chaos, let alone premature "leaping".
Of particular relevance to any discussion of the role of the GARs 
in the pattern of national political integration is a consideration of 
the significance of "regionalism" at the GAR level. William Whitson's 
field army hypothesis suggests a new form of warlordism in terms of
5. Jao Shu-shih, "Experiences in East China Land Reform Experiments 
Summed Up", in SCMP, No.39, December 29-31st 1951, p.43.
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the balancing of power relations between several field army 
elites in post-1949 China. Furthermore, some observation has 
been made, attributing great significance to the charge of 
"independent kingdomism" in the Kao-Jao Affair. Franz Schurmann 
has suggested that there are close parallels between post-1949 and 
pre-1949 centre-region relations, and he has noted: "Power groups
continue to develop in regional governments with regional loyalties 
stronger than their commitment to Peking".^
The charge of "independent kingdomism" in the case of Kao Kang 
assumes significance in terms of Kao’s relation to Mao. This charge 
has been applied almost gratuitously to Liu Shao-ch'i and Lin Piao, 
as well as to Kao. There is obviously reason to doubt the 
objectivity of post-purge rationalizations, and certainly one cannot 
construct a theory of centre-region relations based on the use of 
an epithet.
Did Kao further a Northeast political identity? Did he favour 
the interest of the Northeast at the expense of national interests?
If he did, there is nothing in the March 1955, speeches and 
denunciations which provides us with concrete details of such activity. 
The mainspring of action in the affair was K a o ’s circulation of a 
secret list of Politbureau membership without M a o ’s knowledge. Thus 
Kao was exposed for having entered into an "anti-Party alliance", and 
for having engaged in unprincipled struggle, subversive of Party life 
and collective leadership.
The top GAR leadership was part of the "centre". In 1946 there
was a federalization of the executive as the CCPCC sent part of its
senior membership to the Northeast. The same federalization occurred
7m  1949 in terms of the top leadership of other GARs. The Kao-Jao
6. Franz Schurmann, o p .cit., p.214.
7. Dorothy Solinger has recently described GAR leaders as "political 
middlemen" in her study of administration, Regional Government and 
Political Integration in Southwest China 1949-1954, pp.137-138.
This description would seem more appropriate in the case of second- 
rank MAC leaders, who acted as department heads or ordinary committee 
members. As for the top leadership, all of whom were senior members 
of the Central Committee, these leaders held down important posts at 
the centre, and they were "national" figures before they were assigned 
duties in the several GARs.
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Affair is, thus, described in terms of an intra-centre as opposed 
to a centre-vs-region conflict. It was a problem at the Polit- 
bureau level, and the post-purge allegations that the NEB Disciplinary 
Inspection Committee had failed to make investigations of Kao's 
"anti-Party" activitities, therefore seem largely gratuitous.
The debate among elite theorists as to the nature of power 
relations in China will no doubt continue, but there would seem to 
be some justification to assert in the context of this debate the 
basic viability of the Chinese political system in order to counter­
balance an understanding of the post-1949 context, based on perceptions 
of the nature of pre-1949 warlord politics. The centre vis-k-vis 
the regions has demonstrated an ability to transfer personnel, to 
rectify and dismiss personnel, and to experiment with kinds and 
degrees of decentralization. Contrary to expectations in some 
quarters, the Chinese political system has not disintegrated. On 
the contrary, this political system has demonstrated a remarkable 
capacity to withstand rapid institutional change!
In other political systems "lobbying" (defined in terms of the 
application of pressure by "regional" officials on the "centre" for 
"regional" development) is considered as a healthy instance of 
democracy, whereas in China it is seen as indicative of systemic 
weakness and as a sign of imminent political disintegration. But 
even in China, the development of a regional resource is not 
necessarily seen as being inimical to national economcc development- 
One cannot, therefore, assume that Li Fu-ch'un, when he called in 
1950 for the development of Northeast industry, was acting to further 
a regional interest as opposed to a national interest. Nor can it 
be assumed that Peng Teh-huai argued for greater investment in the 
Northwestern economy because he wanted to create an "independent 
kingdom".
Undoubtedly there have been occasions when the part has acted 
in a fashion inconsistent with the interests of the whole, but the 
problem lies in the interpretation of this inconsistency. Were 
regional interests perceived as being incompatible with national 
interests? Were "regional" loyalties asserted in .^position to
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"commitments" to Peking? The source of inconsistency might well 
lie in part with the centre itself in terms of policy contradictions, 
as was the case in Kiangsi, when the emphasis on strict budgetary 
unification conflicted with emphases on self-reliance and "economics 
through finance". Such inconsistency might not demonstrate so much 
the formation of a regional vested interest, as a problem at the 
centre in terms of internal policy contradictions, or even in terms 
of a failure on the part of central authorities to assert leadership. 
In the Great Leap Forward, for example, problems in the localities 
were exacerbated to a great degree by the collapse of the central 
planning authority.
The pattern of national political in China has been 
profoundly affected by a continuity in the CCPTs perspectives on 
government communications. In 1951, in the course of explaining the 
rationality sustaining Chou En-lai's "centralized leadership and 
divided responsibilities", the Jen-min j ih-pao asked somewhat 
rhetorically:
"In such a vast country like China where state 
enterprises are scattered, how can the Central 
Government finance and economic departments know 
everything about the ideological state, political 
understanding, working conditions, labour attitude 
of each personnel of an enterprise?"^
The centre could not know; there really had to be a decentralization
in order to further centralization. The emphasis of 1951 was not as
clear in 1954. In 1950, "direct leadership by specialized systems"
had been rejected, but in 1954, the GARs were abolished to make way
for a new centralization, and such "direct leadership" received a
certain degree of official sponsorship. During the September 1956
session of the Eighth Party Congress, there was a reaction to the
over-centralization of 1954-55.
8. "3-Grade Government Financial System Instituted by the GAC to 
Consolidate Centralization of Finance", SCMP No.91, p . 18 
(from JMJP, Peking, April 5th 1951).
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In April 1956, Mao had lectured on the importance of local
initiative. He argued that in order to strengthen the centre’s
"unified leadership" it was necessary to enlarge the powers of the 
9local authorities. In his proposals to the Eighth Party Congress 
on September 16th, Chou En-lai repeated his 1951 argument:
"As the local authorities are in closer contact 
with the primary units of enterprises and public
institutions and with the masses, and enjoy greater
facilities to understand the actual conditions they
will as their jurisdiction is extended, be able to
organize effectively all local forces and positive 
factors for social construction."10
The emphasis was once again on the mobilization of all positive
factors. Chou then advocated "centralized leadership and
administration by the various levels in accordance with local
expediency and the nature of work" (t'ung-i ling-tao, fen-chi kuan-
li, yin-ti chih-i , yin-shih chih-i). He emphasized co-ordination at
the centre in relation to the localities, hence plans and financial
targets were to be issued in a unified way by State Council and not
by the separate ministries. After the the principle of "from
economics to finance", Chou En-lai stressed that finance policy must
insure economic development. During the Great Leap Forward slogan
of the early 1950's "faster, better and more economical" became
"greater, faster, better and more economical". It was in this context
that certain aspects of GAR administration re-emerged. In particular
the demarcation of the seven "co-ordinated economic regions" closely
paralleled the 1949-54 demarcation of the GARs.
In this later period old themes of "unified Party leadership",
"local expediency", "dual leadership", etc., were even more clearly
articulated, but there was a much greater problem in terms of the
unity of theory and practice. The tenets, explicit in "unified Party
9. Mao Tse-tung, "On the Ten Major Relationships", April 25th 1956, 
Peking Review, January 1st 1977, Vol.20, N o .1, p . 16,
10. Chou En-lai, "Report on the Proposals for the Second Five Year Plan 
for Development of the National Economy", September 16th 1956, in 
People's China, Supplement No.21, November 1st 1956, p.21,
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leadership” were more honoured in the breach as the provincial 
Party committees over-centralized in relation to the state. In 
the very act of calling for the further expression of the mass 
line in the linking of general calls with specific guidance, local 
Party committees destroyed the unity of theory and practice. Self- 
reliance was vigorously misapplied. In "Economic and Financial 
Problems", Mao had advocated "act according to local conditions 
and seasons". He urged deep ploughing only where local conditions 
were appropriate. The same theme was reasserted in 1951 and 1956, 
but in 1958 the Commune Party Committees forced deep ploughing in 
thin top soil, thus to insure the "8-Point Charter" and crop failure. 
Communes in well forested areas focused on rice production despite 
climatic disadvantages. Calls for the construction of iron-smelting 
plants were heard in areas where there were no iron deposits. In
short, the great leap became the great paradox! The psychological
pressure to "leap" was so great and the application of "unified 
Party Leadership" so rigid that local levels ignored their own 
specific conditions, violating their own natural economies.
One might note by way of comparison that the dialectic of 
flexibility and discipline was perhaps more of a success in 1951 
than in 1958 due to the existence of an intermediate structure, which 
linked the centre with the provinces. In 1958, the distance between
centre and the provinces was too great, and the emphases of the mass
line did not withstand the buildup of political pressure and 
"subjectivism" (or perhaps psychological anxiety), which led to 
"leaping". During the Great Leap, the centre failed to "lead", and 
there was a greater decentralization under less controlled conditions, 
which resulted in a misguided over-centralization on the part of 
provincial and local Party committees.
At Lushan in 1959, the leadership had to face the painful task 
of summing up. Indeed, there was much soul-searching and wringing 
of hands in self-criticism. Peng Teh-huai was particularly forth­
coming, and in the context of his subsequent purge, it was claimed 
that he had seen the Great Leap Fowards as a total failure as opposed
to a "partial" failure. In his "Letter of Opinion", which was to
become "a rare textbook of negative example", Peng revealed that
the centre had been carried away by "subjectivist" enthusiasm in
the course of "leaping". He observed:
"Our minds swayed by the idea of talcing the lead, we 
forgot the mass line and the style of seeking truth from 
facts, which the Party had formed over a long time. So 
far as our method of thinking was concerned we often 
confused strategic planning with concrete measures, the 
long-term policies with immediate steps, the whole with 
the part and the big with the small c o l l e c t i v e 1
Mao in his turn accepted Peng’s self-characterization as a "rough
fellow", but he absolved K'o C h ’ing-shih of blame and personally
accepted responsibility for the setting of impossibly high targets
for the smelting of iron. It was one of the ironies of history that
a man who had spent most of his revolutionary career arguing the
importance of personal study of concrete conditions, should have
violated his own basic and deeply held principle.
Mao was not too hard on local organization. He noted: "The
local organs can be forgiven if for a time they did not concern
themselves with planning.,.", but he could find no excuse for the
. . . 1 2
central planning authorities, who had had ten years experience.
While Mao agreed that there was some truth in the criticism of the 
head of the State Planning Commission, (^i Fu-ch’un) to the effect: 
"His foot wants to move, but he hesitates...", Mao was prepared to 
admit that it was not good to be like the legendary hot-head, Li 
K ’uei. In terms Of a mass campaign there had to be a balance between 
mobilization and leadership. Furthermore, there had to be leadership 
in terms of unified planning, particularly in relation to the co­
ordination of different aspects of an industrial system such as 
resource exploitation, transportation, production and consumption.
11. Peng Teh-huai, "Letter of Opinion", July 14th 1959, in URI,
The Case of Peng Teh-huai 1959-1968, p . 11.
12. Mao Tse-tung, "Speech at the Lushan Conference", July 23rd 19^9, 
in Stuart Schram, etc., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p . 142.
At Lushan everybody agreed that in 1958 there had been no plans 
for the achieving of balances between these different aspects, 
and the wisdom explicit in the following March 20th 1958, statement 
by Mao became apparent to one and all:
"If everyone is trying to surpass everyone else,
the country may be thrown into confusion [kao-te t 1ien- 
hsia ta luan] as a result. ...Every province should 
not follow the same wind, as though when they say it 
can be done in one year in Honan, everyone should do 
it in one year...."13
In the course of the campaign the psychology of "leaping" had 
militated against the carefully timed inter-relation of advanced, 
intermediate and backward.
In the context of the aftermath of the Great Leap, the "co­
ordinated economic region" also came in for criticism in terms of
the "subjectivism", which had infected leadership at both the 
centre and the local levels. In reaction to the collapse of 
central planning and the failure to balance comprehensively the 
different aspects of state enterprise, there was in 1959 a renewed 
emphasis on the uneven development of the economy and hence on the 
need to assert leadership in the determination of a system of 
priorities. During the Leap the division of labour, whereby the 
centre concentrated its resources on selected key industrial projects, 
while localities seconded the centre's efforts by developing local 
self-reliance projects, broke down. The State Planning Committee 
lost its initiative to co-ordinate over-all arrangements. In this 
context Ch'en Yun criticized that national economic development must 
come first. He argued that self-reliance cannot be taken at the 
expense of co-ordination, and it was his view that a complex 
industrial system could not be built exclusively on a regional b asis.^
13. Mao Tse-tung, "Talks at the Chengtu Conference", March 20th 1958, 
in Stuart Schram, ec., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed, p . 104.
14. C h ’en Yun, "Some Immediate Problems Concerning Capital Construction 
Operations", from Hung-ch’i , No.5, March 17th 1959, translated in 
JPRS, 708-D/CSD; 2794-D, p.4.
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One notes with considerable interest that Vice-Premier
Yu Chiu-li’s recent comments at the National Conference on
Learning from Taching in Industry, seems to have taken the
experience of the Greap Leap, as well as C h Ten Yun's criticisms,
into consideration. Yu stressed that it is necessary first to
build a nationwide, independent and relatively comprehensive industrial
and economic system, and only then turn to the building of six
economic systems, which, he points out, were to "function self-
• • 1 5reliantly", but were also to "work in close co-ordination".
In the wake of the "partial" failure of the Great Leap, the
theme, "the whole country as a single chessboard" received great
publicity. There was, as has been indicated, a greater emphasis on
over-all arrangements and the establishing of priorities, but the
concept of a division of labour was reasserted in the context of
this emphasis. The Jen-min jih-pao, for example, called for "the
combination of a high degree of democracy with a high degree of
centralism, and the practice of exercising centralized control 011
the one hand and transferring authority to lower levels on the 
16
other". K ’o Ch'ing-shih similarly reaffirmed "centralized
leadership and management by different levels" in the context of his
17discussion of taking "the whole country as a single chessboard".
There was also greater emphasis on "unified Party leadership", and 
in the context of the assertion of the Party’s line of taking
15. In his speech Yu noted six major regions, namely, the northeast, 
north, east, northwest, southwest and central-south, Hence South 
China ha& once again been related to Central China. See Yu Chiu-1i, 
"Mobilize the Whole Party and the Nation's Working Class and 
Strive to Build Taching-Type Enterprises Throughout the Country"
May 4th 1977, Peking Review, Vol.20, No.22, May 27th 1977, p . 17.
16. "Take the Whole Country as a Coordinated Chess Game", JMJP,
February 24th 1954, translated in SCMP, No.1970, March 11th 1959, p.3.
17. K ’o Ch'ing-shih !>Lun 'chuan-kuo i-pan ch'i", (On "the whole country 
is like a single chessboard), Hung-ch’i , Vol.IV, 1959, p.9.
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"agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading
factor" the six regional Party bureaux, which had been abolished
subsequent to the 1954 administrative reorganization were reinstated
in order to facilitate the CCPCC’s leadership over the provincial 
18
Party committees.
With the Great Leap Forward behind him, Mao returned to the 
lessons of the 1940's and crystallized his thinking on problems of 
organization. Just as yin is explicit in yang, so decentralization 
is explicit in Mao's concept of centralization. The "centralization 
of correct ideas" was, of course, crucial to "unified Party leader­
ship", upon which depended the viability and integrity of the 
political system as a whole. But there is explicit in emphases on 
the division of labour and devolution of administrative responsibilities
a clear recognition of the significance of the democratic aspect of
democratic centralism. Mao summarized all past experience on this 
point, when he observed in January 30th 1962:
"Without democracy, you have no understanding of what 
is happening down below; the situation will be unclear- 
you will be unable to collect sufficient opinions from
all sides; there can be no communication between top and
bottom; top-level organs of leadership will depend on 
one-sided and incorrect material to decide issues, thus 
you will find it difficult to avoid being subjectivist; 
it will be impossible to achieve unity of understanding 
and unity of action, and impossible to achieve true
centralism........ If we fail to promote democracy in
full measure, then will this centralism and this 
unification be true or false?"19
It is not surprising that decentralization is viewed as 
necessary to centralization, as this inter-relation was characteristic 
of the pattern of political integration established in the 1940's.
18. See Ahn Byung-joon, "Adjustments in the Great Leap Forward and 
Their Legacy: Divergence of Ideology and Practice...",
Conference on Ideology and Politics in Contemporary China,
Santa Fe, New Mexico, 1971, p . 10.
19. See Mao Tse~tung, "Talk at an Enlarged Central Work Conference", 
January 30th 1962, in Stuart Schram, etc., Mao Tse-tung Unrehearsed 
p . 164 and refer to Professor Schram's comments on p . 12.
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The pattern was determined in a period of extreme political 
disintegration and was later applied on the plane of national 
political development in the 1950’s., Indeed, this relation of 
decentralization to centralization is the key to our understanding 
of the role played by the Greater Administrative Regions in the 
processes of national political integration.
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF NORTHEAST PERSONNEL KNOWN TO HAVE TRANSFERRED 
TO IMPORTANT POSTS IN NATIONAL STATE ADMINISTRATION
NAME OF MEMBER 
OF NEPG/AC
POSITION DATE OF TRANSFER
Wang Kuang-wei 
Chu Li-chih
Tung ChTun~tsfai 
Wang I-fu 
Wang Chih-hsiang 
Ku Chuo-hsin 
Ni Wei
Wang Hsueh-ming 
Wang Hsing-jang 
Chang Hua-tung 
Wang Hao-shou 
Li Tung 
An Chih-wen 
Wei Chen-wu
Assistant Secretary, State 
Planning Council
Director of Supplies 
Distribution Bureau, GAC 
Economic and Finance 
Committee
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Education
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Internal Affairs
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Public Security
Vice-Chairman, State 
Planning Council
Member, State Planning 
Council
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Finance
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Trade
Director, Bureau of Imports, 
Ministry of Foreign Trade
Minister, Ministry of Heavy 
Industry
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Heavy Industry
Vice-Chairman, Committee of 
Capital Construction
Director of CPG Bureau of 
Northeast State Farms
October 1953 
August 1952
June 1953 
November 1952 
October 1954 
November 1954
November 1954 
November 1954 
August 1952 
1953
August 1952 
August 1952 
November 1954 
October 1954
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NAME OF MEMBER 
OF NEPG/AC
Pai Hsi-ch'ing 
Li Fu-ch'un
Lin Feng 
Liu Chih-ming 
Chu Ch?i-wan
Liu Ya-hsiung 
Yu Kuang-sheng
Yen Ku-lising
Liu Ming-fu 
Ying Wen-t*ao
POSITION
Deputy Director of CPG 
Academy of Health Research
Minister, Ministry of Heavy 
Industry; Member State 
Planning Council; 
Vice-Premier of State 
Council; Chairman of State 
Planning Council
Director of 2nd General 
Office of the State Council
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Culture
Vice-Chairman of GAC 
Committee of Political and 
Legal Affairs; Deputy 
Director, 1st General Office 
State Council
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Labour
Special Commissioner of 
Ministry of Railways, 
resident in the Northeast; 
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Railways
Vice-Chairman, All-China 
Sales and Supply Co­
operatives
Member, State Planning 
Council
Deputy Minister, Ministry 
of Forestry
DATE OF TRANSFER
November 1955
October 1949 
September 1953
September 1954
November 1954 
September 1953 
1953
November 1954 
1952
March 1950 
January 1955 
July 1954
November 1954 
September 1953
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GLOSSARY OF SELECTED CHINESE TERMS RELATING 
TO ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY
chan-ch*u. ( ), war zone
chan-ltieh ti chi-chung chih-hui ho chan-i chan-cheng ti 
fen-san chih-hui ( ^  v3J§ .ys-j tjj ^  ^  ^  Vi. #)C%  
n>L 4'v& ’^1? centralized strategic command the
decentralized command in campaigns and battles.
ch*ang-chang fu-tse chili ( i*- ® ' B'i ),
factory manager responsibility system.
\t 'S
ch*eng-hsiang lien-1 o wei-yuan hui C T-^ ^ 4  H  ),
City-Country Liaison Committee.
ch*eng-pen ho-suan ( rfi 'VJL, Ay ), cost accounting.
HI.
cheng-t*i ( ^ vf )9 form of government, as distinguished
from kuo-t *i ( l€| )5 form of state.
cheng-ts *e shui-p*ing ( ), policy-level.
cheng-ts*e ssu-hsiang ( y’4-- $  £ §  ), policy thought.
cheng-wu yuan C ), Government Administration
Counc il.
chi-chung ling-tao f en-pieh ching-ying ( ^  ^  ^  ^  -^ '1
PjL centralized leadership and separate management.
chia-sheng fan C ik. ), half-cooked rice.
chi-lu chien-ch * a wei-yUan hui ( nii isl ^  ) ?
discipline inspection committee.
/■fc /Vis ^
chi-t1 i ling-tao ( ^  HS/ w  *J|L- ), collective leadership.
chieh-f ang ch*il ( ^fA b? ), liberated region
chien-ch*a ( Uu ir- )> control, after-the-fact
investigation.
) Z--J
chien-ch * a wei ytian hui ( fen ^  ** )
control committee.
chien-she ts * ai-cheng ( s i  a/L. ^  ^  ^
construction finance.
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chien-tan ti sheng-chan lcuan-tien ( 'r|? Xfc X. J-L -^lYL ) 5
pure production viewpoint.
chien-tu ( ), supervise, before-the-fact control.
chih-shu chi ( XJc ), technical plan.
"V" i ■' Hr. I
ching-chi ho-suan chih ( .4^ ^   ^ )
economic accounting.
ching-pei ch'ii ( jja ), defence area.
ching-ping chien-cheng ( 44} X  ),
crack troops and simple administration.
chf u chih yu-min, yung chih yu-min ( >, lt-|
21 /7/a> &  ) > That which is taken from the people is to be used
for the people. Distinguish from c h ’u-chih yu-yung-chih yu-chi
(s*. ± yr> \t ^ lYi X XYG )
That which is taken from the people use for yourself.
it ♦ 1 -I*-■
ch u-pu she-chi ( A  -1 0 ^ ), preliminary design.
ch1 uan-lcuo i-pan chi1 ( ~~ ^  ) 9
the whole country is a single chessboard.
chun-f a chu-i ( Yf! !'<£) X  &  ) , war lord ism.
chlin-shih lcuan-li wei-yuan hui ( 'Y? ^  Yt 4' %. it ) ,
Military Control Commission
chung-chih ti yeh-wu hsi-t ’ung ling-tao ( X  Ul X  ^  iX 
i|- direct leadership by specialized systems.
chung-hsin kung-tso ( ‘O ’ X  Yf ), centre of work.
Chung-nan chu ( Vji )$| fzj ), Central-South Bureau.
Chung-nan chun~cheng wei-yuan hui ( ^  ir.A 4^ ) t
Central-South Military and Administrative Committee.
f . — --Vi, •£■ v
chung-nan hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui ( <p \ }\ Vl A A  A  H  ® ,
Central-South Administrative Committee
chung-yang j en-min cheng-fu wei-yuan hui ( ^3 A_ (X- A X  
X  ^  If X  Central People’s Government Council.
chung-yang, ching-t *u ( 1Y X  ) , over-emphasizing
foreign and paying little attention to native.
chung-yang chu; chung-yang f en-chu ( 5k. jfj ; cjj- ^  X  YYj ) t
CCPCC Bureau; CCPCC Sub—Bureau.
fang-shou fa-tung c h 1 un-chung ( 4  1ji S i  J. ) >
taking a free hand to mobilize the masses.
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rJ-:
fen-ch’u kuan-li ( *7 17 J\§. ), sub-region
management.
j ^  v j \
fSB. chih-chih ( ' 6  Z_ )} divide and rule.
fen-kung chuan-tse chih-tu ( -'A -1 7  A  A  )
division of specialized responsibilities system.
j > e z, A- :i'
fen-san chu-i ( '-0 7-^ IT. )9 dispersionism.
hao, k'uai, sheng ( 7 ^ ^  ), better, faster and
more economical.
ho-p'_ing t*u-kai C ^ X-i-TC. ), peaceful land reform,
hsi-nan chU ( iHj If] M) ), Southwest Bureau.
X - x, v3-
hsi-nan chlin-cheng wei-yuan hui ( 1^'J )V] Vv- XX., X  \sl vl )
Southwest Military and Administrative Committee
hsi-nan hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui ( r'7 If) 4 7 xf, ■A ^
Southwest Administrative Committee.
hsi-pei chu ( i'£) :1U 7t? ), Northwest Bureau.
it •' _ • &  y
hsi-pei chiin-cheng wei-yiian hui ( ny ;ib #  &£* A- ^  a  ),
Northwest Military and Administrative Committee.
j2.
hsi-pei hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui ( 77 7 7  A 1  77 ^  "<a )
Northwest Administrative Committee„
! A
hsi-t’ung ( )? system.
hsing-cheng ch’u ( 7 A i££- \la ), administrative district.
hsing-cheng lien-ho pan-shih ch ’u ( i’\ 7.X. *77 ^  ^  /*- )f
Joint Office of Administrative Affairs.
hsing-cheng tu-ch1 a ch*u ( A \  7*7, 7Jr vS ^
administrative inspectorate under the KMT. The same as the CCP’s 
chu an-yuan c h ’u ( §  ft Q« ), special district, or fen-ch’ii
( 7s tX ), sub-region, which was inclusive of several hsien.
hsing-shih chu-i ( 7 7  -rX  -x - ), formalism.
hua-nan fen-chu ( '7- >7 " A 7/ ), South China Sub-Bureau.
hua-tung chu ( If A  }7? ), East China Bureau.
3 Jtb B
hua-tung ch*# ch^eng-hsiang wu-tzu chiao-liu ta-hui (
(5 '#? \{[ ) j East China Conference
of Urban-Rural Trade interflow.
v_~>   ‘y 'j f'~
hua-tung chlin-cheng wei-ylian hui ( ^  ^  * ),
East China Military and Administrative Committee.
{- o
** ✓ 't, y' —  T  i • • - vi? 'Xy
hua-tung hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui ( ^  5*- - - ),
East China Administrative Committee.
i-fen ch*ien i-chih ch*iang tou chi-chung le ( ™  'jf'
" ^  ^  ^  %• ^  ^ centralize every last penny and gun.
i-k * ao ku-pfin, t "uan-chien chung-nung» chung-li fu-nung hsiao-mien
tju^iw ( i f !  A. - f , H T T s  >h S , *  '$  $ . ,
3:... ), depend on the poor peasants and hired labourers, 
ally with middle peasants, counter-balance rich peasants and 
eliminate the landlords.
i_ ko-chung pu-t *ung tl-ch*u erh ts,ai-ch*u pu-t * ung f ang-fa
( i  7  W  T ®  i5 I'i'J ' f t ;£ ),
adopt different methods according to different regions.
,1 en-cheng ( .drft. )» benevolent government.
jen-min f a-t' ing, jen-min fa-yuan ( / \  ft , J k . ft. ?£ ,
peoplefs tribunals, peoplefs courts.
kao-chia ssu-hsiang ( v3] . 3ft ), high-price thought.
kao-i»chi ti ti-fang cheng-chTuan chi-kuan ( va? *^1
m  111 1949-52, Great Administrative
Region government was described as the "highest level of local 
state power".
ko tzu-wei cheng ( ), semi-autonomous
administration by various levels.
i »  »
kuan-lcuan hu-hsiang ( S pi ^ ~k_ ), off icials protecting
officials.
kung-ch*en chu-i ( .-L^ l ), meritism .
kung-kei ssu-hsiang ( t s  fe'o'* '§/ )j supply thought.
kuo-chia li-fa ch*uan ( i|^  if ~>lt\ ), state
legislative power.
1 a-kuo c h Tu ; p 1ai-ch’u lai ( m  j >ft- )j pull in:
sending in.
ling-tao; chih-tao ( *Jf“ ), leadership;
guidance.
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nei-ti mao-i tsu-yu cheng-ts1 e ( tfcX. ^  ) ?
freedom for domestic trade.
nung-min chuan-cheng C Jg|_ ■§ d X  ), peasant
dictatorship.
pai-fa chu-hsing ( Y5} /jji. -r? ) prosperity on
all fronts.
P T ai-ch'u chi-lcuan ( X .  X  iiX ), an agency
which acts only as an extension of central organization in the 
context of "vertical rule".
pao-pan ta-tfi ti tso-feng ( 4 ^ ^3“ v^) ) ,
a work style characterized by a tendency to usurp the role of 
the masses.
pen-wei chu-i ( 5 L  )? departmentalism.
>i i p"
pien-ch*u ( lJL~ liF ), border region.
pu; chu; t'ing C 1 $  , J§> , /ft ), CPG ministry,
or GAR deparment; GAR bureau; provincial office.
san-ko jen ti f an yu wu-ko jen ch * ih ( Hi: ,A-
^32 3£ 1\^1 A , 0/* )9 three people's rice to feed five people.
shih-wu chu-i ( ^  ), routinism.
shuang-chung ling-tao ( '>6. ) dual leadership,
ssu-mien pa-fang chan-sheng ;£  ) f
production on all "Front s', Inclusive of four policies: 
kung-tzu chien-ku; lao-tzu liang-li; ch'eng-hsiang hu-chu; 
nei-wai. chiao-liu ^  ^  > ^  ,
B'/I » ^  tfi'jCsjOii ) 9 consider both public and private; 
mutually benefit capital and labour; mutual assistance between 
countryside and city^ foreign and domestic trade interflow.
sui-ching kung-shu C ^  j||’ ), Office of
Pacification.
__ t V- ^______ __
ta ching-chi hsien-tso ch1!! ( X -  y t'jn 11" ?
co-ordinated economic region.
ta hsing-cheng ch'u ( LtXlsk ), Greater
Administrative Region.
ta-kuei-mo ti chien-she C X  X v i  ), large-
scale capital construction.
tai; t'u.i; t'iao ( ; Jilt. ; ),
leading; pushing; leaping.
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tan-ch*un hui-lung ssu-hsiang ( '3 -'ov 3^1 ■ ) 5
simple currency recall thought.
tang ti ling-tao ti i-yuan-hua ( 'j? ^  —  7ts ),
unification of Party leadership.
tang ti t*ung-i ling-tao C Ik, ^0 ’7S^ * ) t
centralized leadership of the Party.
ti-fang hua ( X!3 ^3 ■''ftli ), localization,
ti-f ang hua ti ko tu-li shih ( AJ At* S'J 'o’ If ) 9
localization of independent divisions.
\ '*1^ *J
ti-fang tang ti i-yiian hua ti ling-tao ( >t£ 7^ VJ| &~)
—  Jti i3“) ), unified leadership of the local
Party committee.
, v -A
ti-pen chu-i ( ^  3L )9 departmentalism.
to chi-tung ( more flexibility.
to pan-shih ( ^  ^  ), more to administer.
tsung ching-chi tao tsfai-cheng ( -i^L %■%- ^  ^  ?
from economics to finance.
t tu-chtan chan-1 an chiao-liu ta-hui ( i-t- ]§L
^  y$j X .  ^ g* )j native product exhibition and interflow
meeting.
v ^  y^ vS.
t fu-chT an hui-i ( ZTZ \g ), native products
conference.
t fui-hsiao t Tu-cht an ti-chih wai-huo ( -©
)> sell native produce and boycott
foreign goods.
t*ung-chih ssu-hsiang ( ^ ‘4 'VS* )? control
thought.
t*ung-i kuan-li, ho t*ung-i ling-tao C ' ‘'ip
n4L> —  Xll centralized control and centralized leadership.
t*ung-i ling-tao. fen-chi fu-tse ( tx&s -^pL
ii ), centralized leadership and divided responsibilities.
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t*ung-i ling-tao. fen-chi, kuan-li, yin-ti chih-i, yin-shih
( MT-- 'T&, &&Tlr ?n, ©
)> centralized leadership and administration by tfre 
various levels in accordance with local expediency and the 
nature of work.
t*ung-i ling-tao. f en-san chin guying C ‘ ^||
vt" W.L ^  ), centralized leadership and
decentralized management.
tung-pei chu ( ^  Jay ), Northeast Bureau.
tung-pei hsing-cheng wei-yuan hui (
Northeast Administrative Committee.
tung-pei .jen-min cheng-fu ( A .  R >  ),
Northeast People's Government.
tzu-li keng-sheng ( H  i  ), self-reliance.
yii-tien tao-mien. tien-mien chih-ho ( I£j ^  >
) from points to surface, linking up points
with surface.
yung ho-fa tou-cheng ( H  ^  ), legal struggle.
